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Foreword
an
he International

War

Naval

Law

Studies "Blue

Book"

College in 1901 to publish

was

series

essays, treatises,

by the

initiated

and

articles that

contribute to the broader understanding of international law. This, the seventy-

volume of the series, consists of papers written for the Naval War College's
Symposium on Computer Network Attack and International Law.
Participants in the Symposium represented a broad range of expertise in the
rapidly developing field of information operations. Included were government ofsixth

ficials,

operational commanders, international law scholars, technical experts, and

military

and

They were brought

civilian lawyers.

together to examine the expand-

ing capabilities created for military planners by the technological revolution that

today permits means and methods of attack beyond the contemplation of warfighters
attack.

of the

past.

Although

tegral part

network

to

its full

—computer network

Symposium focused on one of those
potential

of the way warfare

is

is still

unrealized,

it

will certainly

commander,

when and how

be done,

it

these challenges

may be

Symposium

this

become an

in-

waged. Because of its unique nature, computer

attack presents difficult challenges to the law. Yet, if it

the operational

rounding

This

is

to be useful to

must be addressed and the

used resolved. Although

issues sur-

much work

remains

has that process well underway.

While the opinions expressed in this volume are those of the individual writers
and not necessarily those of the United States Navy or the Naval War College,
their insightful analyses

ment of the law
tary

applicable to

a valuable contribution to the study

computer network

attack.

a special

I

extend to

all

and develop-

On behalf of the

of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the

Marine Corps,
with

make

Secre-

Commandant of the

the contributing authors our thanks and gratitude,

note of appreciation to Professor Michael N. Schmitt and Lieutenant

Commander Brian

T. O'Donnell,

provided invaluable service

as

who

not only contributed individual papers, but

the editors of this important publication.

RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval

War

College

Introduction

T

he 1990's produced

a

worldwide, technological explosion in computers,

information processing, communication systems, and the use of the

The

complex networks pervades almost
every aspect of modern civilization. The Naval War College conducted a Symposium on Computer Network Attack and International Law in June 1999, to
Internet.

global reach of these vast and

address such advanced technology's impact in the area of warfare directed

through and against computer networks. The Symposium

documented in this
volume of the International Law Studies (the "Blue Book") series.
The Symposium was made possible with the support of the Honorable Arthur
L. Money, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communication,

and Intelligence) and the

Pell

is

Center for International Relations and Public

Policy of Salve Regina University, Newport,

Rhode

Island.

Their assistance

is

greatly appreciated.

Professor Michael

N. Schmitt, George C. Marshall European Center

for Se-

and Lieutenant Commander Brian T. O'Donnell, JAGC,
Navy, Navy Warfare Development Command, collaborated as editors for
curity Studies

US
this

member of the Oceans Law and Policy Department, (now
the International Law Department) before retiring from the US Air Force. Brian
was also a member of our Department prior to his transfer to the Navy Warfare
Development Command. Their dedication and perseverance are responsible for
volume. Mike was

a

seeing this project to completion.

A special thank you

is

necessary to Dr. Robert

S.

Wood,

the former

Dean of

the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, and Dr. Alberto Coll, the current Dean,
for their leadership

and support in the planning and conduct of the Symposium,

and the funding for the printing of this book.

The "Blue Book"

series

is

published by the Naval

uted throughout the world to academic institutions,
foreign military
series as

it

commands. This volume is

begins

its

a fitting

War

College and distrib-

libraries,

and both

US

and necessary addition

second century of publication.

DENNIS MANDSAGER
Professor of Law

Chairman, International

Law Department

and

to the

Preface

T

volume of the International Law Studies series ("Blue Books") completes work begun in June of 1999 during the United States Naval War
College's Symposium on Computer Network Attack and International Law.
his

Gathering international legal scholars, judge advocates, warfighters, and computer experts under the auspices of the Oceans

Law and

Policy

(now

Interna-

Law) Department, the symposium comprehensively considered an

tional

emerging means, the computer, and method, computer network

attack,

of

warfare.
States,

were be-

capabilities.

Simulta-

At the time, numerous countries, most notably the United
ginning to develop computer network attack

(CNA)

neously, there was a growing global sense of vulnerability to computer network
attack,

not only from State actors, but

also terrorists, criminals,

Unfortunately, thinking on the technical possibilities of
that

on the

be) subject.

volume.

and cybervandals.

CNA was far outpacing

which such methods and means were (or should
gap was the symposium's purpose, and that of this

legal limitations to

Narrowing

this

By bringing operators,

ronment was created

CNA could acquire a

technicians,

and lawyers together,

a fertile envi-

which those responsible for designing and conducting
more sophisticated understanding of the normative limits

in

on their activities, while those tasked with considering prescriptive constraints
became better equipped to grasp the context in which the law is to be applied.
Simply put, the intent of both the symposium and this book was to relate the
possible to the permissible.

In 1999 the nature of international law's applicability to computer network
attack

was quite uncertain. Despite the increasing attention paid

since then,
issues. It

much

uncertainty remains. This

addresses the

most pressing

begins with contributions describing the operational milieu in which

the law applies, including

focus then

shifts to

bellum, that aspect

its

technical possibilities and strategic significance.

the law.

Most

significant

is

Does

a

when

a State

may

computer network

resort to

attack vio-

prohibition on the use of force found in Article 2(4) of the United

tions Charter, and, if so,
that proscription

—

when? Can

it fall

The

the legal analysis of the jus ad

of international law governing

force as an instrument of national policy.
late the

volume

to the issue

Na-

within one of the two exceptions to

use pursuant to Security Council authorization in accordance

with Chapter VII of the Charter and use in self-defense, based either on Charter

—
Article 51 or the

customary right thereto?

other State, can the target respond with

conducts

If a State

CNA against an-

a

classic kinetic force? If so,

under what

circumstances?

Equally challenging are the jus

duct of hostilities.
operations?

its

(LOAC)

does the law of armed conflict

implicated in

Is it

outside

fall

When

those that surround the con-

in bello issues, i.e.,

all

purview? Does

it

cases

apply to

CNA

of computer network attack or do some

present difficulties for the application of core

LOAC principles like discrimination and proportionality or pose particular risks
and objects?

to protected persons

Do

lacunae exist in

intended to shield non-participants from the
contrast, offer possibilities for

Complex

effects

a

normative architecture

of conflict? Might

confines of the jus ad bellurn andj'wi
is

by

enhancing their protection?

questions regarding computer network attack extend

ones. Specific attention

CNA,

in bello.

This "Blue

Book"

beyond

the

explores the key

devoted, for instance, to the topics of neutrality, space

operations, intelligence gathering, and terrorism. Additionally, both the suitability

of existing treaty law and application of rules of engagement are considered.

Given the uncertainty surrounding the
network

precise legal limitations

on computer

attack, considerable interpretive play exists. Paradoxically, those States

most capable of integrating computer network

attack, or

more broadly informa-

tion warfare, into their operational capabilities, are those with the greatest vulnerability to

CNA.

Thus, they find themselves on the horns of

a

dilemma

on the technology and thereby heighten opportunity and threat,
or normatively impede it and forfeit asymmetrical advantage out of concern over
asymmetrical risk. Conversely, those States most defenseless against computer
network attack might well find developing a CNA capability attractive because
doing so is relatively inexpensive compared to acquiring the conventional military capabilities necessary to challenge those who are currently dominant mili-

resist constraints

tarily.

How

States resolve these policy

face of future conflict

Many thanks
this

are

and

its

Catch-22s will determine

much of the

legal infrastructure.

due in any major publishing

project, a fact especially true in

one. First and foremost are those earned by the contributors to the volume.

Aside from the insightful analysis for which readers are in their debt, they were
paragons of patience and cooperation during the unfortunate delays that accom-

Thomas (USN, rework. His name would have

panied completion of the project. Secondly, Captain Ralph
gave of his

tired) selflessly

appeared on the

Grunawalt

also

title

own

this

page, but for his excessive modesty. Professor Emeritus Jack

contributed substantial time editing and reviewing the chapters

for their content. Lieutenant

and brought

time to editing

his past

Colonel James Meyen,

experience in bringing
xiv

this

USMC,

volume

assisted in editing

to print. Particular

gratitude

is

due

to Professor

lege's International

who

Dennis Mandsager and the entire

Law Department, Ms.

staff

of the Col-

Pat Goodrich of the Naval

War Col-

Mr. Samuel O.
Johnson, Mr. Jeremiah Lenihan, Ms. Susan Meyer, and Ms. Joan Vredenburgh
for desktop publishing and proofreading support.
lege Press,

Hopefully,

served

as

the Press' project editor,

this collection

of articles will

assist

as

well

as

in elucidating the intricacies

applying international law to computer network attack. Perhaps
the desire to have

it assist

as

important

of
is

in the process of determining appropriate normative

meet these new capabilities. CNA offers
both promise and peril. Understanding it, and the legal environment in which it
operates, is essential if computer network attack is to contribute to international
stability and humanitarian protection. Regardless of the allure of CNA for those
starstruck by its possibilities, ultimately the objective of operators and attorney
must be to further such ends.
vectors as the relevant law evolves to

Michael N. Schmitt

Brian T. O'Donnell

Professor of Law

LCDR, JAGC, USN

George C. Marshall European
Center for Security Studies

Legal Advisor

Garmisch-Partenkirchen,

Germany

Navy Warfare Development Command
Newport, Rhode Island

XV

I

CNE and CNA in the Network-Centric
Battlespace:

Challenges for Operators and Lawyers

Arthur K. Cebrowski

IT

s

21 and Network-Centric Warfare

President of the Naval War College,

I

am charged with examining ad-

.vances in technology and asking the question:
tions for the

Navy and

activities in the

its

"what

next century?" Admiral Jay Johnson,

former Chief of Naval Operations, has described the future
three

growing

—and

irreversible

—

trends:

is

being shaped by

assimilation. Critical to

our under-

a recognition that these trends operate synergistically.

Using the

Internet, intranets,

and extranets, networking has rapidly become

force for global organization,

dented in

as

networking, greater globalization and

economic interdependence, and technology
standing

are the implica-

human

history.

one

that fosters an

The phenomenon

is

a

powerful

interdependency unprece-

the result of extraordinary leaps in

technological possibilities. Within the next twenty years, for instance, constellations

of satellites will blanket the earth providing

and business opportunities
Complicating the
this

to

all

difficulties

television, telephone, Internet access,

but the furthest reaches of the world.

of coherent planning and systems development

environment of continual flux

is

the fact that technology

is

being assimilated

in
at

CNE and CNA in the Network-Centric Battlespace
an ever-increasing

rate. It

took nearly three generations for

power

electric

to be-

come an everyday part of people's lives. It took radio and television about a generation and a half. The Internet will achieve that status within a single generation.
Obviously, these trends have enormous implications for the armed forces.

We are now in the midst of a revolution in military affairs unlike any seen since
the Napoleonic Age. In that period, the practice of maintaining small profes-

was replaced by the mobilization of citizen armies

sional armies to fight wars

composed of much of a nation's adult population. Henceforth, societies as a
whole would, perhaps tragically, become intricately vested in warfare. The
character of armed conflict had changed fundamentally.
Today we are witnessing an analogous change in the character of war and
warfare
an information revolution that enables a shift from what we call plat-

—

form-centric warfare to Network-Centric Warfare. Understanding of these

new operations remains nascent; no great body of collated wisdom has emerged
to explain how this revolution will alter national and international security dyone of the challenges with which I charge readers, to identify and
explore the operational and legal issues associated with the new way in which

namics. That

is

wars of the next millennium will be waged.
Perhaps most notably, Network-Centric Warfare enables a
based warfare to

a

from

much faster and effects-based war fighting style, one

by operating

ized not only

shift

mand, but by an

ability to

theory, the result

may

How might this be

attrition

character-

by speed of comchange the warfare context or ecosystem. At least in
inside an opponent's decision loop

well be decisional paralysis.

achieved?

The approach

is

premised on achieving three

objectives:

The

(1)

force achieves information superiority in terms of accuracy,

relevance, and timeliness, thereby having a dramatically better

awareness or understanding of the battlespace.
Forces acting with speed, precision, and the ability to reach out

(2)

long distances with their weapons achieve the massing of

effects

versus the massing of the forces themselves.
(3)

The
tions

results that

follow are the rapid reduction of the enemy's op-

and the shock of rapid and closely coupled

forces.

This disrupts the enemy's strategy and,

it is

effects

on

his

hoped, forecloses

the options available to him.

Underlying
trol.

this ability

is

an alteration in the dynamics of command and con-

commanders engaged in top-down direction to
of forces and weapons at the point of contact with the

Traditionally, military

achieve the required level

—
Arthur K. Cebrowski

enemy. However, top-down coordination inevitably
in force disposition.

It is

results in delays

an unwieldy process that denies

and

flexibility to

errors

subordi-

commands. Combat power is needlessly reduced and opportunities present
themselves to one's enemy. In contrast, bottom-up execution permits combat to
move to a high-speed continuum in which the enemy is denied operational
nate

pause to regroup and redeploy.

The key to

this possibility

force levels that

one

offer

is

the ability to provide information access to those

most need it. In

a sense, the

middle-man is cut

out.

Allow me

to

illustration.

Three years ago, the Navy launched an
for the 21st Century, or "IT-21."

It

effort called

Information Technology

reflected the Navy's understanding that 21st

Century combat power must come from warriors and platforms operating in

networked environment. What is required is linkage between systems

that accu-

provide the necessary levels of understanding of the battlespace (the sen-

rately

and systems

sors)

a

overlying these

that link the ships

two

and

aircraft

(the shooters). Therefore,

must be high-

systems, or grids as they are referred to,

—

complex and responsive information grid
that empowers real-time C4ISR processes (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Although the
full integration of the three grids
sensor, engagement, and information
remains incomplete, and new technologies must be developed to optimize Network-Centric Warfare, this vision is clearly the future of United States war
performance information

links

a

—

fighting.

Challenges

One indispensable need in building our Network-Centric Warfare capability
is

adequately defending the information grids that support our capabilities.

know

all

too well that our enemies recognize the vulnerabilities posed by our

network dependent systems. Because information and the network
ued,

it

build,

will

become

a target.

will

and operate secure IT systems

resistant to

computer network exploitation
or corruption of these

systems could have devastating strategic effects. Think, for example,

would be today

if the

be val-

Therefore, a core strategic goal must be to design,

(CNE) and computer network attack (CNA). Disruption

where we

CNA caused

Yugoslav intelligence agencies had through

Allied Forces to "inadvertently"

bomb the Russian Embassy in Belgrade

hospital ... or a school. Information assurance

is

...

or a

the sine qua non of effective, reli-

Network-Centric Warfare. Assurance need not be absolute
war. But some aspects require higher levels of assurance.
able

We

.

.

.

nothing is in

—
CNE and CNA
A

troubling reality

Network-Centric Battlespace

in the

we must

deal with

that

is

most military systems obtain and

which the Department of DeThese civilian systems are likely to

process information from civilian systems over

—

fense has a lesser

much more

be

—degree of

or no

CNE

vulnerable to

public access, and

may have fewer

control.

and

CNA

than military systems because of

resources dedicated to their security.

the same lines, our military infrastructure

is

dependent upon the domestic

tems rely extensively on the public telecommunications

and domestic transportation systems. Each

potentially vulnerable

The
mated.

threats

Some

civil-

and routine communications

ian infrastructure. Military supply, logistics,

electric grid,

Along

is

grid, the
itself

sys-

domestic

dependent on

computer networks.

cannot be overestimated because the value cannot be overesti-

are

new; others

are

merely

new

forms of existing

certain to be used in conjunction with traditional warfare

threats.

by those who

CNA

are oth-

erwise unable to match the United States' military wherewithal. In particular,
is

guaranteed to appeal to

see

and rogue

terrorists

computer network exploitation

as

a

States. Further,

new form of

is

it

we may expect to

an age-old threat

espionage.

United

In facing such threats, the

States

and

its allies

should never presume, technological dominance.

CNA

technologies are warfare on the cheap,

I

When

should

strive for,

but

CNE

and

people say

think of the National Security

Agency budget. But formidable capabilities can be developed and obtained relatively inexpensively. The critical capital in this industry is brainpower and
computing power. With only a fraction of the world's population, and given
the widespread nature of computing power, it may become difficult for us to
maintain our present advantage.

Though

improve, so too will the offensive

ronment

will

defensive mechanisms will constantly

abilities

be hostile and dynamic.

It

of potential adversaries. The envi-

may be

impossible to determine

who

has the advantage at any time. In the conventional world of land forces, ships,
planes,

and submarines,

US

intelligence agencies have a fair ability to deter-

mine the enemy's order of

battle;

that luxury disappears in the

world of

cyberspace.

The

face of war

is

truly changing. In particular,

different reality in the effort to shape international

the post-Cold
tional forces

on

potential adversaries

tively protected.

provide a

attacks

false

With

past. In

by conven-

On the North American continent,

by the Adantic and

Pacific oceans,

we were

rela-

CNE and CNA, those large expanses of ocean only serve to

sense of security. Today, the

terrorist organization,

law than faced in the

the territory of the United States

have not been a great concern.

from

separated

War era,

we in the United States face a

or hacker behind a

homeland threat is from any country,
computer anywhere in the world.

Arthur K. Cebrowski

During future

crises,

CNA activity against both our military and civilian infrastructures.
forward-deployed

CNE

the United States must expect significant

battle systems

Though our

should be impenetrable, the support systems

reaching back to and in the United States will be

of the United States homeland as

and

far less secure.

This

new reality,

a viable target, will inevitably influence

our ap-

proach to international law. The Department of Defense's interest in the shaping
of international law in the recent past has arguably been driven by the desire to
further our offensive interest

Today, with the homeland
fensive interests

Many

Does

What

than

as a target.

new balance between our offensive and de-

must be achieved.

new

paradigm. Particular attention

to the following:

international law require us to wait until lives are lost or property

destroyed before
•

at risk, a

interests as a shooter rather

questions are presented by this

must be paid
•

—our

the

is

new

we may

engage in

acts

of self-defense?

context of rules of engagement? Proportional response?

Precision? Perfidious act?
•

How

targeting affected

is

to civilian

by the

fact that military systems are

networked

IT systems controlling communications, energy, finance, and

transportation?
•

Are

legal

gaining

consequences of international law triggered upon the perpetrator

access to

our IT systems, or do they depend upon the

effects

or

tangible consequences of access?
•

Are there

on the desired direction in which the law
Government agencies and among different

differing perspectives

should develop

among US

nations?

Framework

of the

The Hague and Geneva Conventions, and
both ad bellum and

in hello,

Law

other sources of international law,

provide guidance for future conflicts. Consider the

critical principles that regulate

the conduct of nations during

may be

armed

conflict:

(1)

Only

(2)

It is

(3)

The loss of civilian life and damage to civilian objects must not be

military objectives

attacked.

prohibited to launch attacks against civilians.

excessive in relation to the military advantage anticipated.

No reasonable person would disagree with these norms; but their application
in cyberspace attacks will place stress

on commanders,

targeteers,

and

their

CNE and CNA in the Network-Centric Battlespace
lawyers.
tions

There

will

be considerable

difficulty in identifying sources

of threats in cyberspace. Dual-use technology will render the

tinguish

between

a military

and

civilian target elusive.

and third order effects from information
Despite the

attacks will

difficulties in application,

I

am

be

And
a

and loca-

ability to dis-

determining second

complex task indeed.

persuaded that

we

will

be well

served by applying the core principles of international law to information age
warfare.
as a

We cannot, in our zest for tactical mission success, lose sight of our goals

nation

—

to protect

life

world. Adherence can be

and

liberty, in

difficult,

our country and throughout the

but our commitment to protecting the in-

One commentator
who we are as a nation,

nocent, the noncombatant, reflects our national values.
stated

it

with precision: "Adherence to the law

reflects

and separates the good guys from the bad guys." Therefore, the warfighters, IT

what steps need to be taken so the cyberwarriors of tomorrow can remain the good guys.
Finally, I would caution that we should not rush to place undue controls on
professionals,

and lawyers must

information operations before

The law of armed
restrictions

on

conflict

we

ask

understand the implications of such control.

developed over centuries

as

nations determined

what

were willing to accept. Time
the brick and mortar of international law. As our understand-

their

and experience are

all

war

fighting capability they

ing of the technology increases, so too will the ability of nations to best deter-

mine the desired international norms.

We must be cautious not to advocate new

law regarding information warfare without understanding
practical implications.

its

moral,

legal,

and
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Introduction

echnology began shaping the conduct of war
picked up

a stone to increase his killing

combat. 1 Ever since,

power
•

when

the

first

warrior

power during hand-to-hand

new technologies have increasingly affected the balance of

by:

leveraging existing strategies or efforts of either the attacker or the
defender;

•

enabling

new and unexpected

strategic

uses

of existing weapons

technology;

new weapons

•

providing

•

neutralizing or mitigating the effects of enemy

•

providing or denying the element of surprise.

of increased destructive force;

weaponry or strategy; and

Telecommunications and information-related technological advances, however,

have perhaps been the most fundamental in shaping warfare. Telecommu-

command and control by providing rapid, accurate, and secure
communications among friendly forces. Without communications, the Stratenications enables

gic Air

Command

Commander-in-Chief, General

Tommy

Powers, once
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observed,

"all

I

would command

my

is

desk, and that's not a very lethal

weapon." Telecommunications has allowed the

encompass outer space, the atmosphere, the

grassy field to

under the

seas.

several orders

battlespace to

Table

demonstrates

1

how

grow from

earth's surface,

command and

of magnitude the time needed for

control.

Time

Message from Boston

1775

ship,

and

telecommunications has reduced by

Methodology

Circa

a

which then

sails

via horse

to

and courier

Months

to a

London and taken by

horse and courier to the King - and return reply

1850

Message from New York to San Francisco via
telegraph and the Pony Express

1925

Message from Washington,

DC

to

Tokyo

DC

to

Tokyo

Weeks
Days

via

high frequency radio

Message from Washington,

2000

Telecommunications today give fighting forces incredible

Seconds

be

capabilities to

proactive and adaptive, and to take meaningful response. Today's warfighters

expect and

demand

reliable, fast, interoperable,

Telecommunications

also enables the acquisition

disposition, objectives,
tage,

of information concerning the

and vulnerabilities of the enemy to gain a strategic advan-

creating warfighting disciplines such as

(COMINT),

and protected communications.

Communications

Intelligence

Electronic Warfare (EW), Electronics Intelligence (ELINT),

Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT), Imagery Intelligence

(IMINT), Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), and Signals Intelligence
(SIGINT). High-speed communications cannot occur, however, without computers,

and the pervasive use of computers in almost every device inextricably

link telecommunications, computers,

modern

and the warfighting capability of any

military force.

Information Operations (IO) and Information Warfare (IW) compose the

modern

construct that embodies and demonstrates the dependency of

warfare

on telecommunications and computers. Fundamentally, IO and

clude any activity that influences the production, modification,

modern

IW

in-

falsification, distri-

bution, availability, or security of information relative to any aspect of the pursuit

of war. These

activities

may be

wide-ranging, even low technology,

as

long

as

they influence the gathering, analysis, distribution, or implementation of useful

bombing of communications infrastructure,
radio frequency jamming, High Energy Radio Frequency (HERF) weapons, and
electromagnetic pulse generation are all examples of relevant, modern IW.

warfighting information. Sabotage,
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Offensive and defensive
ly

IW implications of new technologies must constant-

be assessed by the professional warfighter.

becoming ever more

technologies are

Sr.

Specifically,

integrated into

computer networking

modern commerce and

communications; consequently, attacks on these computer networks must be integrated into offensive and defensive warfare strategies. Relevant

technologies include the

full

networking spectrum

—from

IW

computer

small, hardened, inde-

pendent Local Area Networks (LANs) and regionally distributed Wide Area Net-

works (WANs)

to the use

of the global, publicly-supported Internet.

Enter the Internet

Although the impact of telecommunications on warfare has been dramatic,
the invention of the Internet has been profound. Because of its pervasive inte-

gration into

used

modern technology

as either

tack.

interests

and

reliability

now

dependent on the

of Internet communications. Exploitation, elimina-

compromise of this vulnerable

nent of a nation's

The

medium for any computer network atof developed nations, and even many unclassi-

of these same nations, are

fied military functions

tion, or

be

the primary or a collateral

The commercial

availability

infrastructures, the Internet will very likely

asset will often

be the primary compo-

IO campaign.

Internet began in 1969 as the

was simply an experiment

ARPANET. 2

Originally the

ARPANET

in highly reliable information networking.

The ex-

periment connected the Department of Defense with military research companies

and specified

reliability

universities

who had

military research contracts. 3

was achieved through the development of a new

collectively

named "packet

In 1990, the

set

High

of technologies,

switching."

ARPANET shut down, and was replaced by the NSFNET. 4

At

non-DoD related commercial enterprises started to recognize the
a pervasive, distributed communication medium and they began

the same time,

value of such

connecting their previously private computer networks to the Internet, supplying

new paths for all transmissions. These commercial entities brought commer-

cial

employees, suppliers, and customers to the Internet for the

also

began making

a profit selling Internet access to the public.

first

time.

They

As commercial

NFSNET backbone handled less and less
of the total traffic volume. While the NSFNET is not completely gone, the proconnections and

cess

traffic

burgeoned, the

of replacing the government's Internet infrastructure with commercial

equivalents

The

is

well under way.

essential,

high

reliability

ARPANET, NSFNET,

and

now

concept of packet switching used by the
the Internet,

is

the elimination of a central,
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and switching center. Packet switching first divides an electronic communication into pieces, known as packets. A header then
single-point-of-failure, control

prefixes each packet with identifying data such

as:

•

the sender of the message;

•

the intended recipient of the message;

•

the subject of the

•

the date and time of the transmission; and

•

the position of this packet in the series of packets for this message.

communication

(for e-mail);

Each packet is then independently routed to a computer that forms part of the
backbone of the Internet (an Internet node). Each Internet node passes packets
on to any computer on the network that is "nearer" to the destination identified
in the

header information than the present location. Recognize, however, since

Internet

node routing considers existing network traffic loads, and the

of "nearer"

node

to

is

definition

an estimate of total travel time rather than physical distance, the

which

a

packet

is

may be physically farther away from the

routed

desti-

nation. Packets often travel quite circuitous routes to their destination. In fact,

the various packets of a message

may

travel very different routes to the destina-

tion and will almost certainly arrive at different times.

The header information

allows the packets to be reassembled in proper order

at

the destination

computer.
Internet Vulnerabilities

For many reasons, however, these commercial and governmental

seldom considered security

as a part

of the infrastructure. The main reasons for

not implementing greater security were capability,
uses system resources

and thus slows the system

cost,

down

perspective, does not permit certain features. Security

money, and people.

It

is

and schedule. Security
or,

worse from

costly in terms

a user's

of time,

adds to the cost of the delivered capability. Security also

lengthens delivery schedules because

gram without the

initiatives

flaws

which make

it
it

takes longer to write a

computer pro-

vulnerable.

Perhaps the overarching reason for not implementing security is that the public,

industry,

extra cost to

and government did not perceive

a threat sufficient to

warrant the

embed security into hardware and software. For example, not real-

izing that a mountainside switch

was on the

rail line

that the

US Army

uses to

main battle tanks to a seaport during hostilities, a Conrail railroad
employee might ask, "Why would anyone want to attack a switch?" Not only is
transport

its

security expensive,

it is

prohibitively costly if it

10

is

considered after the

fact.

One

David Tubbst Perry G. Luzivick, Walter Gary Sharp,

Sr.

IBM study stated that it would cost ten times more to retrofit security into a system than

it

would

if

it

was considered from the beginning.

Potential vulnerabilities are also frequently overlooked

by the government in

The rationale for their use
is two-fold. First, COTS provides strong capabilities at reasonable cost. Not
only do these strong capabilities enable businesses to make a profit, but in addiits

use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products.

government does not bear the long-term costs of the resources to develop the products. Second, COTS upgrades and new products are more timely.
However, the typical software product, portions of which are developed overseas in countries that either are or may be US competitors, contains several million lines of code. Determining whether such software contains any malicious
code is economically infeasible and practically impossible. To do so would require a line-by-line code check as well as an understanding of how the lines of
code interact. There is no artificial intelligence program that does this. It requires skilled people and time; indeed, more people and time than it takes to
tion the

write the software in the

first

place.

hallmark of modern software. There are

300 security
features in Windows NT, for example, that can be turned on and off. Adversaries constantly probe for weaknesses. It takes just one weakness not detected
Complexity

a

is

and resolved in one system to make

all

connected to

users

it

at least

vulnerable to exploi-

Because of the trusted relationship between systems and net-

tation

and

works

in our highly interconnected infrastructure, achieving

attack.

control over our environment

The

is

very

and maintaining

difficult.

distributed routing design of the Internet

means

that there

is

no

central

point of control and thus no single-point-of- failure. This creates a highly
able telecommunications system because an

every Internet node to disrupt

traffic.

enemy

reli-

or accident must disable

Paradoxically, this high reliability carries

— every

node
computer is a decision-maker, with full routing information and authority and
access to the information stream. Accordingly, access to any Internet node will

with

it

an associated security vulnerability

participating Internet

give a hostile or criminal element access to Internet
Also, with

no

—

hostile traffic that

recognized

as

do not naturally make use
evaluate the intentions of their

centralized control, Internet entities

of information correlated from diverse sources to
traffic

traffic.

conducts

a distributed

computer network attack is not

such and thus allowed unimpeded'passage. In direct analogy to

covert, spread spectrum

number of radio

communications that spread wireless information over a

frequencies to disguise transmissions, distributed Internet at-

tacks use coordinated connections

and communications from disparate locations

to disguise the activity or objectives

of the

11

attack.

These distributed

attacks
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ultimately
just as
is

make

use of flaws in the operating system or applications software,

with any other computer "hack." Often, however, the distributed exploit

not obvious because individual steps are taken by different remote computers

and each step

and of itself,

in

is,

Methods

of

relatively innocuous.

Computer Network Attack

Perhaps the greatest vulnerability of any computer system

ment. Most people
use

more

difficult

and

tempt to

the

human

ele-

names or other easy-to-remember passwords, or
passwords but write them down in an easily accessible location
still

use family

near the computer. While
ticated

is

some hackers may

persistent threat dedicated to

surveil the system physically

attack only

compromising
and

from conventional forms of surveillance and

a

by the

Internet, a sophis-

computer system

will at-

electronically. Information gathered
analysis

is

very effective in determin-

ing which type of intrusion will be the most successful. Insiders, of course, are the
greatest threat to

—they have

any computer system

If physical access

compromise

is

authorized access.

obtained, both information gathering and actual system

are significantly easier.

pany's computers through

Hackers

employment

may gain physical access to

as a janitor

a

com-

or temporary secretary

—or

may simply be a client or customer who is left alone near a computer momentarily. Once they gain physical access to a computer, hackers can immedithey

download or corrupt information, or install sniffer software to collect it. A
sniffer is a program that runs in the background of the target machine, collecting
ately

information, such

as

passwords or credit card numbers, during normal opera-

tions. It generally requires a return visit to retrieve the collected information,

these programs

may be

but

quite small and difficult to detect.

Physical access also allows hackers to plant conventional recording devices
that will collect information.

printer

may

For example, an audio recording of an impact

allow the printed characters to be recreated. Similarly, devices

planted in nearby offices can record an entire

document when

by

may

electronic bursts to a laser printer. Hackers

tion

by simply collecting

Finally, hackers

may

trash

it is

transmitted

also learn relevant

informa-

from the curbside.

use social engineering techniques to learn information

compromise a computer system. Social engineering takes advantage of the
fact that most people endeavor to be honest and helpful. Unless an enterprise has
taken steps to educate its user base to the vulnerabilities represented by releasing
that

seemingly innocuous information, social engineering gathers attack design information very effectively. Typically,

on an over- worked
plausible need-to-know

a perpetrator will call

employee, either in person or by telephone, invent
12

a
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excuse, and ask for relevant information.
subscription in return for answering a
ally

They may

few survey

Sr.

also offer a free

magazine

questions. Or, they

may actu-

send free software (which contains malicious code) to try out on a computer.

A trained practitioner in social engineering will usually obtain at least unclassified system details,

but often passwords and sensitive information can also be

obtained.

Seemingly innocuous information can
access

through system configuration

passwords. Public records, such

the target. This information

useful, leading to ease

company's website, or public business

full access.

a

of

personnel information, or guessed

details,

may point to

insecure business partner with

when

be very

amount of information

tionships allow a significant

tion (EFI)

as a

also

to

rela-

be collated for use against

vulnerable electronic interface or an

These elements of friendly informa-

may be insignificant in isolation, but can generate considerable weight

collected and pieced together.

Aside from the vulnerabilities exposed by a lack of discipline and compliance

of the user base, computer network attacks ultimately rely upon flaws in

soft-

ware, and these type of attacks are greatly enhanced in an Internet environment

because of the robust and flexible access and communications paths that the
Internet represents.

The incongruous

truth

is

that, in spite

of a carefully crafted

public image of total control over others' information systems, the hacker
cisely limited to

what the inadvertent holes the software design process

is

pre-

leaves

behind allow him or her to do.
Flaws in software design take
tain

many

many forms.

million lines of source code,

5

Since large software packages con-

the law of averages guarantees

many

flaws in logical construction, reduction to source lines, typographical errors,
ill-defined interfaces

ferent times,

and in

between code developed by many

different groups, at dif-

The hacker community lives to find and exand they are very good at doing so, but they cannot

different places.

ploit these inevitable flaws

normally create holes a

priori for their

Buffer overflows, for example, are

They require specific knowledge of the
ful in that

and

they allow arbitrary code

own use. 6
a common

vulnerability in

all

software.

targeted operating system, but are

(i.e.,

power-

malicious programs) to be executed.

Buffer overflows occur when data written to a pre-sized
the buffer's allocated space.
areas.

This can occur

when

The

a user

excess data then

response

is

memory buffer exceeds
overwrites other memory

longer than the software designer

expected. Intentional buffer overflows attempt to write the perpetrator's code
into the computer's instructions. Implementation of this exploit

however,
cific

it

must be precisely written, aligned, and sized

memory

location.

13

so that

is

it falls

routine;

on

a

spe-
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The

majority of flaws in any software package simply represent sand in the

gears, disrupting or halting operation in generally unpredictable ways.

centage of these purely disruptive flaws are useful for Denial
attacks.

The defining characteristic of a DOS

attack flaw

is

A large per-

Of Service (DOS)

the element of control.

The DOS must be activated by an external action over which the perpetrator has
As with any compromise of a computer system,

control.

control

is

crucial. Unfortunately,

common

stabilities in

In a

DOS

DOS flaws are legion, due to the pervasive in-

operating system and application software packages.

attack, triggering the flaw simply disables the target

some way, denying

Combined with

machine

the services of that

extortion or other kinetic or

puter was designed to monitor or prevent,

many IW

access to exercise this

attacks. In the

to the

IW

DOS

owner or intended

can be

hacker community, which

One method
which is

commonly
for

available

conducting

a

and easy

DOS

attack

in

user.

comcomponent of

attacks that the target

is

a useful

largely a socially-based

merit system, there are very few "brownie points" awarded for
cause they are so

computer

DOS attacks be-

to perpetrate.
is

to transmit

malformed

data,

by the target. For example, sending a
negative value where the programmer assumed a positive value would always be
data in a format that isn't expected

received.

Although the

mined, the

common

result

result

is

of a malformed data packet
to crash the target, thus

is

generally undeter-

denying

service.

A small percentage of the inherent flaws in a software package are useful for
more purposefully
verity: destruction

directed attacks. These include, in order of increasing se-

of data (vandalism), viewing protected data (read

modifying data (read/ write
tive rights or root access).

to

Of particular

importance are exploits that allow

a

to increase his assigned rights

make himself an

and

and control of the system (administra-

on the network to more powerful
These exploits allow a hacker who gains access to the network at any level

normal user
levels.

capability),

capability),

administrator, with

every aspect of the system

full rights to

data.

Hackers have the innate advantage, and they work together. The
intellectual nature

antees that

collegial,

of the hacker community and of the Internet in general guar-

many hundreds of hours are spent by malicious individuals to develop

and improve

existing, published exploits. Websites, chat

tronic bulletin board systems, and other services

which

rooms, private elec-

cater to the malicious

hacker number in the thousands. Hundreds of pre-designed exploits are categorically listed

forums

(e.g.,

velopment

by operating system and software application on public electronic

see wvwv.rootshell.com 7 ).

in private venues,

with news of the

first

Many more

though private

major attack using the
14

exploits exist or are in de-

exploits are published coincident
exploit.
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Defending Against Computer Network Attack

computer security demands constant vigilance by all users, system
and depends upon an integrated security
administrators, and commanders
program that protects against hardware, software, and social engineering attacks. The cornerstone of all computer security programs is situational awareness, training, and education. "Security through obscurity," i.e., not worrying
Effective

—

about flaws buried in millions of line of code,

work

is

a very

poor choice

for net-

must be prevented through an active,
layered defense, erecting sequential electronic defenses, which include intrudefense. Unauthorized access

sion detection systems. This strategy allows the defender to detect intruders in

the information-gathering stage that precedes every significant information attack.

The

Achilles' heel

of this approach

is

that

human

operators must

tor intrusion detection systems for full effectiveness. This

is

moni-

a thankless task

of

reviewing scores of perfectly legitimate electronic transactions looking for the

one obscure, innocent looking interchange

time-consuming and boring
patience

—

a difficult

that

might indicate an

task requires considerable technical skill

This

and

combination.

The Application of International Law

in

There has been no evolution of international law
activities in

attack.

cyberspace such

as

computer network

a credible ability to project military force in

Cyberspace

to

govern or prohibit State

attack. Indeed,

cyberspace

is

maintaining

a lawful

and funda-

mentally important aspect of deterrence and maintenance of international

peace and security. Existing international law, however, does govern the conduct of computer network attack and other State

While

activities in cyberspace.

norms do not explicitly address information
operations, information warfare, computer network attack, or other State
activities in cyberspace, they do prohibit the entire range of State activities that
these international law

causes certain effects. Accordingly,
ties

in cyberspace, especially those

it is

critically

important that

all

State activi-

conducted by the military and the

intelli-

gence community, be reviewed by assigned government counsel.
Until a legal regime matures that comprehensively addresses State activities in
cyberspace,

which

is

highly unlikely anytime in the near future, legal advisers

must principally conduct an effects-based analysis of international law to determine the lawfulness of State activities in cyberspace. State activities must comply
with the law of conflict management and the international peacetime regime,
and, during times of armed conflict, the law of war.

15
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Under the law of conflict management,

all

State activities in cyberspace

must

comply with the Charter of the United Nations. Unless otherwise authorized by
the Security Council under

Chapter VII authority, Article 2(4) of the Charter
prohibits the threat or use of force by any State against the territorial integrity or
political

its

independence of another State except

in

individual or collective

by international law and recognized by Article 51 of
the Charter. Customary international law requires that all use of force autho-

self-defense as authorized

rized

under the law of conflict management be necessary and proportional.

Although unlawful under the domestic law of most

States, the

peacetime

regime of international law permits espionage, but the unique nature of computer network attack, which allows remote electronic access, undermines the
deterrent value of national law.

espionage

may be

considered

Of grave concern is that many forms of computer

a hostile act

or

a

demonstration of hostile intent,

many

thereby causing a State to use military force in response. There are

peacetime norms that govern State

activities in cyberspace.

Nations Convention on the

Law of the

ducted in the

aimed

territorial sea

The 1982 United

Sea, for example, prohibits

at collecting

other

any act con-

information to the prejudice of

the defense or security of the coastal State; any act of propaganda aimed at affect-

ing the defense or security of the coastal State; and any act aimed

with any systems of communication or any other
coastal State. Similarly,

facilities

peacetime telecommunications

at interfering

or installations of the

treaties

such

as

the 1982

Nairobi Convention prohibit harmful interference with radio navigation services,

and the 1976

tions infrastructure

Law of war
well

as

armed

INMARSAT Convention requires that

principles

embodied

in the

Geneva and Hague conventions
activities in

as

cyberspace during

For example, the universally accepted general principle that the

"right of belligerents to adopt
certainly places

telecommunica-

be used only for peaceful purposes.

customary international law apply to State
conflict.

its

many

restraints

means of injuring the enemy

on the conduct of cyber

is

not unlimited"

warfare. Similarly, the

principles of military necessity, unnecessary suffering, proportionality, distinction,

and

More

collateral

damage

also apply.

detailed analyses of these

and many other applicable international

volume by other authors who are noted experts
in international law. There are a number of issues, however, which remain unclear under international law. For example, what State activities in cyberspace
constitute a use of force prohibited by the law of conflict management? What are
peaceful purposes? Can hostile military activities which are tantamount to a use
of force conducted in self-defense as recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of
the United Nations be peaceful within the meaning of the INMARSAT
norms

are provided later in this
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society, the military
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extent
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upon

heavily dependent

telecommunications infrastructure.

the ci-

To what

the civilian telecommunications infrastructure a lawful target because a

military relies

upon

it

in

some way

for

command and

control or computer net-

work attack? What about the Internet nodes of a State that is not a party to a conflict; is its

telecommunications infrastructure

against the critical infrastructures

a lawful target? Is a

of an "undefended"

Hague Convention even if no physical destruction

cyberattack

city prohibited

ensues?

by the

How do we regulate

computer espionage to avoid the appearance of a hostile act or a demonstration
of hostile intent without outlawing espionage completely? A legal review of
these and the many other unresolved issues must be conducted in the context of
the fundamental principle of international law and sovereignty which provides
"that which is not prohibited is permitted." Legal advisers must also understand
and embrace the Internet technology of binary mathematics and electronic
cuitry

which forms the foundation of digital

cir-

warfare.

The Future of Technology, Law, and Warfare

While the future of technology, law, and warfare is uncertain, it is very clear
that technology will continue to drive profound changes in the nature and conduct of 21st century warfare, and that international law, by its very nature, will
always lag behind. The international community does not yet understand, much
less agree, on how existing international law applies to State activities in
cyberspace. An international consensus on a comprehensive regulation of State
activities in cyberspace is very unlikely, and States must continue to regulate
these activities by their own domestic laws and rules of engagement. In crafting
their domestic norms, States must remember, however, that State practice will
shape the evolution of international law that will in turn permit or prohibit future activities in cyberspace

by

all

States.

The unintended consequences of computer network
tain.

attack are also uncer-

For most, the notions of computer network attack and

up

jures

digital

visions of precision warfare, but these visions are far

warfare con-

from

reality.

Information systems are constructed from flawed building materials. All operating systems, software applications, and hardware architectures contain

many

—

by computer network attack and the variations on
how they can be combined represent almost an infinite number of vulnerabilities and unintended responses to unauthorized intrusions. Unauthorized access,

flaws that can be exploited

such

as

bility

during

a

computer network attack,

of inducing

therefore, has a relatively high proba-

instability into the target system.
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accurate modeling of the target system, the uncertainty in predicting the exact

primary, secondary, and subsequent order effects of a computer network attack
is

large.

Obviously estimates of distinction, proportionality, and

age are very tenuous

An

when

collateral

dam-

predicated on uncertain estimates of effects.

exact determination of the uncertainty of a computer network attack

calculable, given complete information

but such

a calculation

is

about the information systems involved,

would become quickly outdated due

to the fast pace of

software development. Reasonable estimates that account for incomplete infor-

mation are

also

short-lived since

possible, but these estimates are

minor changes

even more

to a system configuration can

difficult

and

have dramatic

ef-

on the results of a particular attack. Estimating the effects of a computer network attack will continue to be risky and inaccurate until the operating systems
and applications, for the attacker as well as the target, achieve a reasonable measure of stability. Scenarios where a computer network attack on a military inforfects

mation system

disables a linked civilian system that controls

water purification,

for instance, are very plausible.

The Information Environment (IE) is the new battlespace of the 21st century.
The IE is the interrelated set of information, information infrastructure, and information-based processes. Information

edge

—and

data,

is

the information infrastructure

is

and knowl-

information,

the hardware,

software,

and

media used during information-based processes created when storing,
manipulating, and transferring information. Denying, degrading, or destroying
transport

a select subset

of the IE can have significant repercussions in one or more

infrastructures

tion of the IE

and can be more

effective than physical destruction.

now offers the potential to

States

must develop

Manipula-

obtain political and military objectives

without the use of kinetic weapons. Indeed, control of the IE
effective than physical attack,

may be

and may be able to prevent future

a national strategy to

defend their

own IEs

far

with traditional organizing, equipping,

more

hostilities.

and

affect the

international IE to successfully attain political and military objectives.
strategy requires breaking

critical

Such

training,

a

and

warfighting strategy. Political support, along with appropriate planning guidance, strategy, and force structure,
sights

and

intellectual

must be developed. The philosophical in-

understanding of such

a national

IE strategy are in their

nascent stages and need further development.
Existing information systems have not

begun

to scratch the surface

of the ca-

pabilities for self-aware behavior. In ten years, these systems will

make

use of what we have learned in both neural networks and

intelligence to

model human thinking more
tems will modify their

closely.

artificial

practical

This means both that our information sys-

own behavior in response to past experience and that the
18
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more

larger the network, the

ble of detecting
tions in their

effective this behavior will be.

and correcting defects in

Sr.

They will be

capa-

own hardware, minor imperfec-

their

own software codes, damage due to neglect, vandalism, or war, and

obvious errors in the judgment of their operators.

For information warfare, the potential of self- aware behavior
ing.

is

overwhelm-

We could, for example, teach a distributed information system to gather in-

formation from a target network

would

legitimate users

exactly as a series

use the system,

i.e.,

of

model an

number of

their intrusion detection software

be able to distinguish between the two events.

will not

a certain

Or

the attack could

on the enemy network from 600 saboteurs in 200 locations,
target network to disconnect vast subnets. This would exacerbate

attack

causing the

the degradation of the target network's self- aware functions, denying

formation

it

it

the in-

needs to discriminate further fictional attacks from real events (the

speed and accuracy of a neural net

On the battlefield,

is

directly related to the size

of the

net).

individual warfighters will be connected to vast informa-

tion resources to enable effective decision-making

and coordination of troops.

Forward observers will be automated and equipped with sensors that dwarf a human's information collecting hardware. Indeed, humans
habit the kinetic battlefield at

skill

against ours.

likely to continue, a quickly escalating

weapons

possible.

Lagging behind in

this race

arms race in kinetic weapons, but the time

The United
most

at

some point pitting their

With rapid software and hardware de-

velopment
is

not need to in-

all.

Defensive capabilities will reap similar advantages,
software and processing

may

arms race in technology

might be

scales will

as

deadly

be much,

as

losing an

much shorter.

States currently enjoys a distinct technological advantage.

likely scenario

is

that this will continue

and technical developments

The
will

open the disparity in capability between us and our enemies, to
our favor. Commercial development pressures will drive this naturally, although
military applications need to be carefully identified as new technologies present
new offensive and defensive possibilities. This creative ruminating is not trivial
and must not be cursory the selection process that produces technologists ensures that they are creative. The weapons they design will exploit non-obvious

generally tend to

—

niches in

new

technologies.

At present, however, the instability of present operating systems and our
dependence upon them, paradoxically leaves us more vulnerable to information
warfare and computer network attack than less technically developed nations.
Malicious code,

HERF

weapons,

EMP, and

other

less

sophisticated attacks

could wreak great havoc in our technological society. This "Blue Book," and
the conference

on which it is based,

is

a

tremendous
19
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understanding of the implications of information technology on
tional security, the information

a State's

na-

environment, and the underlying international

legal issues.

Notes
Stephen Bull, An Historical Guide to Arms & Armor 7 (1991).
Advanced Research Project Administration NET work later renamed D ARPANET:
Defense Advanced Research Project Administration NETwork, although ARPA had always been
1.

—

2.

Department of Defense entity with military objectives.
3. M.L. Young and J.R. Levine, Internet FAQs: Answers to the Most
Frequently Asked Questions 22-24 (1995).
4. National Science Foundation NETwork. The NSFNET was initiated to handle the
increasing volume of traffic as the ARPANET became more and more popular. NSFNET also
solved a number of technical headaches inherent in the original design of the ARPANET, and so
eventually the ARPANET was phased out completely.
a

5.

The Windows

NT™ operating system, for instance, contains roughly

fifty

million lines of

source code.

A

when

works for a software development
firm
a not infrequent case. Even in this case, inserting a "backdoor" providing access to the
software after deployment is not trivial. The software development enterprise has layers of testing
in place to catch such defects. While these layers of testing are far from foolproof, such a hacker has
a slightly lower than even chance of success. Failure typically results in termination of employment,
making repeated attempts statistically meaningless.
7. These sites are free and are extensively cross-referenced. The primary belief that motivates
the maintainers of these sites is that full disclosure of all exploitable flaws is the only way for
6.

—

notable exception

is,

of course,

the hacker

intelligent system administrators to ensure robust information systems security.
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A Different Kettle of Fish:
Computer Network Attack

Roger

W.

Barnett

he Information Age has dawned, and
markable the celerity and scope

at

maturing rapidly.

it is

which the

entire

one far-flung network! As one pundit observed, "To

a first

world

Internet. In

year 2003,

is

linked globally to

all

re-

becoming

approximation,

computers in the world are connected to each other." Indeed,
nects to the Internet, he or she

is

How

all

when one con-

other computers on the

1999 there were nearly 200 million Internet users worldwide; by the
at least

another 100 million are expected to be on

Some have suggested that,

in terms

line.

of technological progress, these are revolu-

tionary times. Yet, as long ago as the decade after the orbiting of Sputnik, Soviet

authors wrote about a "Revolution in Military Affairs."

The instrument that ef-

fected this particular revolution was the marriage of the intercontinental range
ballistic missile

for the

first

with the nuclear weapon warhead. This combination meant that,

time in history,

strategic attacks (attacks

with the potential to

alter the

outcome of a war, as opposed to an attack with the potential to alter the
course and outcome of, say, a battle, which would be at the tactical level) could be

course and

conducted
lutionary,

doctrines,

at

any time against any target in the world. This was genuinely revo-

and had

to

be addressed by developing

and international

information technologies

is

rules.

a

wholly

new set of concepts,

Today, the close-coupling of societies by

beginning to portend the same

effect

—

potentially a

A Different Kettle of Fish:
strategic effect

—but without

the necessity for nuclear

missilery. Just as the Soviets noticed

major occurrence, but

also a

Computer Network Attack

weapons or long range

something revolutionary going on,

this

is

also a different kettle offish.

it is

While the Soviet "Revolution in Military Affairs" offered to produce strategic effects, the means to accomplish this end was centralized in the hands of
the State. For good or ill, the power was concentrated, and it was a power that
could be acquired only with significant technological effort and
pense. Today, the potential for a

strategic information

What makes

this so

remarkably different

is

not only the

produced without the use of nuclear weapons, but
power. The entry costs to conduct a

icant

systems attack has

ex-

become

a

1

reality.

this

at great

—an inexpensive computer, some

strategic

effects that

might be

also the diffuse availability

of

information attack are insignif-

easily obtainable software,

and

a

simple

connection to the Internet. In theory, anyone just about anywhere can gain access

and mount an information attack

Moreover, using
with

little

structural
oil, gas,

this

that

might bring about devastating results.

ubiquitous capability, strategic effects might be wrought

damage and no loss of life. Conceivably all national infracomponents could be vulnerable: telecommunications; food, water,
physical

and

electrical distribution; health care; education; finance; industry;

also military facilities,

Even more

networks,

command and

control,

and

and personnel.

disconcerting, such strategic attacks can be conducted anony-

mously. Heretofore, the concentrated power of long-range nuclear weapons

was

and under the responsibility and accountability

in the hands,

mental

were

officials.

tightly

govern-

Military means, especially those with strategic consequences,

and

way in which

of,

centrally controlled.

Time, technology, and the change

wealth have changed

societies create

all that.

in the

Thomas Czerwinski

has cautioned that "As the 'combat form' in any society follows the 'wealth creation form' of that society, the wars of the future will be predominantly, but not
solely,

'Information Wars.'

Now nameless,

"2

faceless actors

can potentially attain strategic objectives; and

the possibility exists of not being able to identify the perpetrators and hold

them

accountable. Because of the diffusion of power, the anonymity and ease of access,

the speed at

which

attacks can

preparation (resulting in

cyberspace attacks,

as

comprehension. Yet,

To

ascertain at

little

be mounted, and the paucity of observable

or no warning time), control or regulation of

might be attempted by
efforts

must be made,

what points

legal

means, seems almost beyond

for the stakes are high.

legal instruments

might be

effective either in pre-

venting attacks or in mitigating their consequences, the ingredients of an attack
can be factored into five parts for

analysis.
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•

•

power
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These could range from overturning the ruling

Objectives to be sought.
political

W.

to the infliction

of sheer pain.

Actors with motivation. Motivations

might be

political, anarchic, criminal,

monetary, or merely to vandalize.
•

Inexpensive, easy-to-use

tools.

Low

expense and ease of attaining powerful

tools increase the potential for their use.
•

•

Access

to a variety

access

would be

Wide-ranging

from the

of targets almost too

numerous

to count.

A key route

of

via the Internet.

from mere copying of information (no

results,

act) to

area, to sparking

direct injury

contaminating the water supply of a large metropolitan

economic chaos,

to causing the release

of a weapon of

mass destruction.

Recognizing

that these categories are interdependent,

it is

nevertheless useful to

break each of them out for individual discussion.

Objectives

Someone who has the ability to review and

Access to information empowers.

change

a

power.

A person with access to private or classified information can use that in-

pay schedule or an academic grade, for example, wields significant

formation in a variety of ways, not
stakes are high

of which are beneficial or lawful.

all

enough, the temptation to copy, or

alter,

If the

or pilfer information

can be very strong.
Objectives for obtaining, altering, or obliterating information can vary, de-

pending on the kind of information,
accessing

it.

its

potential uses and value, and the ease in

Conceivably, governments could be toppled by a malefactor with

the right information.

The

sheer

e-mail, financial transactions,

only a very small fraction

is

—
form of
example —means

volume of information flow

and telephone

calls,

for

corrupted, intercepted, or stolen,

lems can ensue. Each day over a

in the

that if

enormous prob-

trillion dollars circulates electronically in the

global currency market, and in excess of nine billion e-mail messages are sent in

the United States alone.

An error, loss,

or siphoning rate in the currency market

of only one one-hundredth of one percent (.0001) equates to more than

Numbers

on the incomprehensible. Consider the potential damage that could be wrought by an unauthorized person changing a bank's financial records by a simple instruction such as
"change all sevens to ones." Or even more deviously, change every third seven
to a one. Or, perhaps, change the first one thousand sevens to ones, change the

$100,000,000.

(and tolerances) such

23
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second two thousand fours to twos. Such instructions are
with very modest computer literacy to compose, but the

damage could be

repair the

is

at

someone

and cost to

difficulty

significant.

Information has the special property that

one time. This

trivial for

it

can exist in more than one place

at

the same time an advantage and a disadvantage; for example,

on the same information simultaneously, even
though they are widely separated by distance. On the other hand, it can permit
the compromise of valuable or sensitive information without its owner's
decision makers can view and act

knowledge.
Information also frequently has an element of timeliness; that
can be so perishable that
worthless

at a later

—or conceivably even an

information depends on

For those

can have great value

it

who would

its

one point

at

—

earlier

its

in time

and be

confidentiality.

seek to attack the information of others, these

the targets. Availability includes the loss of information, delay in
loss

information

time. Thus, the value of

and

availability, its integrity,

is,

its

would be

receipt,

and the

or delay of an information service. Integrity includes unauthorized changes in

the information or the introduction of

data.

false

Confidentiality

means the

unauthorized access to data or information that has some requirement for protection or privacy. In

The

data

some

cases,

no damage

might be undisturbed, but

its

to the data will result

from

exploitation.

revelation could have severe repercussions.

An additional complication is presented by the medium of "cyberspace." Because cyberspace
his

bedroom,

a

is

viewed

as a virtual

realm,

young hacker connects

in seconds, enters the

it

carries

an aura of unreality.

to the Internet, travels thousands of miles

computer system of a large corporation, and views the

contained on storage devices there. His unauthorized presence

be detected. If he destroys data on the storage device, by
strokes

on

disappears.

his

keyboard, there

The

tions, the sense

tactile

is

no

fire,

a

may

mere

or

Have any cyberspace

series

all its

part,

because

of key-

manifesta-

They

are far

removed from an
is

actual, corporal

the same.

events taken place to the extent that severe conse-

quences, either monetary loss or damage to national security, resulted?

the possible.

may not

of personal danger, and the resultant damage from such an activ-

breaking and entering, but the transgression

is little

data

smoke, or noise. The information just

experience, the physical environment in

ity are unreal, truly virtual.

there

From

evidence to support such

One might

not

a claim,

know whether

but

it is

To

date,

well within the realm of

such attacks have taken place, in

if any institution suffers a loss, it has great

incentives to suppress that

Confidence of investors or customers can be greatly undermined by such a
revelation. Moreover, the fact that an institution was attacked and suffered losses

fact.

can inspire additional attacks on other institutions. But central to the issue of
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one must analyze what gain might accrue

objectives,
acts. If

W,

the objective

gain, then protection

is
is

to the perpetrator

no

sheer malice, or to inflict pain with
at

the level of maximum difficulty.

anticipation of

The same

terrorism, for example. If terrorists have an agenda or an objective,

deter

them by withholding the

of such

is

true of

one seeks

to

"You might be

objective. In effect, they are told,

me, and to inflict great pain on me, but you cannot attain what you
seek
so you might as well not even make the attempt." If, on the other hand,
terrorists intend only to cause pain and suffering, and they place little or no value
able to injure

—

on their own lives or prospects, then they become exceedingly difficult to deter. 3
If, rather than wanton damage, the objective is monetary gain, political
change, or competitive advantage,

it is

helpful for the defender to try to antici-

pate or envision the objectives of the perpetrator. In that way, the defender can
erect active or passive defenses to try to thwart an attack or to

minimize or other-

wise manage the consequences of a successful attack.

Actors

Closely coupled to the question of objectives
tion attack

it

has

is

become a simple matter for anyone,

unauthorized access to information. This means,
erate person

the issue of actors. In informavirtually

anywhere, to gain

literally, that

any modestly

lit-

who has minimum capabilities in computing can be a participant in

information attack or exploitation.

From

the lowest level (drawing moustaches

on billboards or spray painting subway cars) to the highest (gaining unauthorized
access to the information held by a large corporation or government), the difference in capability of the actor is remarkably small. This means that children can
be recruited and taught the necessary skills; indeed many of the identified "hackers"

have been minors. 4 The entry fee, in short,

tends to be

As

low

a special

Like any

is

low in terms of capability, and

in terms of age as well.

commission reported

new tool in previous

eras,

to the President of the

United

computers can be used by those

the innocent. International narcotics traffickers

now

routinely

who

States:

prey on

communicate

with each other via computer messages. Hostile governments and even some
transnational organizations are establishing cyber- warfare efforts, assigned the

mission of crippling America's domestic infrastructure through computer attacks.

Hackers

destroy

cyber-property

by defacing homepages and maliciously

manipulating private information. Pedophiles

computer chat rooms.

Individuals

post

stalk

unsuspecting children in

homepages with

instructions

to

manufacture pipe bombs, chemical weapons, and even biological agents. Crooks
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break into business computers, either stealing funds directly or extorting

payments from companies anxious to avoid more expensive disruption.
Disgruntled employees, with valid access to their companies'

system, can take

steps to disrupt the business operations or steal proprietary, sensitive,

And our personal data is at risk of being unlawfully accessed and read

information.

by malicious

without our knowledge,

individuals,

longer

even primarily

on or

as it resides

espionage something undertaken exclusively

is

—by

traverses

5

communications and computer networks.

No

and financial

—

or, perhaps,

professional spies in highly adversarial countries; the field

now open to rank amateurs on a global basis,
or religious axes to grind.

with or without

is

political, cultural,

No longer is sabotage reserved to anarchists, social ac-

or well trained enemies of the State; the electronic environment of

tivists,

cyberspace makes

it

privacy, without personal

tivities in singular

anti-government groups, or
ingly, security forces

may

they

Alternatively,

struction.

may perform their acmentoring and a modicum of in-

widely available for the doing. Actors

as part

be

organized

and

of a government or industrial

by
team. Accordscripted

guarding against electronic attack or exploitation will have

great difficulty in "profiling" potential perpetrators.

State-supported acts are in

a class

of their own. As noted, however, they

might well be indistinguishable from mere "hacking." The non-governmental

computer network attacks (CNA), however, knows no
international boundaries, and it tends toward alienation and hostility. Here is an
excerpt of the "Hacker's Manifesto," in which can be heard echoes of the ravings of the infamous Unabomber:
culture that underwrites

This

is

our world

the baud.

be

dirt

.

.

.

the world of the electron and the switch, the beauty of

We make use of a service already existing without paying for what could

cheep

criminals.

now

if it

[sic]

We explore

.

.

wasn't run by profiteering gluttons, and you
.

and you

call

us criminals.

without nationality, without religious bias

.

.

atomic bombs, wage wars, murder, cheat, and
it is

that

for

our own good, yet we're the criminal.

of curiosity.

never forgive

me

individual, but

Among the

.

.

.

My crime

for.

you

I

am

a

is

that

all

.

.

.

.

.

.

this

is

is

Yes,

I

us criminals.

You build

make

us believe

and

try to

am a criminal. My crime is

after

my manifesto. You may

all,

most feared and powerful of all

are insiders. In part, this

to us

call

of outsmarting you, something that you will

hacker and

can't stop us

lie

us

We exist without skin color,

and you

.

call

we're

all alike.

actors in attacks

because the strength and integrity
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From an outsider's
has many nodes, many

of perception.

largely a matter

might appear very robust.

It

point of view, a network
links,

many

alternatives to

good security. To an insider who knows the network,
there might appear to be a substantial number of vulnerabilities. An outsider is
reluctant to attack what seems to him to be a very difficult, very adaptive target.
The insider, however, knows the system and its potential weaknesses. This is
routing information, and

why the insider is of such high concern
rity.

—

His trustworthiness and reliability then ascend to the level of pivotal issues.

Motivation of actors must be viewed

one

he's inside the firewall, inside the secu-

who

acts

from the

as a

outside, the rewards

much

ships,

less

might be monetary,

political, reli-

For an insider, the motivations might

gious, or perhaps just personal satisfaction.

be

major variable in the process. For

consequential. Changes in workplace environment or relation-

revenge, malicious acts

at

the behest of an outsider, the challenge, sheer

problem can all stimulate
an insider to action that could be exceedingly damaging and costly.
Because "cyberspace" has been so ill-defined, because it was initially commancuriosity, or

even

a

misguided good-faith

deered by the youth of the world, because
global and instantaneous, almost

effort to fix a

it is

so easily accessible,

and because

it is

anyone can become an actor within its confines.
Tools

On a daily basis, new tools for attacking networks are honed and made available via the Internet to

anyone

who

wants them.

Many

are free

merely for the

downloading. According to Bruce Middleton, an expert on the subject, "The

most popular of these
scanners,

war

dialers,

tection systems."

a

into several categories: password crackers, port

general network vulnerability scanners, and intrusion de-

firewalls

breach them, password
It is

fall

7

Because many

might be.

tools

and other security devices require

crackers

well-known

a

password to

attempt to determine what the user's password

fact that the

most widely used password, owing

to

the fact that employees are lazy and do not understand (or often care about) security, is

"PASSWORD." Easy-to-crack passwords involve variations of people's

names, their addresses, their pet's names, or the names or nicknames of their
favorite sports team. If a

match

fails

on

these easy passwords, the password

cracker employs a dictionary that very rapidly

tries

words

until the

password

no longer just try each potential word at the locked door (firewall) of the target site, for now most sites can
detect such efforts and will not accept password attempts beyond about three.
So, some other method must be used, such as locating the password file on the

is

discovered. In general, the password cracker can
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to decrypt

or catching passwords "on the fly"

it,

a "snitFer."

"knock on the door" of networks to see if they are unlocked.
Many, many computers and services connected to the Internet, for example,
have no protection against penetration. Port scanners try to find these unprotected ports and then gain access to information on the victim computer. Many
of the "no need to dial up" or "on all the time" services (Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) and "Web TV" fall into this category) can place their users
in a vulnerable position if they do not include security services. It is the function
of port scanners to find those unsecured computers. "Strobe" is an example of
such a scanner. It "attempts to locate and build a picture of all ports on one or
several hosts in a given network, using what is considered a very efficient algoPari scanners

rithm that helps optimize speed.
"8

or 'listening.'

War

dialers

Strobe

It

then displays

available

is

on the

all

those ports that are turned on,

Internet at

no

cost. 9

organize banks or networks of modems to dial the same

repeatedly in order to overload

many numbers

it

or keep

it

number

from receiving other signals, or they

hope of detecting a computer on the
other end. These can be very effective in situations where computers are networked but also employ modems to the outside via phone lines. Often computmight

dial

ers are

manufactured with internal

rapidly in the

modems installed.

connect their computers to a telephone

line,

Users then merely have to

and they can operate in cyberspace

outside the firewall that protects the network to

which

their

computers are

also

attached. Because users can connect to the outside directly, the "outside" can
also enter their

vice.

on

computers via

this route,

around the

firewall or protective de-

War dialers are easy to implement, and can be used with devastating effects

a targeted site.

General network vulnerability scanners. Perhaps the most famous of these

SATAN,
many

the Security Administrator's

for Analyzing

functions and has been available, also for free,

Internet.

Networks.

literally for years

It

has

on

the

SATAN analyzes a target computer system and provides the user a de-

tailed report

on

the kind of equipment, directories, and hosts supported.

Intrusion detection systems help secure
bells

Tool

is

computer systems. They have

a variety

of

and whistles, some of which are detailed record keeping of attempted intru-

sions, alerts to operators

of

attacks,

and recommended actions

to correct the

problem or even to respond. In this class one finds ISS SafeSuite, Cisco Net
Ranger, NAI CyberCop, and AXENT Technologies NetRecon, to mention
only a few.
In addition to these technical tools, there are also "social tools"
use.

For example, there

is

"dumpster diving," where
28

trash

is

commonly in
screened for

Roger

passwords,

file

and

Barnett

information, personal information, and any other data that might

aid a perpetrator's efforts. This
years,

W.

is

a

common

procedure;

it

has

been used

for

pays off Often, armed either with the material gathered from

it still

dumpster diving or sheer

gall, a

potential attacker will then engage in

what has

become known as "social engineering." For example, a telephone call will be
made to an employee in the targeted organization and a misrepresentation made
compromise of protected information. A common ruse is to
call an employee and pretend to be an "information management systems troubleshooter." The employee is told that the system is experiencing difficulties,
and that the employee's system name and password are needed to fix the problem. For many of the same reasons that "password" has the highest frequency of
in order to elicit the

usage, this technique

is

very often successful, because

propensity of people to pay
Peter G.

little

it

takes advantage of the

attention to security.

Neumann has summarized quite

succinctly the potential for

"com-

puter misuse," in the table reproduced below:

Mode

Misuse type

External
Visual spying

Observing of keystrokes or screens

Misrepresentation

Deceiving operators and users

Physical scavenging

Dumpster-diving for printout

Hardware misuse
Logical scavenging

Examining discarded/stolen media

Eavesdropping

Intercepting electronic or other data

Interference

Jamming, electronic or otherwise

Physical attack

Damaging or modifying equipment,
power

Physical removal

Removing equipment and

storage

media

Masquerading
Using false identities external
computer systems

Impersonation

Usurping communication

Piggybacking attacks

to

lines,

workstations

Spoofing attacks

Using playback, creating bogus nodes
and systems

Network weaving

Masking physical whereabouts or
routing
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Pest programs

Setting up opportunities for further

misuse

Implanting malicious code, sending

Trojan horse attacks

letter

Logic bombs

bombs

Setting time or event

bombs

(a

form

of Trojan horse)
Malevolent worms

Acquiring distributed resources

Virus attacks

Attaching to programs and replicating

Bypasses

Avoiding authentication and authority

Trapdoor

Utilizing existing flaws

attacks

Password cracking, hacking tokens

Authorization attacks

Active misuse

Writing, using, with apparent
authorization
Creating, modifying, using, denying

Basic active misuse

service, entering false or misleading

data

Incremental attacks

Using salami

Denials of service

Perpetrating saturation attacks

Passive misuse

attacks

Reading, with apparent authorization

Browsing

Making random or

Interference, aggregation

Exploiting database inferences and

selective searches

traffic analysis

Covert channels

Exploiting covert channels or other
data leakage

Inactive misuse

Willfully failing to perform expected
duties, or

committing

errors

of

omission

Indirect misuse

Source:

Peter G.

Company,

Preparing for subsequent misuses,
off-line preencryptive matching,
factoring large numbers to obtain
private keys, autodialer scanning

Neumann, Computer- Related

Risks

(New York: Addison- Wesley

as

in

Publishing

1995).

Targets

The

variety of objectives, the multiplicity of actors, and the great array of

tools together are a clear indicator that the target set

is

large

and

rich.

Targets

range from very specific systems, persons, or infrastructures that are linked
tightly
ies.

with

a perpetrator's objectives, to

sheer random, serendipitous discover-

Depending on the motivation of attackers and the
30

tools available to

them,

Roger

W,

the attack might be precisely focused

take the

form of a

Barnett

on

a

known,

discrete target; or

blunt, across-the-board destructive

mation system. The attacker might use
and the effort might take a long time

a variety

blow

might

it

to an entire infor-

of techniques to gain

access,

—perhaps spanning months, or even

years.

Monetary flows and

financial databases, because they offer the prospect

great gain with comparatively

low pain or

risk, are

prime

more

the greater the sensitivity or the value of information, the

be protected. This

is

targets.

only a presumption, however, because

Presumably,

carefully

many

—with no conception

—and they

of,

as

will

are oper-

or attention to, any threat.

National infrastructures have
cent years

it

information

systems and vital services were designed, and constructed
ated

of

come under increasingly intense

scrutiny in re-

potential targets for information attack. Because of the

growing

on July 15, 1996, issued Executive Order 13010 establishing a Presidential Commission for Critical Infrastructure Protection
(PCCIP). Chaired by retired Air Force General Robert T. Marsh, the commission identified eight infrastructures that must be protected from the depredadanger, President Clinton,

tions

and

of information and other kinds of attack. These were:

oil (storage

and

transportation), telecommunications,

electrical

power, gas

banking and finance,

emergency services (including medical,
police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government services. The PCCIP
presented the results of its inquiry in October 1997.
Another attractive target is the US Department of Defense. The Deputy Secretary of Defense testified in 1998 that "95 percent of all of our communications
transportation, water supply systems,

now go

over public infrastructure

computer systems,
tine

et cetera." 10

—

public telephone lines, telephone switches,

Much

of this departmental information

is

rou-

and administrative, which is not to say that it is unimportant. Virtually all lo-

gistics

and medical information on service members

travels

over the public

were unaware of such a dependency
before, they clearly are now mindful of that vulnerability, and one prudently
must assume that they are planning ways to exploit it.
If, indeed, essentially all computers in the world are connected, then that constitutes about as target-rich an environment as can be imagined.
infrastructure, for example. If antagonists

Results

The

horizons being very wide and deep for information operations, and spe-

computer network attack, the results also occupy a broad spectrum.
From a mere nuisance of defacing a web page with a political message to the loss

cifically
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of great amounts of money, or potentially
tives, attackers, tools,

and

targets, as

well

lives,

as

the results vary with the objec-

the vigor, and the rigor, with

which

targets are defended.

Exhortations have been raised that the United States
an "Electronic Pearl Harbor." Those

United

States

is

might well be

a

prime candidate for

who issued such a warning meant that the

unprepared and not watching very

that the results

is

truly shocking.

closely,

can be surprised, and

Of course, beyond

the

initial

trauma, what Pearl Harbor (and the subsequent declarations of war) accom-

American public and focus it laser-sharp on conducting
the Axis powers. Given these facts, some argue that the reason more

plished was to anger the

war against

catastrophic events have not occurred

—bringing down
—

the Internet, for

exam-

which some have contended is possible is that potential attackers fear the
"post-Pearl Harbor" backlash.
To date, no catastrophic event has occurred because of computer network at-

ple,

make and for that reason often lack credibilIf a particular company is prevented from doing business on the Internet for,

tack. Estimates
ity.

say an hour,

of loss are

what

is

difficult to

the cost of that?

Was

a once-in-a-lifetime

opportunity

missed, with incalculable costs? Opportunity costs are especially difficult to esti-

what is lost in a computer network attack.
could vary from the time lost to clean up the graffiti on a defaced

mate, and that
So, results

website

to,

frequently

is

perhaps, billions of dollars in a financial transaction, drug deal, or ex-

tortion. National infrastructures could

very disruptive

results,

The potential

to

instantaneously, at

law

be successfully attacked by

and perhaps high innocent

loss

CNA,

with

of life.

wreak great damage virtually anywhere in the world, almost
very low cost, by almost anyone is imminent. International

offers a prospective tool to

attempt to help control or mitigate the potential

Each of the ingredients of an attack listed above offers a possible pressure point for legal application. As analyses and discussions on the subject proceed, these five points can provide a useful framework upon which to build.
dangers.
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Information Operations, Information

Warfare, and Computer Network Attack
Their Relationship to National Security in the
Information Age

Daniel T. Kuehl*
Introduction

hat

is

"information warfare"?

sticker,

find

it

used

as a

Is

new amalgam of

nothing more than

new

concept?

fall

military technologies such as the catapult

warfare

as

become

The

obsolete?

Is it

same receptacle

into the

moded

understand

bumper

such a revolu-

technologies and concepts that old and traditional

forms of warfare are soon slated to

we

a

"quick fix" rescue for budgets and programs that

useful to attach themselves to the hot

tionary

it

it,

in

which out-

and war galley slumber?

featuring "blast, heat, and fragmentation," about to

intent of this brief introduction to information warfare

(IW) and information operations (IO)

is

to

both explore these

issues

and present

the thesis that they are best understood in light of the environment in

they take place
ship of that

—

—and

the information environment

environment

computer network

Is

attack.

to the specific topic

which

to explore the relation-

on which

this

book

is

focused,
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What

A

useful starting place

warfare

The

itself.

is

is

Information Warfare?

to trace the evolution of the

earliest use

term information

of the term in the United States probably origi-

nated in the Office of Net Assessment, where in the 1970s Dr.
investigating the relationships
netics.
as

Dr.

among

control systems, a field

Tom Rona was

known

as

cyber-

Rona described the competition between competing control systems

"information warfare," in the sense that control systems can be described

as

means for gathering, processing, and disseminating information, processes
which can be diagrammed and described with flow and feedback charts of
the

mind-numbing
published an

dryness and complexity. 2 In 1993 the Department of Defense

official definition for

the term, in a highly classified

TS3600.1. There were actually several definitions,

DoD Directive,
of classifi-

at differing levels

cation.

3

tional

and organizational implications of the concept evolved. The current

Not

surprisingly, this definition

definition has the record for longevity

was frequently revised

—more than

the opera-

as

five years at the

time of this

on information warfare
Directive 3600.1 on December 9, 1996. 4

writing, since the promulgation of the current guidance

and information operations in

The

Op-

publication of Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information

erations, in

tions

DoD

October 1998 probably ensures

of IW and IO will remain in

that the current official

effect for

some time

longer.

DoD defini-

5

The present definitions leave much to be desired, however, if one is hoping to
find explanations that clarify

and explore what might constitute the character,

conduct, and intent of IW and IO. But since one must understand what
order to

move to its less comprehensive building block, IW,

provide

a useful starting point:

Information Operations: Actions taken to
systems while defending one's

own

affect adversary

to

is

these definitions

in

do

information and information

information and information systems.

Information Warfare: Information operations conducted during time of
conflict

IO

crisis

or

achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or

adversaries.

There

is

actually a

second sub-activity of IO that

is

critical to

national security in

the Information Age, namely information assurance (IA), defined thus:

Information

Assurance:

Information

operations

that

information and information systems by ensuring their

36

protect

and

defend

availability, integrity,
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authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for
restoration of information systems

reaction capabilities.

by incorporating protection, detection, and

6

throw a less-than-blinding light on their constituent
activities, there is one critical theme that they are intended to bring out, and
that involves "who" does them and "when" they are done. IW is clearly a military activity conducted under a special set of circumstances, whereas IA involves not only the military, but also government at all levels, and even
portions of the private sector. Therefore, IO as an activity goes far beyond just
the military during conflict, to include the government and a wider range of

While

these definitions

private sector activities than perhaps that sector or even the

government

recognizes.

Most US

service concepts of

Whether described

tion environment."

whatever, there
"place" in

is

which

IW rest in part on the concept of the "informaas

an environment, realm, domain, or

become some kind of
conducted. The Army's trailblazing

information has

a clear sense that

crucial operations are

1996 doctrinal publication, Field Manual 100-6, Information Operations, even
speaks of a "global information environment [and] battlespace" in
flict is

waged. The

Force Doctrine

latest

version of the

Document

1

,

USAF's

which con-

basic doctrinal publication, Air

published in 1997, explicitly addresses the need to

dominate the information realm, and discusses information superiority
ability to collect, control, exploit,

versary the ability to do the same

mation realm.

." 7
.

.

Joint

.

"the

and defend information while denying an ad.

.

[it]

Pub 3-13

capability to collect, process,

as

includes gaining control over the infor-

defines

it

somewhat

differently as "[t]he

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of informa-

do the same." Both,
however, share the sense that information superiority involves doing something
tion while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to

to the adversary while protecting ourselves in order to control

information environment. Using
scribed as the struggle

to control

and

that extends across the conflict
virtually

all

philosophy, then,

IW

and IO can be de-

exploit the information environment, a struggle

spectrum from "peace" to "war" and involves

of the government's agencies and instruments of power. 8

of this approach
time,"

this

and exploit the

is

that if one replaces "information"

you have defined

poses, airpower

air

One appeal

with "aerospace" or "mari-

and naval warfare, or more appropriate to our pur-

and seapower. Information operations can thus be described

as

those activities that governments and military forces undertake to control and
exploit the information

environment via the use of the information component

of national power.
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This immediately

raises

More

nent of national power?
logical fluff,

another question: what

compo-

origins actually predate this decade, starting with the strategies

its

in

its

Reagan Administration

In 1984 the

sion Directive 130,
strategy for

the information

than just another bit of computer-age termino-

developed by the Reagan Administration

mer USSR.

is

US

very real struggle with the forissued National Security Deci-

International Information Policy,

which outlined

employing the use of information and information technology

strategic instruments for

cultural forces

shaping fundamental

on a long-term basis to

political,

affect the global

economic,

military,

a
as

and

behavior of governments,

supra-governmental organizations, and societies to support national security. 9
This

new concept, and clearly governments and leaders have been ex-

hardly a

is

ploiting the information

environment

for centuries. Indeed,

that the stone carvings that Assyrian rulers

made of conquered peoples and cities

being enslaved and pillaged were intended

and potential subjects

what hard and

as to

one could argue

as

much

to

cow and

terrify current

inform archeologists thousands of years

later

about

cruel folks they were. Regardless of the fact that the information

technology being employed was stone and
puter network,

this

chisel,

and not microchip and com-

was exploitation of the information environment

for strate-

gic political objectives.

Two

examples from

this

century will suffice to

tance of this environment to national security.

when

1914,
all

five

The

illustrate
first

the critical impor-

took place on August

the royal cableship Telconia sortied into the

North Sea and severed

of Germany's direct undersea telegraph links with the outside world.

After that date, the view that the rest of the world had of The Great
creasingly passed through a lens located in

mation warriors to mount

campaign
side

a

London. This enabled

Allies, thus

safe for

War

in-

British infor-

very effective strategic perception management

that eventually helped bring the

of the

world

5,

United

war on the
waging war to "make the

States into the

moving from strict neutrality to

democracy." Great Britain was exploiting the information com-

ponent of national power. The second example comes from the Cold

War and

some of its allies to exploit another segment
of the information environment radio to weaken the political cohesion of
the Soviet Union and the peoples it controlled. Radio Free Europe did not by
the efforts by the United States and

—

itself,

of course, cause the

certainly

had

its

lapse.

gies

—

Yet

of communism and the Soviet government, but

role to play.

within the former Soviet
10

fall

—

It is

Union

still

perhaps instructive that certain elements

blame Western IO for communism's col-

employed old information technolothey also beg the question: what is the role of

since both these examples

telegraph cables and radio

the computer in

all

—

it

of this?
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A New

The

Geostrategic Context

previous examples raise the question of what

about the current

state

is

so

new and

of the "information environment" to warrant

different

all

the fuss

The answer is fouromni-linking, and com-

about "computer network attack" and information warfare.
fold: cyberspace, digital

convergence, global

puter control of infrastructures,
create a

new

digital

of which are synergistically combining to

all

geostrategic context for national security.

One's receptivity to the changes of the information revolution
vealed by the reaction to the

word

often re-

is

"cyberspace." At the very utterance of the

word, doubters and skeptics display

and sometimes even physical

intellectual

discomfort, while the "digerati" and those at ease with the technologies of the

information age react

as if

someone had

said "traffic" or "radio" or

any other

commonplace term. Almost everyone is familiar with the use of information as a
tool, a process, even a weapon
recall the earlier comment about "blast, heat,

—

and fragmentation"
vital to the

—

yet while

of these remain not only applicable but even

all

new and evolving "American way of war," none in isolation goes far

enough. This chapter argues that the synergistic

effects

of electronic

digital tech-

on societies that are becoming increasingly informationdependent, have made information into a virtual environment, with cyberspace
as its physical manifestation. Cyberspace, defined here as that place where electronic systems such as computer networks, telecommunications systems, and

nology, acting in and

devices that exert their influence through or in the electromagnetic spectrum

connect and

interact, has always existed,

but not until mankind invented tech-

nologies that operated via the electromagnetic spectrum did

and noticed.
until

A useful analogy

is

outer space.

humans developed technologies

used it to
cal

11

affect terrestrial affairs did

It

has always

for extending

our

it

become

been

"visible"

there, but not

activities into

it

and

we fully comprehend that it is another physi-

and operational environment in addition to the land,

sea,

and air. Outer space

does not have the same physical presence or properties of land or water because

you cannot "weigh"
because

we

it

or "measure"

can see the physical

it

in a useful sense, but

results

it

nonetheless exists

of things that happen there. 12

The physical laws and principles that govern and delineate how systems function in these environments are the borders that fix their boundaries. 13 Submarines, for

example, function very well in an environment governed by the laws

of hydrodynamics, but they cannot
fectively

on

fly.

Armored

fighting vehicles function ef-

land, but they are useless in space. All of these distinct

and unique

environments synergistically interact with each other, and the same holds true
for cyberspace.

The

devices and systems that operate in cyberspace
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radars,

microwaves, computer networks

—function because they conform

and exploit the laws governing radiated and electronic energy.

to

We can date our

use of this environment to the mid- 19th Century and the invention of the tele-

which was the

graph,

with the laws of

first

this

telecommunication system to operate in accordance

medium. 14 The following century saw

ever-more technologically sophisticated advances in our
exploit this
relay,

medium

—undersea

even communications

regular and

ability to control

microwave
extended the reach of telecommu-

telegraph cables, radio, television,

—

satellites

that

We have in-

nications to continental and eventually intercontinental distances.

creased the

and

volume of information

that

we can store, manipulate, and transfer to

previously unimaginable proportions, but

it

was only

in the closing quarter of

the 20th Century that the fortuitous, perhaps even serendipitous, marriage of
these technologies with the microchip led to attainment of "critical mass" and

the emergence of cyberspace
forces

learn

and society in general

how

to operate.

—

Given

fledged environment in which military

as a full

politics, business,
this definition

computer network attack; cyberspace

is

education, and more

of cyberspace,

we

—began

to

see the link to

the physical environment in

which such

operations take place.

Cyberspace

is

the basic arena in

which two

additional developments of the in-

formation revolution are transforming the strategic landscape: the increasing capability to transform almost

any kind of information into ones and zeroes, in

what is known as digital convergence, and the growing Internetting of global telecommunications media in a condition referred to here as global omni-linking. Although these developments are distinctly different, they are at the same time
synergistic

and interdependent. Thomas

Kuhn

suggested in his landmark study

of scientific revolutions that the history of technological advancement has not

been one of steady discoveries or developments, but rather one marked by spikes
or sharp advances that flow from extraordinary finds or revelations that yield dis-

continuous and revolutionary changes. 15 Such has been the case with information technology.

Advances in communication technologies prior

—

of the 20th Century were relatively linear
so forth.

middle

telegraph to telephone to radio and

The break point came with the invention of the microchip because

synergistic advances in information storage, manipulation,
pabilities

to the

made

possible

by

digital

the

and transmission ca-

convergence are happening

at

increasing and nonlinear rate. These developments have occurred in

an ever-

two

areas,

the speed of information manipulation/transmission, and the volume of information that can be manipulated/transmitted.

The combination of these

attributes

with computer-enhanced and controlled telecommunications systems have led
to the "omni-linking'

of the electronic

digital
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world. In a word, the globe

is

now
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"wired."
to

The

explosion that has resulted from the application of the microchip

communications technologies has formed the

new science of telematics

—

the

marriage of computers and telecommunications.

Telematics has created a

we use

the telematic age

new

operational environment.

to exploit cyberspace

cades old, and global omni-linking

cyberspace

as

is

is

The technology of

new, perhaps

than two de-

less

inseparably tied to the emergence of

an operational environment. While current technology

rudimentary compared with what the future holds in store

actually

is

—compare

the level

of aviation technology in the 1930s (biplanes) with what came just half a century
later (747s

and B-2s)

—

the omnilinking of the world

is

increasing every day, as

more and more computer networks and telecommunications systems
gether and pass the lifeblood of today's economic and political world

.

.

tie
.

to-

digital

The degree to which our societal dependence on this environment
is growing is startling. Our military forces already depend on it. The Persian Gulf
War of 1990-91 simply could not have been fought in the way we fought it
information.

without precision information for precision weapons,

command and

woozy and

systems that enabled us to operate like a matador around a
half-conscious bull, or
half a

world away

satellite

(NORAD)

communications links
to

monitor

control

that enabled organizations

Iraqi missile launches

and

ing information to Patriot batteries to engage the missiles. 16

pass target-

Our micro-

chip-driven information collection, storage, manipulation, and transmission
capabilities are so

Internetted, that

skew

advanced, and the links that

move

the information around so

we worry that TV news commentators on the

election results

on

the west coast

indicate candidate 'Z' has

by announcing

"analysis

east coast

could

of voting trends

won the election." The global economy cannot func-

tion without the constant supply of digital electronic information.

It

has

become

form of energy or capital, and global business is utterly dependent on telematic
systems and capabilities to keep the world's economy going twenty-four hours a
a

day. Business practices such as "just in time inventory," or military techniques

such

as "just in

time

logistics,"

cannot function without the

digital

information

17

which could be called the
"new American way of war," is possible only if American forces possess "information superiority," defined by Joint Pub 3-13 as "[t]he capability to collect,
that fuels

process,

it.

In a very real sense, Joint Vision 20 10,

and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting

or denying an adversary's ability to do the same."
nite place

nor

a collection

of gadgets such

The

as routers

tion of the increasing omni-linking of the world.

such

as

and switches;

is

neither a

it is

a

fi-

descrip-

Thinking of the Internet

in

"America OnLine" or "CompuServe," or in terms of
chat rooms or E-commerce, is as shortsighted as describing

terms of its users, such
uses,

"Internet"

as
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aerospace in terms of an

While some

airline.

dismiss this

Internet as merely entertainment or worse, this
large percentage

environment and the

view ignores the

of the information currently available on

very

fact that a

TV or in print would

same category. Few, however, would deny the impact of visual meon the American populace's support of the Vietnam War or the impact of the
into the

fall

dia

printed

word on democracy and freedom

ence" or "Emancipation Proclamation."

and omni-linking make

it

via the "Declaration

What

is

different

of Independ-

that the Internet

is

increasingly possible for that televised image to be

seen instantly by an ever increasing percentage of the world's population, or for
that opinion-shaping paper to

be sent to tens or even hundreds of millions of

people simultaneously and in their

own language. 18 Digital

convergence, com-

bined with connectivity, adds up to the second major part of the fundamental
difference

between the information age and the period

"BMC"

— "Before

the

Micro Chip."

The

new

major development shaping the

final

increasing reliance

on computerized networks

of key infrastructures in advanced

geostrategic context

for the control

The growing

societies.

is

the

and operation

reliance

on

these

systems for the control and functioning of an increasingly large segment of the

on which we depend for economic, social, political, and even
strength is both a boon and vulnerability. As suggested by Chairman

infrastructures

military

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 6510.1, Defensive Informa-

dependence

tion Warfare, "use breeds dependence, and
ity."

19

Whether

ment of

it

be the supply of energy

creates vulnerabil-

(electricity, oil, gas), the

transportation (railroads, air traffic control,

manage-

motor vehicle move-

ment), the transference of digital wealth (electronic funds

transfer,

digital

banking, control of stock exchanges), or the operation of the very telematic

media

below the
and one will

that supports the entire structure, look

segment of

daily life in

modern

any

find Internetted and

systems. 20

computer
The degree to which

interlinked

real incident. In

this

invisible to the general

is

February 1996, Washington

typical industrial-age accident
train collided

societies

surface of almost

with

—

a train

a freight train,

populace

is

illustrated

by

a

DC suffered a tragic but relatively
commuter
The investiga-

wreck. During a snowstorm

and several people were

killed.

a

by the news media examined almost every aspect of the accident, including
the signaling system that provided instructions to the train operator (who was
tions

also killed, heroically trying to

warn passengers

ubiquitous signal lights that line railroad tracks

all

over the world. The news

me-

on whether the operator saw the signals, whether they were properly
or whether they functioned properly. None asked whether the signals

dia focused

placed,

instead of saving himself) via the
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had been electronically tampered with (they had not been), nor even raised the
issue of how the signals were controlled or where those controls were located.
They were controlled, of course, by Internetted computer systems, and the
computers which control the
located
eral

at

the operations center for

hundred miles

modern

societies

distant.

This

a

is

for the trackage in

government

DC are

Washington

CSX Railways, in Jacksonville,

Florida, sev-

an illustration of how deeply imbedded within

such control systems have become, and

us are of their functioning.
It is

rail signals

how unaware most of

21

responsibility,

however, to not only be aware of such de-

velopments, but also to take precautionary and preventive measures to mitigate
potential disruptions to the effective functioning of systems
ciety

upon which

the so-

and national security depend. In July 1996, the Clinton Administration

sued Executive Order 13010, which directed the formation of

a

is-

unique

commission, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
or

PCCIP, which brought together senior governmental

officials

and represen-

from those private sector industries and businesses that comprised these
key infrastructures into a commission tasked with studying the vulnerability of
these infrastructures to disruption. While the commission examined both the
physical and cyber threats, they freely acknowledged that their emphasis was on
the cyber threat, in part because it was
and remains less well understood than
tatives

—

—

physical threats. Their conclusion that the threat

is

real

and growing might seem

unsurprising and perhaps even preordained, but nonetheless reflects the grow-

ing awareness that our very dependency on computerized control of infrastructures creates an inherent vulnerability that

scenarios for information warfare in
infrastructures "take

is

at

the heart of hypothetical

which computer network attacks on critical

down" key segments of those

on such systems
It was the need to respond to

infrastructures

banking, or emergency

erate cascading effects

as transportation,

services.

this vulnerability that

Administration to issue Presidential Decision Directive

and thus gen-

caused the Clinton

(PDD) 63 on May

22,

1998, establishing a national coordinator for infrastructure protection within the

National Security Council and creating an organizational structure by which

such threats and vulnerabilities could be mitigated.

PDD

63 called for

a public

sector-private sector partnership to develop cooperative procedures and organizations to assess the threats

and

vulnerabilities

and create countermeasures, and

what is now called computer network defense
(CND) against the threat of what has in some quarters been termed
"infrastructural warfare" employing computer network attack (CNA). 22 But as
perhaps the key element in information warfare, is the computer network the
target, or merely the means to the target?
thus stands as a landmark step in
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Computer Networks, National

Security,

and the "Metanetwork"

This chapter has already used several terms relating to computer networks

without defining those

Operations Policy, dated
activities,

The current CJCSI 3210.1, Joint Information
November 6, 1998, currently includes three such

activities.

defined thus:

Computer Network Attack (CNA): Operations

to disrupt, deny, degrade, or

destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the

computers and networks themselves.

Computer Network Defense (CND): Measures taken

to protect

and defend

infonnation, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or
destruction.

Computer Network Exploitation (CNE):
obtain information resident in

files

Intelligence collection operations that

of threat automated information systems (AIS)

and gain information about potential vulnerabilities, or access
resident within foreign

operations.

The

AIS

critical

information

be used to the benefit of friendly

that could

23

thread that

ties

network may be the

these activities together

is

The
make

the computer network.

actual target, in the sense that the attacker wishes to

network cease its function of transferring information. It may be the
means to affect another target, such as a database or other information-based
process, in which the attacker does not want to cut the network, but rather
the

use

The

it

in order to impact or degrade an adversary's decision-making process.

objective of

computer network defense

is

to prevent an adversary

doing either of these to our networks. Computer network exploitation

concerned with intelligence operations. While the dividing

cifically

tween

CNA

and

CNE

may

well be very

might be the only difference
ther, in part

thorny

—

will not discuss

and unresolved questions.

CNA

is

line

spe-

be-

indeed, a single keystroke

CNE

because those operations bring along their

issues

problem

—we

murky

from

will

be

or even

own

CND

baggage

fur-

train

of

a sufficiently difficult

to address here.

Imagine for a

moment that a warrior

(the specific service or

warform is

irrele-

vant) has just destroyed a critical target, comprised of all the computerized databases contained in the enemy's central

with a laser-guided

aerial

bomb,

C3 facility. Does it matter if this was done

a five-inch

44

round from

a

warship

at sea, a

Daniel T. Kuehl

120mm round from a
cious

tank, a ballistic

weapon dropped from

programming code "delivered" by computer intrusion? The

CNA cited above does not clearly state the answer, but
tion that the
spirit

space, or via mali-

means used

is

last case,

selves to

be on

part, this

all

of the examples just cited could be

however, warriors and jurists

fairly

firm ground.

comes from our

this author's

conten-

immaterial; since the intent clearly conforms to the

of the definition, any or

but the

it is

definition of

It is

intellectual

the

last

CNA.

In

all

probably consider them-

alike

case that gives everyone pause. In

and doctrinal desire for

clarity.

Warriors

seek to clearly distinguish between different kinds of operations so that they can
establish clear lines

of authority and control. Unfortunately,

The example

possible in the information battlespace.

naval, land, or space warfare, in addition to

cited

this

may not be fully

above could be

air,

being information warfare. This

not unique to information warfare, although

is

we do not often examine military

During the October 1973
armored forces crossed the Suez Ca-

operations from such a multi-doctrinal perspective.

Yom Kippur War, for example, once Israeli
nal in their counteroffensive they

began destroying Egyptian surface-to-air mis-

which enabled the Israeli Air Force to expand operations. This is a
wonderful example of what airmen term Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses, or
SEAD. Doctrinally, SEAD is a part of what is in turn called Counterair Operasile

forces,

tions

—

things

were

part

done

of an

to seize

air superiority

what ground forces would
bility

must

The

also

first

and maintain control of the

call

operation

at

in

CNA.

CNA mentioned above focused on the destruction or ne-

guided bomb, for example

—

is

—

accomplished kinetically

We

will not consider kinetic

further, since they are already well understood, but the use

puter to negate another computer
to discuss the intricacies

and

the

or via cyberspace, the intent remains the same,

to prevent the adversary's use of the network.

means

were engaging

maneuver warfare. This same kind of doctrinal flexi-

gation of a network. Regardless of whether this
laser

Thus, armored forces

the same time they

be applied to information warfare and

aspect of

air.

well understood. There

less

is

details

is

of computer code, and such

of the com-

no need here
issues are ad-

on computer security and information technology. That said, a word or two on the basic context are in order. 24
The basic objective of virtually any computer intruder or hacker is to be able to
dressed in great detail in a myriad of books

operate within the system

as if

he/she

owned

it.

Once

this level

of access

is

pseudo-owner can then change programs, functions, addresses, and
almost any other aspect of the way the computer or the entire network in which
it resides operates. Thus, an intruder that obtains root access into a computer
network that controls personnel records, for example, could perhaps alter the
gained, the

content of those records or change

how
45

those records are stored or transferred.
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The implications of this for the proper functioning of any computer network, be
it

government, or business, are obvious.

military,

As pointed out
creasingly

modern

earlier,

technologically advanced societies are in-

dependent on computer networks for a growing range of societal and

national security needs. If the

computer system

that controls rail operations in

the southeast United States can be degraded, for example,

movement of military

perhaps even stop the

move

to their

deployment

graded
ergy

it

US

could seriously hinder the

Command,

Transportation

movement of US

(electric,

gas,

degraded during severe winter weather

and

strategic

Air Mobility

it

and

in the northeast could be

might cause

away from

attention

oil)

a refocusing

distant

a

that

all

down"

at

home. Some of the

and robustness of these networks. However, while loose

entire national infrastructures

Examples

as

recent

as

the 1999

of allied computer networks such

what was

traffic,

little

is

fanciful at best,

it

also

credit

talk

of

remains true

of these infrastructures are in some degree vulnerable to intrusion and deg-

radation.

via

of national

and perhaps poorly-

discussion of infrastructural vulnerability seen recently has given far too

"taking

links to

rail

forces overseas. If the en-

understood overseas problem to an unfolding disaster right

to the resiliency

or

the Tanker-Airlift Coordination Center, can be severely de-

management system

political

depend on

down

locations. If the telephone system that supports Scott

Air Force Base, headquarters of

Command, and

forces that

slow

will

it

a "denial

as

of service"

the

Kosovo

conflict,

during which

a variety

NATO e-mail system came under attack

effort to

overload the system with electronic

indicate that this will be an active battlespace in the future. 25

If the intent

of a

CNA

to partially or completely

is

network, defenders are faced with

a

thorny

set

deny access

of problems, but

probably be aware that the system has been targeted.

to or use of the

at least

they will

When you receive multiple

thousands of unanticipated e-mail messages within a short span of time in what is

"spam" or denial of service attack, you can reasonably assume that
someone even though you might not know whom means you harm. CNA
that does not attempt to overtly prevent use of the system, however, but rather is
termed

a

—

—

intended to covertly subvert

even more

difficult

its

purpose by changing the content,

problem. Let us use the analogy of a pipeline that

jet fuel. In traditional, kinetic warfare,

the

air,

and

a

smart airplane carrying

the thing apart, thus preventing the

what

if

we

is

it

(from a jet fuel standpoint,

even though the pipeline

a small

at least)

target

it

is

carrying

for destruction

from

PGMs would come along and neatly blow
enemy from

did not want to be so noisy?

to the pipeline, attach to

we would

perhaps an

refueling his jets

from

it.

But

We could send a special operations unit

pumping device that injects a small but fatal
amount of some nasty foreign substance, and,

itself is still intact,
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pipeline unusable.

might be

It is

analogy for

a perfect

modification of data, and

digital

virtually invisible until too late. Let us

it

assume that the computer code

"bomb, 500 pound" is a combination of forty-four ones and zeros, while the
code for "bomb, 4,000 pound" is another combination of forty-four ones and

for

zeroes

—

almost, but not quite, identical.

immediately apparent.

up

at

some

Base X, but

all

If one eighth the

of them are too large for the

that deal

where

aircraft at that base to carry,

been injected into the

significant friction has just

history of instances

The opportunity for logistical chaos is
anticipated number of munitions show

accidental but incorrect

air

war.

We have a long

computer code

in systems

with telecommunications or energy has caused significant malfunctions

with those systems, and

we

have seen a growing number of cases of intentional

computer networks. 26

intrusion into these and other such

The mindset of many
seems to be that they are

senior strategic leaders regarding the
large, expensive,

"data center" somewhere.

The

reality

is

and stand alone in

just the opposite

—

computer

still

their respective

for they are small

(and getting smaller every week), cheap (and getting cheaper every week), and

interconnected on a global

scale. It

can be a

difficult realization that if you

oper-

computer that is plugged into a telephone, you are theoretically connected
every other computer on the face of the earth that is also connected to a tele-

ate a

to

phone, even
chapter
less

calls

if it is a cell

computer networks

"metanetwork"

and entire

—hence

the strategic importance of what this

"omni-linking," because the globe

individual

global

phone

to

which

is

literally

that are nonetheless

covered with count-

all

growing

part of the

tens of millions of individuals, organizations,

societies are connected.

It

would seem to be

inescapable that

as

and more human activity is conducted in cyberspace via the metanetwork,

become

a battlespace

and an arena for

conflict.

Information Warfare

—

But

Is it

will

it

more
it

will

be war?

"War"?

Perhaps a necessary starting point for this question is: what is war? Most mem-

community would have no difficharacterization of war as "an act of [physical]

bers of the military and the national security
culty recognizing Clausewitz's

force ... a pulsation of violence." 27

Too often, perhaps, the rest of the phrase,
"to impose our will," is forgotten. The reason for the force and violence is the
imposition of the will of one political entity onto another political entity. The issue at hand now is the potential ability of political actors to impose their will
through informational means.
In the Clausewitzian paradigm,

"warriors,"

on behalf of a

special

war was waged by

a special class

kind of political entity, "States."

47

of actors,

The

warriors
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were the uniformed

military

—

soldiers, sailors, later

airmen

—and

the States

were the legitimate and recognized holders of international legal authority to
engage in the force and violence of warfare. Almost at the same time (late 19th
Century)

as

the Clausewitzian paradigm began rising to international promi-

nence another force arrived on the scene, the international codification of legal
norms for the conduct of war and the protection of certain classes of society.

These norms,
ately

first

enacted a century ago (1899)

encountered two extremely powerful

dustrial State

at

The Hague,

forces: the nature

almost immedi-

of the modern in-

and the influence of new technological means of warfighting.

The modern

industrial State possessed

an unprecedented amount of killing

and dying power. Although this was clearly hinted at by the course of the American Civil War, the great European military powers failed to recognize
28
late.

it

until

was the stalemate and slaughter of The Great War and the
Western Front, in which the amount of destructive force that the industrial State
too

The

result

could generate was matched only by the amount of destructive force

it

could

Twenty years later these same great powers demonstrated that their
killing/ dying power had actually increased, with the result that World War II's
toll far exceeded that of World War I. This was made possible by the State's ability to employ and draw upon power sources that cut across almost the full
withstand.

breadth of society. These sources crossed the boundaries of what had been in-

tended

as sanctuaries

combatants such

as

and protected groups, such

women. But

Was "Rosie

undefended towns or non-

did the concept of an undefended

anything useful in an era of nationwide
fighter patrols?

as

air

town mean

defense systems with flak belts and

the Riveter" a protected person

when

she and her

29

homes to build U-boats or liberty ships? It became increasingly
obvious that the modern industrial State was a series of networks or infrastructures, and the American doctrine for strategic airpower in World War II was
based on exploiting this fact. The "industrial web" theory of targeting, developed at the Air Corps Tactical School in the 1930s, came from precisely this paradigm and was based on the belief that if the critical nodes or "centers of gravity"
sisters left their

(a

1990s adaptation of a Clausewitzian term) of an industrial State could be ne-

gated, the resulting stresses
spider's

web whose

critical

interplay of these factors

on the

entire system

would cause

connecting points have been

was

a

it

cut. 30

to unravel like a

The result of

change in our paradigm of warfare, from the

"limited" dynastic wars of the 19th Century to the "total" wars of survival
litical,

religious, racial, ideological

A second critical factor was

the

—of

—po-

the 20th Century.

the development of new forms of warfare based

on the exploitation of new forms of technology. The first great revolution in
military affairs (RMA) of the last century was the adaptation of the internal
48
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combustion engine to warfare, and by the end of the century's second decade
warfare had become incredibly more complex than it had been in 1900 because
it

now

was

Now

No

multidimensional.

longer was warfare

waged on

the surface.

went on below the ocean's surface and above both the sea and the land,
and military success became increasingly dependent on the successful coordination of operations in all three dimensions. Thus, the invention and employment
of the submarine and the airplane transformed warfare, a fact that was clearly visible during World War II in that no nation that failed to dominate all three environments was successful. To make the situation more complex, by 1945 it was
it

clear that

any force that was unable to operate in yet

a

tromagnetic spectrum, or what has here been defined

have great

difficulty operating successfully in

—
cyberspace —would

4th dimension
as

the elec-

any of the other three dimensions.

This trend has continued and been intensified with military exploitation of yet

The

another physical environment, outer space.

ronment

for warfare at the cusp

awareness, global connectivity,
plicated the art of war.

and operational envi-

strategic

new millennium now enfolds geospatial
and a host of new factors that have further comof the

Not surprisingly,

the legal context for conflict,

which in-

war and the complex series of agreements and treaties that
provide a framework for the affairs of State and conduct of statecraft, has been
outpaced by the technologies available to global society. At the outset of the
cludes the law of

20th Century, issues such

as

unrestricted submarine warfare and strategic

ing held promise of a disconnect between the law and war, while at

other issues, such
tainty in

as

netwar or the weaponization of space, hint

at

bombclose

its

further uncer-

how States and societies will attempt to regulate conflict. The same two

forces that arose at the

opening of the last century are

ble difference that instead of the industrial age

it is

still

work, with the nota-

at

the information age that

is

changing the paradigm.
In

some ways, the impact of the information revolution on warfare

quite

is

apparent, and the application of advanced information technologies to traditional military capabilities

mation "in war"
efficiently

and

—

and weapon systems

serves to

effectively.

make

"blast, heat,

Information used

nothing new, even though the

—what could be termed

infor-

and fragmentation" work more

as a

weapon,

tool, or

new technologies vastly increase

even

its

target

impact

as

is

an

enabling capability or force multiplier. Sending target photos via secure fax from
intelligence organizations in the

NATO,

United

States to air

in

thus enabling the destruction shortly afterwards of key Serbian infra-

structure nodes via precision guided munitions,

is

an example of this

exponential power as an enabler is an important, even

Force

campaign planners

calls

"information in war,"

31

a critical

49

vital aspect

fact.

This

of what the Air

foundation for information warfare,
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but

not synonymous with

it is

it.

Information warfare

evolving from the synergistic effects of several

a

is

new warform

new and unique

factors,

that

all

is

part

and parcel of the information revolution.
This brings us back, however, to the entering question:
this

fit

is

with the Clausewitzian paradigm of force and violence?

degrade an adversary's military capability, damage

its

key

economic

ject great disorder into political systems or

this

"war"? Does

If a State

is

infrastructures,

affairs, all

of kinetic force and violence, might not the recipient of such

able to

and in-

without the use

effects

argue that

they had indeed been "attacked" and were thus "at war" with the inflictor? During

recent exercise conducted annually

a

at

the Air Force

Wargaming

Institute

by students from all of the DoD's senior military colleges, the "red team" developed a war plan against "blue" that included information warfare attacks against
such targets

as

the air

traffic

control system, financial centers, energy distribution

network, and telecommunications infrastructure, with the intent of degrading

and disrupting blue's political will and strategic
tive

was to seriously undermine the

ability

and

capability.

will

The red team's objec-

of both blue and

its allies

to

continue armed opposition to red's other operations. This exercise in information warfare

seen

as a

—which

the students

named "Dangerous Opportunity"

mirror-imaging of American attitudes and mindsets, but

—might be

it

also reflects

technological conditions and vulnerabilities that the information environment

may make available in any future conflict.
cations

by some senior Chinese

officers,

It

also closely tracks

who

postulated precisely such opera-

tions in their concept for "Unrestricted Warfare." 32
reflect

any

sort

of consensus on what

with recent publi-

IW and IO

But does

this

perspective

are?

Perspectives and Doctrines

Earlier
ing;

it

was pointed out

that the

terminology of IW and IO are

still

evolv-

not surprisingly, so are the various operational and doctrinal concepts held

by the

different organizations involved in the

IW/IO

effort,

both in the United

worth some time to briefly explore some of these doctrinal and operational concepts. In the American military much of the future direction for IW/IO will come from "Joint Vision 2010," published by the Joint
Staff in 1996, amplified in 1997 by "Expanding Joint Vision 2010: Concept for
Joint Warfare," and further amplified by "JV 2020" in the summer of 2000. 33
States

and

globally. It

is

JV2010, as it is called, postulated several dynamic changes in the overall strategic
environment and the emergence of new operational concepts. A key hypothesis
ofJV2010
attaining

is

that dramatic changes in

new

information technologies will

and maintaining information superiority
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a

critical

make

requirement.
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Concepts such

Dominant

Battlespace Awareness or

Network Centric War-

new information

technologies will enable

based on the assumption that

fare are

US

as

forces to develop

and exploit networks of

sensors, decision-makers,

and

shooters that can operate far faster than their adversaries, and thus translate infor-

mation superiority into actual combat power. 34
If the technologies

based RMA,

it

of the information revolution are creating an information-

remains for the American military to bring this to fruition by cre-

ating organizations, doctrines,

advantages, and turn

them

and operational concepts to exploit technological

into actual military capability. 35 In 1998 the Joint

Staff finally published Joint Publication 3-13, Joint

Operations. Like any such publication,

it

represents

Doctrine for Information

what all of the various coor-

dinating parties could agree on, including the four military services.

document with

sionary
that

radical

new operational concepts,

but

It is

not a vi-

does emphasize

it

IO is not a technical capability, but rather a coordinating strategy for opera-

tions in the information

makes three critical points. First,
conduct IO, and every one of the com-

environment, and

it

must organize to
batant commands, such as European or Central Command, have created
full-time planning cells for IO. Next, the IO planning process must begin long

joint forces at

all

levels

before operations begin;

it is

too

late to

begin planning just a few days before the

operation's scheduled initiation. Finally, joint forces

an information-intensive environment and engage
zations, including perhaps private sector or

US

All

services

—Army,

must

all

train

and exercise in

of the applicable organi-

combined-multinational

entities.

Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force

—have

IW/IO somewhat differently, viewing them through their individual warfighting lenses. The Army was the first service to publish specific doctrine
approached

and Field Manual 100-6, published in 1996, contained eloquent lan-

for IO,

guage about the "global information environment [and] battlespace,"
tioned

earlier.

"integrate

all

But the

doctrine's perspective

aspects of information to support

combat power," those being the rather

was

clearly

on

as

men-

the need to

and enhance the elements of

traditional: infantry,

armor,

artillery,

and, to a lesser extent, airpower delivered via rotary-winged helicopters.

Army

has chartered an organization, the

(LIWA)
IO, and

at

The

Land Information Warfare Activity

Fort Belvoir, Virginia, to develop both concepts and capabilities for

LIWA personnel have been active in the Balkans for much of the
Army IO

1990s,

The Navy views IO as something that enables
fleet operations and makes those operations more efficient and effective. The
Navy's perspective on IO also reflects the expertise and experiences of several of
assisting

its

different

efforts there.

"communities," with two in

and cryptology,

as

particular, space/electronic warfare

having special interest and impact on IO. The
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Navy

has

two
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key organizations, the Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC)

Creek, Virginia, and the Naval Information Warfare Agency

Meade, Maryland, dedicated
Corps does not have
than merely another
that

makes the

ficient

and

a specific

to

its

IO

entire range

to

be used

of Marine Corps

effective. Finally, the

(NIWA)

at

Fort

develop IO. While the Marine

efforts to

doctrine or organization,

weapon or tool

at Little

when

it

sees

IO

as larger

appropriate, as something

capabilities

and operations more

ef-

Air Force has perhaps the most visionary ap-

proach to IO, with several doctrinal publications that explicitly focus on the
information realm

an arena for combat and

as

as

an operational environment in

which operations needed to be coordinated with and integrated into those in the
air and outer space. It, too, has made organizational changes, and was the first
service to dedicate an organization to the effort, recasting the existing

USAF

Electronic Warfare Center into the Air Force Information Warfare Center

(AFIWC)
do

in 1993. 36

None of these approaches are "right" or "wrong," but they

reflect the perspectives

of warfare and warfighting held by their originating

work

would be
more optimistic to think that from these differing perspectives will come a more
robust, richer and more comprehensive concept for IW and IO than we have at
services.

While some

will see

narrow parochialisms

at

here,

it

present. 37

would have meant the four services acting in unison, but that is insufficient for effective IO. Not only are there a range of
non-service DoD organizations that are critical to the military's ability to wage
IW, using the previously-cited definition of IO means that virtually the entire
apparatus of the federal government is involved in some way with the national
security exercise of information power. While perhaps only a handful of federal
organizations would be involved with CNA, others would be involved with
In a simpler time, "joint"

CNE, and virtually every one with CND,
organization

is

increasingly dependent

mation networks for
noticed, segments of

its

because in the information age every

on its

electronic

efficient functioning.

PDD

One

and computerized infor-

of the most

critical, if little-

63 was the tasking of each federal department or

agency's chief information officer (CIO) with the responsibility for information
assurance within that organization. This
actions, the assignment

into another of

PDD

63's critical

of specific segments of the government to work with

their private sector counterparts
try, for

ties

(Department of Energy with the

electric indus-

example) in developing the strategic partnership called for in the docu-

ment. The

latest

National Security Strategy (December 2000) contains repeated

references to the critical importance of safeguarding national infrastructures

from intrusion or
via

attack,

whether

that attack

CNA.
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comes from the

physical world or
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While some feel that the US military's interest in IW and IO is a reflection of a
peculiar American affinity for technology and the degree in which information
technology is embedded within our systems and structures, the growing interest
of the rest of the world indicates that IW/IO is not solely an American issue.
While this is neither the time nor place to make a detailed exploration of
non-US perspectives on IW/IO, a few examples are in order. The British military has been pressing ahead both operationally and educationally, as have most
of our other English-speaking allies, and their interest has included the pressing
need to provide CND to counter the threat of CNA against vulnerable infrastructures. 38 Several other governments, including that of Norway, have undertaken specific PCCIP-type studies of their own national infrastructures
because of the growing awareness that national security, including economic
health and prosperity, depends on the smooth and confident functioning of
these computer networks. The Swedish National Defense College (Forsvarshogskolan) has integrated IO into the core of its curricula, and the other Scandinavian countries are following suit. The Russian and Chinese perspectives have
already been cited, albeit too briefly, and the views of one senior Indian national
security strategist are enlightening. Major General Yashwant Deva recently
wrote that the "metaterritorial" nature of IW was blurring the boundary between peace and war, and he argued that India's national security strategy must
have an information strategy component to be effective. 39 These are perceptive
insights from a country possessing the world largest "Silicon Valley" and one
which is a global leader in information technology. Finally, the rapidly increasing use of cyberspace and computer networks for political objectives by
nongovernmental organizations, whether they be humanitarian groups such as
the Red Cross, political and environmental activists such as Greenpeace, or revolutionary groups such as the Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka), Zapatistas (Mexico), or
Hezbollah (Middle East), poses an interesting problem for governments and supra-national organizations that are uncomfortable working outside of the traditional and terrestrial boundaries of national security. In cyberspace all actors look
somewhat alike, and as some recent incidents such as the Solar Sunrise case have
illustrated,

it

can be very

difficult to

determine

if the

intruder

is

a

lone individual

or the agent of a State acting for State-sponsored purposes.

Concluding Thoughts

Those old enough to remember sayings and slang from the war in Southeast
Asia may recall one that went "When you're up to your backside in alligators, it's
kind of hard to remember that your initial mission was to drain the swamp."
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Right now,

of information warfare,

in the field

and there are

we are hip-deep in the swamp of

number of alligators

At the outset of
this discussion we faced the Clausewitzian paradigm of warfare, which was based
in part on the concept that wars are waged by "warriors" in service of identifiable States. In a postulated paradigm of war by keystroke, are those that operate
from the keyboards to be considered "warriors?" We have seen examples in
unresolved

issues,

which young

a

moving from

hackers, skilled at

database to database via cyber-

space, never physically leaving their keyboards,

armed

forces

super-skilled

countries. 40

home
operators who now

of their

gertips, instead

them

Our

have the technology of States

Could such

it

cadre of

a

at their fin-

One thinks of the case

individuals, if acting in the interests

be considered cybermercenaries?

to act

whether

Could this be used to provide

who vainly offered their services to Saddam Hussein during

the Persian Gulf War.
State,

have been inducted into the

of what they can afford from Radio Shack?

of the Dutch hackers

of a

circling.

41

Equally plausible

and behalf

the potential for

is

on behalf, not of a recognized State, but of some other interest group,
have

existing

political, religious,

or even simply monetary motivations.

paradigm for war requires kinetic

actions, destroying things, or

crossing physical boundaries with physical objects such

as airplanes

or tanks.

What are the political and legal regimes for actions that do not cross the physical
limits

of territorial sovereignty or cause kinetic destruction, but

impact on the national security of the "attacked" State?

still

Where

have serious

are the lines of

sovereignty in cyberspace, and

how does

and intrusions of what may be

shadowy and virtual opponent? More and more

a

of the key infrastructures that support
sense, the military

power and

the State respond to the provocations

civil society also

support, in a strategic

capability of the State. Electric grids, oil

pipelines, transportation networks,

and telecommunications are

just

and

gas

some of

those dual-use infrastructures and architectures that support both civil society

and military strength. Those kinds of assets have been attacked and destroyed in

wartime before, and they will be

again, but

what is the impact if the means of ne-

gation comes across the Internet in the forms of bits and bytes? Just
the question of

armed
does

who

forces protect

this

as

troubling is

can and should defend those infrastructures? National

them

against attack

by

"traditional" military means, but

mission extend into cyberspace? In the United States the answer from

PDD 63 seems to be that this
ity that will require the

is

a

shared public sector-private sector responsibil-

coordination and cooperation of those communities to

problem of infrastructure vulnerability, but this may not necessarily be
the answer in other countries that have different political-economic systems and
traditions. These are just a sample of the questions and issues to be discussed and
solve the

analyzed in the pages of this volume.
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For more than

century and a

a

half,

from the

era

of Napoleon and Clausewitz,

of strategic bombing and national liberation organizations, western polit-

to that

on the means employed: force and violence, employed to defeat or destroy the enemy's powers of
physical resistance. Information "in war" is a continuation of this paradigm, and
thus
as important as those capabilities are for the capability to employ tradiical society

has had a paradigm of warfare that has focused

—

tional military force

—

is

incomplete because of the

new

capabilities for influ-

by the new information
technologies. Information warfare and information operations do not replace
the older forms, but they do augment, modify, and change those forms. The difference between the terms is important, even vital, and we dare not ignore it, lest
ence, power, and the imposition of will offered

an adversary

who

lacks

our bureaucratic and intellectual shackles and does not

"understand our rules" use our very dependence on computer networks to administer a nasty strategic defeat via the very same environment and metanetwork

we

are so confidently constructing.
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met Dr. Rona and heard his concepts during a presentation on June 13,
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International Law, Cybernetics,

and Cyberspace*

Anthony D'Amato

M

y pleasant assignment this morning is to talk about the future of computer network attack under international law. Any prediction is diffi-

cult to

make, but the hardest thing of all to predict

play

safe

it

I

would just

know that if there
of 100%,
country

it is

who

—no matter what
is

that can

I

given the job of talking about

sense a certain

national law.

be asserted with

the topic might be

There has already been a lot of talk
and

the future. If I

wanted

to

we

all

stand here and be quiet for thirty minutes. Yet

one prediction

is

is

this

it

a

confidence level

—any law

professor in this

will talk

about

it.

week about rules of international law,

amount of discomfort about the

old, received rules

We have been cited rules dating from 1949,

of inter-

1945, 1929, and back

Somehow they seem archaic when compared with a revolutionary new technology. Professor Yoram Dinstein has advised the convenas far as 1

907 and 1 899.

ing of an international conference to update the old humanitarian rules of
warfare.

But pending the replacement of existing

rules

by new ones, Professor

Dinstein contends that the existing rules will serve us well enough

them
*

He

as written.

Address delivered

tional

Law, Naval

at

appears to view these rules

the

War

as a

if

we

kind of international

Symposium on Computer Network "Attack" and

College, June 1999.

apply

Interna-

International

legislation.

common
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do not completely share

I

law

bias,

but

think there

I

that point

this betrays

my

kind of spirit of international law that

a

is

of view. Perhaps

on the books and provides a basis for interpreting them.
This spirit is evolutionary. Being aware of it gives us a basis for predicting how
the rules of international law may bend and change to fit new situations. Since
any international crisis will appear quite different to decision-makers on the in-

shapes the rules

the previous ones they have experienced, simulated or studied,

side than

all

indeed

kind of rigid thinking to say

a

we applied to the last one.

we

should treat

this crisis

it is

by applying the

would be somewhat like accusing generals of fighting the previous war. But rules of law are like that; as words on a paper
or on a screen, they do not change by themselves, they stay the same. And they
were obviously fashioned to cover past situations. Thus, I argue that we cannot
take our stand solely upon the rules of international law as written. These rules
same

rules

have to be interpreted in

light

It

of new circumstances.

And yet it is clear that if we simply change the old rules to apply to new situations, the rules will

can be changed

of law

at all if they

fore,

want to argue

I

give to the

comes,

law

I

no use having any rules
that would amount to anarchy. There-

be sapped of all their vitality. There
at will;

is

we are constrained in the degree of latitude that we can
interpretation of old rules to fit new situations. And this constraint

argue,

that

from

a

good

faith appreciation

of the structure of international

itself.

What is the structure
and must be,

of international law?

a self-perpetuating

coherent

arena of international relations. Because

ronment

for

its

own

it is

We begin by recognizing that

set

it is,

of rules that operate within the

dependent upon a multi-State envi-

existence, international law consists of rules that are de-

signed to maintain the peace and stability of those States, for total anarchic war is
the absence of rules. International law opts for stability by ensuring that

minimize the

friction

among

States

putes. If war breaks out despite
tain the war,

its

An example

rules,

of a

the containment of war are the

rules

and provide for peaceful resolution of disthen international law attempts to con-

minimize the damage caused by war, and provide

following the war.

its

set

of international

complex and

ioned over centuries, which specify the

for a secure peace

legal rules

realistic rules

providing for

of neutrality, fash-

acts that neutral nations

may or may not

war in order to maintain their neutrality. And a classic example of a
favoring an agreement to stop the war is the rule that treaties of peace are

take during a
rule

valid

even though the losing side could be

the treaty by the threat of continued

Although the content of the
tatively

rules

war

said to
if it

have been coerced into signing

did not sign.

of international law has not changed quali-

over the course of the past five thousand years, existing rules have been
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adjusted and modified to

ment

meet new

situations

and contingencies. This adjust-

operates through an elaborate system of customary law that modifies rules

These mechanisms include

in light of feedback mechanisms.

"

with each other (the

offices interacting

communications, international

courts, foreign

dedoublement fonctionnel")

legal conferences

,

diplomatic

and codification conventions,

negotiations of bilateral and multilateral treaties, and so forth. International law
in brief, a cybernetic system.

is,

tional

—

that

is,

only

if

rules are useful only if they are func-

Its

they promote the

stability

of the system. The feedback

mechanisms, which are the hallmark of cybernetic systems, continuously mea-

whether rules of the system operate to resolve disputes rather than aggravate

sure

them. If a rule has
ified,
It

a

tendency to aggravate disputes, then it is reinterpreted,

or in drastic cases overruled and replaced by a rule that stabilizes the system.
follows that too rigid an interpretation of any given rule could lead to a

rupture in the system. Let
interpretation.

count

its

military

A

for

hesitate to

US

Forces of October

1994, provides in
all

cannot be given

commander who

is

a

start a

necessary

means

its first

rule that a

to defend the mili-

global conflagration. Thus, the

robotic interpretation.

familiar

with

many

The

rule

is

first

instead

other rules within the

with the requirements of warfare, and with the general principle of mil-

itary proportionality. In short, the rule

the often unarticulated premise that
rule.

"robotic"

that

ROE

directed to a

ROE,

1,

the right to use

including a nuclear missile that could

of the

a

none of the remaining rules in the ROE can limit this inherIf a robot were programmed with this rule alone, it would not
employ a hugely disproportionate weapon in the defense of its unit,

and

ent right.

an absolutely rigid interpretation

call

consequences. 1 For example, the Standing Rules of En-

commander has

tary unit,

me

robot will interpret a rule exactly, without taking into ac-

real- world

gagement

rule

mod-

A

on the books was made by humans with
humans like them would interpret the

military rule presupposes a military interpreter. 2

Sometimes the laws of war build terminological

flexibility right into their

own language. Many of the older rules of warfare, for example, prohibit acts that
are

"not justified by military necessity." Such rules also betoken the good mili-

judgment of a human being. Legal

on warmaking stem from the
need to keep the international system stable. Many years ago Quincy Wright put
this another way: the goal of the military during a war is not just to win the war
but to win the subsequent peace. If force is used that is not justified by military
necessity, the seeds will be sown of future revenge; hence, a stable peace may not
tary

restraints

have been secured. "Military necessity" should be construed

win the engagement
killing

of enemy

at

hand" and not

to demonstrate brutality

civilians.
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The cybernetic system of international law is thus a purposive system.
cannot be interpreted

or applied mechanically because each rule

literally

ply an indication of how the system should deal with disruptions that

Our

bodies are purposive systems;

surgeon operates with
obviously the idea

is

to

if

surgery

needed

is

to

remove

a

rules

Its
is

sim-

may arise.

tumor, the

damage to the surrounding tissue as possible, for
remove the tumor and not to kill the patient. A ship is an

as little

example of a self-contained purposive system. The primary purpose of a purposive system

is

survival

—

persistence through time.

In order to survive, purposive systems attempt to maintain systemic equilib-

rium.

When our bodies are invaded by a flu virus,

provide a hostile environment for the invaders;

our temperature

when

the virus

is

rises so as to

defeated, our

temperatures return to normal. Similar servomechanisms exist on larger military
vessels; a

torpedo

partment that

is

hit

on the

hull

being flooded.

nisms; there are

may

trigger an automatic seal-off of the

A thermostat

many more we

can think

is

com-

one of the simplest servomecha-

of.

Purposive systems are able to survive and to reverse disequilibrating interrup-

have elaborate internal communications systems.

tions because they

have to

tell

our bodies to

raise

our temperature; our blood stream

sage of outside virus invaders to our central nervous subsystem
cates

with the subconscious

board

a ship, the internal

parts

of our brains and in

communications

carry messages of the ship's condition to
that operate

by

all

carries the

up the

mes-

heat.

On

and highly structured

hands. There are

fail-safe

to

mechanisms

default in case the intra-human messages are disrupted.

he communications on board a ship are structured by elaborate
tional assignments, protocols,

of the system.

do not

which communi-

effect turns

are elaborate

We

and regulations. These constitute the

Any person on board who

vival of the ship

is

acts in a

way

immediately arrested; any person

librium of the ship

is

rules, jurisdic-

also stopped. All the

ship are designed to actualize the

internal laws

that jeopardizes the sur-

who acts to

upset the equi-

everyday rules and regulations of the

two primary

goals of persistence through time

and the maintenance of systemic equilibrium.
Just as a ship's rules are designed to maintain the integrity of the floating military unit, the rules

of international law are designed to maintain the integrity and

peace of the States of the world in their international relations.

The

essence of all

communication of information. Naval rules are worthless unless communicated. The equilibrium of our bodies is maintained by an elaborate
system of neuron communications into and out of the brain and spinal column.
My thesis is based upon the signal importance of the communicative aspect of
rules. Without communication the rules do not work. And if the rules do not
these rules

is

the

work, the entire system can break down, with adverse consequences to everyone.
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The importance of communication in international law is

by one of
its most ancient rules: the personal immunity of diplomats and ambassadors. Even
during wartime nations realized the importance of keeping open the channels of
communication with their enemies. Diplomatic immunity under international
law is well known. The relation to Internet communications is obvious. I would
like to discuss a more subtle and perhaps more illuminating practice allowed by
letters of marque and reprisal.
international law that also has a long history
Back in the days when there were no international courts, no international
illustrated

—

peacekeeping organizations, and nations did their best to avoid war because of the

war could bring, a curious practice of a kind of limited
this practice is what might be termed "unilateral commu-

unforeseeable calamities that
private

law

nication."

required.

To

arose.

Key to

A message

is

The message

sent out that

is

intended to be received, but a response

contained in a

is

letter

of marque and

is

not

reprisal.

envisage the situation, imagine five hundred years ago that merchant

in nation

A was

one of a

class

of rich international

purchased in A, into nation
rency, of course),

B

to

be

M takes

a

sold.

With

silks,

which he

the selling price (in B's cur-

M intends to buy goods in B that are relatively scarce back in

A, and transport those goods back to
usual,

importing and ex-

traders,

M sends a caravan of

porting goods. In the course of his trade,

M

A to be sold there.

M and

percentage for himself.

In every transaction,

his fellow

as

merchants are very

important to the king of A because taxes on their profits are the king's primary
source of revenue.

Now let us

assume that

a

greedy provincial governor in B, seeing the large

M

amount of money that
has obtained by selling the silks in his province, decides
to levy a 100% tax on the money that M's trading activities in B have amassed.
M's employees in B are simply merchants; they do not have the power to resist
the provincial governor.

As

cated and they return to

A

a result, their capital as

want

as their profits are confis-

empty-handed.

An outraged M reports to
the king does not

well

the king of

to start a

war

A the "denial ofjustice" within B. But

against nation B.

There

are too

many risks

and uncertainties in war, and, in addition, the king simply cannot afford to
nance an all-out war. True, the king admits, the queen of
either,
is

and for the same reasons. But once

started,

who knows what

a

B

fi-

does not want war

war between two sovereign nations

the result will be?

we assume that at that point,

M

mount a private mercenary attack
against B. In that way, by looting and pillaging,
can get his money back while
teaching B a lesson. Such an action would probably drive the king into an unwanted war. And the king may not be quite powerful enough to stop
from
So

offers to

M

M

doing it, especially if JV1 recruits

his fellow
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M

between the king and M. The king wants
to
go ahead but in a limited way, one that would be sufficiently justified so that the
queen of B would not feel honor-bound to go to war to resist it. The only thing
that would be so justified would be what Aristotle called compensatory justice.
should have the right to be compensated for his losses plus the cost of obtaining that compensation. So the king issues to
a letter of reprisal. The letter
contains the terms of M's planned expedition into nation B. It specifies the geo-

Thus

the stage

is

set for a deal

M

M

graphical limitation of the expedition

—

in this case, the particular province

whose governor took away M's assets and profits.
be recovered

—

in this case, property

losses plus interest plus the cost

against

amount that can
equal in amount to M's

specifies the

It

and other valuables

of paying the mercenaries.

It

specifies the persons

whom the losses can be recovered—in this case, probably, all officials and
coming first. The fact
pay for M's losses is un-

private citizens in the province, perhaps with officials

all

innocent

that

civilians are

going to be robbed to

avoidable. In principle, they should seek recompense

from the queen of B,

who

should levy against the governor of the province and who, in the future, should
ensure that none of his subordinates mistreat foreign traders in

M's motivation

show

it

of reprisal

in obtaining the letter

to officials (or the queen) in

but rather to legitimize

his

B

during

expedition in his

his

home

is

not so

this fashion.

much so that he can

mercenary expedition

country A. After

ceeds without the king's approval, he might eventually return to
arrest for his private

breach of the peace. Moreover, M's

all,

if

there,

M pro-

A only to face

ability to recruit

merce-

A will be greatly facilitated by the legitimacy of the letter of repriotherwise, a potential recruit would reasonably worry about arrest in A

naries within
sal;

when

the expedition

is

completed. Therefore,

one-way communication within nation A.
to read it; its "power" is exhausted once

It is

as

I

have

said,

the letter

is

just a

not necessary for the queen of

M receives

B

from the king of A. But if
respects the conditions of his reprisal raid into B, then the queen of B can see,
by the results, that
confined himself to the province of which he complained
it

M

M

M

helped himself to
were confiscated by the governor, and that
compensatory justice.
In this fashion, many limited wars were fought under the aegis of letters of
marque and reprisal. Sometimes the mere issuance of such letters was enough to
provoke the monarchs of neighboring countries to offer restitution in order to
avoid the impending mercenary raid into their territory. And naturally, over the
course of time, the conditions for the issuance of letters of marque and reprisal
that his assets

were

spelled out in treaties of peace.

The Treaty of Westphalia

armed attacks as reprisals for denial ofjustice. Farraids were replaced by judicial procedures. By the

potential legitimacy of limited

ther along in time, reprisal

recognizes the
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Mexico set up a Joint Arbitration Tribunal which settled all outstanding claims between American citizens against
Mexico on the one hand, and Mexican citizens against the United States on the
other. Since payments to the aggrieved plaintiffs were secured by net-net transactions between the two governments, only the monetary difference at the very
1920s, for example, the United States and

end had

be paid in

to

specie.

This subsequent history shows that the early

letters

of marque and

reprisal, 3

by allowing limited war, operated as a deterrence to general war. When people
are robbed, they need restitution. When they are robbed by another country,
the alternative is either war or self-help. The history of the use of letters of
marque and reprisal constitutes an example of my general point that even a war
can be, in some circumstances, not systemically disequilibrating, but rather a

method of preserving and

restoring systemic equilibrium. If all wars in the fu-

ture are intended to be limited wars
this era

will

(we can hardly contemplate

of weapons of mass destruction, though

not erupt by accident), then

the communications

network

we need

to

we must be

a

world war in

ever vigilant that

it

be very careful about preserving

that in the past has

been instrumental in keeping

wars limited.

Thus,

I

contend that the main lesson for present purposes of this short

tory of letters of

—both

marque and

reprisal

—

is

the importance of

his-

communica-

means of limiting warfare. In
considering the escalatory potential of destroying computer Internet traffic in
future conflicts, we should not just look at the disruption of communications
with the enemy, but also consider the severe negative consequences to ourselves if the disruption cannot be pinpointed and spreads to affect the network
in its entirety. For although a letter of marque and reprisal signified an agreement between the sovereign and one of his subjects (the king of A and his subin my example), it was also meant as a communication to a foreign
ject
country (to the queen of B, in my example). While it was desirable that the
foreign sovereign read the letter, it was not necessary. Many communications
today are of this one-way type. In the recent NATO bombing of Yugoslavia,
for example, NATO leaders held numerous press conferences which they
were confident were being monitored by Milosevic and others in Belgrade.
Limited- war aims must be communicated to the enemy whenever possible.
They must be credible (as, indeed, were the letters of marque and reprisal,
which were not casually issued by any means). And they must be continuously
communicated, for when the enemy is suffering its darkest days it must be fortified by the belief that its leadership continues to hold the key to armistice and
tion

internally

and externally

M

a

peaceful settlement. 4
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can foresee what will cause future wars to break out, but

the causes that have led to wars has been the need to protect by

When

force the lives of innocent persons in foreign countries.
lives
a

were

a

common

country's

own citizens,

extended from nationals to non-nationals. As
is

those innocent

then intervention to protect them has been

casus belli for several centuries.

intervention of the latter type

armed

Only
I

recently has intervention

contended

in an article in 1982,

designed to protect our "internationals." 5

internationals are people everywhere, with

whom we

share

mitment of protection under the developing international

Our
a mutual comlaw of human

rights.

Once any war

has begun, the international system tries to bring the system

back to equilibrium. Thus,

we have in international law the phenomenon of the

humanitarian laws of war. Occasionally I have had the feeling during this confer-

ence that some military planners and targeters appear to believe that the laws of

war are an evil imposed by the lawyers and politicians, and that their job is to adhere to the letter of the rules while violating the spirit. They seem to say that the
most important goal in war is to win it as soon as possible and indeed there is a
logic to that position. Ending a war quickly will often save many lives. The
problem is that nations that get an upper hand during a war often convince
themselves that the quickest way to end the war is to terrorize the enemy's civilian population. I think that General Curtis LeMay's terror bombings of Tokyo
suburbs in the spring of 1945 were well-intentioned in this regard. Nevertheless,
those raids constitute, for me, the clearest example of a war crime in the entire
Second World War. What did the bombing "communicate" to the people ofjapan? That they should surrender unconditionally to an enemy who was ruthless
enough to drop flaming napalm on women and children living in wooden
homes? If LeMay believed he was saying, "Surrender now and we won't keep
on doing this," he may in fact have communicated "Better to die than surrender
to the devil incarnate." What the humanitarian laws of war do is to take this kind
of calculation away from those who would emulate General LeMay. The laws of
war prohibit the deliberate targeting of civilians. I think in the judgment of most
observers, military and civilian, the exercise of this kind of restraint during a war
is more likely to lead to a quick peace and, similarly, to a lasting peace.
Moreover, from the international systemic viewpoint, given the fact that war

—

itself

may be

a necessary equilibrating

values, prolonging a

war

is

adjustment to preserve deeper systemic

not necessarily

a

systemic value preservation to prosecute the

prolongs the war. This
terror

is

perhaps

a

may be important for
right way even if doing so

bad thing.

war the

It

deeper reason for ruling out the deliberate

bombing of civilians.
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But the viewpoint of the international system is not the only possible
viewpoint. You can obtain the same result from the point of view of a nation
looking outward at the international system. For if the maintenance of the system is necessary for lasting peace and order, then each nation partakes of that sys-

own foreign policy. The systemic viewpoint is primarily a useful

temic goal in its

ways in which the system itself strives to
have identified the ways, each country's na-

heuristic that enables us to predict the

maintain

its

tional interest
I

is

served in facilitating them.

have mentioned so

letters

Once we

equilibrium.

far the rules

of diplomatic immunity and the history of

of marque and reprisal as two of the ways that the international system rec-

ognizes disruptions to the system and
store equilibrium.

A

third

is

able to

mechanism

is

permits espionage. Although each nation

changed for
country.

It

a nation's

own

would have been

spies

who

communicate

that

may

customary international law

punish

spies,

they are often ex-

have been caught by the exchanging

easy for international law to have generated a rule

prohibiting espionage, but the fact that

it

allows for espionage

affirmation of the importance of the exchange of information.

many

instances in

which

effectively to re-

a nation's military posture

is

a further strong

There have been

appeared bellicose to

a

neighbor, yet intelligence networks exposed the reality that there was no bellicose intention.

launched

a

Without

preemptive

attempting to

start a

that information, the

attack, starting a

war

against

its

neighboring country might have

war by mistake. Even when

a

nation

neighbor, the international system

is

is

well

served by intelligence information that allows the neighbor to get prepared for

an attack. Preparation often dissuades the attacker from going ahead.
this

out.

is

to say that the

But

it

exchange of information prevents

has stopped

mistake, and

it

some wars

that

would have been

has served to limit wars that have already

ing information

all

None of

wars from breaking

the result of a mutual

broken out by convey-

as to military intentions.

been somewhat surprised by the slow and deway the Security Council has conveyed to countries such as Iraq and

In recent years observers have
liberate

Yugoslavia the intentions of the major powers

and desist their unlawful acts. The
sible for a greater

clarity

if

those countries did not cease

of communications is probably respon-

reduction in casualties than would have occurred

if the

UN's

motives and intentions had been kept secret.

Where do

these arguments lead, in terms of international law?

to predict that attacks

international law.
position.

No

on the

They lead me

Internet will soon be seen as clearly illegal under

Maybe customary

international law has already reached that

matter what short-term military advantage might be seen in dis-

rupting another country's Internet system, the disruption
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may

spread to the

International

point where

it

totally

is

haw,

counterproductive. But even

tained within the target State,
tional system's attempt to
I

do not want

it

if

nevertheless violates, in

it

literally

on

this

—

can be kept con-

my view,

end the war and win the peace. In

be taken

to

and Cyberspace

Cybernetics,

the interna-

—although

a sense

disrupting the Internet

is

like

method is
Internet com-

unleashing biological warfare: the limits are unpredictable and the

inhumane. What
munications

is

inhumane about disrupting

is

that

it

a target State's

deprives innocent people within that target State from

means they have of obtaining external information
and using it to communicate with each other, possibly to oppose the war from
within. In the recent NATO attack on Belgrade, some citizens of that city
were able to obtain news of the war from nongovernmental sources. 6 Unfortunately NATO targeted some of the Belgradian communications facilities. I
think that was a mistake; it set a precedent that could backfire and it did not
noticeably shorten the war. 7 Whether that targeting was illegal is not a question that will be addressed in any foreseeable forum. But I believe that informed international legal opinion will in the near future weigh in on the side
the only possibly effective

of the

illegality

of attacks against the Internet.

believe this because the stability of the international system

I

upon the
make up
have, the

free

and

efficient

the system.
less

flow of information within and

among the

units that

The more freedom of international communication we

the likelihood of war and other disruptions to the stability of the inter-

national system.

The

global Internet, with

across national boundaries,

is

its

already achieved interconnectivity

of diplomatic immunity,

a natural heir to the rules

letters

of marque and reprisal,

many

other communicative aspects of international law.

legality

of espionage and intelligence-gathering, and

am not claiming that during a war there would be

I

dependent

is

a

prohibition against dis-

rupting the enemy's command-and-control communications system. If that sys-

tem is separate from the
the

enemy

is

code?

Of course,

its

military

why disrupt it when a better alternative
in an actual conflict the military

whether such an

will decide

game as it always has been. However,

it is fair

instead using the Internet itself for

then

trol system,

Internet,

alternative

is

better.

is

command and conto break

commander on

That

is

through

ognized

as a

Finally,

I

and therefore

is

why I am making
likely to

is

the

in the

be soon rec-

foundational principle of international customary law. 8
predict that in the near future

we

will see massive public support

throughout the world for the inviolability of the Internet. Although
cent

its

the ground

stronger point that a rule of absolute prohibition of Internet disruption
best interests of both sides in the long run

if

phenomenon,

the Internet in

a

very re-

my view is securing for itself a place in public

consciousness that will be impossible to dislodge. Indeed, the Internet has
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become one of our vital

national interests.

protect in the event of a war.

It is

new kind of community

will

and

it

to

communi-

has fostered

awareness and empowerment.
fiction to say that

already are living in virtual communities. Their chat
all

we will have

television). Instead,

hope it does not sound too much like science

I

be something

not just a mechanism like previous

cations systems (the telephone, the radio,
a

It

over the world, people who share similar interests.

some people

room partners come from

We will see an increasingly

we will be able to see on
our computer screens the faces of the people with whom we are communicating^— GeoCities in real time in full color. People who live in these virtual comspecialized

and fine-tuned system of chat rooms where

munities also live in real communities; they have dual citizenship.

be an American and

also a citizen

A person can

of America On-Line; another can be

a citizen

of Ecuador and Excite; another of the Netherlands and Netscape; and another
dual citizen of

a

Yemen and Yahoo. People are now able to buy and sell goods di-

—

from exotic places, native works of art and
artifacts (which are skyrocketing in price on the Internet), travel, and services.
People can play games against opponents from all over the world. Many people
are finding the Internet passionately consuming of their spare time, and others
are finding a way to make a living on the Internet
either creating technology,
or investing, or buying and selling, or providing the one thing in business transrectly

from each other

foodstuffs

—

actions that

computers are

have exaggerated

I

still

—

deficient in

a

human

touch.

my point, of course, but in this risky game of prediction we

sometimes have to think outlandishly. As the world shrinks in
ication

size, as

commun-

and knowledge-sharing become the key concepts of the twenty-first

century, the Internet will increasingly be valued as a precious resource, the
"heritage of mankind" in the
the systemic considerations
will

I

words of international law. For

outlined

earlier, I

this reason, as

well

as

think that computer network attack

soon be the subject of an outright prohibition under customary international law.

Notes
Of course,

a list of "real world consequences" can be programmed into the robot in the first
which case the robot will take those consequences into account. But if the consequences are
not foreseen by the human programmer at the time of the programming which is the usual case in
war where surprises are part of the strategy of war then the robot will simply not know about them
and will not take them into account. At the present and reasonably foreseeable state of computer
technology, a computer cannot "see" and "analyze" the real world and "evaluate" whether a given
operation could be counterproductive in terms of its foreseeable real world consequences.
2. It is not clear, however, whether the rules contained in the Internal Revenue Code
presuppose human interpreters, even though it is often claimed that IRS agents are human
1.

place, in

—

interpreters.

69

—

International

3. Even
marque and

Law,

Congress the power to issue letters of
actually exercised only during the sea war of 1800
"classic" situation of self-help, but rather a roundabout way of

the Constitution of the

(although the

reprisal

with France, and
enlisting the help

it

was not

a

Cybernetics, and Cyberspace

United

States gives

power was

of private vessels in

a national war).

Controversy remains whether the Allied insistence upon "unconditional surrender"
unnecessarily prolonged World War II. Of course, in 1945 German and Japanese leaders did not
know about the potential of being tried as war criminals. If they had been able to foresee
Nuremberg and the Military Tribunal for the Far East, would they have surrendered at all? I discuss
4.

some of the problems of negotiating a peace when the negotiators themselves may
indicted for war crimes once the peace is established in Anthony D'Amato, Peace v.
88

Bosnia,

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Anthony D'Amato, The Concept

5.

of Human Rights

find themselves
Accountability in

500 (1994).

in International

Law, 82

COLUMBIA LAW

REVIEW
6. It

1110 (1982).
was in NATO's

interest to accurately

NATO's limited war aims.

inform Serbian

Consider what happened

in the

first

citizens

about the war and about

half of 1945 in Japan.

The Japanese

people were incessantly reassured by the press that the Allies were on the verge of being beaten and
peace was imminent. Well, the papers were right about the imminence of peace, they just had the

would have been no way for
by the Japanese controlled media. Our campaign to
demoralize the Japanese people could have been accomplished more swiftly and with considerably
less loss of life. In the aftermath of the Kosovo air campaign, Loral Space and Communications
Limited said it might be forced to cut transmissions into Yugoslavia from one of its satellites under
the general trade embargo that was proposed by the United States. Fortunately, State Department
spokesperson James Rubin quickly denied that there were plans to interfere with Internet access
for citizens of Yugoslavia.
7. Indeed, the Serbian news sources that remained in Internet communication provided useful
information to American citizens and the American press. During the recent NATO bombing of
Yugoslavia, I got my news of the progress of the bombing attacks from Belgrade and other Serbian
Internet sources. I soon found out that the New York Times and the Washington Post were getting
their information from the same Internet sources that I was using. What reason did we have to trust
any of this information when we knew that the Milosevic government was censoring it? Let us take
a specific case: a building in downtown Belgrade is struck by a missile, and the collateral damage in
fact kills ten civilians. Now the Serbian Internet could inflate the casualties and say there were 50
civilians killed. But this kind of inflation, repeated over many bombings, could intimidate and
terrorize the population of the city, and Milosevic could be counted on not to want to do that. All
right, take the opposite extreme: they report no civilian deaths. But that falsification would
encourage NATO to increase the bombardment, figuring that it is a surgically precise destruction
of Serbian infrastructure with no loss of civilian life. So the safest path, the path of the least chance
of government interference, is simply to report the accurate number of deaths, in this case ten. And
as the Times and the Post, and I for that matter, discovered in the course of the war when there was
independent empirical verification, Serbian Internet information about the bombings was by and
mixed

sides

up. If the Internet had been invented at that time, there

the Japanese people to have been fooled

large rather close to accuracy.
8.

than
this

I

believe that the United States has far

to lose if our

computer networks

are attacked

could ever hope to gain by attacking the computer networks of other countries. Earlier in
conference someone shrugged off the damage that might happen to our banking and

brokerage system by saying, "Well, so what
I

more

we

if the

Dow Jones drops 30%?" If that

is all

that happens,

would agree. But that is not what is going to happen. What will happen is people across the nation
down and the television saying, "Don't worry, you haven't lost

will find their Internet connections

your

life's

word

will

savings."

And they will call

sweep the nation

their

banks and stock brokers and get a busy signal. And the
no longer going to be accepted, and if you have

that credit cards are
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some hard cash on hand that is the only thing that will get you food. And there will be riots in every
city

and village, and people

will raid the grocery stores

—

money

and steal all the food.

You and everyone else

—

may have been
wiped out by the Internet attack. Even if later it turns out that there was enough redundancy in the
storage system to retrieve many of the financial records, it may come too late to prevent riots and
will fear that

insurrections.

all

their

in banks, in stock accounts, in retirement plans

The dimensions of a

national disaster of this kind could far surpass anything in our

nation's history.
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Computer Network Attack

as a

Use of

Force under Article 2 (4) of the

United Nations Charter

Daniel B. Silver

A

Introduction

wareness has been growing in recent years that modern

creasingly computer-dependent, are highly vulnerable to malicious in-

trusion into their computers and
is

especially high in the

at risk.

The

reality

computer networks. Concern about

United States;

of these concerns

is

all

ever, a conflict involving another State or

Instead, this struggle pits federal

"hackers"

likelihood,

even

a terrorist

law enforcement

group

as

is

who have defaced US Government Internet sites

not,

how-

the adversary.

officials against

computer

(including the

web-

of the National Infrastructure Protection Center) and have threatened the

electronic destruction of Internet servers if the federal

the battle.

government continues

1

At the moment, the

reality

of such computer network attack

vate individuals and non-State actors
as

this issue

no other country is more
underscored by news reports chronicling

in

an active "cyberwar" that appears currently to be underway. This

site

societies, in-

(CNA) by

pri-

may be more pressing than the use of CNA

an instrument of hostile action by one State against another. Whether

CNA

Computer Network Attack as a Use

actually has
ing.

been used

According

as

an instrument of State action

numerous

to

of Force under Article 2(4)

is

uncertain

press reports, President Clinton

as

of this writ-

approved

a covert

action against Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic that was intended to include

computer network
goslavia.

2

It

Yu-

attacks against Milosevic's financial assets held outside

also has

been reported

that General

Henry H.

Shelton,

Chairman of

acknowledged that the United States used CNA against
Serbian computer networks in the course of the Kosova conflict and that the
Defense Department is actively engaged in organizing for the coordination not
the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

only of defensive measures to protect military computer networks from

CNA operations.

"cyberterrorists," but of offensive

nior defense officials" also have been quoted

as

3

However, unnamed

"se-

saying that the United States re-

from implementing plans to use CNA against Serbian computer
networks for purposes of disrupting military operations and basic civilian serfrained

due in part

vices,

from the Defense Department's Office of
uses of CNA could be considered as "war

to legal guidance

General Counsel that certain
crimes. ^

Thus,

it

remains unclear whether the United States attempted to use

connection with the Kosova

conflict.

There

is

no doubt, however,

CNA in
De-

that the

partment of Defense has made an extensive study of the international legal

issues

engender and that US military and national security experts,
5

that such use could

CNA in future conflicts, have an understandable
interest in understanding the implications of CNA under international law.

looking to the possibility of using

Such legal
discussion

issues

can

arise

under both the jus ad helium and the jus

in hello.

This

confined to the former, specifically to the extent to which peace-

is

CNA

time use of

hostilities that

by or on behalf of

do not

a State (including use in the

course of

of a war under international law) can be

attain the status

characterized as an exercise of "force" under Article 2(4) of the United Nations

Charter. 6 Because the discussion

extend into other
Article 2(4)

might

is

limited to this threshold question,

it

will not

CNA that constitutes force under

areas, in particular,

when

also rise to the level

of an "armed attack" under Article 51 of

the Charter or might be lawfully used

as a

defense against such an attack. 7

At the outset, it may be useful to define the "rules of engagement" for this discussion. Reisman has pointed out that jurists' formulations, which characteristically take the form of "this is the law," often refer "simultaneously and without
discrimination to descriptions about flows of decisions in the past, predictions

about the
ence."

8

is

decisions

may be

taken in the future, or statements of prefer-

This criticism seems particularly applicable to statements about interna-

tional law.
ter

way
It

thus

is

appropriate to

make

clear

intended to make.
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chap-
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It is

too early for any legal authority to have emerged on the status of

under Article
basis

Consequently, analysis of the question must proceed on the

2(4).

of analogy to such possibly relevant authority and doctrine

contexts.

The statements about the law set forth in this chapter,

purport to describe the flow of past decisions directly on point.
a policy preference unless explicitly identified as such.

of where

tive

sonably

it

as exists in

therefore,

other

do not

Nor do they state

Rather, they are predic-

appears that existing legal doctrine, found in other contexts, rea-

would

peacetime

CNA

carry a court seized with an issue concerning the status of

CNA under Article 2(4).

The conclusion

which such

to

predictive analysis leads

"bright-line" rule. Instead, certain applications of
constitute force

under Article

This nebulous conclusion

2(4),

may

no

is

CNA are likely to be held to

but many other applications are likely not

to.

disappoint the proponents of two positions that

have emerged in scholarly and military
ently malicious

that there

is

circles.

The

first,

focusing on the inher-

and destructive nature of CNA, advocates

that

it

should be con-

sidered to be a prohibited use of force under Article 2(4) and thus to violate
international law, except

second, viewing

when

with less violence than traditional means of warfare, points in

the opposite direction

— CNA

should not be viewed

as a

(except

maybe

in

mode, however,

leads

one

most extreme

applications)

would pro-

Approaching the question

to conclude that

examples of wishful thinking, conflating
the state of the law.

its

prohibited use of force, because to do so

application of more lethal techniques.

predictive

The

CNA as having the beneficial potential to achieve military or

political objectives

mote the

otherwise authorized under the Charter.

in a

both these extremes are

a policy objective

with

a fair

reading of

9

Preliminary Questions

Before addressing the core question, several preliminary issues merit discus-

namely the definition of CNA, the techniques that it encompasses, and, finally, whether there is any real prospect that the status of CNA under Article
2(4) will be clarified without creating a new legal regime or clarifying instrusion,

ment

The

for that purpose.

Definition of

"Computer Network Attack"

A threshold question
has

been defined

is

what

is

meant by "computer network

attack."

CNA

in Joint Chiefs of Staff doctrine as "operations to disrupt, deny,

degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks,
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Use

of Force under Article 2(4)

or the computers and networks themselves." 10 For the sake of convenience, this

But

definition will be adopted for present purposes.

sweeps too broadly to be truly

useful,

because

techniques of attack that could be directed

Unless

be contended that computer

it

national law than other facilities
targeting a kinetic
a

computer

should not

weapon, such

more

(or,

(a

at

it

it

should be noted that

includes a range of physical

almost any target.

facilities

have

a different status in inter-

proposition for which there

is

no

authority),

bomb or other explosive device, at
known to house computing facilities)

as a missile,

likely, a structure

any different question under international law than

raise

it

if

the same

weapon were targeted at another piece of equipment or a structure used for a different purpose. The operation itself almost certainly will be characterized as a use of
1

force.

Thus, because it includes techniques of physical attack that are not unique to

computers but instead are widely applicable without distinction
Joint Chiefs' definition of

as

to target, the

CNA has limited utility as a tool of legal analysis.

At the same time, the definition contains an ambiguity that also may limit its
usefulness, in that it is unclear whether it encompasses the manipulation of a
computer network to achieve an effect extrinsic to the network itself, as opposed
to

merely rendering the network ineffective.

fect

would be

as to

the hostile manipulation of a computerized railway control system

produce

from the

train wrecks. 12 Similar hypothetical

potentially catastrophic

ations could

An example of such an extrinsic ef-

be viewed

as a

13

examples abound, running

to the merely vexatious. 14

While such oper-

form of "degrading" the information resident

in the

awkward. Since these manipulative variants of
CNA are, however, potentially among the most important from a force perspective, they will be assumed to be included within the definition for purposes of
computer, the definitional

fit is

this discussion. 15

Techniques of CNA

How CNA
not

a

is

accomplished can have

monolithic technique.

a

bearing on the legal analysis.

is

On the contrary, there are many methods by which

computer networks have been, or could be,
of being directed

CNA

attacked.

at a single objective. Instead, a

Nor is

CNA capable only

broad array of purposes can be

served by hostile intrusion into computers or computer networks. These include,

among others:

(espionage);

network

(ii)

(i)

extracting the information held in the target

computer

disseminating information through the adversary's information

in order to deceive the adversary or stimulate political instability; (hi)

preparing the battlespace by incapacitating the adversary's

and communication

capabilities;

or

(iv)
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control,

causing property damage, physical
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injury, or death

by the
It

target

by manipulating infrastructure or operational systems controlled

computer.

should be obvious that which technique

purposes for which
legal

to

it is

is

being considered,

be employed, can make

outcome. As noted above,

well

as

as

the

a significant difference to the

a traditional physical attack (e.g.,

bombing

the

building that houses the computers) seems to present no legal issues specific to

computer or computer network. The legally most interesting applications of CNA are those methods of attack which are highly specific to computers because they make use of the methods by which computers
the fact that the target

is

a

themselves operate.

Concern about
United

on computers and computer networks has
of the non-kinetic technical means by which

States to malicious intrusion

generated considerable discussion

computers might be attacked. 16
details. It
is

and the potential vulnerability of the

infrastructure security

is

sufficient to

their vulnerability to

It is

not necessary here to rehearse the technical

note their general outlines.

what

has

been

What is unique to computers

called "digital data warfare" 17

namely the

covert introduction of malicious computer code into a computer system or net-

work

to achieve an objective.

There

is

worm,

virus,

bomb"

a rich

18

context

Iroj an horse,

flying

Dutchman,

but the labels do not matter here.

),

is

lexicon describing variants of malicious computer code

What

is

time bomb,

(e.g.,

logic

significant in the present

computer code can be designed to lie dormant until
self-destruct and eliminate evidence of its presence after the

that malicious

triggered and to

mission has been accomplished. Also significant
are linked electronically to other systems

and

is

that

most computer systems

that malicious

code usually can be

introduced into a computer system by electronic data transfer (over the Internet
or directly)

as

long as the attacker can evade or overwhelm whatever defenses are

built into the system. Malicious

system by concealing

it

in

code

also

can be introduced into

a

computer

hardware or software that the operator of the target

system unwittingly incorporates into the system. There also reportedly are

back-door techniques for introducing malicious code into computer systems
without any use of media for which the system was designed, for example by
manipulating the power system or using high-energy radio frequencies or carefully controlled

The

electromagnetic pulses. 19

Prospects that the

Law

will

Although the application of
ally interesting

question, there

be Clarified

UN Charter Article 2(4) to CNA

is

reason to

77

wonder whether,

is

an intellectu-

as a practical

matter,

Computer Network Attack as a Use

of Force under Article 2(4)

The most important obstacle may be the difficulty of attributing CNA to State action. Moreover, even if State use of CNA were to emerge as a recognizable phenomenon,
such CNA would have to occur in relative isolation in order squarely to pose the
the issue ever will arise in a context requiring an actual decision.

relevant legal issue. Because this seems improbable,

be

likely will

it

ever, before the practice of States, decisions of the International
(ICJ), or other

how Article

recognized sources of international law yield

2(4) applies to

CNA.

Thus, the best prospect for

a

long time,

if

Court ofjustice

a clarification

of

prompt and auwould be if States
a

CNA under Article 2(4)
were to agree to define the legal parameters of CNA through an appropriate inthoritative elucidation

of the

of

status

ternational instrument.
1.

State action. Although various authors have posited a

that an incident

of

"busting" dams or

number of forms

CNA could take, from disrupting air traffic control systems to
oil pipelines,

the rub

is

that, at least

up

to the time

of this writ-

ing and to the best of the author's knowledge, none of these imaginable instances

of

CNA

actually has

State sponsorship.

20

been perpetrated by

Indeed, the

certainly

is

true that

numerous

works by private individuals
cently.

21

at all.

instances of intrusion into

computer net-

fairly primitive,

such

as

the flooding of US

Internet websites with messages ("spamming") emanating

Serbia and protesting
phisticated

interesting)

(generally called "hacking") have taken place re-

Some of these have been

Government

or with publicly-discernible

more extreme (and therefore more

examples apparently have not occurred
It

a State

US bombing

of that country. 22

from

Others have been more so-

on Defense DepartGovernment computer networks. But most appear to have

and potentially quite harmful, including

ment and other US
been the work of individuals or groups not
accessible to the public) as sponsored

by

attacks

identified

(at least

not in any source

a State.

Lacking acknowledged, or at least provable, State action or State sponsorship,
such events must be considered

as raising

problems in international criminality,

not public international law. Moreover, to date there appears to have been no
State reaction to

CNA in the international legal arena. Because no State has yet

taken any action or asserted a legal position vis-a-vis another State arising out of

an incident of CNA, there

is

a lack

of the State practice that could illuminate the

international legal analysis of CNA,

whether under Article

2(4) or

under cus-

tomary international law.
This
unlike
ficult

state

of affairs

is

not surprising.

CNA

new phenomenon. Moreover,
most forms of CNA may be dif-

a

is

many other putative techniques of force,

or impossible to trace to the real perpetrator. Indeed, the most effective

forms of

CNA

are likely to

be contrived so

78

as to

conceal the fact that they
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occurred

leaving the target State in doubt

at all,

as to

whether the

affected

com-

puter network was externally attacked or simply failed for other reasons. Obviously, to the extent that

it is

of an event of CNA, even

not possible plausibly to demonstrate the existence

less

the identity of the perpetrator and a nexus to a

imply State responsibility, any State response based on an

State sufficient to

leged violation of Article 2(4), or indeed any other

would

norm of international

al-

law,

lack credibility.

This issue

is

exacerbated by the amorphous structure of the Internet. If an in-

CNA

by "indirect penetration" 23 over the Internet, it may
be difficult to determine where it originated. There is no inherent reason why
the point from which the attack is launched must be in the territory of the State
that caused the act to be done. Moreover, even if the identity of the immediate
perpetrator is discovered, it may be impossible to demonstrate a link between
that person or organization and a State to which responsibility for the CNA can
be attributed. To date, the mode of CNA in actual practice is the computer
"hacker," wreaking havoc for sport or, occasionally, for some ideological mocident of

tive.

to

is

effected

One would expect any State that chose to use CNA as a weapon to attempt

make

its

efforts

look

like those

of a hacker.

Moreover, the contexts in which

a State

is

most likely to use

CNA unaccom-

panied by an array of traditional military instruments are intelligence collection

and covert action, for example, the use of
population. Such applications of
likely to

CNA,

CNA to sow unrest in the target State's
however, probably are

be publicly acknowledged by, or credibly attributable

to,

also the least

the State that

perpetrates them.

Unlikelihood of Isolated Use. In order for the status of CNA under Article 2(4) to emerge as an issue, the incident in question probably would have to
be considered in isolation. If, as may have been the case in the Kosova conflict,
CNA is used in the context of a military operation conducted by traditional
means that indubitably constitute force, the target State would have little interest
in raising a legal dispute on the sole issue of CNA. (Thus, Serbia may have tenable claims that the entire operation conducted against it was a violation of international law, but it is unlikely that it would single out US hacking into its
computer networks, if it occurred, as a separate violation, even less one worthy
2.

of an individualized response.)

The Status of CNA Under

Article 2(4)

Lacking any directly applicable precedents or other sources of international
law, the status of

CNA

under Article 2(4) only can be predicted by drawing
79
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analogies to other

Use

as a

of Force under Article 2(4)

phenomena whose status is better established.

manifestations easily could be assimilated to

would be

armed

If

CNA in

force, further discussion

superfluous, since Article 2(4) indisputably encompasses

Neither every form of

armed force.

CNA nor every purpose for which CNA can be

however, readily can be analogized to armed
(including, notably, those the

United

States

force.
is

all its

Some

applications of

used,

CNA

reported to have contemplated

using against Slobodan Milosevic) operate only in the economic or political

making highly relevant the question whether Article 2(4) encommeasures of economic or political coercion, or, if not all such measures, at

sphere, thus
passes
least

those that threaten the target State's territorial integrity or political inde-

pendence. Moreover, because
tracing

CNA to

may be unclear (given the inherent problems of

it

source) whether an incident of

its

military forces, another relevant issue, if one

non-military uses of physical force can

Economic and

Political

fall

is

CNA has been conducted by

to reason

by analogy,

is

whether

within the scope of Article 2(4).

Coercion as Force

was adopted, controversy has existed as to
whether measures of economic and political coercion constitute force under ArVirtually since the Charter

ticle 2(4).

The weight of scholarly opinion supports the negative view, 24 but that

does not appear to have put the question to

one recent
vailing

analysis

of

rest, at least as

more

economic and

2(4) to

balanced, contextual view of Article 2(4)

political sanctions

State's territorial integrity

and

within Article 2(4) derives from

of the

status

of

"armed

force," as-

can threaten international peace and

political

this

"pre-

would conclude

that

a target

independence and therefore can

fall

CNA generally

falls

within the ambit of Article 2(4); the author's conclusion that

ysis

CNA. Thus,

CNA under Article 2(4), while admitting that the

view" among scholars would confine Article

serts that a

applied to

premise.

25

In contrast, another recent anal-

CNA under Article 2(4) adopts the opposite conclusion, that

"the prohibition of the threat or use of force includes armed, but not economic
or political coercion." 26

The same author

goes on to comment, however, that

the borders of force do not necessarily "precisely coincide with

armed force,

i.e.,

27

by conventional weaponry."
On balance, the latter perspective is better founded. Although a conclusion that
economic or political coercion standing alone constitutes force under Article 2(4)
might well contribute more to the purposes of the Charter and to the maintenance

physical or kinetic force applied

of world order than the contrary, that does not make
analysis.

A number of points

sustain the

view

it

tenable as a matter of legal

that Article 2(4) does not apply to

measures of political or economic coercion. These include the following:
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•

The

background of Article

historical

against

background of international

a

recourse to armed force.

were not the
•

The

2(4)

28

shows

efforts

that

it

was conceived

eliminate unilateral

to

Measures of economic and

political

coercion

issue.

travaux preparatories of the Charter indicate that the San Francisco

Conference declined to adopt
prohibition

on the use of force

a proposal that

to include

was advanced to extend the

economic

sanctions.

Subsequent

General Assembly declarations, principally the Declaration on Friendly
Relations 29 and the Declaration on the

of the Principle

Enhancement of the Effectiveness
of Refraining from Threat or Use of Force in

International Relations, 30

Assembly
coercion

to

as

clarify

provided an opportunity for the General

the issue

by delineating economic and

political

equivalents of armed force for purposes of Article 2(4). Efforts

were made by some Members to this end, but they met resistance from
other Members and were unsuccessful, 31 demonstrating that there is no

common

understanding

Article 2(4) to
•

among Members

economic or

that

would support extending

political coercion.

no decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) holding
that measures of economic or political coercion constitute force under
Article 2(4). Indeed in the Nicaragua case, 32 in which the Court generally
There

is

considered the customary international law prohibition against the use of
force to be coterminous with Article 2(4) (which

was not

itself at issue),

Nicaragua complained of substantial measures of economic pressure.

These were considered to be violations of the
Friendship,

United

Commerce and

States,

Navigation between Nicaragua and the

however, and were not even mentioned

violations of the customary international
force.

of

treaty

bilateral

Moreover, the Court held

that

as

possible

law prohibition on the use of

even the United

States' furnishing

of

substantial financial support to insurgent forces in Nicaragua, support that

was used to

of violence, did not constitute the use of force

sustain acts

under customary international law. 33

armed insurrection
that

have

is

a less direct

would seem, if financing an
not force, that, a fortiori, other economic measures
nexus to armed violence would not be either.
It

Thus, despite arguments advanced to the contrary, the
drafting history of the Charter

is

fact

remains that the

inconsistent with such an extension, that this

question generally has divided Western States from significant components of
the "Third

World," and

economic and

that

no

international consensus has

political coercion, standing alone, as force,
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is

a
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strong basis for concluding that such forms of coercion

of international law, such

An argument
political

as

may violate

other norms

the principle of non-intervention. 34

made

view regarding economic and
measures of coercion should not apply to CNA. Although ultimately

not convincing,

can be

it

that the prevailing

proceeds along the following

lines. In

more than

half a cen-

economic and political coercion, the kind of coercion that has been envisaged has been primarily external
and gradual trade sanctions, withholding economic benefits, unequal trading
practices, interference with the target State's external commercial relations. In
contrast, the kind of economic coercion that CNA might make possible, crippling the banking system, or shutting down the securities markets, operates on
the internal economic structures of the target State and does so through a swift
and devastating blow. Therefore, since CNA is a different phenomenon, it can
be argued that the earlier debate over economic and political sanctions as force is
tury of debate over the application of Article 2(4) to

—

irrelevant.

While the factual premise underlying this argument may be valid, all it demonstrates is the neutral fact that CNA is a new form of hostile activity. That
CNA may differ from earlier forms of economic and political coercion does
not tell us whether CNA comes within the intended scope of Article 2(4) or
instead should be viewed as another manifestation of the types of economic
and

political

tional

coercion that various

states

have

failed to

persuade the interna-

community to acknowledge as falling within the definition of "force."

In analyzing the application of Article 2(4) to

CNA in order to predict how

community will view CNA, it seems prudent, in light of
existing legal authority, to acknowledge, however much a different conclusion
might be desired on policy grounds, that there is little likelihood that purely economic or political coercion, even if effectuated in novel ways, will be considered
the ICJ and the world

to violate Article 2(4). If this proposition

stone in any future analysis of
cific

application of

coercion,

cept

is

correct,

it

suggests that the touch-

CNA under Article 2(4) will be whether the spe-

CNA at issue more closely resembles economic and political

on the one hand,

commonly

is

or,

on the other hand,

military force as the latter con-

understood.

NonrMilitary Physical Force

is

Another interpretive issue under Article 2(4) that bears on the status of CNA
whether non-military physical measures can also constitute force for purposes

of Article

2(4).

acts to cause

Examples of such measures would include:

flooding in an adjacent

down river State;
82

a State intentionally

a State sets a forest fire in a
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frontier region intending that

spread into the target State; a State releases nox-

it

ious substances into the environment,
target State.

there

is

no

Opinion is divided as

knowing that

to the status of such acts

decisional authority directly

bility that in certain

physical force could

felt

under Article

in the

2(4)

and

on point. Some scholars admit the possi-

circumstances a hostile use of such non-military forms of
fall

within Article 2(4), especially if the

of magnitude that could be viewed

as

ing the right of self-defense under

Article 51. 35

The

the effect will be

the equivalent of an

results rose to a level

armed

attack trigger-

view would appear to be that non-military physical force can indeed fall within Article 2(4), even if the consequences do not rise to the level of
an armed attack. The principal reason why scholars have opposed such an extension of Article 2(4) appears to be a "slippery slope" fear that applying Article 2(4)
better

when

to non-military physical force

force

its

approximate those of military

effects

would open the door to applying Article 2(4)
coercion that have similarly devastating

to measures

of economic and

This fear

is

misplaced.

In the case of non-military physical force, the fact that the force

is

physical

political

enough,

first,

to distinguish

it

effects.

from coercive economic and

political

is

measures

and, second, to support an analogy to those military forms of physical force that
clearly lie at the core
If one

is

of Article

2(4).

prepared to admit that non-military physical measures can constitute

force for purposes of Article 2(4),

it is

hard to see

why this should be the case only

if the

consequences are of a type and degree of seriousness that would

level

of an armed

attack. It

is

widely recognized that not

when

it

the

force under Article

under Article 51. The ICJ implicitly
indicated in the Nicaragua case that supplying arms and other

2(4) necessarily constitutes an

so stated

all

rise to

armed

attack

support to armed rebel bands in another State

is

not an armed attack but could

on the use of
To require non-military force to rise to the level of an armed attack in
order to violate Article 2(4) would obliterate the important distinction between
Articles 2(4) and 51. Such a position would either legalize under Article 2(4) a
broad range of hostile and destructive physical acts that fail to reach the armed
attack threshold or would provide an incentive to lower the Article 51 threshconstitute a violation of the customary international prohibition

force. 36

old,

with a concurrent risk of expanding violence under the pretext of legitimate

self-defense.

Thus, on balance,

it

seems better to conclude (although admit-

tedly without the benefit of any supporting authority) that intentional, hostile
uses of non-military physical force

the scope of Article 2(4)

when

physically destructive effect,

by one

State against another can

fall

within

they sufficiently resemble military force in their

whether or not the

are met.
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Concept of Military Force

Even if one were to accept the restrictive view
means military force, it should be noted that the

that force
latter

under Article

concept

2(4)

carries a large

measure of flexibility. As the techniques of warfare evolve, so too does the general

understanding of what constitutes "military" force.

were not

If this

so, the

would become ossified at the level of military technology that existed at the end of World War II and would become increasingly
irrelevant to the modern world. Thus, we have no difficulty in recognizing that
prohibition of Article 2(4)

new forms

of biological and chemical warfare, directed energy,

innovative technologies,

if used intentionally

by

lasers,

and other

a State to cause physical injury

or property damage in another State, will constitute forms of military or armed
force. This applies

even

when

herently harmful but also

is

the instrument

used for

itself,

like a laser

beam,

not in-

is

range of beneficent purposes.

a

The hard question is how one recognizes when a new technology has become a form of military or armed force. The answer is not always obvious, but
one

significant criterion

is

forces of the State that uses

whether the technique
it.

is

armed
if this technique were to

associated with the

Thus, in the case of CNA,

be deployed only by intelligence agencies in conducting covert actions,

it

seems

would be generally accepted as a form of military or armed force
were used by the armed forces. Consequently, it is likely that the fact

less likely that it

than

if it

that the

US

the day

when

Department of Defense (apparently joined by the military forces of
other countries) is making preparations for the military use of CNA will hasten
a State's offensive use

of

CNA,

at least for

purposes of causing

physical injury or property damage, will be considered a use of force under Article 2(4).

Preliminary Conclusions
Against the background of the foregoing discussion, what preliminary conclusions can be reached about the application of Article 2(4) to

conclusion appears to be that force
certain forms of

is

CNA as force when

like
it

CNA? The basic

pornography: the law will recognize

sees

them. The present

state

of legal de-

velopment does not permit laying down any hard and fast rules as to when
will be. It does, however, permit one to make some predictions about the
cumstances in which State use of

CNA may be likely to be

that
cir-

held to constitute

force under Article 2(4).
•

CNA

is

not

form of activity, nor is it potentially capable only of
single purpose. Thus there is no basis for concluding

a single

being directed

at a
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that

CNA

forms of

all

per se constitute a violation of Article 2(4).

when CNA will fall within the force category
case-by-case basis. The question is how.

Consequently, whether and

must be determined on
•

CNA

most

is

a

and thus most

like traditional military force,

constitute force

under Article

2(4), if its direct

and foreseeable

likely to
effects are

physical injury or property damage.
•

CNA that

directly

damage similar to
weaponry is likely
especially if that
•

and foreseeably produces physical injury or property
that resulting
to

CNA

from the use of

be viewed
is

forms of

use of force under Article 2(4),

as a

carried out

traditional

by

a State's

armed

forces.

CNA that produces effects (even if direct and foreseeable) that are only of
an economic or political nature

not likely to be held to be within the

is

scope of Article 2(4). (Thus a program of
infrastructure of a target State
2(4).

Even

if

The notion

would not be

that

a use

direct

of force under Article

down

angry investors rioted and tore

damage would not be

that physical

CNA that crippled the financial
and

the stock exchange,

foreseeable.)

CNA will be recognized as force under Article 2(4) when

sufficiently resembles military force implies that

it

views on particular forms of

CNA are likely to evolve in light of developments in military operations. These
may

lead to surprising conclusions. For example, before

against Serbia,

one might have predicted

that using

NATO's

campaign

CNA to produce transitory

power outages in a target State would not be recognizable as an analog or equivalent of military force, because it causes no permanent damage to the targeted
power system, and the effects on users of power, including the military, are uncertain, indirect and incalculable. Transitory outages seem more of an economic
measure or a psychological weapon (intended, if one may put it this way, to induce

a sense

of powerlessness in the target

population and leadership)

State's

than a military one.
In the

NATO,

last

year,

however,

it

was reported

that the

employed an innovative form of weapon

filaments used against electric
aircraft, like a

bomb, with

power facilities.

little

States,

on behalf of

against Serbia, a type

of carbon

The filaments were dropped from

the intention of causing property damage. Thus,

seems incontrovertible that their use was
attacks did

37

United

a

form of armed

force,

it

even though the

or no permanent damage, merely shorting out the

power system

and disabling it for a brief period, thereby producing some disruption to the econ-

omy

and the military

The same
Should

this

effort,

kinds of effects

ever occur,

it is

but having principally

on

the

a psychological effect.

power system could be produced by CNA.

likely that the earlier military use
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weapon

described above will color the

down

shut

controls.

a target State's

Use

way

of Force under Article 2(4)

the world looks at such use of

power system through manipulating

its

The Views

of Other

fit

such an incident of

CNA to

computerized

The existence of a military, non-CNA precedent, it is submitted,

ate a predisposition to try to

A

as a

will cre-

CNA into the force category.

Commentators

number of commentators have addressed the status of CNA under
2(4) and have come to widely divergent conclusions. A few assert that

small

Article

CNA causing destructive effects
view advanced in this chapter,

that

2(4) if it sufficiently resembles

force and focus

is

on attempting

use of "force." Others espouse the

ipso facto a

CNA will only constitute force under Article

what the world recognizes
to provide a

more

precise

as

armed or

military

way of identifying

the

principles that underlie such recognition.

Destructive effect as the touchstone. In one of the most extensive ex-

1.

aminations of

Sharp has proposed a rule that appears both

this issue to date,

sweeping and simple: "Any computer network attack that intentionally causes
any destructive effect within the sovereign territory of another

state

is

an unlaw-

of force within the meaning of Article 2(4) that may produce the
an armed attack prompting the right of self-defense." 38

ful use

should be noted that

It

Does
does

this rule

the term "destructive"

it

is

not without

mean only

its

own

effects

of

interpretive issues.

physical destruction, for example, or

include economic harm? Sharp suggests that

it

could include the

latter in

some circumstances. He concludes that Article 2(4), while not including all coercive economic and political sanctions that are intended to influence another
State's policy or actions, does extend to coercive political and economic sanctions that threaten the territorial integrity or

Thus, a non-physical destructive

independence of another

effect (such as disruption

should be considered force under Article 2(4)

if it

is

State. 39

of financial markets)

sufficiently serious to

threaten the target State's territorial integrity or independence.

Aside from the

fact that this

conclusion

is

inconsistent with the weight of legal

authority, extending the concept of "destruction" to include coercive

economic

and

political measures,

rity

or independence, seems likely to deprive the posited rule of much of its ap-

but only

if they

threaten another State's territorial integ-

parent objectivity and simplicity, because

economic and political measures

ment

is

being made

are likely to

it

is

not easy to determine

have such an

after the effect already has

when

effect unless the judg-

been produced.

For example, the Arab boycott of Israel manifestly was intended to threaten
that country's territorial integrity

and independence;
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it

was carried out by

States
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had declared war on

that

Israel

tion of the target country.
political
ally

Did

and espoused

war aim the

total elimina-

of economic measures, or the associated

that set

measures intended to delegitimize

"threaten"

as their

Israel's territorial integrity

Israel in the international arena, re-

and independence? With the benefit

of hindsight, the answer clearly seems negative, but at different points in time the

outcome was not
was

so clear.

Would we

therefore conclude that the Arab boycott

of Article 2(4) at certain periods in Israel's history and not at othSuch a result seems an unworkable rule of law. The example illustrates the

a violation

ers?

difficulty,

except perhaps in the most extreme cases, of applying a rule that de-

pends on determining

when

a threat exists to territorial integrity or political

independence.
In advancing the "destructive effect" standard, Sharp reasons

on the

basis

of the proposition that other forms of non-military physical force constitute
force under Article 2(4), 40 citing as examples the release of floodwaters or the

spreading of fire across a border. 41

to

types of significant property

fatalities,

could be effected through
chemical explosions, and

The argument then proceeds
damage, as well as possible human

CNA,

fires. If these

stitute force

under Article 2(4)

means,

argued,

it is

duced by

such

why

as

physically destructive events

if produced

by

a State

should they not also be considered force

when

pro-

CNA?

be widely accepted

if

to

used

as a

springboard to

or psychological.

make

reasonable and should

far. (It

this already

The

analysis

be-

untested proposi-

a leap into the arena

of the

run on banks or a massive financial

exchanges" 42 also

lying principle too

is

financial,

The analogy to flood or fire is not convincing as a basis

for concluding that causing "a

ing national stock

be supported by judicial

confined to the examples given above.

comes markedly less compelling, however, when
political,

would con-

agency using non-military

decision or State practice, the conclusion nonetheless

is

that

flooding, train wrecks, plane crashes,

Although the underlying premise does not seem

tion

adumbrate

would constitute force.

should be noted that

this

value judgment. Such State intervention in the

It

assessment

affairs

crisis

by crash-

pushes the under-

is

not intended as

a

of another ought to be

may well may be on other grounds,
The sole question, here, is whether

prohibited by international law and, indeed,

such

as

the principle of non-intervention.

Article 2(4) provides the norm.)

There might well be narrow circumstances in which Article

2(4) could

be

held applicable to an attack having effects solely or primarily in the economic or
political sphere, but, if so,

it is

would be because of the means emFor example, if a State were to use physical

submitted, this

ployed, not the nature of the target.

but non-military means to achieve these results
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dispatching intelligence
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on which

operatives into the target State to cut a fiber-optic cable
nancial information

is

transmitted), scholars

might well conclude

essential fi-

that an inci-

dent of force had occurred. Suppose instead, however, that a State sought to
achieve the same end, financial disruption in the target State, through purely

non-physical means, such

of trading orders or dissemi-

as large-scale falsification

nation of false market information. These seem to be quintessential measures of

economic coercion, and it is very unlikely that scholarly opinion would sustain
the view that such acts constituted force under Article 2(4). Thus, identity of
ultimate effects, standing alone, simply does not supply a sufficient basis for con-

cluding that Article 2(4) applies.
held to constitute force

is

The

reason

not the end result

why

the act of sabotage might be

(that the stock

exchange

but cutting the cable would involve an intrusion on the target
that,

although arguably "non-military," would achieve

crashes),

State's territory

a physical effect closely

resembling the use of kinetic action.
2.

Characteristics of armed force as the touchstone. In

a recent analysis,

Schmitt, recognizing that within the existing framework of international law,

CNA will be deemed to be Article 2(4) force only when
armed

force,

embarks on an impressive

identifying those cases of

He

it

sufficiently resembles

effort to delineate a principled basis for

CNA that meet this test.

notes that traditional notions of force are instrument-based: the Article

namely military

2(4) prohibition against using a particular instrument,

against another State

is

tied to the high degree

force,

of congruence between its use and

reprobated consequences, primarily physical destruction and injury. This,
posited, explains

why armed

struction or injury,

whose

tie to

is

which almost always results in physical deprohibited force, while economic or political coercion,
force,

predictable physical destruction or injury

This observation

is

it is

not entirely

satisfying,

is

tenuous,

however, because,

as

is

not. 43

Schmitt has

recognized, "the instruments do not precisely track the threats to shared values

community would seek to deter." 44 It is clear
that many technologies that would be recognized as weapons when used for the
purpose of causing physical damage or personal injury, e.g., laser beams, can be
which,

ideally, the international

entirely beneficent in other uses, such as medicine. Thus,

those technologies to the "armed force" category,
lethality

it is

when we assign one of

not because of its inherent

but because of the potential destructiveness of the

The same could be said of CNA. And, for
it seems unlikely that many would debate that CNA used directly to

the purpose for
this reason,

way it is being used or

which

it is

deployed.

cause physical destruction or injury (busting a dam, rupturing a pipeline, causing
airplanes or trains to crash)
2(4),

making its use

force.

is

The

tantamount to
question

is
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criteria that will

be
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recognized

consistent with the current understanding of Article 2(4), any

as

other use of

CNA

be placed confi-

sufficiently similar to these easy cases to

is

dently in the force category.

To answer
tional

this question,

community

is

Schmitt has suggested

prepared to adopt

a

that, unless the interna-

new normative

structure to apply to

CNA

must be fit into the traditional
instrument/consequence based frame of reference by looking to see whether
particular uses of CNA meet the criteria that distinguish armed force from poliinter-State coercion, the analysis of

tical

or economic coercion. 45 These criteria, he suggests, are: severity

—

the

higher threat of physical injury or property damage associated with armed force;
immediacy

—

the comparative swiftness of harm arising from

pared with other forms of coercion;

directness

—

—

invasiveness

com-

as

the relatively direct connection

between armed force and negative consequences,
of coercion;

armed force,

the fact that in the case

compared with other forms
of armed force the act causing
as

harm generally crosses into the territory of the target State whereas measures of
economic or political coercion normally do not; measurability the greater
ease and certainty of assessing the consequences of armed force as compared with

—

other forms of coercion; and presumptive legitimacy

presumptively
at least

—the

fact that

violence

under domestic and international law, whereas most

illegal

many) techniques of economic and

political

is

(or

coercion are presump-

tively legal. 46
It

of

would be

desirable to

be able to delineate

criteria for identifying those types

CNA that should be treated as analogous to armed force. Yet,

that Schmitt's

proposed

six criteria reliably serve this

it is

not clear

purpose. Rather, examina-

tion of the criteria suggests that virtually any event of

CNA can be argued to

on the armed force

regards the criterion of se-

verity,

and

side

of the

that the criterion

except perhaps

line,

of severity in

ing the observation that, for an event of

under Article

2(4),

it

must produce

effect

is

as

just another

way of articulat-

CNA to be considered a type of force

(or at least threaten to

produce) personal in-

jury or property damage similar to that caused by military weapons.
the proposed criteria,

Immediacy:

it is

fall

Review of

submitted, substantiates this proposition.

CNA ordinarily occurs with great immediacy, once

its

destructive

While malicious software may be designed to lie dormant
for an extended period until some triggering event occurs, once it becomes active, the disruption of the targeted computer or computer network can be ex-

potential

is

triggered.

pected to be immediate,

as

well

as

immediately perceptible in

owner of the computer does not recognize
tion or destruction.

(It is

that

CNA

is

result,

a slow,

imper-

computer would be advantageous
89

if the

the cause of its degrada-

hard to imagine circumstances in which

ceptible deterioration of the targeted

even

to the

Computer Network Attack

as a

Use

author of the attack.) Thus, there seems to be

of Force under Article 2(4)

little

difference

between

CNA and

ordinary armed force.
Directness:

Compared to economic

or political coercion,

many applications of

CNA are as direct as traditional armed force. The consequences generally flow
directly

from the

act

of attack

itself

and do not depend on intervening or con-

become an
were property damage and any effect on human

tributory factors in order to have a harmful effect. Directness might
issue if the

only harmful effect

beings was reactive. Thus, there could be a significant difference between
that caused a

dam's floodgates to open and

convenienced the target population
such

a

degree that rioting ensued.

people, and

CNA that merely in-

by disrupting

financial markets) to

kill

(e.g.,

CNA

On the other hand, the path even from the lat-

form of CNA to the reprobated result of physical injury and tangible property
damage is no more (or less) indirect than similar consequences, such as starvation
or health disasters, arising from a military blockade. Yet a military blockade is
ter

undeniably
really

a use

of force.

To

the extent that the directness criterion

is

useful,

it

seems to do no more than restate the proposition that to constitute force an

event of

CNA must directly cause physical injury or property damage and not

operate solely in the economic or political realm.
Invasiveness:

At

of electrons, the act causing the harm in a

least at the level

CNA attack usually crosses into the target State, whether
a

it

be by importation of

corrupted item of hardware or software, the actions of an agent of the hostile

State (a cyber saboteur), or cross-border data transmission over the telephone

network. There appears to be no difference, in

this regard,

between

CNA and

armed force.
Measurability: There seems no reason to assume that the consequences of an
event of CNA would be any harder to measure than the negative consequences
of armed coercion.
traditional

Presumptive legitimacy:

Many States already have enacted laws outlawing CNA

when

perpetrated by private parties within the territory. As

States

become aware of the

used by non-State
gal, 47

threat,

actors, will

it is

been regarded

as

armed

likely that this technique, at least

be viewed in most

thus eliminating any distinction

more and more

between

when

States as presumptively

ille-

CNA and what traditionally has

force.

Factoring out those of the criteria that do not appear reliably to distinguish

CNA from armed coercion,

all

that

is

left is severity.

Moreover,

severity, as de-

fined for this purpose, seems applicable only to physical injury and property

damage, compelling the conclusion that

CNA

will

force category only if its foreseeable consequence

property damage and, even then, only

90

if
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be considered within the
to cause physical injury or

the severity of those foreseeable
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consequences resembles the consequences that are associated with armed coer-

way of analyzing incidents of CNA in practice may in fact turn out to do no more than identify the
cases that would be clear without applying a criterion any more formal than was
cion. In short,

what seems

at first

blush to be a nuanced

suggested in the preliminary conclusions above:
force

CNA

will

be considered

as

when it causes physical injury or property damage that is recognizably sim-

produced by instruments generally identified as weapons.
The limitations of the proposed factors are demonstrated by Schmitt's own
comparison of two hypothetical uses of CNA. 48 In the first, CNA is used to dis-

ilar

to that

able an air traffic control system, causing airplanes to crash.

Schmitt, this meets the criteria and

is

force. In the

According to

second example, the attacker

computer network for purposes of disrupting military research being conducted on campus. This does not meet the test and is not force.
Schmitt suggests that there should be a different result in the attack on the university because the desired outcome, diminished capacity on the battlefield, is
too remote from the event of CNA and too dependent on indeterminate factors.
But this is not persuasive; the question of remoteness depends on how the outcome is defined. The immediate objective of the hypothetical CNA is to degrade the functioning of the targeted computer network, and the nexus between
the act and that outcome is immediate. (One could as well argue that dropping
filaments on Serbian electric power facilities to produce temporary power outages is remote from the ultimate objective, impairing Serbia's ability to maintain
military operations. Yet few would gainsay that the NATO bombing raids in
which these devices were dropped constituted force under Article 2(4).) Thus,
destroys a university

except for this purported difference in directness, Schmitt's two examples are re-

markably similar with respect to the proposed

factors. In reality,

it is

submitted,

the only tenable reason, and the real underlying explanation, for the difference

outcome is that in the first case there is physical injury and significant property damage and in the second there is not.
That severity does not reliably predict the legal outcome unless it is confined
to the severity of physical injury and/ or property damage is shown by consider-

in the posited

ing another hypothetical use of CNA, disruption of the target State's financial

system through interference with the computers through which securities are

money moves, and financial transactions are recorded and settled. If successfully used against the United States or many other Western countries, the retraded,

sulting social

and economic disruption and monetary losses would be staggering.

For each of Schmitt's
an

air traffic

factors, this

event of

CNA seems comparable to disabling

control system, except for the fact that

it

does not directly and

foreseeably result in physical injury or property damage. In terms of severity,
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more broadly construed, can there be any doubt that the impact of such an attack
would be orders of magnitude more serious than if a hostile State, through a misno loss of life, obliterated a military warehouse full of uniforms an incident that no one would hesitate to describe as within the scope of
Article 2(4)? Yet, applying the existing legal framework for analyzing Article 2(4),
this hypothetical attack on the country's financial infrastructure probably would
be considered to fall outside the Article 2(4) force category, because it much more
closely resembles economic coercion than traditional armed force.
sile

attack that caused

—

Conclusion: The Unsatisfactory Reality

There

is

ticle 2(4).

no

legal authority directly applicable to the status

The most

support extending

economic or

it

CNA under Ar-

under Article 2(4) that might
broad range of types of CNA is whether force includes

significant interpretive issue

to a

and the weight of prevailing opinion

political coercion,

does not. Against

of

this

is

that

it

background, two approaches recently have been suggested

The first, destructiveness as the criterion, is relatively simple to
apply (or could be made so with a few clarifications) and might be an appealing
rule in a legislative context. The problem is that it is not founded in sufficient lein the literature.

gal authority to

engender confidence

national law under Article 2(4).

by prevailing

as a

correct predictive statement of inter-

The second recognizes

interpretations of Article 2(4)

and

tries to

the limitations imposed

remain

faithful to

while positing criteria by which one can recognize those uses of
the force category.

bottom,

it

The

CNA that

them,
fall

in

somewhat illusory, however. At
probably can be reached by reference to

exercise turns out to be

leads to a conclusion that

only one criterion: whether the foreseeable consequence of a particular manifestation of

from

CNA

is

physical injury or property

military weapons. If so, the

gory. Otherwise

What we

damage comparable to that resulting

CNA will be held to

fall

within the force cate-

49
it will not.

are left with,

it is

submitted,

ment probably can be reached on
CNA that so resemble armed

is

the proposition that
force

which general agreethere are some kinds of

a situation in

that,

like

other

non-military physical force that have been suggested

manifestations

as falling

of

within Article

2(4) (e.g., diverting a river in the hostile State so as to cause flooding in the target
State),

they will be held to

these forms of

within the scope of Article 2(4).

It is

likely that

CNA will be recognized widely as Article 2(4) force if and when

they occur, but
will rest.

fall

it is

difficult to articulate the precise bases

on which recognition

The one basis that seems most reliable is that physical injury or property

damage must arise

as a direct

and foreseeable consequence of the
92
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resemble the injury or damage associated with what,
recognized

at

the time, are generally

military weapons.

as

This conclusion appears highly unsatisfactory, leaving the law in a
certainty,

but does

it

matter that

really

much?

First, it is clear that,

not they violate Article 2(4), most significant uses of
other rules of international law, such
the

affairs

of other

international

States,

law. 50

state

of un-

whether or

CNA probably will violate

as

the prohibition against intervention in

which the ICJ

has held to be a principle of customary

Various specific techniques used in carrying out

likely to violate other international treaties,

such

as

CNA are

those relating to telecom-

munications. Thus, responsible decision-makers concerned about determining the legality of proposed uses of

CNA are not bereft of legal principles to

guide them.

Second,
incident of

at least

from the

target State's perspective, the

key issue

is

whether an

CNA gives rise to a right to take counteraction in self-defense.

that right to arise

under the Charter, there must be an armed attack within the

meaning of Article
Article 2(4).

For

51, a standard that goes

It is difficult

to say

beyond the existence of force under

whether an event of CNA that caused significant

physical injury and/or property damage, standing alone, ever could be consid-

ered an armed attack. In

all

likelihood, however, a State's use of

CNA of such

magnitude would not occur in isolation; instead it probably would form part of a
coordinated offensive, other elements of which undeniably would constitute

armed

attack. In

such a context, the legal

status

of the

CNA element in isolation

probably would be of little importance.
Third, worrying about the status of

while
ture

CNA under Article 2(4) may be fiddling

Rome burns. The notion that the

Charter represents the sole legal struc-

under which coercive force can be exerted by one State against another

largely has

—both by

been discredited

nism to function

as

the failure of the Security Council

mecha-

envisioned by the Charter's framers and by the practice of

States in ignoring recourse to the Security

ing alliance-based) interventionism.

Council in favor of unilateral (includ-

The recent NATO humanitarian interven-

which was given the fig leaf of a Security Council resolution only
after its military aims were achieved, may be a step on the road to a better and
more moral system of international law, but it was only the most recent in a series
of events that, over the decades, have dealt a heavy blow to the system supposedly established by the Charter. 51 These events sustain the view that, while Article 2(4) represents an aspiration, (perhaps, like another form of prohibition, a
failed "noble experiment"), the reality of international law on the use of force
lies in the^ development of a "nuanced code for appraising the lawfulness of individual unilateral uses of force" 52 that is different from Article 2(4). If so, it can be

tion in Serbia,
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expected that over time

of Force under Article 2 (4)

of understandings

a set

as to

the lawfulness of

CNA will

evolve outside the Charter framework.
This patient approach will not

satisfy

many,

especially those

who view CNA as a

dangerous phenomenon. Enormous benefits to humankind, both actual and potenderive from the use of computers.

Advanced societies are moving towards
pervasive dependence on the interplay of computer networks and advanced
communications technologies. While not all consequences necessarily are weltial,

come

(loss

of privacy, for example,

sophisticated countries like the
fits

United

in terms of increased productivity

quality of life.

These

are benefits to

a significant

is

States are experiencing

enormous bene-

and enhancement of many

aspects of the

which the rest of the world appears to aspire.

Yet technological sophistication engenders

would have been unimaginable

concern), technologically

a

degree of vulnerability that

in earlier generations.

(Who would have imag-

ined a few decades ago that significant numbers of people would fear the end of a

millennium not for religious reasons but because of a computer programming issue?)

Human well-being throughout the world increasingly will depend on the

inviolability

of computer networks and the communications

them. The world,
clear

it

links that

connect

can be argued, should not have to rely for protection on un-

and debatable interpretations of the Charter or on principles of customary

international law, such as non-intervention, that are

honored

in the breach

and

no ready enforcement mechanism. Nor should civilian populations be exposed to the risk that a code of rules on the use of CNA will evolve only after
carry

devastating examples of its use have pointed the way.

Thus,

it is

suggested (and

this

not a statement about the law

is

an explicit expression of a policy preference,

as it is), efforts

tion of an international convention that
for

any military or

whether

cooperation in fighting

legal

would bind

hostile use. This should

in the context of the

should be

made towards

the adop-

the parties not to use

be accompanied by enhanced

same convention or

CNA

efforts,

separately, to achieve global

CNA perpetrated by non-State actors, by making

such action criminal under domestic laws regardless of purported justification,

and by allowing prosecution of the perpetrators wherever apprehended or
extradition to the country in

which the

target

their

computer or computer network

was located.
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VII
Computer Network Attacks
and Self'Defense

Yoram Dinstein

Armed Attack and Self-Defense

T

he general prohibition of the use of force in the relations between
constitutes the cornerstone of modern international law.

embedded both

in the Charter of the

United Nations

1

[Article 2(4)

It is

2
]

States

currently

and

in cus-

tomary international law (which has consolidated under the impact of the Charter).

3

Indeed, the International

of the use of inter-State force

Law Commission has identified the prohibition

as

"a conspicuous example" ofjus cogens 4

(i.e., a

peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is
permitted 5 ). The Commission's position was cited by the International
Court ofJustice in the Nicaragua case of 1986, 6 and in two Separate Opinions
the peremptory nature of the proscription of the use of inter-State force was
explicitly emphasized. 7

The

correct interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Charter subsequent to the

Nicaragua

Judgment

is

that there exists in international

law today "an absolute

prohibition of the use or threat of force, subject only to the exceptions stated
in the Charter itself." 8

The only two

exceptions spelled out in the Charter are

collective security pursuant to a Security
cially

of Article 42

9
)

Council decision (by virtue espe-

and individual or collective self-defense (consistent with

Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense

10

Article 51

This chapter will focus on self-defense, namely, forcible counter-

).

motion by

on

own

measures put

in

tively), in the

absence of a binding Security Council decision obligating or au-

them

thorizing

behave

to

States acting

their

(individually or collec-

in such a fashion.

accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, the right of self-defense can

In

only be invoked in response to an "armed attack."
cle 51

deliberately restrictive.

is

The

The choice of words

phrase "armed attack"

is

in Arti-

not equivalent to

much broader and looser term, used, e.g., in Article 39 pertaining to the powers of the Security Council
An armed attack is actually a partic"aggression"

(a

1 ]

)

of aggression. This

ular type

"une agression armee. "

armed

force

For an

borne out by the French

is

text,

which speaks of

expression "armed attack" denotes the

illegal

use of

recourse to violence) against a State.

(i.e.,

illegal

The

.

use of force to acquire the dimensions of an

armed attack,

a

min-

imal threshold has to be reached. Since Article 2(4) of the Charter forbids "use of
force" and Article 51 allows taking self-defense measures only against an "armed
attack," a gap

an

fact that

is

discernible

illegal

between the two

stipulations. 12

use of force not tantamount to

launched by one State against another, but then
tack) self-defense
ically,

is

The gap is due to the
an armed attack may be

the absence of an

(in

armed

at-

not an option available to the victim. Logically and pragmat-

the gap has to be quite narrow, inasmuch

as

"there

is

very

little

protection against states violating the prohibition of the use of force,

they do not resort to an armed attack."

13

If a victim State

is

effective

as

long

as

barred from respond-

ing with counter-force to force, this ought to be confined to the sphere of application of the ancient
the gap conveys

When

is

apothegm

that the

the use of force

—no armed

tier

is

de minimis non curat lex. In other words,

illicit

trivial

—

is

that

use of force has to be of sufficient gravity. 14
say, a

few

stray bullets are fired across a fron-

attack can be alleged to have occurred. 15 In that case, there

room for forcible counter-measures of self-defense.
of force

all

of sufficient gravity, an armed attack

is

16

is

no

By contrast, when the use

in progress

even

if it

is

charac-

by small magnitude. Aufond, whenever a lethal result to human beor serious destruction to property
is engendered by an illegal use of

terized
ings

—

—

A against State B, that use of force will qualify as an armed attack.
The right to employ counter-force in self-defense against State A can then be in-

force

by

State

voked by

State

B

(and, as

we

shall see infra, also

To better understand the legal position,

it is

by

State C).

necessary to distinguish between

an armed attack, on the one hand, and an ordinary breach of international

— or even

—

mere unfriendly act on the other.
State A can commit an unfriendly act against State B without thereby being in
breach of any binding norm of international law. Such unfriendly conduct by
law

a

100
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State

A

is

upset State B.

liable to

Dinstein

may cause the latter psychological embarrass-

It

ment or even material harm in the political, diplomatic, or economic arena. Yet,
as long as no breach of international law is committed, State B does not possess
any

conduct of State A.

legal standing (jus standi) for objecting to the

Acts that

may

phenomenon of unfriendly

highlight the

acts,

carrying with

them no connotations of infringement by State A of international law, are: (i) re17
(ii) a notificafusal to permit an official visit of State A by the Head of State B;

member of the

tion that a

persona non grata;

18

(hi)

diplomatic staff of State

B

the prohibition of the import of certain goods

B into State A (absent treaty commitments to the contrary);
A. 20

The
by clandestine agents of State
activities
and similar ones in the same vein

carried out

these

19

and

from

is

State

espionage

(iv)

fact that, strictly speaking, all

—

—

A

accredited to State

are legal (albeit unfriendly)

mean that State B is completely helpless in terms of potential response.
B may opt to indulge in "retorsion" by taking equally legal yet unfriendly

does not
State

of diplomats sent by State A). 21

steps (such as a reciprocal expulsion

A breach of international law transcends unfriendliness, crossing the red line
of illegality. If State A ignores the immunity from local jurisdiction enjoyed by
duly accredited diplomatic agents of State B; 22

if State

A's trawlers fish in the ex-

economic zone off the
A fails to extradite a fugitive from State B notwithstanding clear-cut obligations in a treaty concluded
by them State A will bear international legal responsibility vis-a-vis State B. In
coast of State B; 23 if State

clusive

—

keeping with the international law of State responsibility, "[t]he injured State
entitled to obtain
ful act full

tion,

which has committed an internationally wrongthe form of restitution in kind, compensation, satisfac-

from the

reparation in

is

State

and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, either singly or in

combination.

" 24

Seeking reparation, State
against State

A before

B

—

as

the injured party

—may

present a legal claim

any international court or tribunal which

with jurisdiction over the dispute. Alternative avenues are
always free to bring the dispute with State

A

also

may be

vested

open. State

B

is

to the attention of the Security

Charter 25

Council [under Article 35(1) of the
]. The Council may then recommend appropriate methods of adjustment [pursuant to Article 36(1) 26 ] or even
determine the existence of

above-mentioned Article

a threat to the

39).

27

Acting on

non-forcible reprisals against State

from State A under the same

A

28

(e.g.,

its

—but

the treaty obligations postulated

Whichever channel of response

is

(in

own,

compliance with the

State

by declining

treaty provision).

that the act in question (non-extradition)

peace

B may

also apply

to extradite a fugitive

A reprisal differs from retorsion in

would have been

illegal

—

in light

of

for the prior illegal act of State A. 29

chosen by State
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quintessential point

is

that, as a rule, the fact that State

sponsibility towards State
tiate

A incurs international re-

B does not create for State B a legitimate option to iniEven an ordinary

force against State A.

violation of the

UN Charter itself

does not excuse response by force.

The only time
at

—

—when

consistent with the Charter

State

B

(without acting

may lawfully wield force against State A, in
is when that illegal act amounts to an armed

the behest of the Security Council)

response to an
attack

illegal act

by

State A,

and the counter-measures can be appropriately subsumed under the head-

ing of self-defense.

Computer Network Attacks (CNAs)

The

scientific

and technological revolution, which has rendered the com-

puter ubiquitous, has also "changed the scope and pace of battle." 30 This

dent to

all

where the computer

serves as an instrument of

command,

is

evi-

control,

communications, and intelligence (not to mention simulation, surveillance,
sensors,

and innumerable other military purposes). But the modern computer

can also become a weapon in

itself by

puter systems serving the adversary.

occur either in wartime

—

being aligned for attack against other com-

A "computer network attack" (CNA)

in the midst of on-going hostilities

—

can

or in peacetime.

The former situation is governed by the jus in hello and does not come within the
scope of the present paper. The question to be analyzed here is the latter. More
specifically, the fulcrum of our discussion is whether a CNA mounted in peacetime may be categorized as an armed attack, thus justifying forcible countermeasures of self-defense in compliance with the jus ad helium.

A CNA

is

often defined inadequately

as

disrupting, denying, degrading, or

destroying either information resident in a computer network or the network itself.

31

This definition

is

rooted in

a

presupposition that a

CNA

device to counter the antagonist's electronic capabilities.

been

legally

binding

nical capabilities

full-fledged

—

or had

it

factually

of the computer

armed

attack

—

would be

is

Had

no more than a
the definition

mirrored the whole gamut of the tech-

the likelihood of a
scant.

CNA ever constituting a

However, whereas

CNAs

recorded

heretofore have admittedly been circumscribed to operations of intrusion and
disruption,

it

would be extremely imprudent

into the years ahead.

A

to extrapolate current restraints

credible forecasting of future developments

must

start

from the indisputable premise that potential CNAs (by feeding false messages
into a target computer system) may also encompass grievous sabotage, designed
to leave behind a trail of death and devastation through induced explosions and
other malicious "malfunctions." 32
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—

The determination whether or not an armed attack has taken place so as to
does not necessarily depend on the
justify response by way of self-defense
choice of weapons by the attacking party. The International Court of Justice

—

aptly

commented,

Weapons Advisory Opinion of 1996, that the

in the Nuclear

provision of Article 51 does not refer to specific weapons;
attack, regardless

of the weapon

employed. 33

Of

it

applies to

any armed

course, the detonation of

weapons of mass destruction (say, nuclear warheads) makes it easier to stigmatize
the strike as an armed attack. Still, what counts is not the specific type of ordnance, but the end product of its delivery to a selected objective. After all, even
unsophisticated pernicious tools
area

—may

From

—

like

the poisoning of wells in a desert

give rise to exceedingly grave results.

a legal perspective, there

and electronic means of attack.

no reason

is

to differentiate

between

A premeditated destructive CNA can qualify as

—

much as a kinetic attack bringing about the same or simThe crux of the matter is not the medium at hand (a computer

an armed attack just as
ilar

—

results.

kinetic

server in lieu of, say, an artillery battery), 34 but the violent consequences of the

action taken. If there
lent consequences,

is

a cause

it is

and

between the CNA and these viothey were produced by high rather than

effect chain

immaterial that

low technology.

When

a

CNA

emanates from within the territory of the same country in

which the target is located (assuming that no foreign State is involved in the operation and no attempt is made to route the attack through a conduit abroad),
this is a matter that in principle can
and should be regulated by the domestic
law of that country. Generally speaking, subject to few exceptions (see the next
section), international law comes into play only at a point when the CNA turns

—

—

into a cross-border operation.

Even in a cross-border scenario, CNAs are not all of the same nature. It is necessary to distinguish between four discrete rubrics of CNAs originating from
State A and directed against State B, depending on whether they are unleashed
by: (i) individual computer hackers who are residents of State A, acting on their

own initiative

for

linkage to the

government of State A;

whatever personal motive (benign or otherwise) without any
(ii)

terrorists 35

based in State A, acting on

behalf of any chosen "cause" inimical to State B, unsupported by the govern-

ment of State A;
of State A; and

(hi) terrorists

ties

of State

organs

(iv) official

ment of State A.
The first two categories

A itself,

ducted from within

with
its

overtly or covertly sponsored

—

by the government

either military or civilian

—of

the govern-

by the proper authoriprecluding or terminating hostile acts con-

usually call for coercive action

a

view

territory

to

by hackers or
103

terrorists against State B.
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International

every State

used for

Court ofjustice proclaimed,

is

acts

under an obligation "not to allow knowingly

contrary to the rights of other

national obligation, State
tion of hostile activities

preventing these
ers after the acts

to

in the Corfu Channel case

from within

do what it is supposed

to, State

B

(as

If the

we shall see

inter-

B

—optimally by

by prosecuting offend-

materializing, but minimally

have already been committed.

be

suppress the perpetra-

territory against State

its

territory to

its

implementing this

A should take resolute steps to

from

acts

States." 36 In

of 1949, that

government of State

A fails

can take certain excep-

infra)

tional counter-measures unilaterally.

When

sponsored by State A, they

terrorists are

gans" of that State.

37

tionable if evidence

"[T]he imputability to

pulling the strings

terrorist act

apparatus), rather than activating

A for the

acts

is

unques-

a State

organ

a terrorist organization (not formally associated

this

of State

of a

"de facto or-

When State A chooses to operate against State B at one

of
—
governmental
— does not diminish one

with the
forces

a State

provided that the author of such act was

is

acting in that capacity." 38

remove

may be deemed

iota

from the

full

armed

regular

its

international responsibility

taken and their consequences, provided that

"it

is

estab-

39

were "in fact acting on behalf of that State."
The International Court ofjustice, in the Nicaragua case of 1986, explicitly

lished" that the terrorists

held that an armed attack encompasses not only action by regular armed forces

but also the employment of "irregulars." 40 Granted, not every
cate area

is

universally agreed upon.

The

detail in this deli-

majority of the Court in the Nicaragua

Judgment added that the mere supply of arms (or providing logistical and other
support) to armed bands cannot be equated with armed attack, 41 whereas Judges
Schwebel andjennings sharply dissented on this point. 42 Be it as it may, there is a
consensus that when State A goes beyond logistical support and dispatches a terrorist

group to do

its

bidding against State B, State

B

can invoke self-defense

against State A.

In 1999, the Appeals

Chamber of the

Former Yugoslavia pronounced,

International Criminal Tribunal for the

in the Tadic case, that acts

bers of a military or paramilitary group organized
acts

of de facto State organs regardless of any

ling State concerning the

by

a State

performed by mem-

"may be regarded as

specific instruction

commission of each of those

acts."

by the control-

43

The Tribunal

concentrated on the subordination of the group to overall control by the State.

opined that the State does not have to

issue specific instructions for the direction

of every individual operation, nor does
rorists

It

it

have to choose concrete

can thus act quite autonomously and

trolling State.
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still

stay

targets.

44
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de facto organs of the con-
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The most crucial flow of events stems from a CNA undertaken overtly by official government organs. The intrusion of the organs of State A into the computer systems of State B may have a whole range of purposes and outcomes, for
instance:
(i)

Espionage. As indicated supra, espionage activities conducted by
clandestine agents are merely unfriendly acts. In singular circumstances, official espionage

is

openly acknowledged by

question whether the act can then be viewed
national law

armed

constitute an
(ii)

violation of inter-

In any event, espionage per se does not

debatable.

is

as a

the

a State;

attack.

Disruption of communications and digitized services through the

induced failure of computer systems, without causing
alties

or significant destruction of property. This

is

human casua

CNA,

but

since the act (whether merely unfriendly or a transgression of inter-

national law) does not entail sufficiently grave consequences, the

conclusion
(iii)

is

the same.

caused by

Fatalities

tems; an extensive

loss

of computer-controlled life-support

power grid outage

sys-

(electricity blackout) creating

considerable deleterious repercussions; a

shutdown of computers

controlling waterworks and dams, generating thereby floods of in-

habited areas; deadly crashes deliberately engineered

misinformation fed into

in

rials

is

salient point

egre-

a State

A may be

less

In

all

these cases, the

CNA

would be

attack.

computer dependency creates a special
The more technologically advanced and, therefore, computer
is

that an excessive

—

vulnerability. 48

is,

more

the

developed

susceptible

manages to penetrate

B becomes

to a paralyzing

CNA.

Overall, State

a debilitating

burden once

—can

own

its

Through

in a sense

a

CNA,

State

weapon being

as it

triggered
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A

the

no

"go nuclear" by exploiting the

were, provides the nuclear weapon against

by agents of State A).

is

A—having

and technological infrastructure of State B, thus turning the

the target State. State B,

State

State B's electronic defenses. This, writ large,

scenario of a nuclear core meltdown.

nuclear capability of

it is

and technologically than State B. 49 Yet,

scientifically

the very advantage of State

scientific

The most

that can result in countless casualties if the neighboring areas

deemed an armed

—

etc.

the

are densely populated.

reliant

computers),

through

wanton instigation of a core-meltdown of a reactor
a nuclear power plant, leading to the release of radioactive mate-

gious case

A

aircraft

(e.g.,

tables

on

itself (the

Computer Network Attacks and Self'Defense

CNAs against
It

must be appreciated

and Corporations

Private Individuals

computer system subjected to

that a

CNA by State A

a

need not belong to the government, or even to any semi-governmental agency,

An

of State B.

attack

may be

computer system operated by

The American

US

the

utilities in

US

territory (or, for that

American flag and aircraft registered in the US)

matter, vessels flying the

entity.

carried out, e.g., inside

either a private individual or a

situation

is

non-governmental

perhaps the most acute, inasmuch

ing the American armed forces. But anyhow,

computer system under

attack

tween

a

act as an

armed

the

and aircraft servcivil-

Even

if the

CNA impinges upon

to the military establishment

would vouchsafe the
no immanent difference be-

devastating impact

(like a private hospital installation), a

of the

is

operated by a civilian supplier or

is

computer system which has no nexus

classification

public

immaterial whether the

it is

sub-contractor of the Department of Defense.
a civilian

as

owned, and, indeed, corporate America

are privately

principal manufacturer of military equipment, naval platforms,

ian

against a

attack.

There

is

CNA and a kinetic attack targeting ordinary civilian objects within the

territory

of State B. Needless to

say, the

bombing by

State

A of,

e.g.,

an urban

population center (apart from being unlawful per se under international

by not being directed

itarian law,

armed attack,

in the air-raid.

territory

a single

The same

Furthermore, a
qualify as an

not

albeit

B

against a military objective 50 ) constitutes an

member of the armed forces of State B is injured

is

CNA—just

armed

of State

rule

CNA.

applicable to a

like a kinetic use

attack against State

(including

human-

its

B

vessels

even

and

—by

of force

if the

aircraft)

State

computer system
is

A

would

inside the

operated by an individual

or a private corporation possessing the nationality of State C.

A corporation,

an analogy with an individual, has

of the State under

the laws of which
office).

the

51

it

was incorporated and

But the foreign

as

the

CNA

is

State B, but

affects a

a

CNA

vessels,

governmental

and

it

has

its

registered

is

its

from the perspective of State B,

It

as

territory.

by

inflicted

State

A

outside the territory of

State

B or one of its nation-

goes without saying that a lethal kinetic strike

installation

of State

B

—such an embassy of
A) —
be deemed an armed

aircraft

even State

territory

computer system operated by

(individual or corporate)?

against a

(or

it

irrelevant

carried out within

What happens when

whose

in

nationality of the corporate or individual operator of

computer system under attack is

long

als

a distinct nationality (that

on

stationed outside

State

as

will

standing the geographic disconnection from
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its

B

its

in the capital city

territory,

of State

C

attack against State B, notwithterritory. 52

This

is

also true

of an

Yoram

electronic attack against the
in State

Dinstein

computer system of State B's embassy in

A) culminating with

A

State

situated in State C,

of the armed

A within

State

B

cannot regard

B

or to

its

nation-

the genuine ob-

itself as

On the other hand, if a destructive CNA launched by
territorial boundaries of State C (or even State A) against a

attack.

the

(or

(kinetic or electronic)

and any injury caused to State

coincidental. In such a case, State

als is

ject

is

C

or destruction of property.

fatalities

The position differs when the target of an armed attack
by

State

is

computer system operated privately by nationals (individual or corporate) of
State B
and the target is specifically selected on account of that national-

—

—

B is

armed attack against itself. Thus, if
an explosion-inducing CNA strikes a computer operated by US citizens across
and this is plainly done not at random but because of the American
the ocean
the act may be deemed an armed attack against the
nationality of the operators
US (although perpetrated abroad). There are many instances in international relations in which nationals attacked abroad by State A have been protected or rescued by State B in the name of self-defense. 53 This is perfectly legitimate,
provided that the attack occurred owing to the bond of nationality existing between the victims and State B. 54 Once more, there is no difference here between
an electronic and a kinetic attack.
ity

State

entitled to consider the act an

—

—

Self-Defense Responses to CNAs

Just as there are variable settings for the
State

A in the form of a CNA,

to State

commission of an armed attack by

there are also several possible responses available

B in the exercise of its right of self-defense. The most obvious response is

"on-the-spot reaction," 55 where the computer network under attack strikes instantaneously back at the source of the

quently the server which

manipulated by the true

CNA. The trouble,

seemingly the source of the

is

assailants

however,

CNA

the attacker

—

tor

is

a

—and

as

well

as

been

(who have routed their attack through it), and

unlawful.

56

is

liable to

Establishing the genuine identity of

from apparent) acof technological development (see

attributing the act to the real

major challenge in the present stage

discussion

that fre-

has only

swift responsive counter-measures against the intermediary conduit

be counterproductive,

is

(as distinct

infra).

On the whole, the most effective modality of self-defense against an armed attack in the shape of a
ible
as

CNA

1

is

recourse to defensive armed reprisals, to wit, forc-

counter-measures undertaken

at a different

time and place.

such are generally "considered to be unlawful" in peacetime.

reason

why armed

reprisals

cannot

come within
107

the

Armed

57

reprisals

But there

is

no

framework of self-defense
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under the Charter. Armed

armed

reprisals

can constitute

a legitimate

response to an

attack within the ambit of Article 51, provided that they are genuinely

namely,

defensive,

future-oriented

(deterrent

in

and

character)

not

past-oriented (confined to punitive retaliation). 58 State practice definitely shows
that defensive

to

armed

armed reprisals are part and parcel of the

attacks. 59 Indeed, falling

built-in advantages.

Above

all, it

arsenal

back on defensive armed

gives State

of States subjected

reprisals has certain

B an opportunity to review the facts

(and determine culpability) while considering options for response.
It

should be borne in mind that defensive armed

be performed kinetically even though the original armed attack

was executed

electronically,

and vice

CNA can

reprisals against a

versa. Again,

whatever

(justifying
is

them)

permitted (or

when kinetic means of warfare are used is equally permitted (or prowhen the means employed are electronic; the rules of international law

prohibited)
hibited)

same whatever the means selected for attack.
The ultimate type of force stimulated by self-defense may amount

are the

result in) war. 60 In the setting

of CNAs, the outbreak of war

measure of self-defense would be

waging of war

as

rare.

Due

as a

may

counter-

to the conditions precedent to the

an exercise of self-defense

constitute a proper response to a

to (or

(see discussion infra),

war would

CNA only in far-fetched scenarios (such as the

prompting of a nuclear core meltdown).
Sometimes, State A constrained by political

calculated

ations

—would

—

or

military

consider-

passively tolerate the use of its territory as a base for activities

terrorists against State

B, without actively sponsoring those activities or even en-

couraging them. 61 Such

a turn

of events would not cloak the

terrorists

with

mantle of protection from State B. "If a host country permits the use of its
tory as a staging area for terrorist attacks

down, and refuses
insulate

its

by

when

it

requests to take action, the host

territory against

measures

government cannot expect

to

As already epitomized in

B may

legitimately invoke

self-defense to exert counter-force within the territory of State

armed bands which use

terri-

could shut those operations

of self-defense." 62

the classical Caroline incident of 1837, 63 State

a

A— targeting

that territory as a springboard for operations against State

—

B when the host government remains inert. The present writer calls such a
mode of self-defense "extra-territorial law enforcement," 64 while others prefer
the term "state of necessity." 65 What counts, however, is the substance of the
law and not the formal appellation. The substance of the law
lates to electronic, as

much

as kinetic,

in this respect re-

terrorism against State

State A.
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The Three Conditions of Self-Defense

Three cumulative conditions

of self-defense are wellentrenched in customary international law: (i) necessity, (ii) proportionality, and
(iii) immediacy. The first two conditions were articulated in the 1986 Nicaragua
Judgment, 66 and reiterated in the 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion. 67
Immediacy, while glossed over in the Court's rendering of the law, is of equal
to the exercise

specific weight. 68

Necessity primarily denotes "the non-existence of reasonable peaceful alternative measures." 69 Differently put, non-forcible remedies
futile in limine

upshot

is

either prove

or have in fact been exhausted in an unsatisfactory manner; the

that there

is

no

effective substitute for the use

of force in self-defense. In

CNA, it is requisite to ascertain that the CNA is no accident,

the context of a
verify the

must

genuine identity of the State

—or non-State

attack (so as not to jeopardize innocent parties),

force as a counter-measure

is

and

to

entity

—conducting

to

the

conclude that the use of

indispensable. Should there be an opportunity to

settle

the matter amicably through negotiations, these must be conducted in

good

faith.

70

The second condition

chiefly relevant to defensive

is

taken in a situation "short of war."

ter-force

tained

—

by

Since

them,

A modicum

injury inflicted

State

A by

CNAs

on

State

in

—

the question

B by

isolation,

is

the

armed

attack versus

which

when

may

—

—and inasmuch

But there

is

from a series of small-scale

CNAs.
The

act

is

as

sus-

called for.

each one of

assessed in their totality, the results

may

whether defensive armed reprisals may be under-

some

by

terrorists,

is

The is-

not free of

authority for the position that a State suffering

attacks

a single large-scale forcible

B

appear to have only a minor

ordinarily arises in the face of assaults

difficulties. 73

State

damage

taken in proportion to the cumulative effect of the sequence of attacks. 72
sue,

under-

of symmetry between force and coun-

are often discharged in a cluster

("pin-prick") adverse effect, yet,

be calamitous

The counter-measures taken by

dint of the self-defense counter-measures

when examined

reprisals

must not be out of proportion with the

(kinetically or electronically)

prompting them. 71

armed

is

permitted to respond to them aggregately in

counter-measure. 74 This would equally apply to

quantum of force and counter- force, which is the
key to the legitimacy of defensive armed reprisals, is not germane to war as the
ultimate manifestation of self-defense in response to an armed attack. 75 Once
war is in progress, it may be fought to the limit (subject to the exceptions and
qualifications decreed by international humanitarian law), and there is no
balance between the
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mandatory correspondence between the
ing sides. 76
is

scale

of force expended by the oppos-

The meaning of proportionality in the concrete circumstances of war
of comprehensive counter-force in the exercise of self-defense

that the use

must be warranted by the critical character of the original armed attack. 77 Once
the vital justification of a war of self-defense by State B against State A is recognized, there
single

is

no

measure taken by State

termination (which

through

a

to

not to be confused with the suspension of

is

cease-fire 78

ponder the defensive disposition of every
B. From the outset of a war of self-defense until its

need

additional

),

the legitimacy of every instance of the use of force by

B against State A is covered by the jus ad bellum

State

jus in

Admittedly, where

hello).

hostilities

CNAs

(albeit

not necessarily by the

are concerned, a

war of

self-defense

would be vindicated as an appropriate response only in outre circumstances (such
as the catastrophic event of a CNA-induced nuclear core meltdown).
Immediacy intrinsically suggests that the activation of self-defense countermeasures must not be too tardy.

There may be

armed

attack

ing after a

a time-lag

condition

is

construed "broadly." 79

of days, weeks, and even months between the original

and the sequel of self-defense. The delay may be

CNA,

since in cyberspace activities can

around the world "in the time
is

Still, this

almost unavoidable

when

—

that

it

produce reverberations

takes to blink an eye." 80

in a desire to

fulfill

particularly glar-

Still,

the letter and

lapse

spirit

of time

of the con-

dition of necessity— a slow process of diplomatic negotiations evolves, with a

view

to resolving the matter amicably. 81

Interceptive Self-Defense

The

gist

of Article 51 of the Charter

is

that there

is

no

legitimate self-defense

armed attack. All the same, an armed attack need not start with the opening of fire on the aggrieved party. In fact, at times, it is the victim of an armed at-

sans an

tack

who

fires

the

first

military formations
State

B

and then

1999

is

accessible

a

halt,

B

(the

point 82

).

to postulate that

it is

it

troops into Indian Kashmir

If the invasion takes place in a region

not

easily

entirely conceivable that

some time would

B

has actually tran-

competent authorities of State

spired. In these circumstances,

State

it

A intentionally cross the frontier of

movement of Pakistani

lightly guarded,

pass before the

State

suffice

positioning themselves in strategic outposts well within

good case in

and

For an obvious example,

commissioned by

the territory of State
in

shot.

may

grasp

what

very well ensue that the armed forces of

B would be instructed to dislodge from their positions the invading contin-

gents belonging to State A, and that

fire

be opened

first

by

soldiers raising the

banner of State B. Nevertheless, since the international frontier has been crossed
110
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by the military units of State A without the consent of State B, State A cannot relieve itself of responsibility for an armed attack.
As a matter of fact (and law), an armed attack may be viewed as a foregone
conclusion even though no

has

fire

been opened

(as

yet)

and no international

had the Japanese aircraft en
route to Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, been intercepted and shot down
over the high seas by US air forces, Japan would still have incurred responsibility
for the armed attack that triggered the Pacific War. 83 A more up-to-date scefrontier has

nario

been

would be

that

ration for fire. 84
die has

been

crossed. Thus, hypothetically,

of a missile

site

whose

locked on to

a target in

prepa-

Resort to counter- force in the exercise of self-defense cannot

cast.

as threats

alone do not form an armed

armed attack is incipion the verge of beginning, the intended victim need not wait impo-

attack. Still, if it
is

is

The linchpin question in analyzing any situation is whether the

be purely preventive in nature, inasmuch
ent or

radar

is

blatant to any unbiased observer that an

tently for the inescapable blow; the attack can legitimately

be intercepted.

comes within the
purview of permissible self-defense under the Charter. The theme of interceptive self-defense is apposite to a CNA when an intrusion from the outside into a
computer network has been discovered, although, as yet, it is neither lethal to
any person nor tangibly destructive of property. The issue is whether the intrusion can plausibly be construed as the first step of an inevitable armed attack,
which is in the process of being staged (analogous to the detection of attack aircraft en route to their objectives) It is a matter of evaluation on the ground of the
Interceptive (in contradistinction to anticipatory) self-defense

.

information available
ports,

and other

at

the time of action (including warnings, intelligence re-

data), reasonably interpreted. 85

The Attribution of CNAs to a State
Reference has already been made to the problem of attribution to State

A of a

CNA as an armed attack for which responsibility devolves on that State. As obno means clear who originated
identify the attacker undermines in practice the theo-

served, in the present state of the

the

CNA. The inability to

retical

entitlement of State

defense.

86

State

B

art, it is

often by

to resort to forcible counter-measures in self-

B must not rush headlong to hasty action predicated on reflexive

impulses and unfounded suspicions;

sponse until hard evidence

is

it

collated

no choice but to withhold forcible reand the state of affairs is clarified, lest the

has

innocent be endangered. However, the following points should be recalled:
(i)

The same problem arises in many other situations,
when acts of terrorism are committed kinetically.
111

for instance
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the

either

—

mously

leaving

no

miliar. Since States
role:

of the

perpetrators

signature

—

terrorist

attack

anony-

act

or those "taking credit" are unfa-

sponsoring terrorism usually try to conceal their

may be

holding such States accountable for their misdeeds

fraught with great difficulties.

87

Prior to determining

combating terrorism, the victim

tween the

and

terrorists

State

must

its

options in

establish a linkage
88

their sponsoring State.

CNAs

be-

invite a

similar approach.

Not

(ii)

always

is

attribution shrouded in

doubt for long. In the

past,

wars began with bombings and bombardments. In the future, they
are increasingly likely to start

does not

mean

nitely. It

that the

with CNAs. But recourse to

enemy wishes

to

CNA

remain incognito indefi-

CNA will be

within the realm of the possible that a

is

a

wave of later attacks, which will be
mounted with traditional means and be easily traceable to an irrefutable source. Hence, it would be a mistake to assume that a CNA
inevitably manifests an attempt at deception and perfidy. The CNA
merely the precursor of

may be

a

designed merely to achieve surprise and cause temporary

havoc, without trying to hide the identity of the perpetrator for

a

prolonged stretch of time.
(iii)

Future advances in technology are likely to
identify the attacker, just as current
ables the

phone

immediate

registration

—

it

much

easier to

—technology en-

unlike past

of the source of an incoming

tele-

(although, patently, identification of that source does

call

not conclusively establish which person

phone

make

call;

the same

is

is

actually

making the

tele-

true of the user of a computer).

Collective Self-Defense

Pursuant to Article 51 of the Charter, collective

—

—no

less

than individ-

armed attack. The rule does not discriminate between different classes of armed attacks, and therefore it pertains
inter alia to a CNA crossing the threshold of an armed attack. The right to collective self-defense means that any third State in the world 89 (State C) is free to join
State B in bringing forcible measures to bear against State A, with a view to repelling an armed attack. The occurrence of an armed attack by State A against
ual

self-defense

is

permissible against an

State

B

State

A by State C was underscored by the

as a conditio sine

qua non to the exercise of collective self-defense against

112

International

Court ofJustice

in the

Yoram

Nicaragua case. 90

Dinstein

The majority of the Court further held that State

ercise that right unless

and until

C may not ex-

B has first declared that it has been subjected

State

91

armed attack by State A. This dictum has been cogently challenged in a dissent by Judge Jennings, 92 but it may have some merit against the background of a
CNA. Certainly, States B and C must see eye to eye on the identification of an
elusive attacker. State C is enjoined from taking collective self-defense action
to an

against State

A if State B

(the

right

target) declines to

confirm that State

A

is

is

a

CNA constituting an armed attack.

indeed accountable for a

The

immediate

exercise of collective self-defense in conformity with the Charter

and not a duty. The right can be transformed into

a

duty should States B and

C become contracting parties to a mutual assistance treaty or a treaty of guarantee,
and

a fortiori to a military alliance. 93

Thus,

if State

B

member of
extend military aid when an

happens to be

NATO, other members of the alliance are expected to
armed

attack occurs against

it

(within certain geographic bounds). 94

need

for a collective self-defense treaty to exist

State

C

it

is

competent to

act spontaneously

—

between

State

a

But there

B

and

is

no

State C.

—and

appraising events as they unfold

B

can do so whether the armed attack against State

is

kinetic or electronic.

The Supervision of the Security Council
Article 51 of the Charter sets forth that the right of self-defense

cised until the Security

ternational peace

and

may be

exer-

Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain in-

security.

must immediately report

to the

Under

the article, a State invoking self-defense

Council what

steps

do not diminish from the authority of the Council

it

has taken, and these steps

to take

any action

it

deems

As the International Court of Justice enunciated in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, the "requirements of Article 51 apply whatever the

necessary.

means of force used in self-defence." 95 There is thus no difference between kinetic and electronic counter-measures.
Three thorny aspects of the Security Council's supervisory powers deserve to
be mentioned.

matter of fact, "[relatively few communications have

First, as a

been circulated expressly
to the

meet the Charter obligation

to report

immediately

Council on measures taken in the exercise of the right of individual or col-

lective self-defence after
ter

to

of law, however,

a failure to report to the Security

self-defense against a
case, the majority

an armed attack has occurred (Article 51)." 96 As

CNA may be

perilous. In

of the Court implied that

ing on the right of self-defense

porting to the Council.

97

if it fails to

its

a State

mat-

Council about engaging in

Judgment

in the Nicaragua

may be precluded from rely-

comply with the requirement of re-

Judge Schwebel dissented, holding
113

a

that the reporting
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duty

a

is

State

procedural matter and that therefore nonfeasance must not deprive the

concerned of its substantive cardinal right to

self-defense. 98

The

dissent

is

quite persuasive, but the majority's position cannot simply be disregarded.

Second, the Security Council's record since

much

its

inception

is

not such

as to instill

confidence in the likelihood of its taking the necessary remedial action for

the maintenance of international peace and security, thus avoiding any further

need of unilateral self-defense

against an

armed

attack.

Once

the Council's inac-

Cold War and the abuse of the veto power by Permanent Members, each voting in tandem with the political interests of the bloc
which it led or to which it belonged. Regrettably, even recent permutations in
tion

was

largely

Big Power

due

politics

to the

have not revived the

faith in the Security

Council's role

as

an

above-the-fray arbiter of all armed conflicts in the international community.
Third,

it is

by no means

Council would divest

clear

States

self-defense against an

what

of resolution adopted by the Security

sort

of the right to embark upon unilateral use of force in

armed

attack. Surely, the

Council

is

fully

empowered

to

override specious claims to self-defense and adopt a legally binding decision to the
effect that allegedly defensive

mean

that

defense."

99

measures must stop forthwith. But

this

does not

"any measure" adopted by the Council "would preempt

self-

Short of an explicit decree by the Council to discontinue the use of

force, the State acting in self-defense retains

its

right to

do

so until the

Council has

taken measures which have actually "succeeded in restoring international peace

and security." 100 Only

effective

measures that would not leave the victim State

defenseless can terminate or suspend the exercise

of the right of self-defense. 101

Conclusion

The

introduction of any

and foremost the

raises first

Protocol

I

of its

issue

into the arsenal of inter-State conflict

legality.

Under

Article

36 of Additional

Geneva Conventions, any State adopting (or even
new weapon must first determine whether or not it is prohibited

(of 1977) to the

developing) a

by international law; 102
law. 103

new weapon

this

norm

appears to reflect customary international

CNAs are not incorporated in any present list of proscribed weapons un-

der the lex

lata.

Evidently, there

is

a separate issue de legeferenda

whether man-

kind would not be better off by legally banning them altogether. The dilemma
will probably

their

be debated with growing intensity as the incidence of CNAs leaves

mark on

the evolution of armed conflict.

—

—

The novelty of a weapon any weapon always baffles statesmen and
lawyers, many of whom are perplexed by technological innovations. It is
perhaps natural to believe that a new weapon cannot easily intermesh with the
114
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pre-existing international legal system. In reality, after a period of gestation,
usually

dawns on

belligerent parties that there

is

no insuperable

difficulty in ap-

plying the general principles and rules of international law to the novel

some adjustments and

(subject to

can scarcely be denied

adaptations,

that, unless legally

which

it

weapon

crystallize in practice). It

excluded in advance,

CNAs are almost

bound to play a pivotal role as a first-strike weapon in the commencement of future hostilities. The challenge is to study now the most efficacious means of response to this ominous prospect.
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Self-Defense against

Computer Network

Attack under International

Horace B. Robertson,

j

n

his

opening remarks

to the

Law

Jr.

Symposium which was

the occasion for the

)\ current consideration of the international-law constraints on computer net-

work attack (CNA), Vice Admiral A. K. Cebrowski,
1

War

College, asked the conferees,

"Does

inter alia, to

President of the

US Naval

pay attention to the question,

international law require us to wait until lives are lost or property

aged before

we may

engage in

acts

2

of self-defense? This

is

dam-

a question that has

troubled international decision-makers and legal scholars for centuries.

It

has

numerous and diverse opinions as to the proper threshold for the
moment at which a potential victim State may lawfully use armed force to protect itself before the national border has been crossed, or the bombs have begun
to fall, or the missiles have been launched. Consideration of this subject has
given rise to a number of theories denominated by scholars and others variously
given

as

rise to

"pre-emptive"

and

a variety

strike,

"anticipatory self-defense," "interceptive self-defense,"

of other terms. Determining the

moment when a

State

may legally

armed defensive action as a matter of self-preservation is difficult enough in
the arena of conventional armed attack, where military and political intent may
be divined from concrete actions of the alleged aggressor State, such as mobilization of military and economic forces, movement of ground troops and/or air
and naval forces, and military exercises which may be regarded as rehearsals for
take

Self'Defense against

—

action.

of a mouse
criteria

even more

is

The

target State, 3

Nevertheless, the

difficult.

determining the threshold

harm

to a target nation

be equally or more devastating than

and

if kinetic forces

its

were

destruction or impairment of critical networks controlling such activ-

domestic

ities as

from the

location remote

at a

infrastructure can

used.

—

But when an attack i.e., computer network attack can be iniwithout warning and instantaneously by a few computer strokes or clicks

armed
tiated

Computer Network Attack

air

banking systems,

control systems, electrical

even

etc.,

if military

fected, could cripple a nation's

power systems and grids,

national

command and control networks are unaf-

economy and

create a public health crisis of im-

mense proportions.
While a leading expert in the field of network security who addressed the
symposium assured the participants that a successful penetration of secure systems was not as easy as some alarmists have made it out to be, 4 it is nevertheless
generally accepted that a skilled and persistent "hacker" could penetrate and seriously

damage many

critical infrastructures.

Assuming even

pending attack could be predicted with reasonable
be discussed

at a later

point in

this chapter,

im-

an issue which will

the fact that the attack could be con-

may

ducted by an individual or group that

certainty,

that such an

or

may

not be

a part

of the armed

forces or otherwise officially connected to a State, raises the additional questions

of whether such an attack can be attributed to the State in which the attack is
tiated

and whether such an attack

meaning of that term. Or

is

in the

is it,

ini-

an "armed attack" within the accepted

nomenclature used by Professor

Yoram

Dinstein, only an "unfriendly act" or an "ordinary breach of international law," 5

which, under the widely accepted view, does not come within the prohibition

of a "threat or use of force"
tions Charter?

mandate

armed

The

6

as that

Categorization

term is used

in Article 2(4)

particularly important in

is

that authorizes resort to the "inherent" right

attack occurs against a

principal paper

Member

on the

of the United Na-

view of Article

51's

of self-defense only "if an

of the United Nations." 7

subject of self-defense at the

CNA Symposium

was given by Professor Dinstein and is published in this commentary under the
8
As the moderator of a
title, "Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense."
small group of symposium participants designated to discuss this subject follow-

ing the presentation of the paper,
the subject. Rather than address

I

was asked to prepare additional comments on

all

aspects

of the doctrine of self-defense against

computer network attack that were dealt with in Professor Dinstein's paper and
in the small group discussion, I shall primarily focus in this commentary on the
discussion which dealt with the issue raised by Admiral Cebrowski in his opening remarks
whether international law requires a State to wait until lives are
lost or property damaged before it responds in self-defense. Professor Dinstein

—
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answers

this

Jr.

,

question in the negative by invoking a doctrine which he labels
9

"interceptive self-defense." This subject

provoked the most lively discussion in

the small group and revealed substantial differences of opinion

find support in the legal literature
"strict" interpretation

of

on

The

this subject.

of these supports the

first

UN Charter Article 51, which would require that an
may respond

attack have actually taken place before a victim State

self-defense. Professor Dinstein's "interceptive self-defense"

is

a sub-set

in

of this

some flexibility of interpretation by allowing counter-action to
advance of the first blow being struck by an analysis of when the

school, giving

be taken in

among the con-

they appeared to be expressions of two schools of thought that

ferees. In essence,

armed

as

it

armed attack actually begins, that is, when the potential aggressor "embarks
upon an irreversible course of action, thereby crossing the Rubicon." 10 The second school asserts that there exists an "inherent" right of self-defense pre-dating
the Charter, which continues to exist alongside the law of the Charter, and permits, in some cases, "anticipatory" self-defense when an armed attack may not
have actually occurred but, according to objective evidence,

The

The

intellectual

is

imminent.

"Strict" School

foundation for a "strict" interpretation of Article 51 can be

narrow or literal reading of Article 5 1 as suggested by a
number of eminent authorities or in the interpretation elaborated by Professor
found either in

a

Dinstein in his book,

War, Aggression and Self-Defence, that there was no

pre-existing law of self-defense prior to the adoption of the
thus the law of self-defense as expressed in Article 5 1

UN Charter,

and

the sole legal basis for

is

exercising this right.

One

of the

found in an

earlier expressions

article

by Professor Josef Kunz, who

[T]his right [of self-defense

aggression

of the narrow or literal reading of Article 51

which does not

stated in

under Article 51] does not
constitute

"armed

attack."

1947

that:

exist against

any form of

[T]his

term means

.

.

.

something that has taken place. Art. 51 prohibits "preventive war." The "threat
of aggression" does not justify self-defense under Art. 51.

armed

attack does not suffice

.

.

.

The "imminent"

under Art. 51. 11

Dr. Djura Nincic makes a similar argument, stating:

[NJothing less than an armed attack

shall constitute

an

act-condition for the exercise

of the right of self-defense within the meaning of Article 51 ...

123

.

It

further

is

Self-Defense against

stipulates that the

armed

attack

Computer Network Attack

must precede

the exercise of the right of self-defense, that

only an armed attack which has actually materialized, which has "occurred"

warrant

resort

a

self-defense.

to

This clearly and explicitly rules out the

permissibility of any "anticipatory" exercise of the right of self-defense,

to

shall

armed force "in anticipation" of an armed

attack.

i.e.,

resort

12

view include Hans Kelsen, 13 Louis Henkin, 14 Ian
Brownlie, 15 Hersch Lauterpacht, 16 Andrew Martin, 17 and Robert Tucker. 18
Professor Randelzhofer, who authored the Chapters on Articles 2(4) and 51 in
Simma's exhaustive exegesis on the
Charter, 19 also adopts, as the "prevailOther adherents of

this

UN

ing view," the

strict

interpretation ascribed to the aforementioned scholars. 20

With respect to the specific question of whether a State has a right of anticipatory
self-defense, he acknowledges that "[tjhere is no consensus in international legal
doctrine over the point." 21 But he goes on to conclude that "Art. 51 has to be interpreted narrowly as containing a prohibition of anticipatory self-defence.

Self-defence
launched.

" 22

thus permissible only

is

His rationale for

the (alleged)

this

imminence of an

objective criteria, any decision

conclusion

on

is

The

de facto

manifest risk of an abuse of that

undermine the

restriction to

attack occurs. 24

no legally-recognized

UN Charter.
the

right

literal

interpretation of Arti-

Self-Defence,

In support of that

doctrine.

without reservation

.

.

.

view he

was

law, writers sought to apply this [domestic law]
relations, particularly in

But when the freedom

(in the

to

connection with

wage war was countenanced

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), concern

recourse to war was considered free for
territorial

States did not

effect, that there

states:

with the issue of self-defence was largely

—including
grandeur—

he argues, in

of national self-defense prior to the adoption of the

dawn of international

war

and

if,

He reaches that conclusion by a different route,

concept [of self-defense] to inter-State
the just

one

of self-defence. 23

however. In War, Aggression and

earth

by means of

required, arguing, in essence, that a right of self-defense exists

only if, an armed

From

has already been

necessarily have to be left to

Professor Dinstein also adheres to the view that a
cle 51

attack

that since

would

point

this

which thus emerges would

particular case of the right

is

armed

attack cannot usually be assessed

the discretion of the state concerned.
discretion

the

after

expansion

need

a metajuridical exercise.
all,

or

against

even

a legal justification to
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all,

for

motives

As long

any reason on

of prestige

commence

as

hostilities.

and

The
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plea of self-defence

such

was relevant

as extra-territorial

to the legality of forcible measures short of war,

law enforcement ....

had no role to play in the international arena

Up

to the point

most

intents

Jr.

,

of the prohibition of war

Still,

as

logically as well as legally,

regards the cardinal issue of war.

UN Charter], to

adoption of the

[i.e.,

it

and purposes, "self-defence was not

a legal

concept but merely

a

25
political excuse for the use of force."

Further developing

this

theme, Professor Dinstein argues that the right of

self-defense cannot be justified

sovereignty of States.

With

under either natural law or

as

an element of the

respect to the natural law he states:

[A] reference to self-defence as a "natural right", or a right generated

law",

is

unwarranted.

which

in

With

It

by "natural

may be conceived as an anachronistic residue from an era

international law

respect to reliance

was dominated by

on the

ecclesiastical doctrines.

26

principle of sovereignty as a basis for an

"inherent" right of self-defense, he acknowledges that the series of identical

American notes accompanying the

come

parties to the

Those notes
however,

Kellogg-Briand Pact lends

stated, inter alia, that the right

sovereign state and

is

number of States to besome support to that theory.

invitations to a

of self-defense

"is

inherent in every

implicit in every treaty." 27 Professor Dinstein states,

that:

[T]he principle of State sovereignty sheds no light on the theme of self-defence.
State

sovereignty has a variable content, which depends

development of the international

legal order at

index of the altered perception of sovereignty

is

also

that, in the

not crumble.

as

and when

it

pleased

half-century, the sovereignty of States did
to

employ inter-State force

in self-defence

in sovereignty than the discredited right to resort to force at

times. 28

While
right

last

The contemporary right

no more "inherent"

all

war

nineteenth (and early

considered "a right inherent in sovereignty itself .... Notwithstanding

the abolition of this liberty in the

is

the stage of

any given moment. The best

twentieth) century, the liberty of every State to go to

was

on

it is

clear

from Professor Dinstein's

analysis that

he regards

a State's

of self-defense not to be activated until an armed attack actually occurs,

he avoids the catastrophic consequences that might

result

from such

a rigid

doc-

by walking back the time that an attack actually begins to the point where
the incipient attacker "embarks upon an irreversible course of action, thereby
trine

125

Self'Defense against

crossing the

Rubicon." 29

side "has

He labels this as "interceptive"

from "anticipatory"

distinguishes

committed

Computer Network Attack

itself to

rather than that the attack

is

self-defense in that

it

self-defense,

which he

requires that the other

an armed attack in an ostensibly irrevocable way,"

merely "foreseeable." 30

While it is true that the self-defense doctrine owes its origin to theological and
natural-law sources, which were the foundations of the concept of the "just
war," 31 and while Professor Dinstein is undoubtedly correct that during the
positivist era
as

of the 19 th and early 20 th centuries, any State was free to make war

an element of sovereignty, States nonetheless often continued to plead

self-defense as a legal as well as a political or moral justification. This practice

more than

in their statehood;

way

remnant of ecclesiastical law.

a vestigial

it is

States regarded

it

as

was

inherent

therefore not surprising that the term "inherent" found

its

into Article 5 1 of the Charter.

Although Professor Randelzhofer states
of Article 51 with

its

that the literal or strict interpretation

denunciation of anticipatory self-defense

view" among recognized scholars, he nevertheless admits
scholarly opinion contra.

There

is

no consensus

He

the "prevailing

that there

is

substantial

states:

in international legal doctrine over the point in time

which measures of self-defence
particular

is

those authors

who

armed

against an

interpret Art.

may be

attack

51

as

from

taken. Thus, in

merely confirming the

pre-existing right of self-defence consider anticipatory measures of self-defence
to

be admissible under the conditions

when

set

"the necessity of that self-defence

choice of means, and no

moment

up by Webster

is

instant,

in the Caroline case,

i.e.

overwhelming and leaving no

for deliberation." 32

The adherents of this opposing view are both numerous and distinguished. They
include, among others, such publicists as Oscar Schachter, Myres McDougal,
Robert Jennings, Humphrey Waldock, and Antonio Cassese.
Sir Humphrey Waldock was one of the earliest critics of the highly restrictive
interpretation of Article 51 by the literalists. In his Hague lectures of 1952, Sir
Humphrey stated:
If an

armed

attack

would seem

is

imminent within the

times

doctrine of the Caroline, then

To read Article 51 otherwise is
stroke. To cut down the customary

first

of self-defense beyond even the Caroline doctrine does not make sense

when

it

to bring the case within Article 51.

to protect the aggressor's right to the
right

strict

the

in

speed and power of weapons of attack has enormously

increased. 33
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Professor

Myres McDougal and Florentino

Kunz and Nincic
from an

Jr.

Feliciano, focusing primarily

on

the

readings of the Charter text, argue that the objections to such

readings are twofold.
text

,

analysis

First,

Kunz and Nincic attempt to interpret the meaning of the

of the words alone, attempting to divine a

single clear

and un-

ambiguous meaning, and Kunz, in addition, "casually de-emphasize [s]" the preparatory

work on

The second major flaw in their argument is that they
potentialities of modern military weapons systems and

the document.

seriously underestimate the

the contemporary techniques of non-military coercion. 34

With respect to arguments that allowing a State to respond in an anticipatory
manner would vest too much discretion in individual States, McDougal and
Feliciano point out that the claim to the right of self-defense "remains subject to

the reviewing authority of the organized

community." 35

One of the more cogent criticisms of the conclusions reached by the literalists
was made by Professor David Linnan
interpretive principles of the

in a recent article in

which he applied the

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties

interpretation of Article 51 of the Charter.

Under the Vienna Convention,

He

to an

states:

the textual exegesis or ordinary

meaning approach

enjoys primacy in the absence of inherent ambiguity or manifestly absurd result.

employing the ordinary meaning approach, but dismissing Article

Publicists

inherent right-droit naturel language

law

natural

canon.

.

.

.

approach

as

as

generally

mere

51's

infelicitous drafting (viewing the

discredited)

violate

its

most

basic

[U]nder an ordinary meaning approach the use of the natural law

terminology indicates the adoption by reference of

its

scheme of

self-defense

(without reaching or expressing an opinion on the validity of the natural law

approach
states).

itself,

which

a national

is

view of international law not shared by

all

Regarding the scheme of self-defense adopted, U.S. views expressed in the

notes accompanying the Kellogg-Briand Pact are representative. 36

Professor Linnan goes

on

to argue that

herent right" creates an ambiguity,

it

if,

however, the use of the term "in-

brings into play the secondary rule of inter-

which authorizes resort to supplementary materials under Article 32
of the Vienna Convention, at which point the "legislative history" of Article 51
comes to the fore. As he and many other publicists have pointed out, 37 the drafting history shows clearly that Article 51 was inserted to clarify the point that the
new Security Council system would not displace contemporaneous efforts in-

pretation,

volving the creation of regional security systems. 38

But international law

is

not just

a creature

of treaty

text. It

is

at least

equally a

product of State practice. Analyzing State practice since the adoption of the

127

Computer Network Attack

Self-Defense against

Charter, Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts, while cautioning that antici-

patory self-defense should be regarded

as

unlawful under most circumstances,

state that:

not necessarily unlawful in

[I]t is

facts

all

circumstances, the matter depending

on

the

of the situation including in particular the seriousness of the threat and the

degree to which pre-emptive action

is

really necessary

and

is

the only

way of

avoiding that serious threat. 39

Proceeding on that

basis,

The development of

more

involves the use of armed force and the violation of another

can be justified
is

the law, particularly in the light of

launched

probably
against

or

that

self-defence

as
is

self-defence under international law

attack;
.

.

.;

(b)

(c)

there

there

is

state's territory,

an armed attack

(a)

is

an urgent necessity for defensive action

no

the action taken by

(d)

practicable

alternative

way of self-defence

necessary to stop or prevent the infringement,

is

action

to

limited to

what

to the needs of defence;

i.e.,

in
is

and

of collective self-defence, the victim of an armed attack has

in the case

(e)

where

if

immediately threatened, against a state's territory or forces (and

nationals);

its

recent state

150 years since the Caroline incident, suggests that action, even

practice, in the
it

they conclude:

requested assistance. 40

The

severe restraints that Jennings and Watts

would apply

to the exercise

of

"anticipatory" self-defense reflect their concern that the right could be abused

with enormously serious consequences. Professor Rosalyn Higgins has expressed the same concern. She has contrasted
this

self-defense.

The

to Israel's

which

Israel asserted

first

constitute a justified anticipatory exercise of the right of

was the Six Days

pre-emptory

Emergency Force from
seaway link for

a vital

troops

on

Israel's

statements.

nor the
there

UN

was

was

War of 1967.

attack: President

Sinai

and the Gaza

Israel to the

Recall the events leading

Nasser summarily ejected the

strip;

he closed the

border; and Syria and Egypt unleashed

General Assembly condemned

a general feeling, "certainly shared

that

was

of the

a lawful

Straits

UN

of Tiran,

outside world; both Syria and Egypt massed

As Professor Higgins points out, neither the

in context, this

case

cases in

doctrine to justify resort to pre-emptive strikes to illustrate her view of

what may or may not
up

two

a

barrage of bellicose

UN Security Council

Israel's action.

On

by the Western

states, that

use of anticipatory self-defence." 41

Israeli air strike against

128

the contrary,

taken
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,

Jr.

There, the Security Council, with the concurrence of the United States and

Common

the

tions.

42

Market's "Group of Ten," "strongly condemn [ed]"

Not only was

Israel's ac-

the building of a nuclear reactor not a use of force; the

timing of the strike lacked the temporal element of urgency required by the
Caroline criteria. 43

Professor Cassese, in the same collection of essays, agrees with Professor Higgins and, in addition, appears to
criteria

of the Caroline

One might

go further by relaxing somewhat the rigorous

case.

perhaps draw the conclusion that consensus

now

is

emerging

that

under Art. 51 anticipatory self-defence is allowed, but on the strict conditions that
(i)

solid

and consistent evidence

large-scale

armed

exists that

another country is about to engage on a

attack jeopardizing the very

life

of the target State and

peaceful means of preventing such attack are available either because they
certainly

prove

useless to the specific circumstances, or for lack

them, or because they have been

One
late

of the most vocal

Professor McDougal.

pone action

precisely

is

no

would

of time to resort to

exhausted. 44

of the

strict

interpretation theory has

been the

He urged that in the age of the ballistic missile, to post-

in self-defense until after the "last irrevocable act" reduces the right

of self-defense to

It

critics

(ii)

a right

this

of retaliatory response.

probable effect that gives to

construction of Article 51,

when

the

narrowly

restrictive

appraised for future application, a strong air of

romanticism. 45

on the subject of self-defense on several occaWhile his writings reflect a profound commitment to the principles of Ar-

Professor Schachter has written
sions.

ticle 2(4)

of the

UN Charter, he nevertheless concludes that Article 51 cannot be

when,
based on persuasive evidence, an attack appears imminent. As he stated most eloso narrowly construed as to require a State to forego the right to respond

quently in 1986:

On

norm that opposes the
preemptive resort to force but acknowledges its necessity when an attack is so
immediate and massive as to make it absurd to demand that the target state await
the level of principle,

it

makes sense

to support a

the actual attack before taking defensive action. Webster's statement in the
Caroline case

meet

is

probably the only acceptable formulation

46
this situation.
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one must consider the judgment of the International Court of Juswell

tice in the Nicaragua case, as

jurisdictional phase

of the

as Judge

case, the

eral treaty reservation divested the

Schwebel's dissenting opinion. In the

United

States

had argued

that

its

multilat-

court of jurisdiction since the customary

law of self-defense had been "subsumed" or "supervened" by treaty law,
is,

Article 51 of the Charter.

At

that

that stage, the Court, in refusing to dismiss the

case, stated:

The

fact that the

self-defense]

not

.

.

.

above-mentioned principles [including

the principle of

have been codified or embodied in multilateral conventions does

mean that they cease to

as regards

inter alia

exist

and to apply

as

principles of customary law,

even

conventions. 47

countries that are parties to such

During the Merits stage, the Court further concluded that even if the customary
law and treaty principles were identical in content, the customary-law rule may
apply separately and independently. 48 Since, however, the parties to the case
placed their reliance as to the applicability of the right of self-defense only on the
case of an armed attack which had already occurred, the issue of the lawfulness of
an armed response to an imminent threat of attack was not raised nor addressed
by the majority opinion. 49
Judge Schwebel, in his dissent, while also acknowledging that the issue was
not before the Court, and while recognizing that "the issue is controversial and
open to more than one substantial view," opined, ex abundi cautela, that he disagreed with a construction of Article 51 as if it read, "Nothing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence

and only

if,

an armed attack occurs." 50

While the foregoing
of the
I

many

believe

it

discussion admittedly constitutes only a partial review

scholarly writings

on

the use of force and the right of self-defense,

constitutes a fair representation of the various positions taken

leading commentators

would appear
argue for a

safe to

literal

interpretation

is

who

have addressed

conclude that there

is

a

this issue.

inconsistent with the true

To

conclude that

vailing" view, as Randelzhofer has done,

From

this

by the

review

deep division between those

interpretation of Article 51 and those

in the post-nuclear age.

to

if,

who

it

who

argue that such an

meaning of the Article, particularly
one view or the other is the "pre-

is, I

believe, too strong a conclusion

draw given the number and eminence of the

scholars that are represented in

the opposing camp.

view of the foregoing, I do not consider it to be unreasonable that the
United States takes the position that anticipatory self-defense against an
In
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imminent attack is permitted under Article 51 This position is articulated in the
relevant military operational manuals and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)
Standing Rules of Engagement. The Navy's Manual, for example, provides as
.

follows:

Anticipatory Serf-Defense. Included within the inherent right of self-defense
the right of a nation (and

its

armed

International law recognizes that

United Nations Charter
aggressor's initial

if a

forces) to protect itself from
it

would be contrary

to the purposes of the

first

strike before taking those military

measures necessary to thwart an imminent attack. Anticipatory

available.

where attack

attack.

threatened nation were required to absorb an

and potentially crippling

the use of armedforce

imminent

is

is

imminent and no reasonable

self-defense involves

choice ofpeaceful

means

is

51

The JCS Standing Rules of Engagement

authorize the exercise of the right

of anticipatory self-defense against forces displaying "hostile intent," which
defined, inter

alia, as

follows:

Hostile Intent. The threat of imminent use of force against the United

US

US

and in some circumstances,

forces,

commercial

assets,

is

and/or other designated

nationals,

non-US

States,

US

their property,

and

forces, foreign nationals

their property. 52

Having concluded

would not be unreasonable for a State to take the
self-defense against an imminent armed attack is law-

that

position that anticipatory
ful,

and having found

tion remains as to

"imminent." The

it

that the

what

classic

United

States has

adopted

this position, the

are the criteria for determining

formulation

is

US

when

ques-

an attack

is

Secretary of State Daniel Webster's

when the necessity of action is "instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation." 53 This is the test adopted by many eminent scholars and has been repeated
dictum that an armed response

is

lawful

was adopted in the US Navy's operacurrent iteration. 54 A number of scholars have con-

often in legal and diplomatic arguments.

It

manual prior to its
cluded, however, that this

much too

tional

particularly

in

McDougal and

the

light

articulation

is

restrictive in the present age,

of the possibility of devastating nuclear

attack.

Feliciano have stated, for example, that:

[T]he standard of required necessity has been habitually cast in language so
abstractly restrictive as almost, if read literally, to
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impose

paralysis.
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extensive analysis of the required degree of necessity,

and Feliciano are unable to provide
that
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tests that are less abstract, finally

McDougal
concluding

the requirement of necessity "can only be subjected to that most

comprehensive and fundamental
context." 56

of

law, reasonableness in particular

all

Analyzing the particular context of the Cuban Missile

McDougal concluded

Professor

test

US

that the

quarantine of

Crisis

of 1962,

Cuba was

a lawful

application of the doctrine of self-defense.

57

United

"initial discretion,"

States' action

was an exercise of

Central to his analysis was that the

which was then

backed up by mustering the support of the members of the Organization of

American States and reporting its action to the Security Council. 58
Sally and Thomas Mallison have analyzed the criteria for the lawful employ-

ment of self-defense
ings,

against an

imminent armed

attack in several of their writ-

most recently in volume 64 of the Naval War College's "Blue Book"

series

where they, like McDougal and Feliciano, concluded that the Webster
formulation was too restrictive, "since a credible threat may be imminent without being 'instant' and more than a 'moment for deliberation' is required to
make a lawful choice of means." 59 Like McDougal and Feliciano, they also assert that whether an anticipatory resort to armed force in self-defense is lawful
(1991),

can only be determined in the context of the

facts

emphasize that where anticipatory self-defense
fulness

is

of the specific

actual attack has

61

Computer Network Attacks as "Armed

It is

They

claimed, the criteria for law-

must be applied with greater stringency than when an

occurred.

case. 60

important that what

an ongoing armed conflict

is

under discussion here

(jus in bello)

is

Attacks''

not what

but rather actions by

may be lawful in

a hostile individual,

group, or State against another State while the target State and the State of origin

of the actions are not yet engaged in armed conflict

armed

conflict (war),

it is

(jus

ad bellum). In an ongoing

unquestionably legitimate for

en-

a State to attack its

emy's military telecommunications infrastructure, including military computer
networks. 62 Attacks on other telecommunications and network
serve both military and civilian clientele
tives,

may

also

facilities

which

be legitimate military objec-

provided that the international humanitarian law of armed conflict

is

ob-

served with respect to proportionality, including limiting collateral damage. 63
is

a matter

of indifference whether the

mode of attack is kinetic or electronic,

though the former may be more objectionable since

may

cause

more

long-lasting effects.
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In examining whether a computer network "attack"

"armed

may

constitute an

be construed in isolation but rather must be

attack," Article 51 cannot

read in the context of other articles of the Charter, particularly Articles 2(4), 39,

41 and 42. Article 2(4) provides:

All

Members

shall refrain in their international relations

from the

threat or use of

force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in

any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.

Article

39 empowers the Security Council to determine the existence of "any

threat to the peace, breach

of the peace, or act of aggression" and to make

recommendations or decide on "measures"

to be

Article 42. Article 41 provides a non-exhaustive

employed under Article 41 or

list

of measures "not involving

armed force" which the Security Council may take including
"complete or partial interruption of
telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication." Article 42, in turn, provides for actions "by air, sea, or land

the use of

.

forces"

when

.

.

the measures provided for in Article 41 are inadequate. Since the

actions in Article 41 are described as "measures not involving the use of armed
force," 64 whereas those in Article

appear

that, at least as

not be regarded

as

an

initial

would
computer network attack would

42 involve the use of armed

presumption, a

forces,

it

an "armed attack." Giving effect to such an

initial

presumption, however, ignores the significance of the drastic consequences that
such an attack can have on the

As will be discussed

infra,

social,

economic and

military structure of a State.

whether an attack is to be considered as an armed attack

depends on the consequences of the attack rather than the modality.

The various terms used in the

Charter, including the Preamble

— "war"

amble), "armed force" (Preamble), "acts of aggression" (Article
use of force" (Article 2(4)), "act of aggression (Article 39), and
(Article 51)

—

considerably

differ in

scope and content.

in their meaning." 65

1),

(Pre-

"threat or

"armed attack"

Though related in content "they differ

None

of them

is

further explained in the

Charter.

This lack of definition has led to several attempts, primarily by the General

Assembly, to give further content to the terms, particularly "act of aggression."
Article 3 of the

1974 General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression" Resolution

provides the following non-exhaustive

list

of

acts

which

qualify as acts of

aggression:

(a)

The invasion

State,

or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another

or any military occupation,

however temporary,
133
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from such
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invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of force of the territory of another
State or part thereof;

Bombardment by

(b)

State or the use

the

armed

forces of a State against the territory of another

of any weapons by a State against the territory of another State;

(c)

The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State;

(d)

An attack by the armed forces of a State of the land, sea or air forces, marine and

air fleets

of another

State;

The use of armed forces of one

(e)

State

State,

which are within the

with the agreement of the receiving

State,

territory

of another

in contravention of the

conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence in

such territory beyond the termination of the agreement;

(f)

The

action of a State in allowing

territory,

its

which

it

has placed at the disposal

of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating an

act

of aggression

against a third State;

(g)

The sending by
which

mercenaries,
gravity as to

or

on behalf of a

State

carry out acts of

amount

of armed bands, groups, irregulars or

armed force

against another State of such

to the acts listed above, or

its

substantial

involvement

therein. 66

While the term "act of aggression" is broader than "armed attack," it is apparent that most of the acts listed in the General Assembly's resolution would also
constitute an "armed attack" and would, if of sufficient scale and effect, invoke
the victim's right to respond under

its

right

of self-defense.

As several recent articles and monographs have revealed, analyzing the novel
and still-developing concept of computer network attack under either the customary law of self-defense or Article 51 of the Charter presents both theoretical
and practical difficulties. 67 The principal difficulty flows from the fact that both
traditionally and under the Charter, the discussion and codification of what constitutes an act of aggression or an armed attack generally involve the use of
tile acts

—

form of employment of military weapons or hosby members of the armed forces. It is now clear that the "armed

armed force

either in the

force" involved does not have to be
State.

a part

of the organized military forces of a

As indicated above, the General Assembly's "Definition of Aggression"
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Resolution, after listing certain acts involving the "armed forces of a State," also

by or on behalf of a State of "armed
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force

includes, as an act of aggression, the sending

bands, groups, irregulars

against another State" or the substantial

provided they reach

a certain level

involvement of a State in such actions

of gravity. 68 The judgment of the Interna-

Court ofJustice in the Nicaragua case likewise held that the "arming and
training of the contras [by the United States] can certainly be said to involve the
threat or use of force against Nicaragua." 69 It also held, however, that the "mere
tional

supply of funds

.

.

.

does not in

itself

amount

to a use

of force." 70

Those publicists who have grappled with the problem of determining when a
computer network attack constitutes an armed attack, have two possible avenues of approach— either the instrumentality or the consequences test. Nearly 40
years ago, Professor McDougal and Mr. Feliciano, though not visualizing cyber
warfare, were critical of focusing on the instrumentality as the "precipitating
event" for lawful self-defense, stating that to do so

is

in effect to suppose that in

no possible context can applications of nonrnilitary types

of coercion (where armed force
intensity,

is

kept to a background role) take on efficacy,

and proportions comparable to those of an "armed attack" and thus present

an analogous condition of necessity. Apart from the extreme
realistic factual

Michael Schmitt points out, however,
least since

of establishing

bases for that supposition, the conclusion places too great a strain

the single secondary factor of modality—military violence.

At

difficulty

upon

71

that:

the promulgation of the Charter, [the] use of force paradigm has

been instrument-based; determination of whether or not the standard has been
breached depends on the type of the coercive instrument— diplomatic, economic,
or military— selected to attain the national objectives in question.
type of instruments might
the normatively

more

While admitting

that

rise to

The

first

two

the level of intervention, but they do not engage

flagrant act

of using force. 72

an instrument-based approach provides

a

relatively

easily-applied test for calculating lawfulness of an act of intervention, 73 he

ultimately concludes that

network

it

does not provide

a useful test for

computer

attack.

Computer network
consequences cannot

attack
easily

challenges

be placed in

the

prevailing

a particular area
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values threat continuum.

The dilemma

spectrum of consequentiality.
(e.g.,
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Its

CNA

in the fact that

lies

spans the

range from mere inconvenience

effects freely

shutting an academic network temporarily) to physical destruction

hammering phenomenon

in creating a

down power

burst) to death (e.g., shutting

generators).

It

can affect economic,

either directly or indirectly,

in oil pipelines so as to cause

and

its

to a hospital

(e.g., as

them

to

with no back-up

mental, and physical well-being,

social,

grows almost

potential scope

daily,

being

capable of targeting everything from individual persons or objects to entire
societies.

74

Professor Schmitt recognizes, however, the weakness of a system of analysis

which attempts

to apply a system

developed to regulate kinetic

count for non-kinetically based harm.
ture. 76

Recognizing

also,

however,

need for developing such an
tive

75

He

calls for a

that there

he

architecture,

is

articulates

armed

constitute an

damage

as

architecas to

the

an "appropriate norma-

framed within the

UN

on the "consequences" theory.

Charter, that relies

physical

new normative

no current consensus

framework" 77 under current international law

To

activities to ac-

attack, the

CNA

must be intended

to tangible objects or injury to

may respond

individually or collectively,

to a

human

to directly cause

beings.

.

.

.

States, acting

CNA amounting to armed attack

with the use of force pursuant to Article 51

and the inherent right of

self-defense. 78

The
sity

Institute for

National Strategic Studies of the National Defense Univer-

has also adopted a "consequences" test as to

of an armed attack,

potential physical destruction,
target's borders, or violation

sufficiently destructive

of intrusion, and vice

would include some

combined with some
of

its

sovereign rights.

that

Fatalities

power

would

.

versa.

.

level

of actual or

of intrusion into

level

may qualify as "armed attacks," no

.

its

[AJttacks that are

matter what their level

79

Likewise, Professor Dinstein adopts a consequences

CNAs

CNA rises to the level

stating:

appears likely that an "armed attack"

[I]t

whether a

constitute

armed

test.

He offers as examples of

attacks the following:

caused by loss of computer-controlled life-support systems; an extensive

grid

outage

(electricity

blackout)
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repercussions; a

shutdown of computers controlling waterworks and dams,

generating

thereby floods

engineered

(e.g.,

most egregious

Jr.

,

of inhabited

deadly

areas;

through misinformation fed into

case

is

the

aircraft

crashes

deliberately

computers),

etc.

The

wanton instigation of a core-meltdown of a reactor in

a

nuclear plant, leading to the release of radioactive materials that can cause
countless casualties if the neighboring areas are densely populated. In
cases, the

CNA would be deemed an armed

Walter Gary Sharp,

Sr.,

would lower

[T]he mere penetration by a

all

these

attack. 80

the threshold substantially.

state into sensitive

warning or command and control systems,

computer systems such

missile defense

as early

computer systems, and

other computers that maintain the safety and reliability of a nuclear stockpile,

should by their very nature be presumed a demonstration of hostile intent.
Individually, these
itself that

computer systems

are so important to a state's ability to defend

espionage into any one of them should be presumed to demonstrate

hostile intent. 81

be recalled that under the JCS Standing Rules of Engagement,
demonstration of a hostile intent is the determinant for permitting an armed
It

is

to

response to an imminent armed attack. 82 Invoking such a
triggering the right to respond

by armed force

low threshold

for

in self-defense seems to

be

when

establishing a dangerous standard, especially

it

is

often difficult to

computer network attack has occurred at all. In some
instances, malfunctions which appear at first to be the result of computer
network attack have been determined, after more thorough investigation, to be
determine whether

a

the result of faulty software or operator error. 83
If

one agrees

that

computer network

under some circumstances
ply

some

criteria for

may

attacks

constitute

determining

when

of some degree of severity and

"armed

one must apthe threshold from

attacks," then

such attacks cross

interventions that do not warrant responses under the right of self-defense to

those that do. As has been mentioned, the closest the
to describing anything
lists

"complete or

remotely resembling

partial interruption

CNA

... of

UN Charter itself comes

is

in Article 41,

telegraphic, radio,

where

it

and other

means of communication" as a measure "not involving the use of armed
force" which the Security Council may take against threats to the peace,
breaches of peace, or acts of aggression. 84 Presumptively, computer networks
would fall under a broad definition of "telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication," but in today's environment of almost total dependence on
137
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the proper functioning of computer networks for control of vital societal
functions, as well as critical national-security systems, the "complete or partial

would have

interruption" of such systems

much more

a

drastic effect than

anything that could have been envisaged by the framers of the Charter in
1945. Article 41, therefore, cannot be said to require the categorization of

computer network

attacks as actions "not involving the use

As Professor Schmitt has suggested,
architecture specifically tailored to

would be

it

CNA

ever, until a consensus develops for the
ture,

it

would appear

computer

most

that the

desirable for a normative

For the present, how-

to emerge.

need for
and

rational

of armed force."

a

new

normative architec-

practical test

of whether

a

attack can be the precipitating event for the exercise of lawful

self-defense

whether the consequences

is

of vital military or

are

civilian infrastructures or the loss

Anticipatory Self-Defense against

As discussed

where there

major damage to or destruction

earlier,

there

is

of human

life.

Computer Network Attack

substantial legal support for the proposition that

armed attack is imminent, the potential victim State is not required to stand idly by until the actual attack has
occurred it may respond with proportional force to ward off the attack. The
is

persuasive evidence that an

—

difficulty

tack

is

with the application of this principle

is

in determining that in fact an at-

imminent. In the case of an attack by kinetic means, there are usually (but

certainly not always) intimations

ous, such as a step-up in propaganda or bellicose

clearer threat

Some may be ambigustatements; others may carry a

of an impending attack.

—movement of troops

to the border, mobilization

of forces,

increased aerial and electronic surveillance, deployment of naval and

and clandestine
tack
self

infiltration

of intelligence agents. While

a part

capability

computer network atimminent (or it may it-

a

may also be preceded by acts that suggest an attack is
be

air forces,

of the pre-attack build-up for an attack by kinetic means), the

of an attacker to cause almost instantaneous harm suggests that the

notice that a victim State

may have

originator of the attack

may have

first

computer network attack is underway
is to experience the harmful effects themselves. If the consequence of the CNA
is serious harm to vital infrastructure or loss of human life, then under the principles previously discussed, a proportional response is lawful. But difficult questions remain. Response against whom? Can the attacker be identified? The
that a

sent his electronic attack through multiple

on behalf
teen-age "hacker" engaged in what is

switches and servers in several different countries.

of a foreign government, or
to

him

a

prank? 85

If the

is

he merely

hacker

is

not

a

a direct
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government aware of his actions and impliedly consenting to them?
The permutations and combinations of situations under which attacks may octhe foreign

cur

number in

the millions. Professor Schmitt has reported that today over 120

countries are in the process of establishing information warfare

competence 86

and by the year 2002 some "nineteen million individuals will have the

know-how

to launch cyber attacks." 87

Obviously, not every probing of a presumably secure network, whether

one controlling

vital civilian infrastructure

defense functions, such

critical

as air

or a military network controlling

defense, atomic weapons, satellite

munications, or intelligence gathering, can be considered
full-scale

network

attack. Professor

as a

com-

prelude to

a

Schmitt has reported that the Defense

Information Systems Agency identified 53 attacks on defense systems in
1992. 88

By 1995

14,000 in

number had

the

1999. 89

increased to 559 and was expected to reach

by the Defense Information Systems
even more unsettling. That agency reported that the DeFigures supplied

Agency reports are
fense Department may have experienced
1 994.

90

as

many

as

250,000 attacks in

Although each of these "attacks" required investigation and appropri-

none of them presumably were of sufficient gravity either to indicate that they were themselves an "armed attack" that would have authorized
a resort to armed force in response nor were they regarded as indicators that
such an armed attack was imminent.
It would seem, then, that the most likely application of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to computer network attacks would be in the case of
such attacks that in and of themselves do not constitute an armed attack but
rather are evaluated as precursors of an armed attack by kinetic means and/or
ate action,

further,

more

severe cyber attacks. In

field will play a crucial role,

neutralize or destroy

and any

modern

steps that a prospective attacker

enemy's electronic

its

warfare, the electronic battle-

command and

can take to

control, intelli-

gence, communications, or weapons-control networks prior to a kinetic attack

would gain enormous advantage. While these preliminary CNAs may not
themselves rise to the level of armed attack, they may, if combined with other
evidence of an impending attack, be sufficient to authorize armed measures of
self-defense
right

—not

against the

CNAs themselves,

but rather

as

an exercise of the

of anticipatory self-defense against the impending kinetic or more serious

cyber attack.
Professor Schmitt,

of

CNA to

soften

mining when

armed

who

up the

a State

also visualizes the

most

likely scenario to

be the use

battlespace, 91 proposes a three-prong test for deter-

may respond

to a

CNA that itself does not constitute an

attack.
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The

CNA

2.

The

CNA

is
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armed

part of an overall operation culminating in

is

attack;

an irrevocable step in an imminent (near-term) and probably

unavoidable attack; and

3.

The defender

window of

is

reacting in advance of the attack itself during the

possible

last

opportunity available to effectively counter the attack. 92

This formulation appears to be an application of Secretary Webster's dictum

computer network attack. As we have seen, the
Caroline standard has been found by many publicists to be too narrowly drawn to

in the Caroline case, adapted to

apply in

catastrophic results.
gest that

"The

circumstances.

all

last

possible

window" may be

The problem does not lend itself to

whatever the formula used, in the

late to

a specific formula.

the decision

final analysis,

must apply "that most comprehensive and fundamental
ableness in particular context."

too

test

avoid
I

sug-

maker

of all law, reason-

93

Concluding Remarks

In this chapter
to exercise

its

situation in

I

have attempted to defend the proposition that

"inherent" right of self-defense by armed force

which an

may

attack has actually occurred, but

State has persuasive evidence that such an attack

is

not limited to the

when

also apply

imminent

is

a State's right

a

(anticipatory

The State exercising the right of anticipatory self-defense, however,
heavy burden of proof that the evidence upon which it acted was indeed

self-defense).

bears a

persuasive and must withstand ex post facto examination

by the

international

community, primarily through the Security Council. I have also attempted to
demonstrate that the term "armed attack" may also include attacks upon computer networks solely by electronic means if the consequences of such attacks include either substantial
life,

harm to

or both. Although the

and some have labeled

it

first

a

vital civil

or military networks, or loss of human

of these propositions

minority view,

I

is

admittedly controversial,

believe that there

is

distinguished

scholarly support for that position, as well as substantial support in State practice.

The adoption of this

position by the United States, as reflected in

manuals and Standing Rules of Engagement

second proposition, that

armed

attack

is

is,

that the test

is

innocuous instrument
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of whether an action constitutes an

the consequence of the attack, there does not

capability of an

military

therefore justifiable. As to the

other choice, since an instrumentality-based criterion

view of the

its

—

is

the

seem

to

be any

wholly impractical

computer

—

to

in

become

Horace B. Robertson

2l

lethal

weapon

in the hands

of a

skilled

and

,

Jr.

persistent "hacker"

determined to

invade and attack another's computer network.

When

I

attempt to apply the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense to

puter network attack,
likely scenario for

seems likely that

I

CNA

that

a true hostile

it

will occur suddenly,

without warning.

It

also

CNA reaching the level of an "armed attack"

be an isolated incident, but rather will occur

will not

The most

find myself in waters difficult to navigate.
is

com-

as

part of the preliminary

softening-up of the battlespace preceding an attack by kinetic weapons or a

more

serious cyber attack. Professor Schmitt apparently visualizes this

on

nario since he shifts the focus of his section

same sce-

anticipatory self-defense to use of

"computer network attack operations executed to prepare the battlespace." 94
Under these circumstances, it becomes even more important for a State facing

what may appear
its

analysis

to

be an imminent

CNA carefully to utilize

of all the surrounding events,

mination of whether an armed response
fense.

Only

in this

way can

it

meet

political

all its

resources in

and military, to aid in

its

deter-

may be made under the right of self-deits

heavy burden of establishing the

justification for initiating the first resort to the use

of armed force.
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Computer Networks,

Proportionality,

and

Military Operations
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A

Computer Network Attack (CNA)

Jr.

has

been defined

as

operations to

disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in

and computer networks, or the computer networks themselves.

CNA

operations are

employed

computers
1

Whether

in offense or countered in defense, there are

complex issues of proportionality, just as there are in conventional or kinetic attack situations. This chapter explores some of the proportionality judgments an
operational military commander must make. But first, it is useful to consider the
capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of the computers and computer networks that are revolutionizing high-tech military forces.
Operational Proliferation

During the war in Kosovo and Yugoslavia, targets for NATO aircraft were
developed and reviewed by a computerized network that linked, in real time,
commanders, planners, intelligence officers, and data specialists on both sides of
the Atlantic. 2 Simultaneously,
ships
side

Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from surface

and submarines were planned and directed using computer programs. In-

an

aircraft, tank,

heart of every

or the

lifelines

of a warship, there are computer chips

weapons system. For example,

to track

Chinese

at

the

M-9 missiles fired

Computer Networks,

Proportionality,

and Military Operations

Taiwan Straits in 1996, USS BUNKER HILL (CG-52) loaded a theater
ballistic missile surveillance and tracking program into the Aegis weapon system. 3 Computer watchstations acquire, process, display, and disseminate data
from sensors simultaneously. In air defense, the new Cooperative Engagement
Capability (CEC) uses a network of microprocessors and a data distribution system to share unfiltered radar measurements for composite tracking by dispersed
aircraft, ships, and ground batteries. 4 Electronic, acoustic, infrared, and optical
systems have many lines of computer code. Satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, carrying sensors, communication, and data transfer links, are controlled by
computer programs. National satellite imagery, when netted, enables precise
into the

geo-positioning for accurate targeting of standoff weapons,
planning, battle assessment, and intelligence support.

3

as

well

mission

as

Precision guided

muni-

depend on sophisticated computer programs for processing weapon engagement data, such as those embedded in the Low Altitude Navigation and
Infrared-for-Night (LANTIRN) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar (JSTARS) systems. Commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology is being
tions

exploited so that redesigns and updates in military computers can keep pace with
the rapid commercial development in

home and

business computers.

Webbing and Netting

The computing power
creased dramatically for

However,

field units.

in transistors

combat systems

it is

in the netting

mounted on microprocessors
in individual aircraft, ships,

and

has inbattle-

and webbing of computers associated with

command and control, surveillance, targeting, and gathering intelligence that is
adding a new dimension to warfare. 6 In a computer web, commanders at all levels

can simultaneously view the same battlespace.

works, such

as

The synergism of several

net-

the Joint Planning Network, Joint Data Network, and Joint

Composite Tracking Network, enhance defense against ballistic and cruise missiles. In both offense and defense, decision-making is speeded up. Innovative
tactics and "self-synchronization" at the warrior level are facilitated. Coordination and rapid maneuver among widely dispersed units are enhanced. There is a
greater opportunity to get inside an adversary's observe, orient, decide, act

(OODA)

loop. Secure video teleconferencing, data base connectivity, direct

downlink, and broadcast/receive
gistic,

and

essential

capabilities

provide access to intelligence, lo-

support data, including weather, mapping, terrain, and

oceanographic predictions. 7 The correlation and fusion of data from sensors in
satellites, aircraft, ships,

tivity

and precision

and

battlefield units enable sensor-to-shooter

targeting.

A

soldier or

148

Marine equipped with

connec-

a Situational

James H. Doyle,

Jr.

Awareness Beacon with Reply (SABER) has access to thousands of friendly
force positions every hour,

greatly minimizes fratricide in battle. 8

which

The

emerging global infrastructure of communication networks, computers, data
bases,

Command

and consumer electronics provides the National

and military commanders with

most importantly,

new

to get indications

Authorities

opportunities to gather intelligence and,

and warning of a

Capabilities, Limitations,

crisis

or threat of attack.

and Vulnerabilities

But with all the high-tech capabilities and potential, computers and their networks are only tools of warfare. Humans must make judgments, often based on
insufficient or ambiguous data. Identification and discrimination regarding military targets and civilian casualties are difficult issues and cannot be resolved entirely by computer networks. In Kosovo, for example, restrictions on minimum
altitudes and the types of authorized targets made it difficult for NATO forces to
destroy an enemy who had no requirement to shoot, move, or expose himself 9
Then there is the reality that computer networks are not always available or fully
operable. Hard drives jam, memories fail, adapters burn out, cables sever, and
servers saturate. 10 Difficult challenges

puter language,

reliability,

of configuration control, standard com-

and interoperability abound. 11 The Office of Man-

agement and Budget places the number of Defense Department computer
systems

8,145, of which 2,096 are

at

Furthermore,

bandwidth

is

not easy to

it is

constrained.

move

There

deemed

critical to military operations.

"zeros" and "ones" where needed

also the ever-present

is

12

when

problem of recruiting

and retaining trained personnel to operate and maintain the sophisticated computer networks. In addition, data
to

is

not information.

It is

raw material

be processed to obtain ground truth and avoid saturation. Since

displayed looks equally valid, computer-aided tools and

filters

sign confidence levels to the accuracy of the information.

For high-tech military

works

far

outweigh the

addressed. Systems

forces, the capabilities

limitations.

But technical

all

that needs

data

when

are required to as-

13

of computers and their netissues

need

to

be vigorously

must be designed with greater robustness, redundancy, and

the ability to degrade gracefully. 14 Security systems (firewalls, shielding, intru-

motion sensors, encryption, anti-virus
software, and training) are required. But firewalls and intrusion detection devices can be bypassed, and all software is inherently flawed. 15 It must be recognized that command and control, communications, intelligence, surveillance,
sion detection devices, personnel checks,

and reconnaissance systems have become
warfare.

16

This

is

especially true in

much more vulnerable in information

communication systems, which
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rely

on

a
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civilian satellite

networks and transponders.

games, modeling and simulation, and actual incidents reveal

a

War

number of meth-

ods to attack computer networks. These include physical disruption of hardware

and software, insertion of a

worm,

bomb

computer program, flooding networks with false data, buffer overflows, malformed data, and
e-mail attachments, as well as unsophisticated jamming. 17 Intelligence gathering
satellites, military communication networks, sensor downlinks, and precision
virus,

or logic

into a

But low-tech military forces, while less
dependent on computer networks, may, in some cases, be just as vulnerable to
CNA. Command and control may be a single path network without redundancy and fall-back alternatives. Satellite communications may be completely
targeting could be disrupted or defeated.

unprotected. In addition to the vulnerabilities of information systems, computer

network technology employed offensively has the potential of producing devastating effects on both military support (fuel, spare parts, transportation, mobilization,

and medical

supplies)

electrical generation,

vices,

and the

civilian infrastructure (air traffic control,

water distribution, hospital

support,

life

to

ser-

currency control, and, ominously, nuclear reactor operations). Thus, both

high and low-tech military commanders and their national
ties

emergency

command

authori-

need to thoroughly analyze the legal and policy implications before resorting

CNA operations, either in offense or defense. Then, there are the unfriendly

"hackers" and terrorist groups eager to exploit vulnerability asymmetries

at

whatever risk and at relatively low cost. Cyberspace is a highly competitive envi-

ronment world-wide. The long term effectiveness of computer networks may
be less about technology and more about the ability to organize and innovate.

CNA and Consequences
As indicated

in the lead-off definition, a

CNA can either be an attack on the

information resident in computers and computer networks or

Whether

the computers and their networks.

tack"

18

a

a direct attack

on

CNA constitutes an "armed at-

depends not on the means and methods used, but on the resulting conse-

quences. 19

The means and methods of attack may be

information operations, such

consequences

and amount

life

psychological or electronic warfare, but the

may be severe injury,

to or rise to the level

consequences
threat to

as

may be

similar to other offensive

suffering, death, or destruction

of an armed

attack.

On

of property,

the other hand, the

intrusive, annoying, or disruptive, but

not an imminent

or limb, or intended to cause direct damage or injury. In both of-

US military commanders are guided by the Standing Rules of
Engagement (SROE) for US military forces. The SROE bridge the transition
fense and defense,
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between jus ad helium andjws in hello by implementing the inherent right of
self-defense and providing guidance for the application of force to accomplish
the mission. 20 They are based on national policy, operational requirements, and
US domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict. The elements of self-defense and mission accomplishment are necessity and proportionality,

although the meanings in the self-defense context are

much

different

than

when applied under the law of armed conflict for mission accomplishment.

The

SROE

make no

and mission

distinction in the guidelines for self-defense

accomplishment between an attack with conventional weapons and

network attack. Thus, the same general
measures for a specific operation that

a

computer

would apply, with supplemental
might well include guidance on CNA
criteria

operations.

Self-Defense (Jus ad Bellum)

A military force

on

a

post-Cold

War mission

(humanitarian, peacekeeping,

computer network attack. The
attacker could be a malicious hacker, terrorist group, or foreign armed force.
Under the US SROE, necessity requires that the military commander must first
determine whether the CNA is in fact either a hostile act or a clear demonstracrisis

control) could well be confronted with a

tion of hostile intent before

he decides that

it is

necessary to respond.

An armed

on troops, invading territory, blockading
ports, or mining harbors would in most circumstances be regarded as hostile acts.
A physical or kinetic attack against the computer networks that are vital for comattack,

such

mand and

as

sinking a ship, firing

control, surveillance, targeting, or early

warning could well preclude

or impede the mission and thus also be considered a hostile

act.

On

may

hand, a cyberspace intrusion into these same computer networks

not be a hostile

act,

indications of an

although a disruption of the

ICBM

launch might, per

fenses are not yet available,

Although the

may

that provides

a hostile act since active

and in any event, cueing information is so

hostile intent, that

danger. Hostile intent,
call.

be

network

or

de-

crucial.

CNA may not rise to the level of a hostile act, the consequences

may demonstrate
ment

se,

satellite

the other

is,

placing the military force in imminent

however demonstrated,

The determination

is

has always

been

a difficult judg-

both objective and subjective, influenced by

up-to-date intelligence on an adversary and his prior conduct.

One

military

writer has described the concept as an "expression of the national right of antici-

patory self-defense at the unit level." 21 Locking
radar,

approaching on an attack

profile,

on an

aircraft

with

fire

control

massing tanks and troops on the border,

or mobilizing the military and civilian infrastructure for
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all

be evidence
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wide variety of methods of attack previously mentioned that could adversely affect a military commander's computer
networks. However, the means of attack and the consequences may not be tangibly present
no "see and touch" evidence. Besides, since cyberspace attacks
are inherently anonymous, covert, seamlessly interconnected, and travel across
of hostile intent. In cyberspace, there are

a

—

international boundaries via relay points,

source, and establish attribution.

Is

and

difficult to identify

it is

trace the

the perpetrator military or civilian, State-

sponsored, a rogue organization, or an individual acting on his

own? Absent

a

conventional attack component, manipulation or intrusion by itself does not au-

A CNA intrusion into

tomatically indicate hostile intent.

network could be just an
disrupt the air defense

intelligence probe for future operations.

and targeting networks could be the

launching an armed attack. There are

and critical questions

the communications

But a

CNA to

critical step

before

many examples on both sides of the ledger,

Do the consequences of a particular CNA place

to ponder.

imminent danger? Is an adversary attempting to prepare the
battlefield for an armed attack that is likely, imminent, or unavoidable? Is this the
the military force in

last

opportunity for the military

commander

to counter the threat? 22 If so, the

ingredients are there for hostile intent and the necessity to act.

In a

CNA situation, just as in a conventional attack, the response to counter

the threat must be proportional, whether in anticipatory or actual self-defense.

That

is,

under the

US SROE,

"the force used must be reasonable in intensity,

on

duration, and magnitude, based

all

the facts

known to

the

commander at

the

time, to decisively counter the hostile act or hostile intent and to ensure the con-

tinued safety of US forces." 23 In self-defense "proportionality points

metry or approximation in
lawful counter- force. ...

'scale

at a

sym-

and effects' between the unlawful force and the

A comparison must be made between the quantum of

force and counter-force used, as well as the casualties and

damage

sustained." 24

A military commander must decide what weapons, means of delivery, countermeasures, and tactics are the most appropriate for the situation. For example, the

Doctrine for Joint Operations in operations other than war provides that "military force

be applied prudently.

.

.

.

Restraints

violence characterize the environment."

enough force

to control the threat

be in kind or executed on the spot,
ple, in

25

on weaponry,

The

objective

and protect the
if time

forces.

is

tactics,

and levels of

to respond with just

The response need not

permits due consideration. For exam-

EARNEST WILL (reflagging and protecting Kuwaiti tankers
Iran-Iraq Tanker War), after the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS

Operation

during the

(FFG-58)
selected

hit

an Iranian-laid mine, the appropriate and proportional response

by the National

Command Authorities was

forms, attacking Iranian ships only if they fired

152

on

to attack Iranian oil plat-

US

ships. 26

On

the other

James H. Doyle,

hand, a theater

ballistic missile fired at

Jr.

the military force or a facility under

its

protection requires action within minutes to acquire, track, and engage the missile.

Also guiding a military

commander

US

conventional, will be a nation's policy objectives.

SROE,
tive

is

to maintain a stable international

and credible deterrent to armed

CNA

in responding to an attack,

or

policy, as stated in the

environment and provide an

attack. If deterrence

fails,

effec-

in addition to be-

ing proportional, the response should be designed to limit the scope and
intensity

of a

and achieve

conflict, discourage escalation,

objectives. 27 Finally, the

use of force

is

normally the

political

last resort.

and military

When time

and

circumstances permit, the potentially hostile force should be warned and given
the opportunity to withdraw or cease threatening actions. 28

During the Naval War College symposium, "Computer Network Attack and
International

Law," the Proportionality Working Group discussed various ap-

proaches for developing a response to a

of consequences, such as

to analyze the attack in categories

only network

effects, a

network

CNA. 29 One such framework would be

a military

portional response:

network attack with

network and conventional

attack with

and a conventional attack with network and conventional
gory evaluated,

a

effects.

commander could consider various

effects,

For each cate-

options for a pro-

computer network only, both computer network and

conventional, or conventional only. In reaching a judgment, a military

mander, guided by the

SROE, might pose a series of questions to be resolved for

each option, matched against each category:

Is

there time for a warning to cease

threatening actions and an opportunity for the adversary to withdraw?

CNA place the military force in imminent danger?
preparing the battlefield for an attack?

commander to

protect his force?

Is

Is this

the

Is

last

the

and remove

Does the

CNA the final stage in

opportunity for a military

the response contemplated reasonable in in-

and magnitude? Will the response

tensity, duration,

com-

effectively counter the

from danger? Is a computer network response or a
conventional response the most appropriate, or a combination of both? If a computer network response, is there an ability to accurately assess the consequences?
Does a computer network response involve a cross-border intrusion? Will the
threat

response

assist

limit the scope

tion?

Is

his force

immediate

in stabilizing the

crisis? Is

the response designed to

and intensity of an impending conflict? Does

it

discourage escala-

the response consistent with maintaining a credible deterrent to further

CNAs? What

will

be the

effects,

property and infrastructure?

Can

military personnel, equipment,

In the case of a

degrading

intended or unintended, on
these effects be distinguished

civilians, their

from

effects

on

and infrastructure?

CNA with only network effects, the consequences, although

a particular

computer network, may not place the force
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imminent
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danger or be evidence of an impending

be to

shift to

The

appropriate response might

an alternate network, use computer countermeasures to expel the

intruder, sanitize the system,

would be analogous
fire

attack.

and Military Operations

and report

to higher authority. This situation

to tolerating an aircraft tracking radar, but not a locked

control radar. Higher authority, with the requisite technical expertise and

network connections, could

trace the intrusion, identify the perpetrator,

take appropriate action, such as a complaint to the relay State, if the
pears to be State-sponsored. Or, if the intrusion

information covertly.

missile defense
tack, the

If,

network and

is

and

CNA ap-

an intelligence probe, higher

game and "grab

authority might choose to play the
false

on

however, the network

the hacker," feeding

him

effects disable the air

and

are judged as the overriding evidence of armed at-

immediate response might be to launch

—

a

conventional attack against

headquarters, and the like. Such a

on runways,
response would be

timely and might discourage an adversary from attacking or,

at least, indicate that

the most threatening military targets
missile sites,

command

tanks and troops, aircraft

there will be a high cost to proceeding. This

would not

rule out a follow-up

computer network response against, for example, the adversary's military command and control network, executed at the appropriate level by trained network
experts. In either situation of a CNA with network effects only, the proportionality set-point to trigger a

may be ambiguous and
effective, or

In a

response in kind should be high since the intrusion

non-threatening or the response would not be timely,

within the capability of the operational

crisis situation,

an adversary

may choose

commander

to initiate a

to execute.

CNA that has both

network and conventional effects, such as manipulating the air traffic control
network of an aircraft carrier that causes collisions or near misses of aircraft in the
approach and landing pattern. This attack would be
carrier or

solve

its

air

wing.

The

overall effect

some of the ambiguity

cannot be tolerated.

a stern

in identifying the source.

warning

CNA

than attacking the

and re-

to raise the level of hostility

If overall intelligence plus the

sumptively attribute the

might be

is

less risky

Obviously the situation

conventional

effects

can pre-

to a particular adversary, the initial response

to cease the hazardous

computer operations,

in addi-

mode, attempting to expel the perpetradespite the warning and opportunity to cease,

tion to shifting to an alternate control
tor,

and

sanitizing the system.

If,

the disruption continues, the military

commander might respond with

ventional, precision attack against the

most appropriate military

would

Such

reinforce the warning with force.

targets

might be

production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons,
to the response

con-

target that

a facility for the
ballistic

missile

new warship about to be launched. This
when the USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS

launchers that are not yet mobile, or a

would be analogous

a
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mine which was laid arbitrarily to hazard both warships and merThat response was neither in kind nor executed immediately. If the

hit the Iranian

chant ships.

computer specialists

also

versary's vital military

have the capability to intrude and disrupt one of the ad-

computer networks,

this

would also be an appropriate and

timely response. All of these responses are intended to control the

crisis,

discour-

damage and incidental injury to civilians.
In the case of a physical attack against a computer network asset itself, such as
destroying a satellite (communications, navigation, imagery) or damaging a
age escalation, and avoid collateral

command and control

(C2) node, the conventional effects are tangible and seri-

The source and location can probably be pinpointed. Destruction of a satellite without other evidence of hostile intent would not warrant an immediate
physical or CNA response. But such an extraordinary act would have implications and effects world-wide, and would merit immediate attention at the highous.

est levels

of government,

as

well

as

the United Nations Security Council. If the

damage to the C2 facility is the prelude to armed attack, a robust and direct conventional response to blunt the attack would probably be the most effective. All military targets that are part of or supporting the
attack would be fair game. The objective would be to protect the force, control
the threat, discourage escalation, and, at the same time, avoid collateral damage
and incidental injury to civilians. A parallel CNA response to degrade, manipulate, or destroy information resident in the adversary's C2 computer networks
might effectively complement the conventional response. This response might
target networks that support the armed attack, taking care to avoid unintended
network effects that injure or kill civilians or damage their property. Here, the
problem is sorting out the network effects that may be inextricably linked in the
destruction of the satellite or

military

and

There

civilian infrastructure.

are

numerous examples of network and/or conventional conse-

quences and responses to
lated.

The most

CNA that can be analyzed in the categories postu-

appropriate and proportional response will depend

consideration of the

ever

a

facts,

on

a careful

context, and intelligence in each particular case, what-

method of determination

is

pursued.

Mission Accomplishment (Jus in Bello)

A military force involved in a crisis or action in self-defense that develops into
a

low

intensity conflict or

operations, that

is,

prolonged war could be authorized to conduct

attack the information resident in computers

CNA

and computer

networks, or attack the computers and their networks directly. In applying force
to accomplish a mission, the

SROE provides that US forces will be governed by
155

Computer Networks,

Proportionality,

and Military Operations

the law of armed conflict 30 and rules of engagement. Also, as

mentioned previously, the elements of mission accomplishment are necessity and proportionality. Hostile acts and intent are presumed. Necessity means that attacks must be
limited to military objectives, 31 and that force has to be constrained to that required to accomplish the mission. 32 Proportionality in mission accomplishment,

however, unlike self-defense,

is

not

comparison and symmetry between the

a

used. 33

The objective is to defeat the enemy
as rapidly as possible. Disproportionate force may be, and often is, required. But
in applying counterforce, the law of armed conflict requires that a military commander observe the principle of distinction between combatants and noncomquantum of force and counterforce

batants, 34 precautions in attack, 35

and the law of targeting. 36 Although

unlawful to cause incidental injury to

civilians,

it is

not

or collateral damage to civilian

damage must not be excessive in the light of the
military advantage anticipated by the attack. 37 In applying this proportionality
balancing test, a military commander must take all reasonable precautions, based
on information available at the time, to keep civilian casualties and damage consistent with mission accomplishment. He must also consider alternative methods
objects, incidental or collateral

of attack to reduce

civilian casualties

scriptions, a military

and damage. In addition to jus

in bello

pro-

commander will be guided by supplemental measures in the

ROE that "define the limits or grants of authority for the use of force for mission
accomplishment.

The
ing

" 38

Proportionality

Working Group 39 also explored approaches

CNA offensive operations.

For example, the

for analyz-

CNA might be a network at-

network attack against a non-network target, or a
conventional (kinetic) attack against a network target. These categories, while
overlapping and arbitrary, are intended to assist in focusing on the effects and
tack against a

network target,

consequences of a

CNA.

sequences, a military

pose a

series

a

For each option evaluated in terms of effects and con-

commander, guided by the

of questions to be resolved: Will the

intelligence?

Does

CNA disrupt,

it assist

in getting inside the

control, or destroy the enemy's

gence collection and targeting? Will

dominance,

air

it

SROE

and

battle plan,

might

CNA capture important enemy
enemy's

OODA loop? Can the

computer networks

for intelli-

contribute to establishing information

and maritime superiority, and space control? Does the

CNA

commander with new options for favorably controlling the
battle? Will it influence the enemy to terminate military action

provide the military

rhythm of the

Does the

and

alter policy?

Is it

essential in protecting

the

CNA degrade an enemy's supporting infrastructure?
own

forces,

equipment, and

facilities?

Overall, does

CNA contribute to the partial or complete submission of the enemy with the

least

expenditure of

life,

time, and resources? In coalition warfare, does
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preserve unity of effort and consensus in waging war?
inviolability

of neutrals and their commerce?

Is

Is it

CNA consistent with United
if any? Does the CNA involve

the

Nations Security Council enforcement action,
cross-border intrusions?

CNA respect the

Does the

compatible with diplomatic and political

efforts to

achieve a cease-fire, suspension of hostilities, armistice agreement, peace treaty,

What are

or other termination of the war?

persons

(civilians;

chaplains;

wounded,

sick,

the effects of the

CNA on protected

and shipwrecked; medical personnel and

and prisoners of war)? What incidental injury

to civilians or collateral

CNA, based on the best means to accurately assess the primary and secondary effects of a CNA? Can the military effects be disdamage

is

anticipated

from the

tinguished from the civilian effects?
likely to

be excessive in the

light

the incidental injury or collateral

Is

damage

of the military advantage anticipated? Will

it

cause unnecessary suffering or be indiscriminate in nature? Are there alternative

means and methods of attack that will reduce
that considered likely

from the

civilian casualties

and damage from

CNA? Will a decision to withhold network attacks

against

network or non-network targets influence an enemy to

similar

network

to each

attacks,

and can

this restraint

be relied upon?

also refrain

Finally, pertinent

of the questions, does the network or non-network target by

purpose, or use

make an

and thus constitute

effective contribution to the

of the

a lawful military objective

In the category of a

network attack

against a

nature,

its

enemy's military action,

CNA.

network

to adversely affect the information resident in the

from

target, the intention

is

enemy's computer network.

Examples include introducing information or disinformation (not perfidious)
into the

computer network

to influence or mislead behavior, intruding

data device or technique to degrade the military
links in the integrated air defense

C2

with

network, disrupting

a

vital

(IAD) network, or manipulating the military

communication network to confuse the timing of a maneuver or attack. In these
and similar offensive computer operations, the ultimate consequences are neither intended nor anticipated to involve incidental injury or collateral damage.

Psychologically, the civilian population may, as intended, be influenced, but the
effects

would not be

physical.

gence network to capture
be

a necessary step in

quences

objectives.

IAD

information, or indications and warning,

CNA.

computer network

may prove

computer intrusion into the enemy's

intelli-

would

preparing the battlespace, and probably would not even

within the definition of a
tion in a

vital

A

to

In any event, a

that

is

tailored to

fall

network attack on the informa-

produce limited physical conse-

be an effective non-lethal tool of warfare against military

An alternative

conventional attack calculated to degrade the

C2 and

networks, for example, could result in civilian casualties and damage.
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most
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would probably not be considered

cases, these effects

network

In the case of a

damage or destroy

non-network

attack against a

include disrupting the military

air traffic

that

manages

suming an
erations

may prove

though

it

and implode, disabling the

elec-

primary and secondary

targets,

effects,

and

as-

CNA op-

method of prosecuting the war at less risk to
However, network attacks on the civilian infrastructure, even

forces.

to

be an

effective

supports the enemy's military effort, raises difficult issues.

from the

possible to distinguish the military

cable linkage

operating

control system to induce collisions or

For these and other military

vital military support.

to

and manipulating the computer network

facility,

ability to accurately assess the

own

one's

C2

CNA

is

computer network. Examples would

crashes, causing a military satellite to lose control

system in the enemy's

target, the intention

medium of a

military objectives through the

the information resident in the enemy's

trical

exces-

of the military advantage anticipated.

sive in the light

on

Proportionality,

between the two. Even

civilian effects

if that

is

may

It

not be

because of the inextri-

possible, the

CNA

may

set off a

chain of effects that cascades beyond the military and into civilian institutions. This

could

raise questions

CNA was indiscriminate and not directed at a
Furthermore, a cascading CNA might result in disastrous

of whether the

valid military objective.

consequences on

essential services for the civilian

population

(electrical

power,

power operations). Even assuming, for example, a CNA against an electrical power grid that supports the military effort, and
is therefore a valid military objective, there must be no indiscriminate cascading

water distribution,

effects,

damage must not be

The

their use in

An
siles,

support, nuclear

and under the proportionality and balancing

collateral

pated.

life

point

is

excessive in

CNAs

not to rule out

view of the uncertainty

view of the

mander must

artillery shells

is

in predicting effects.

and computer networks with mis-

the traditional

means of attack.

computer network

A military comand

facilities are

and that incidental injury and collateral damage

are kept to a

insure that the various

valid military targets

military advantage antici-

in this category, but to urge caution in

attack against an enemy's computers

bombs, or

any incidental injury and

test,

sites

minimum. Damage or destruction of C2 war rooms and command posts, for example, would contribute significantly to defeating the enemy. Air defense sites,
microwave stations,

data relay

electronically jammed

from

facilities,

aircraft,

and communication

ground

stations,

destruction of a dual-use military and civilian
for high-tech military forces that are
satellites for

frain

satellite

becoming

satellites

can also be

and warships. Damage or

would

raise serious issues

extraordinarily dependent

on

both military and commercial purposes. Should the commander re-

from attacking the

straint? Is the

dual-use

satellite in

the

hope

satellite a valid military
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by the military is relatively minor? Disruption, damage, or destruction of computer network facilities that provide essential civilian services, as well as support
the military effort, such as electrical

power

grids,

may be

unavoidable in prose-

cuting the war. But difficult proportionality judgments must be

made even

though there may not be the unpredictable cascading effects produced by a
CNA. An assessment must be made that the civilian injury and damage will not
be excessive in the

light

of the military advantage anticipated. Temporarily

dis-

power grids by attacking with carbon chaff, for example, may reduce
and avoid more serious consequences, as well as influencing behavior.

abling the
casualties

Attacking computers and computer networks serving primarily the civilian infrastructure,

such

as

banking systems, stock exchanges, water management, and

research centers,

would be

would probably

result in excessive civilian injury

difficult to justify in

terms of a military advantage and

Just as in the jus ad bellum situation, there are
tential

and damage.

many examples of actual

or po-

CNA offensive operations. While mission accomplishment proportion-

ality takes

on

a different

meaning from

that in self-defense, the balancing test

military advantage versus excessive incidental injury

is

damage must
whatever method of

collateral

CNA,

consider both the actual and cascading effects of a
analysis

and

of

used.

Observations

CNA operations as part of information warfare
are in their infancy,

engagement. The

or network-centric warfare

with far-reaching implications for law, policy, and rules of

ability to predict

CNA

and assess the damage from executing a

from assured.
CNAs may well prove to be invaluable in defeating the enemy and countering
an attack, provided that trained and experienced computer network experts can
accurately "hit" the target, control the effects, and avoid unintended cascading

in offense or defense, similar to a precision strike

consequences. This assumes that
priate level. All this adds to the

must be conducted

conventional weapons.

is

far

CNA operations are authorized at the appro-

complexity of proportionality judgments.

ever, the basic rules in jus ad bellum

targeting

weapon,

for a

andjws

in hello still apply.

CNA just as

it is

An

analysis

conducted for

Howof the

attacks using

On the defense side, the old adage of the best defense

is

a

good offense may be turned on its head in the case of CNA operations. There is
no question that a high-tech military force with significant network vulnerabilities

must have

a robust, passive

protection against

CNA.

This requires increased

awareness, training, technical support, hardware and software improvements,
greater redundancy,

and an

ability to

degrade gracefully in computer network
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equipment and systems.

It

Proportionality,

also

means

"work-around" network

train to

and Military Operations

that military

commanders must plan and

attacks that disrupt, deny, or destroy critical

information resident in their computers and computer networks. This
ularly important since

partic-

rogue and terrorist groups without asymmetrical vulner-

can wage network war on the cheap with

abilities

is

little

regard for the

risk.
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Some Thoughts on Computer Network
Attack and the International Law of
Armed Conflict

Louise Doswald-Beck*

Introduction

I

t

seems one has to accept

J-L improvement of man's

how

to

as

life

weaponize or destroy

inevitable that

has

it,

when something

been invented, thoughts

or, in the case

useful for the

will either turn to

of computer network technol-

ogy, both.

The

task

of the international lawyer in the face of a

military activity

is

to establish

how

new weapon or intended

existing law applies

and with what

effect.

Would existing law prohibit the weapon or activity or restrict it in any particular
way? Would it be appropriate, for one or more policy reasons, to impose prohion the conthe new weapon or method might be an improvement from both a

bitions or restrictions that
trary, that

do not already apply? Might it be the

case,

policy and humanitarian point of view?

The purpose of this short chapter is to explore certain aspects of how computer network attack (CNA) could be affected by international humanitarian
law (IHL), including the law of neutrality, based on the knowledge generally
available so far

on

the military possibilities presented

by computer networks.

It

Computer Network Attack and

may be

the International

Applicability of the International

Law

of

CNA

Armed

Conflict

regard

would

Conflict (International

1

when used in

arise if the first,

or only, "hostile" acts

or delivery system has been so far

real difficulty in this

possible.

IHL just as any new
an armed conflict. The

perfectly reasonable to assume that

weapon

would be

Armed

Humanitarian Law)

only

of

that these possibilities are overstated, but the chapter will base itself on

the premise that a variety of the indicated effects

It is

Law

subject to

is

were conducted by these means. Would this amount to an armed conflict within
the meaning of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and other IHL treaties? This
question is close to, but not necessarily identical with, whether the behavior
amounts to an armed attack within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the
Charter. The ICRC Commentary to the 1949 Geneva Conventions indicates that in

UN

the case of a cross-border operation, the

first

shot suffices to create an interna-

conflict, 2

which can therefore be of very short duration. 3 There
are, of course, other views which would require a threshold of intensity or time, 4
but this approach would lead to the need for evaluations that would create inevitable uncertainties and ultimately to the same problems faced when establishing
whether "war" existed without a formal declaration; this issue led to the abandonment for the need for a "war" for the "law of war" to apply. The problem is
still with us, however, in non-international armed conflicts where there remain
many cases of uncertainty (or denial) as to whether the threshold and nature of
violence has reached that of an armed conflict, rather than "just" internal viotional

armed

lence requiring "police" operations. 5 If the
in a non-international situation

doubt would be even

first

or only "hostilities" that occur

were computer network

attacks, the

degree of

greater.

The problem is, of course,

that so far hostilities

launch projectiles, or other types of energy

have involved weapons which

transfer, that lead to visible physical

damage. In the case of IHL, the motivation for the application of the law

is

to

would militate in favor
of an expansive interpretation of when IHL begins to apply. The likelihood of
this threshold being linked with the perception that an armed attack within the
meaning of Article 2(4) has occurred in the case of a cross-border CNA is, of

limit the

damage and provide

care for the casualties. This

course, high, given the historical
hello

.

development of the jus ad helium and the jus

This would not be problematic

if it

mencement of hostilities through CNA,
hibition, or because the Security
threat to the peace

and

dealt

had

a restraining effect

it

on the com-

either because of the Article 2(4) pro-

in a

164

way

that

CNA

amounted to a
avoided more damage.

Council decided the

with

in
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However, the danger lies in the possibility of the CNA being perceived as an
armed attack justifying measures of self-defence, for such a characterization
might escalate the situation further than would otherwise have been the case.
Whether or not these linkages occur, there is an argument to be made in favor of
the implementation of IHL when CNA is undertaken by official sources and is
intended to, or does, result in physical damage to persons, or damage to objects
that goes beyond the bit of computer program or data attacked. CNA alone in
non-international contexts is even more problematic
it is far more likely to be
seen solely as criminal behavior, although the potential for damage could be
enormous and the groups undertaking this could be at least as well organized as
"armed" groups. Once "normal" weapons are used, there is no problem at all.
CNA will be an attack (in the sense of the jus in hello) as any other. Whether
CNA alone will ever come to be seen as amounting to an armed conflict for the

—

purposes of IHL implementation will probably be determined through practice,
rather than a formal decision

by the

though the latter should not be ruled out.
gree of damage that
treated in the
conflict will

How the

one day
Existing

It

will probably also

CNA causes (the more

same way

start

Law

an armed

as

sounding

of

Armed

community in

international

it

creates, the

conflict).
as

depend on the de-

more

likely

it

will

be

Perhaps even the term "armed"

outdated

Conflict

the abstract, al-

as "jus in bellol"

Would

Affect the

Use of Computer

Network Attack

As indicated
to the use

earlier,

one can

safely assert that the

and

all

the rules that flow

from

it,

the use of

of war and the prohibition of perfidy, and whether the rules relating to

combatant
to the

The

applies

of CNA. Three areas of this law seem, however, particularly perti-

nent: the principle of distinction
ruses

whole body of IHL

status

could be affected. In addition, some thought needs to be given

law of neutrality during armed

conflict.

Principle of Distinction

Whereas in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries methods of warfare
meant that civilians were only directly affected by sieges and otherwise only indirectly by the general economic advantages or misfortunes caused by war, the
advent of air and missile warfare in the 20th century brought the need for special
protection for civilians against attack to the fore.

on an importance, and led to detailed treaty and customary law,
goes well beyond the few rules articulated in the 1899 and 1907 Hague

therefore taken
that

The principle of distinction has
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the International

Conventions. Although heartily derided by the
strove to

people

ban the dropping of bombs from the

who

Law

of

"realists,"
air

6

Armed

Conflict

those persons

were obviously

realized the potential for massive destruction that this

who

far-seeing

new method

Even restrictions on air warfare were slow to come about, only being
in the form of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions,

represented.
accepted,

once the potential military utility of air warfare had been thoroughly explored. 7

Although the form and probable

of warfare

effect

is

quite different, the same

pattern

may be showing itself in relation to CNA. Here is a new tool that in civil-

ian

opens up access to the world through rapidity and ease of communication

life

in a

way that has been heretofore

velopment

that could lead to

unseen. Moreover,

it

allows technological de-

kinds to extraordinary steps in

all

human develop-

One suggestion that has been made is to consider banning at least some
forms of CNA; 8 however, it has been rejected, probably because of the desire to
further explore CNA's military potential. As always, there are those who argue
that "progress" cannot be stopped, that new means and methods of warfare are
ment.

anything. Others prefer to see

no point in trying to stop or regulate
which new methods are useful in that they are

more

effective,

inevitable,

and that therefore there

accurate, militarily

are not

more

more

is

really

do not cause unnecessary damage, and

trouble than they are worth. Needless to say,

the principle of distinction in particular, are based

hoped

that,

unlike

bombardment from

CNA before launching into

the

air,

on

careful

relevance for

CNA:

(i)

(iii)

and
It is

thought will be given to

experimentation.
that will

be of particu-

the evaluation that objects considered for attack are

indeed "military objectives" within the meaning of IHL;
indiscriminate attacks;

in general,

the latter premise.

The principle of distinction involves a number of rules
lar

IHL

the need to minimize collateral

(ii)

the prohibition of

damage and to

abstain

damage is likely to be disproportionate to the value of the military objective to be attacked; and (iv) the need to take the necessary precautions
to ensure that the above three rules are respected. From what is known at presfrom attacks

if such

ent, there are potential

Only Military

problems

Objectives

as

regards

all

of these rules in relation to

CNA.

May Be Attacked

The definition of military objective contained in Additional Protocol I 9 is not
only that accepted by the 155 States party to the treaty, but was also referred to

as

being the appropriate one to use by the representatives of several major
non-party States

at

the recent diplomatic conference that adopted the Second

Protocol to the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property

of 1954. 10 In order for something to be
cumulative conditions:

it

a military objective,

must make an
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it

must meet two

effective contribution to the military
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action of the adversary and, in the circumstances ruling at the time,

must

offer a definite military advantage to the attacker.

It is

attack

its

clear that this defini-

view to achieving a particular
military result. It also presupposes a knowledge of what the adversary is using,
and how it is being used, for its military action. The terminology was chosen
carefully to prohibit certain behaviors of the Second World War, specifically, it
addressed the attack of persons and objects on the basis that they are
"quasi-combatants" or in one way or another help the "war effort." Such reasoning leads sooner or later to no restraints, for anything can be justified this way.
Indeed, it rapidly led to the United Kingdom deciding that "civilian morale"
was to be a target 11 and, as a result, to the wholesale destruction of cities.
The specification that the object must effectively help the "military action" of
the adversary means that the link to the military operations must be a close and
tion does presuppose a plan to be followed with a

The

obvious one.

reference to the "circumstances ruling at the time" requires

that the military advantage to the attacker

be equally

clear

and obvious in the

context of the attacker's military plan to achieve the particular military aim.

During the negotiation of the Additional Protocols,

this

was considered

to rep-

economy of force and military professionalism, thereby leading to
the military result needed while moving away from generally attacking anything
in the hope that in due course the adversary would surrender. The decision not
resent both

to adopt a

list

of "military objectives" was part of the same reasoning.

Any

list

could either exclude something that in the circumstances could be of great importance in achieving the particular military mission, or alternatively include
things of little or

no importance

son that any

"list" in a

of what have

at

past conflicts

—they

It is

to

in the particular circumstances.

It is

for this rea-

textbook or manual can never offer more than examples

one point or another been considered to be military objectives in
will not necessarily

be so in any particular future one.

be hoped that planning and precision will not be

lost.

Computer net-

works can easily be seen as "communications." Many manuals refer to "means of
communication" as typical military objectives a simple reference to existing

—

lists

could lead to the appalling result that any computer network used by the ad-

versary State and

its

citizens

could be attacked. Quite apart from the

fact that this

would almost certainly hit protected objects, and in addition amount to an indiscriminate attack, it would not result from the necessary process of evaluation described above. In order to amount to a military objective, either the piece of
network being affected or the object that the network is controlling must meet
the two conditions.
There could also be the temptation to try to totally remove the technological
framework which the whole of society bases itself on (although this may well be
167

.

Computer Network Attack and

technically impossible through

Law

the International

CNA), on

likely to

is

be

all

could

also

be asserted that

sending bombs.

It is

this

stress

is

quite different

An

(which was the ba-

What would happen to the princi-

approach based on technological siege warfare would in

make it disappear,

effect

from that underly-

choices of target for the specific desired military

for the rules in the Protocols) will change?

ple of distinction?

surely follow.

a

goals. Is there a possibility that sophisticated military practice
sis

would make

number of civilian networks.
method would be more "humanitarian" than

clear that this reasoning

ing the Protocols, which

would

Conflict

the greater because military networks will

probably be better protected from hacking than
It

Armed

the reasoning that this

that society's life so generally unpleasant that surrender

The temptation

of

or at least radically change

its

characteristics. It

could re-

quire that specially protected objects, e.g., hospitals, organize themselves so that

they are not within the normal computer network

(if this

were

practicable) in

would represent a return to the reasoning
behind the rules of Geneva Convention IV of 1949 12 and the Hague Convention of 1954, 13 which rely on the concept of the creation of various safe areas because they assumed that the practices of World War II would prove inevitable.
Such reasoning would amount to abandoning the approach of the Protocols and
order to be protected. In

present customary law,
safe

from being

effect, this

i.e.,

that

all

objects that are not military objectives are

deliberately targeted.

Careful thought should be given before going down the road of technological
siege warfare.

tomary and

Quite apart from the

treaty law, the

fact that

it

presumptions that

would be contrary to present cussuch a practice would be based on

two totally separate reasons. First, society is increasingly
becoming so dependent on modern technology that computer systems failure
for a lengthy period would not be just "unpleasant"
it could easily lead to mass
are dubious for at least

—

disease, starvation

and other catastrophes 14

could not be accomplished by

(it is

CNA alone, but

dertaken in conjunction with other methods).
the recent example,
time.

it

is

may well be possible when un-

On

the other hand, and despite

would not necessarily lead to surrender in a short period of

Both reasons lead

the degree that this

it

probable that such a scenario

to the conclusion that surgical technological strikes, to

technically possible,

would make more

sense.

The Prohibition of Indiscriminate Attacks
Additional Protocol
tack
tive

I

defines indiscriminate attacks in Article 5 1 (4)

]

^

An

at-

when it either is not carefully aimed at each military objec(through carelessness or use of inappropriate weapons) or when its effects on
is

indiscriminate

a military objective are

uncontrollable and unpredictable (an obvious and

168
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uncontroversial example

would be

the use of a bacteriological

weapon against a

group of soldiers)

From what has been written so

far

on CNA,

this

appears to be potentially the

most serious problem, i.e., aiming accurately at what the intended target is and,
even if one manages to strike it with precision, not at the same time creating a
host of unforeseen and unforeseeable effects. 16

The Problem of Collateral Damage
The need to avoid, or at least minimize, damage
of Protocol

reflected in Article 57(2) (a) (ii)

jects

is

who

plan or decide

upon an

attack shall

.

.

take

.

I,

to civilians

which

all

and

civilian

ob-

indicates that "those

feasible precautions in the

choice of means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
to

minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to

vilian objects."

and damage to

civilians

ci-

An attack only becomes in itself illegal, however, if it violates the

rule of proportionality, a long-standing rule

used in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol
cause incidental loss of civilian

or a combination thereof,

life,

I is

of customary law. The wording

"an attack which

injury to civilians,

which would be

may be

damage to

expected to

civilian objects,

excessive in relation to the concrete

and direct military advantage anticipated."

The

evaluation

as to

whether likely

ate has an inherent difficulty in that

civilian

one

is

damage would be disproportioncomparing two different things.

Whereas the need to avoid or at least minimize collateral injury is a straightforward rule relating to the choice of means or methods that should be preferred, an
evaluation

as to

possible illegality

seems inevitable, but

some

as

is

fraught with difficulty.

an anticipated result could be

illegal,

objective factors to follow. State practice in this regard

examples have been given on
they have usually been

when

when

there ought to be

is

—just a few

scant

—and

such attacks have been desisted from

either the possible target

military in nature but in the circumstances unusable or
as a

A certain subjectivity

military objective could not be verified. 17

To

was something

where the

that

was

object's value

complicate matters, certain

statements of understanding indicate that the attack

is

to

be considered

as a

whole when making the evaluation. However, these statements should not be
interpreted as meaning proportionality of the civilian damage caused during the
entire campaign compared with military advantages obtained during a specific
attack. Such an interpretation is impossible because the only evaluation that
could be possible would be at the end of the conflict, whereas the rule requires
the evaluation to be done before the attack concerned. Proportionality evalua18

tions pursuant to the jus in hello should also not
in self-defence,

which is the jus ad bellum rule
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be confused with proportionality

that requires the military action as a
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whole

to

be limited to what

Rather, based on a

is

the International

as referring to

Conflict

the fact that the military value of attacking

viously be assessed taking into account

There could

Armed

the statements of understanding can only

an object (which has to be weighed against the likely

a particular military

of

necessary to restore one's territorial integrity. 19

number of sources,

be logically interpreted

Law

operation that

its

may

civilian casualties) will

ob-

role in the broader strategic purpose of
consist

of various individual actions. 20

be, of course, a temptation to consider that

whatever

collateral

damage was caused by CNA, it would surely be proportional to the military advantage gained. This would be an abuse of the rule, as it requires a careful advance
evaluation of the likely effects on the civilians. If the likely effects are quite unclear

and unforeseeable (which appears to be the technical situation

at present),

would be an indiscriminate one and therefore illegal as such
of proportionality would not even be relevant. 21

the attack

—

the rule

Precautions in Attack

obvious that in order to respect the rules relating to the principle of

It is

tions are therefore

amount of thought and planning is necessary. Such precaunothing more than the expression of a bona fide implementa-

tion of the law. 22

The advance

distinction, a certain

importance, but

it

evaluations indicated above are of particular

ought to be possible to

also

call

off an attack once

it

becomes

what was thought to be a military objective is not one after all or ceases
to be one, or if it becomes clear that the consequent collateral damage would be
excessive. 23 This would be particularly relevant in cases of CNA methods that
would not have an immediate effect on the target.
clear that

The

other aspect of great importance, in order to evaluate military objective

or incidental damage,

that

is

tage of computer operations
security of a

of sufficient intelligence information. The advanis

that they can

computer terminal

puter network exploitation

far

be conducted from the comparative

from the

(CNE) could

actual military operations.

help gain

that the data

though

a

it is

is

not

itself deliberate

information on

on reachable netmisinformation. However, al-

an adversary's situation, provided that such data

works and

maximum

Com-

is

available

valuable tool for gaining intelligence and does not pose the risks of

physical presence,

CNE

cannot

totally replace intelligence gathering

means, especially the most reliable one, direct observation. 24

with other intelligence sources could well provide for

by other

CNE

combined
the possibility of good

precautions being taken in attack.

On

the other hand,

CNA

conducted from

problems in relation to precautions in

a

distance poses

two

attack. First, if one suspects that

object of such an attack, taking out the attacker
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is

the

prove to be very
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difficult

The

because of the immense difficulty of being sure where the attack originated.

likelihood, therefore, of attacking

back in quite the wrong place

is

high.

Second, lack of physical presence near the object to be affected means that the
likelihood of making mistakes
military objective

is

as to

whether something really is at that moment a

high. Protocol

I

speaks in terms of the attacker doing "ev-

erything feasible" to verify that the target
sible" clearly indicates that perfection

is

is

a military objective.

not expected.

It is

a

The word "fea-

matter of common

commanders take into account the
need to reduce exposure of their own armed forces (an eliminated army cannot
win an armed conflict). However, it is only a recent practice that so much care is
given to avoiding any military casualties on one's own side, and one can see how
tempting CNA would be in such an endeavor. The law requiring precautions in
attack cannot be simply eliminated if such precautions involve some physical risk
to the attacker. Although not articulated anywhere as such, when such a practice
means that there are many more civilian casualties than military, the concept of
the principle of distinction is badly battered, perhaps even turned on its head.
Once again, apart from amounting to a violation of existing law, such inaccuracy
sense and

good

past military practice that

gives rise to concern as to the effectiveness of the intended military operation.

Ruses of War and Perfidy

Computer

CNE

is

data provides

new

avenues for practicing ruses of war.

more likely it is that misinformation will be

undertaken, the

planted to confuse the adversary. Such misinformation about one's

The more

deliberately

own affairs is

perfectly lawful, for

it is

analogous in principle to any other vehicle for misinfor-

mation. Moreover,

it is

clear

from

traditional sources that ruses

be limited to creating misinformation about

oneself. 25

of war need not

However,

it

must

also

be

computer generated attacks cannot be undertaken whilst giving the impression that they come from the adversary's own side. This would be the equivalent to attacking while wearing the enemy's uniform, which is clearly illegal. 26
As with all ruses of war, care must be taken that they do not cross the line into
true that

perfidy. Therefore, misinformation implicating protected persons or objects

would be unlawful,

as

would

CNE amounting to a breach of good faith, such as

pretending to surrender or to create a truce. 27

Combatants and
It is

sonnel.

most likely

CNA
that

CNA and CNE would be carried out by specialized per-

What would be

the legal situation of such persons?
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attacked by any means and in any place?

probably no reason

There

is

tional

armed

If

What would be

of

Armed

Conflict

their status if captured?

why the rules should be any different than in tradi-

conflict.

incorporated into the armed forces, such personnel would have

rights
like

Law

and

all

the

of combatants. Therefore, they certainly could be attacked

liabilities

any other combatant and should endeavor to be in uniform if captured. The

narrow exception

would allow
such persons,

in Article 44(3)

of Protocol

(for those party to

I

it),

which

POW status if captured without uniform, may well not apply to
as this

provision

batants in occupied territory,

is

and only then

in certain situations. 28

tured in the adversary's territory without uniform carrying out

from outside the

qualify as spies. If conducted

com-

generally interpreted as applying only to

territory,

Persons cap-

CNE would also

however, the situation

should be no different from someone gathering data from

a

spy

satellite.

Technicians that act for the military, but are not part of it, pose more of a

problem. The persons

listed in Article 4(4)

of war status

are entitled to prisoner

more analogous

to

sons

who

have no

actually undertake

considered civilians

taking a "direct part in hostilities." 30

not consistent

as to

ing intelligence by

this

hostilities.

less clear,

and

However, there

means should be

gathering by other means.

occur if the

is

Whether
this

whether intelligence collection

of taking a "direct" part in

The

who would

is

is

those undertaking

because State prac-

falls

no reason why gather-

treated any differently

possibility

into the category

of being treated

from

intelligence

spy

would only

as a

CNE were carried out clandestinely in the territory of the adversary.

The Hague Regulations of
possibility that civilians

46 of Protocol
treaties

could well be, therefore, that per-

CNA would be

CNE are in exactly the same situation
is

listed are

POW status if captured. They would also be subject to attack, as they

would be
tice

of 1949 29

keep the machines in order, and

that

attacks. It

III

but the type of persons

if captured,

computer technicians

not ones that actually undertake the

of Geneva Convention

I

1907, in particular Article 21, do not exclude the

could be spies for the purposes of IHL, although Article

only refers to members of the armed forces. However, both

conceptually indicate the need to be caught in the act in the territory

controlled by the adversary, although this
ever, if the civilian undertaking

is

not the exact wording used. 31

CNA or CNE

ing him, he could be simply treated

as

is

not "claimed" by the army us-

an individual breaking national law and

therefore be subject to criminal law should he be captured

country; the rule that he cannot be treated

army would not apply and there

is

How-

as a
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spy once he returns to his

no reason why

ered either.

on return

own

POW status would be consid-
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The

Effect

on Neutral

Although there

are a

States

number of discussions on whether there

is

a

formal dif-

ference between "non-belligerent" and "neutral" States, and a resulting differ-

ence of legal regime, 32

this

author believes that there

is

insufficient basis in State

practice to support such an assertion. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter,
all

States

not party to a conflict will be treated

as

"neutral."

As many networks link up and/ or are owned by different countries or their
private citizens, and given that it is the general view that the effect of any CNA
might not be limited to the intended target, the law relating to neutral States is of
particular significance.

yond those of other
gimes that

differ

The law of neutrality in cyberspace poses

aspects

difficulties,

of IHL, because neutrality law has led to

be-

legal re-

depending on the region of operations. Thus, there are

significant differences

vided into different

between the law applicable to land, sea (which is subdimaritime areas), and outer space operations. It is not

what the regime should be in relation to cyberspace. To suggest that
should vary depending on whether the data affected are supposed to be at any

self-evident
it

particular

moment

in a country's territory, passing via a satellite, or being

con-

ducted through an underwater cable would create a factual and legal nightmare.

One could,

of course, simply wait to see what happens and deduce customary

law based on practice, rather like what initially happened in relation to the law of
outer space, which began to take shape
into orbit.

through

However,

a series

this

new

when the first satellites were actually put

area of activity did not escape formal regulation

of international instruments that began to be adopted after only a

UN

few years, initially in the form of
resolutions and later a number of treaties
which confirmed the practice that outer space and other planets could not be
acquired by any nation nor be used to base certain weapons. 33 Therefore, the
likelihood of

CNA being left entirely to practice without more formal interna-

somewhat slim.
kind of regime that would be

tional legal regulation
sider the

inventive, see

is

whether

It

would make sense

at this stage to

con-

appropriate, and, rather than be totally

law of neutrality could provide

basic principles of the

some answers.

The

basic premise of the

through

its

law of neutrality

is

that a neutral State should not,

outcome of armed conflict between
expects not to be drawn into the conflict. An

actions, deliberately affect the

belligerents. In return, the neutral

excellent description of the concept of neutrality and the basic rules that flow

from it is contained in Volume
sages in this description
all

States that are

II

of Oppenheim's

International

Law. Certain pas-

remain of fundamental importance. After indicating that

not drawn into the war are presumed neutral,
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provides

that:
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Since neutrality

an attitude of impartiality,

is

succour to one of the belligerents
injuries to the

one

as

States.

of

Armed

Conflict

excludes such assistance and

it

detrimental to the other, and, further, such

as is

benefit the other.

measures from neutral

Law

the International

But

requires,

it

on

the other hand, active

For neutrals must prevent belligerents from making

use of their neutral territories, and of their resources, for military and naval

purposes during the war.

becoming involved

.

.

.

Further, neutrals must,

by

all

means

falling short

of

in hostilities or of abandoning their attitude of impartiality,

prevent each belligerent from interfering with their legitimate intercourse with
the other belligerent through

commerce and

cannot be expected passively to suffer
violation

by

his

enemy of a

damage

vital

which, while

rule,

the like, because a belligerent

it

resulting to himself from the

operates directly in favour of

neutrals, indirectly operates in his favour as well.

The

required attitude of impartiality

belligerent,

is

not incompatible with sympathy with one

and disapproval of the other,

expression in actions violating impartiality.
part of neutrals

even

if these

and

their subjects

.

.

.

long

as
.

.

.

as

these feelings

Moreover,

acts

can never be construed

comforts are provided for the

wounded and

do not find

of humanity on the
as acts

of partiality,

the prisoners of one

belligerent only. 34

The same thought

is

put across even more succinctly by Professor Leslie

Green:

So long

as

the activities of these non-participants do not interfere with the

legitimate activities of the belligerents or benefit
neutrals are entitled to have their territory

because of

one

at

the expense of the other,

and doings respected and unaffected

the conflict. 35

These passages indicate the importance of distinguishing between, on the one
hand, the right of the neutral State to carry on

its life,

including

commerce with

on the other hand, the prohibited behavior of
actively favoring the outcome of the war through State acts. This is also the reasoning, cited in Oppenheim, behind some of the more detailed rules, including
those that distinguish between State acts and the acts of a State's citizens:

belligerents, as normal, from,

International

Law

neutral States are

is

primarily a law between States. ... In the

bound by

first

instance,

certain duties of abstention, e.g., in respect of supply

of loans and munitions to belligerents, which they are not bound to exact from
their nationals. Secondly, neutral States are
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their territory
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from becoming a theatre of war as the

result

of passage of foreign troops or aircraft

or of prolonged stay of belligerent men-of-war in their territorial waters. Thirdly,

they are

bound to

control the activities of their nationals insofar

to transform neutral territory into a basis

as

these

may tend

of war operations or preparations. At the

same time, International Law renders unlawful certain

of nationals of

activities

neutral States, like carriage of contraband or breach of blockade, without,

however, imposing upon these

These

are

and State

changed

acts.

they are directed. 36

whom

recognizes the rather thin line between individual acti-

activity in regulated

Although

exists.

duty to prevent or to penalise such

punished by the belligerent against

Oppenheim then
vity

States the

economies, but indicates that the rule

still

was published 48 years ago, practice has not really
especially in the light of the precision given on export

this text

significantly,

licences:

From

the case of actual governmental responsibility for the production of and

trade in certain articles there

must be distinguished

over exports by the system of licensing and the like.
permits export which

not make

.

.

.

could prevent by means of withholding the licence does

discriminates

it

of governmental control

The fact that the Government

a party to the transaction. Its responsibility

it

thus acting

it

that

between the opposing

is

engaged only

belligerents.

.

Apart from certain restrictions necessitated by impartiality,

between

belligerents

prevailing between
particularly to the

The same point

is

and neutrals takes place

as

when

.

.

all

intercourse

before, a condition of peace

them in spite of the war between the belligerents. This

working of treaties,

made by

in

to diplomatic intercourse,

and to

applies

trade.

Professor Green:

A neutral does not have to forbid the supply of war materielby resident individuals
or companies, nor
territory.

It

is

is

it

required to stop the passage of such goods across

its

under no obligation to forbid the use of privately-owned

communication equipment on behalf of belligerents, but
of its nationals to provide such

facilities this restriction

if it limits the

must operate

freedom

against

all

the

belligerents. 38

This passage
right to carry

stresses the fact that neutral States

on

life

as

have, for the most part, the

normal. Their specific duties are relatively narrow,

concentrating primarily on preventing their territory from being used
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of operations by one belligerent or the other.

must not

(that

facilities

granted to

all

rights.

39

ports,

its

of

Armed

Conflict

they choose to grant specific

concern military operations), they must be

directly

the belligerents equally,

bring prizes to one of

If

Law

it

e.g,. if the

one belligerent to

neutral allows

must allow the other belligerent the same

Therefore, any negative effect of the war on the neutral State

would be

indirect.

The

specific rights

of belligerents in relation to neutral merchantmen in

this

more in the character of an exception to the general rule than otherThey are based on the rather special combination of being acts that are car-

context are
wise.

ried out against individuals, in an area that

is

not national

territory,

from very long and peculiar practice

specific to naval warfare.

tween computer networks and these

special rules

carry
tent

on

of neutrality relating to mer-

seas

normal. State practice over the

life as

with

analogy be-

would be highly dubious; it would certainly not be
general principles which for the most part allow neutral citizens to

chantmen on the high
based on the

Any

and stem

this position.

Arguments

that

most

last

50 years

States are

is

essentially consis-

not really "neutral" be-

cause of the degree of relations that they and their citizens have with belligerents

appear to be founded on an exaggerated interpretation of the degree of restric-

supposed to have. 40 Therefore,

tions

and duties

State

would have to be very certain that a neutral State has indeed violated its du-

ties

that such States are

a belligerent

of neutrality before considering self-help measures involving force to stop

the violation. Such a violation of the duty of neutrality by the State cannot be
easily asserted. In addition, the prohibition

the

UN

Charter means that such

clearly lawful,

the

be not only

UN Charter.

Returning
are for the

ited degree

in favor

a belligerent could, if

breach of the law of neutrality, but also

part

now

to the question

owned by companies

not

a violation

of their continuing to be used

in existing neutrality

of computer networks, which

that are

more

or

less

subject to a lim-

law

is

as

The

normal, even

if some States are in

nearest equivalent to

reflected in Article 8 of Hague

computer net-

Convention

of 1907:

A neutral

of

of State regulation, basic principles of neutrality law would militate

an armed conflict with each other.

works

of force by

41

specifically

most

a

a use

of the use of force in Article 2(4) of

Power

is

not called upon to forbid or

restrict the use

on behalf of the

belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus

belonging to

it

or to companies or private individuals.
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In so far as
this

much of the computer network

provision

is

does indeed use telephone

both

directly applicable. In other cases,

basic principles of neutrality

its

implication and the

law would support application of the same

far as transmission via satellite

is

concerned, there

is

lines,

As

rule.

no reason why the

rule

should be any different; freedom of the use of outer space in international law

is

extensive and the 1967 Outer Space Treaty does not contain any specific provi-

would prevent

sions that

the use of neutrally

owned

give the right to a belligerent to interfere with such
tion in Article
that

satellites.

of outer space should be

that the use

III

satellites

by

belligerents or

Despite the indica-

pacific,

and in Article

I

should be in the interests of all countries, the prohibitions that are clearly

it

enunciated are limited to weapons of mass destruction, 42 and,

at

any

rate,

use

must be in conformity with international law. 43 Without taking a stand on
whether any type of military use of satellites is in conformity with the letter or
of the 1967

spirit

It

contains nothing that

it

would change

such, nor, to this author's knowledge, has

trality as

done

treaty,

so.

it

the law of neu-

been interpreted

as

having

This brings us back to general neutrality law.

would

appear, therefore, that a breach of neutrality

neutral State specifically allowed a

network

to

be built

would only occur if a
on its territory for the

purposes of supporting the armed conflict of one or more belligerents or if it specifically

allowed

network

a

the equivalent of allowing

be devoted to

to

its

territory to

clusion mirrors Article 3 of Hague

Belligerents are

(a)

.

.

this

purpose, for doing so

would be

become a base of operations. This con-

Convention V:

forbidden to

.

Erect on the territory of a neutral

apparatus for the purpose of

Power a wireless

communicating with

telegraphy station or other

belligerent forces

on land or

sea;

(b)

Use of any

territory

opened

installation

of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been

for the service of public messages.

Article 5 of the

same

these acts to occur

So

of this kind established by them before the war on the

on

treaty indicates that neutral States
its

territory.

much for the use of computer networks by neutrals and belligerents. What

would be

the case if a

CNA was directed at a target in a belligerent country but

affected a neutral country. If such an effect
it

must not allow any of

would be purely

accidental.

However,
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was unforeseeable and unlikely, then

if such

an effect was probable or even
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possible, then the situation
strict in its

would not be

the same.

Law

Armed

Conflict

The law of neutrality is very

V puts

it,

"the territory of neutral Powers

1

of the

inviola-

is

The fact that military operations must not adversely affect neutral territory

ble."

further reflected in the traditional rule that a blockade

the ports and coasts of

must not bar

access to

neutral States. 44

State practice also indicates that

belligerents to avoid any,

the

of

prohibition of any violation of neutral territory. As Article

1907 Hague Convention

is

the International

even

US

Second World War,

all

due precautions must be taken by

collateral,

damage

to neutral States.

bombers unintentionally damaged

town on April 1, 1944. Not only did Switzerland protest, but
ment also recognized that due precautions had not been

During

a Swiss

the

US

border

govern-

taken, formally

apologized for the incident, and promptly paid four million dollars in repara-

The US then

tions.

of

issued directives prohibiting

bombings within 50 miles

Switzerland. 45

Such

a clear

and

strict

approach means that

a

computer network

attack that

could well have an adverse effect on neutral territory would be a violation of international law.

Conclusions and Further Considerations on Possible Future Legal

Developments

It is

that

clear that

would

tions

CNA could only be undertaken to the degree and in a fashion
would probably be not only violaamount to war crimes, in which case

respect existing law. Certain uses

of the law of armed

the individuals involved

and international

levels

conflict,

but

would be

also

subject to

punishment both

at

the national

within the context of applicable international law.

It

should also not be forgotten that such breaches require payment of compensation, especially in the context

tion

is

a

of international armed conflicts, where compensa-

long-standing requirement. 46 In addition, the trend towards requiring

reparation to be

made

to victims

of international crimes

is

reflected in Article 75

of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.
In addition to these considerations, further steps deserve careful consideration. First,

some thought needs

whether certain types of actions

to

(for

be given,

after technical analysis, as to

example, the introduction of worm viruses)

would be inherently indiscriminate. If so, in principle they would automatically
be illegal weapons 47 and ought to be formally banned as such. This is probably
the reasoning behind part of paragraph 3 of the draft Russian resolution (that was

presented to the

First

Committee of the 1998 General Assembly):
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Member

Invites all

States to

assessments concerning

.

.

.

:

of developing

advisability

inform the Secretary-general of their views and

international

legal

regimes

to

prohibit

the

development, production or use of particularly dangerous forms of information

weapons

48
.

.

.

This suggestion was not accepted by the United States which took the position that: "it

is

premature

point to discuss negotiating an international

at this

agreement on information warfare" and that "there seems to be no particularly

good reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international law that are directly relevant to information operations." 49 The resolution

finally

adopted, 50 therefore, does not

make such a suggestion any less valid.
Second, given that there does appear to be more support for the idea of international cooperation to suppress unwelcome private actions, 51 there may well
be a move towards creating universal jurisdiction for the punishment of certain
hackers, either on the basis of permissive universal jurisdiction (based on the
model of the customary law relating to piracy and most war crimes), or of comcontain this proposal, but this does not

pulsory universal jurisdiction (such
torture,

as that

created

by

treaty for grave breaches,

and certain types of terrorist acts). Even if universal jurisdiction as such is

not created,

it is

likely that there will

be arrangements to

facilitate

the extradition

and punishment of such offenders.
Finally, a careful policy evaluation

ought to be made

as to

the advantages and

on computer network attacks. On the one hand, if
military advantages can be gained through this method which not only respect
existing law but also reduce physical damage and casualties, then this would be a
definite "plus." On the other hand, computer network attacks do have the potential to seriously mess up a wonderful new human achievement. In this regard,
the most technologically advanced societies would be the most at risk. These
anxieties are clearly reflected in the preambular paragraphs of the two General
Assembly resolutions adopted in 1998 and 1999, which are virtually identical. 52
The operative paragraphs in effect only call on States to think about existing
threats and what could be done about them, in particular the "Advisability of developing international principles that would enhance the security of global information and telecommunications systems and help to combat information
disadvantages of embarking

terrorism and criminality." 53

recognized in the
use but goes
use.

first

on the

The

fact that military applications are possible

preambular paragraph which does not exclude

say that

it is

as

such

is

this

important to maintain and encourage civilian

The policy question remains,

therefore, "is
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it

be
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more intelligent to outlaw this form of warfare before
is hoped that we will not just "wait and see!"

Armed

of

serious

Conflict

damage begins?

It

Notes
* This chapter reflects the personal

views of the author and in no

way engages the responsibility

Commission of Jurists.

of the International

These terms are generally accepted as being interchangeable. Some might question whether
law of neutrality that are more concerned with the protection of the sovereign
territory of neutral nations than humanitarian aspects could be properly characterised as
"international humanitarian law." However, dividing up neutrality law for the purpose of making
such a distinction would be awkward and unnecessary.
2. The ICRC Commentary to Article 2 of all four Geneva Conventions states that:
1

aspects of the

Any

difference arising

armed

the

difference

forces

between two

States

and leading

to the intervention

an armed conflict within the meaning of Article

2.

of members of

...

makes no

It

how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place. The respect due to

human

the

is

person

as

such

The ICRC Commentary

to

is

not measured by the number of victims.

Geneva Convention

Article 6, elaborates further:

By using the words "from the outset of the conflict " the authors of the Convention wished
to show that it became applicable as soon as the first acts of violence were committed, even if
the armed struggle did not continue. Nor is it necessary for there to have been many victims.
Mere frontier incidents may make the Convention applicable, for they may be the
beginning of a more widespread
3. Id. at 59.

Lieutenant

Goodman,

one month, during which he was
the basis that the incident did

Report
Neutral

visited

down by the Syrians on December 4,

by the

ICRC

215-216

1983, was held for

"in accordance with standard criteria"

amount to an armed conflict,

albeit

very short. 1983

PROCEEDINGS 597, 598, 609-610 (1988).
BOND, RULES OF RIOT: INTERNAL CONFLICT AND THE LAW OF

Gulf Area, ASIL

JAMES
in

E.

Internal Conflicts: Tlie Evolution of

HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CHALLENGES AHEAD

(Astrid Delissen

Declaration (IV,

1)

&

Gerald Tanja

Journal of International Law
in

Air Space,

213,

eds., 1991).

to Prohibit, for the

Term of Five Years,

the Launching of Projectiles and

Explosives from Balloons and other Methods of Similar Nature, July 29, 1899,

Rights

on

ICRC ANNUAL

Levie, Tlie Status of Belligerent Personnel "Splashed" and Rescued by a

51-52 (1974); George Abi-Saab, Humanitarian Law and

Legal Concern,

6.

Howard

in the Persian

5. See, e.g.,

WAR,

shot

63.

For example,

4.

conflict.

153 (Supp., 1907). See

also,

1

AMERICAN

David H.N. Johnson,

1965:

French Government submitted, in
addition to a proposal to prohibit air attacks against civilians and indeed to abolish
bombardment from the air altogether, a plan for the internationalisation of civil air transport
It

was to the Disarmament Conference

in

1932

that the

regime organised by the League of Nations. The proposal came to nothing.
At the Disarmament Conference in 1932 four various proposals were put forward
(p. 38)
for the abolition of bombing, and even of air forces; but these came to nothing, (p. 45).

under

a

...

During

discussions

indicated

its

view

on the problem of aerial bombardment during this period, the ICRC also
of bombardment from the air would be the best solution

that a total prohibition

to protect civilians:
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Le Comite international estime que la seule maniere de mettre
de certains des plus graves

bombardement

perils crees

aerien. ...

II

par l'etat de guerre

adresse dans ce sens

les

populations civiles a l'abri

est l'interdiction

un appel

pressant a

la

pure

et

simple du

Conference.

Documents relatifs A la guerre chimiques et aerienne presentes aux membres
de la Conference pour la redaction et la limitation des armements par le
COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE 5 (Geneva, 1932) (the text of the appeal
quoted

is

dated February 18, 1932).

A notable failed attempt was the

drafting of the "Rules concerning the control of wireless
of
war
and
air
warfare"
by a Commission of Jurists at The Hague, December
telegraphy in time
1 922— February 1923 (see esp. arts. 22—24) [hereinafter Draft Resolution]. This Commission was
constituted in accordance with a resolution of the Washington Conference (1922) on the
limitation of armaments. These rules were never codified. Johnson (supra note 6, at 53) quotes
military commanders as saying, in short, that in the past towns would have been besieged to win
wars, which caused much more suffering than air raids during the Second World War. Johnson,
7.

who

wrote in 1965, and therefore before negotiations for Additional Protocols to the Geneva
refers to Professor Georg Schwarzenberger, who

Conventions,

concluded that under modern conditions the standard of civilisation has retreated before the
of war, that the traditional distinction between combatants and non-combatants

necessities

who may still expect immunity from acts
of warfare are persons who are both unconnected with military operations or the
production of war materials and reside in areas that are 'sufficiently remote' from likely
has largely disappeared and that the only persons

target areas.

WAR

RIGHTS 244-258 (3rd ed. 1947) (see, e.g.,
J.M. SPAIGHT, AIR POWER AND
Proposals of 1923, Disarmament Conference of 1932, French proposals at 1932 Conference,
British proposals at 1932 Conference, British proposals at 1933 Disarmament Conference,
See

also,

Resolution of July 22, 1932, proposed Air Pact between "Locarno Powers" of February 1935,
German proposals of 1935-1936, etc.).

UN

Committee, Letter dated September 23, 1998, from the
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations to the Secretary
General, concerning Agenda item 63, "Role of science and technology in the context of
international security, disarmament and other related fields," A/C. 1/53/3, Sept. 30, 1998.
9. Article 52(2), which reads as follows:
8.

General Assembly,

First

In so far as objects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects
their nature, location,

whose

total

which by

purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action, and

or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling

at

the time, offers a definite military advantage.

This Protocol, adopted on March 26, 1999, repeats the same definition. The States that
supported this definition as the appropriate one to use in the new Protocol, because of its
10.

were the United States, India, Turkey, France and Israel.
also, Hays Parks, The Protection of Civilians from Air
Warfare, 27 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 77-82 (1997).
12. Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, August 12,
1949, art. 14, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter GC IV]. GC IV relates to hospital and
safety zones and localities. A hospital zone or locality is generally of a permanent character and is
established outside the combat zone in order to shelter military or civilian wounded and sick from
long range weapons, especially aerial bombardment. A safety zone or locality is generally of a
permanent character and is established outside the combat zone in order to shelter certain
categories of the civilian population, which, owing to their weakness, require special protection
articulation in Additional Protocol
11.

JOHNSON,

I,

supra note 7, at 48-49. See

181

Computer Network Attack and

Law

the International

Armed

of

Conflict

(children, elderly people, expectant mothers, etc.) from long-range weapons, especially aerial
bombardment. Article 15, GC IV, relates to neutralized zones, that are generally of a temporary
character and are established in the actual combat zone to protect both combatant and
non-combatant wounded and sick, as well as all members of the civilian population who are in the
area and not taking part in the hostilities, from military operations in the neighborhood.
13. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240. Article 2 states that the protection of cultural property shall comprise
the safeguarding of and respect for such property. Article 3 states that the High Contracting Parties

undertake to prepare in time of peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their

own

territory against the foreseeable effects

consider appropriate. Article

can only be given
are not in

8, relating to

of an armed

by taking such measures as they
Special Protection, makes it clear that this protection

if the special shelters that are

conflict,

created or the

monuments to be listed in a special list

any industrial center nor near any military objective, including communications

This restriction, which

reflects the old system, has

1954 Convention, adopted in 1999, which

been remedied

reflects the

new

in the

new

Protocol

lines.

of the

II

reasoning and therefore does not

repeat these restrictions for property under "enhanced protection."

The problem of the

14.

The

increasingly integrated information society

Ethics of Information Warfare

Which

15.

and

Statecraft,

is

noted in Daniel Kuehl,

www.infowar.com/mil_c4ij.html-ssi.

reads as folio ws:

(a) those which are not directed at a specific military objective;
which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific
military objective; or (c) those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of
which cannot be limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case,
are of a nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without

Indiscriminate attacks are:

those

(b)

distinction.

Paragraph 5 refers to two other situations "to be considered

view they

as

indiscriminate." In this author's

are not, strictly speaking, indiscriminate, but rather behaviors that are

specific reasons.

Paragraph

5(a) refers in effect to target area

oudawed

bombardments which

for

deliberately

treat as one target clearly separated and distinct military objectives even though civilians He
between them. This behavior is correctly outlawed because, in this author's view, it amounts to a
deliberate targeting of civilians, i.e., those in between the military objectives. Paragraph (b)
represents the customary rule that incidental damage (i.e., damage that is inevitable or likely, but

may not violate the rule of proportionality. Once again, this is
of an "indiscriminate" attack, but rather a prohibition on attacks on
military objectives that, although as well aimed as possible, are still likely to create more civilian
damage than the objective is worth. It is for this reason that the issue of proportionality is treated
in the next section of this article.
not in

itself intended)

not really

16.

during attack

a description

Various "tools of the trade" are described in

problems relating to predictability are referred to

Downs, Jr.,

Digital

STRATEGY

43 (Mary Sommerville

in

Threat:

United

1999,

States

National

Roger Barnett,

and

Security

Computers,

as a

Weapon, in XIII ESSAYS
Pratt,

Computer

Burrus Carnahan, Linebacker

II

and

ON

trusts

I

Tlie Digital

www. devost.net/mgd/documents/

Information Operations, Deterrence, and the Use of Force,
-

The

at 6.

of writings, including Lawrence

Myron Cramer & Stephen

ed., 1996);

9,

www.infowar.com/survey/virus_ew.html; Matthew Devost,

navy.mil/press/review/1998/spring/artl
17.

in a variety

Data Warfare: Using Malicious Computer Code

Electronic Warfare,

digitalthreat.asp;

DEFENSE NEWS, August

www.nwc.

sp8.htm.

Protocol

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 861,

I:

the Convergence of Law

865 (1981),

during the Vietnam war; U.S. Defense Department Report on
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and

Professionalism. 31

in relation to a probable vehicle
the

Role of the

Liw of War in

the

depot

Conduct
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of the Persian Gulf War, 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 612, 626 (1992), in which
reference is made to the decision not to attack two fighter aircraft next to the ancient temple of Ur:

Commander in Chief Central Command

.

.

.

elected not to attack the aircraft

and the belief that positioning of the aircraft.
thereby limiting the value of their destruction

respect for cultural property

placed each out to action,
against the risk

.

.

.

.

.

.

on the basis of

effectively

had

when weighed

of damage to the temple.

Otherwise the same report

refers rather

vaguely to military targets not being attacked because of

the risk to civilian persons or property:

Coalition forces also chose not to attack
adjacent to cultural

.

.

sites,

.

many

military targets in populated areas or in or

even though attack of those military

targets

is

authorised by the

law of war.
Id. at

624.

18. Several countries

Additional Protocol

I

have made interpretative declarations concerning Article 51(5)(b) of

(1977) that references to the "military advantage" are intended to

mean the

and not only from isolated or
particular parts of that attack. See, e.g., declarations upon ratification by Australia (June 21, 1991),
Canada (November 20, 1990), Italy (February 27, 1986), the Netherlands (June 26, 1986), and the
United Kingdom (January 28, 1998).
19 There are different views as to whether, and if so what, other ends can be justified as needs of
self-defence. This chapter does not intend to go into this issue.
20. See, in particular, an analysis of this question in the ICRC document on Elements of
Crimes prepared for the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court,
Doc.
advantage anticipated from

the military attack considered as a whole

UN

PCNICC/1999/WGEC/INF.2/Add.l

at

29-32.

to be indicted as a war criminal under this rule. The
he or she was aware that an evaluation of likely results was not even possible would be an
interesting test case, as Article 85(3)(b) of Protocol I and the ICC Statute both indicate that the
accused needed to have knowledge of the extent of the civilian damage that would be caused.
21. Unless, of course, the perpetrator

were

fact that

22.

They

23. This
24.

It is

are spelled out in Article

is

57 of Protocol

I

spelled out in Article 57(2) (b) of Protocol

somewhat

ironic that the

most accurate

attacks to clearly identified military objectives,

is

I

intelligence,

which

is

the best

way

to restrict

probably that collected directly by undercover

However, the price to be paid is that spies are not entitled to prisoner-of-war status. One
could wonder whether this very long-standing custom is still appropriate.
25. See, e.g., LASSA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW 429 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed.,
1952), which offers the following examples: "the watchword of the enemy may be used, deceitful
intelligence may be disseminated, the signals and bugle calls of the enemy may be mimicked to
agents.

mislead his forces."
26. Id.
27. Id.

and

art.

37 of Protocol

I.

upon

ratification of Additional Protocol I (1977) by Australia
Belgium ( May 20, 1986), Canada (November 20, 1990), Germany (February 14,
1991), Ireland (May 19, 1999), Republic of Korea (January 15, 1982), and United Kingdom

28. Interpretative declarations

(June 21, 1991),

(January 28, 1998) state that the situation described in the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article

44 can

The

exist

only in occupied territory or in armed conflicts covered by paragraph 4 of Article

the situation described in

occupied

1.

by Italy (February 27, 1986) and Spain (April 21, 1989) state that
the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article 44 can exist only in

interpretative declarations

territory.
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29.

Which
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of
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reads as follows:

Prisoners of War, in the sense of the present Convention, are persons belonging to one of

who

power of the enemy:
Persons who
accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof, such as civilian
members of military aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, members of
labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed forces, provided that they
have received authorisation from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall
provide them for that purpose with an identity card.
the following categories,

have

fallen into the

.

.

.

.

.

.

which represents long-standing customary law.
31. See arts. 29 and 31 of the Hague Regulations and art. 46(3) & (4) of Protocol I.
32. Discussions on this issue took place during one of the meetings of experts (Geneva 1993)
that led to the SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED
CONFLICTS AT SEA (text and commentary published by Cambridge University Press, 1995)
[hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. Two papers were prepared on this issue, one by Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg entitled "Neutrality and Non-Belligerency" and the other by Dietrich
30. Article 51(3) of Protocol

I,

Armed

Schindler on "Neutrality and Non-Belligerency in
Archives).

Both reach the conclusion

equally

States not taking part in the conflict as "neutral."

all

likewise rejected, in

III

that there

no such

is

ICRC

Conflicts at Sea" (filed in the

and the Manual

legal difference

Reference

is

also

made

treats

to this idea, but

ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 552

(Jan

Mayen

ed., 1997).

33. In particular: G.A. Res. 1721(1961)

Governing the Activities of States

and 1962 (1963); the 1967 Treaty on Principles

in the Exploration

Moon

and Use of Outer Space, including the

and Other Celestial Bodies; the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by

Moon

Space Objects; the 1979 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the

and the various telecommunications

Celestial Bodies;

INTELSAT

and Other

agreements

OPPENHEIM, supra note 25, at 654-655 (para. 294).
35. Leslie Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict 268 (2d ed.
See also ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 32, at 551:
34.

A neutral

State has the right to

territorial sovereignty,

demand

including

its

State

for

its

has the right to maintain relations with

all

respect for

air space. It

other States, whether neutral or belligerent.

may not, by governmental measures,

.

.

independence and above

2000).

its

.The supreme concept

is

all

that the neutral

intervene in the conflict to the advantage of one

of the belligerents.
36.

OPPENHEIM,

37.

Id., at

38.

GREEN, supra note 35, at 262-63.
OPPENHEIM, supra note 25, at 675-76

39.

659

supra note 25, at

(paras.

656

(para. 296).

296a and 297).
(para. 316). See also, art. 9,

Hague Convention XIII

of 1907.
40. Oppenheim stresses over and over again the right of neutral States to continue
commerce with belligerents. See, e.g., 61 A (paras. 314 and 315), 675 (para. 316), 676 (para.

and 677

(para. 319).

41. This issue

International

more

their

318).

was hotly debated during the discussions leading

Law Applicable to Armed Conflict at Sea {supra note 32). The

restrictive

San

III.
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Remo

result in

than the traditional right of self-help in such a circumstance.

42. Art. IV.
43. Art.

to the

Manual on

Paragraph 22

is

Louise Doswald'Beck

44.

SAN

REMO MANUAL, supra note 32, para.

Declaration. During the drafting of the San
45.

J.

99,

which

reflects art.

18 of the 1909

London

Remo Manual, this provision was totally uncontested.

—

U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War II,
1977, at 20, 21-23. The letter of apology, dated 4 April

Helmreich, The Diplomacy of Apology

AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW, May-June
1944, issued by the

US

Embassy

in Berne, contained the following:

Le profond regret de tous les Americains pour le tragique bombardment par les bombardiers
americains de la ville Suisse de Schaffhouse le ler avril
un groupe de bombardiers
n'ont pas pris les larges precautions prevues pour eviter des incidents de ce genre.
Le
Secretaire de la Guerre ... a demande en meme temps au Secretaire d'Etat d'assurer votre
Gouvernement que toutes precautions seront prises pour prevenir autant qu'il est
humainement possible la repetition de pareil malheureux accident.
.

.

.

.

.

15

DOCUMENTS DlPLOMATIQUES
46. 1907

Hague Convention

IV,

SUISSES 1848-1945,
art. 3,

at

.

.

.

.

315.

repeated in Additional Protocol

I,

art.

91.

47. See, e.g., the articulation of basic rules of IHL in the Advisory Opinion of the International
Court ofJustice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 95, July 8, 1996:
"Thus, methods or means of warfare, which would preclude any distinction between civilian and
military targets

.

.

.

are prohibited."

48. Draft Resolution, supra note 7.
49. Office of the General Counsel,

Department of Defense,

An

Legal Issues in Information Operations (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter

Assessment of International

DoD/GC

Paper].

The paper

is

appended to this volume as the Appendix.
50. G.A. Res. 53/70 (Jan. 4, 1999), Developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security,
Doc. A/RES/53/70.
51. E.g., "current U.S. efforts to improve mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements
should continue to receive strong emphasis. Another idea that might prove fruitful is to negotiate a
treaty to suppress information terrorism. ..." DoD/GC Paper, supra note 49, at Appendix. This
thought is also reflected in the final preambular paragraph of the resolution adopted (note 51):
" Considering that it is necessary to prevent the misuse or exploitation of information resources or
technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes." This provision is repeated in a resolution of the
same name adopted the following year,
Doc. A/54/558 which is essentially the same as the
previous one, G.A. Res. 54/49 (Dec. 1, 1999)
Doc. A/54/558.
52. See supra notes 9 & 51. Paragraphs 2, 3, and 7 of the 1999 resolution read as follows:

UN

UN

UN

Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and applying the

latest

information technologies and means of communication;
Affirming that

it

sees in this process the broadest positive opportunities for the further

development of civilisation, the expansion of opportunities for co-operation for the
common good of all States, the enhancement of the creative potential of mankind, and
additional improvements in the circulation of information in the global community;
and means can potentially be used for purposes that
are inconsistent with the objectives of maintaining international stability and security and
may adversely affect the security of States.
Expressing concern that these technologies

53. Id.,

both resolutions operative

para. 2(c).
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D:

espite

ongoing debates about the existence, or lack thereof, of a "revo-

lution in military affairs,"

differ dramatically

from

that

it is

undeniable that 21 st century warfare will

which characterized

the

20.

markable will be the maturation of "information warfare"
It

Perhaps most re-

as a

tool of combat. 1

will challenge existing warfighting doctrine, necessitate a reconceptualization

of the battlespace, and expand the available methods and means of warfare.
particular note will

Of

be the impact of information warfare on the principles of in-

ternational humanitarian law

.

.

.

and vice

versa.

Information warfare (IW), in particular computer network attack, has been

volume and elsewhere. Therefore, only a brief explatypology employed in this chapter is necessary. Information war-

described in detail in this

nation of the
fare

is

a subset

of information operations (IO),

i.e.,

"actions taken to affect

adversary information and information systems while defending one's

own

in-

formation and information systems." 2 Such operations encompass virtually any

nonconsensual measures intended to discover,
data stored in a computer, manipulated

by

a

alter,

destroy, disrupt, or transfer

computer, or transmitted through

computer. They can occur in peacetime, during crises, or at the
tional,

or tactical levels of armed conflict.

guished by that which

is

3

strategic,

a

opera-

Information operations are distin-

affected or protected

—information.

Michael N. Schmitt

IW

is

narrower.

It

of "information operations conducted during

consists

time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over
adversary or adversaries."

cific

4

Thus, information warfare

from other operations by the context

in

which

an example, routine peacetime espionage

is

it

occurs

—

is

crisis

a spe-

differentiated

or conflict. As

an example of an information op-

eration that does not constitute information warfare unless conducted during a
crisis

or

hostilities.

Computer network attacks (CNA), which may amount to

IW or merely IO,

are "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in

computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves." 5

The

essence of

stream

curs, a data

is

CNA

relied

on

CNA apart from other forms
inter alia,

gaining access to

is

a

that, regardless

of the context in which

to execute the attack.

6

Thus, the means used

set

of IO. These means vary widely. They include,

computer system

so as to acquire control over

bombs

transmitting viruses to destroy or alter data, using logic

that

system until triggered on the occasion of a particular occurrence or
inserting worms that reproduce themselves

loading the network, and employing

This chapter addresses the use of
is

oc-

it

sit

it,

idle in a

at a set

time,

upon entry to a system thereby over-

sniffers to

monitor and/or

seize data.

CNA during international armed conflict and

limited to consideration of the jus

in hello, that

body of law addressing what

conduct is permissible, or impermissible, during hostilities, irrespective of the legality
ters

of the

on

initial resort to

the use of

CNA

Moreover, the chapter

is

force

by the

belligerents. 7 Discussion therefore cen-

in the context of "State-on-State"

an effort to explore the

While

in considering lexferenda.

setting forth lexferenda

project as the nature of warfare evolves,
applicability

8

the goal here

than an exercise

an especially worthy

is

is

conflict.

simply to analyze the

of existing humanitarian law to computer network attack, and

identify any prescriptive lacunae that

may

exist therein.

Applicability of Humanitarian

The

lex lata, rather

armed

threshold question

to humanitarian law.

law instrument

To

is

to

CNA

whether computer network

begin with, there

that directly addresses

CNA

Law

is

CNA,

attack

no provision

in

is

even subject

any humanitarian

or, for that matter,

IW or IO;

this

armed conflict. Additionally, it could be argued that the development and employment ot CNA
post-dates existing treaty law, and thus, having not been within the contemplation of the Parties to those instruments, is exempt from the coverage
might suggest

thereof.

A

that

third possible

is

as

yet unregulated during

argument

for inapplicability
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is

the Jus in Bello

designed for methods and means that are kinetic in nature; since there

CNA,

is little

by computers fall outside the scope of humanitarian law. Restated, humanitarian law applies to armed conflict, and
computer network attack is not "armed."
The first two possibilities are easily dispensed with. The fact that existing conventions are silent on CNA is of little significance. First, the Martens clause, a
well-accepted principle of humanitarian law, provides that whenever a situation
is not covered by an international agreement, "civilians and combatants remain
under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived
from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates
of public conscience." 10 By this norm, all occurrences during armed conflict are
subject to application of humanitarian law principles; there is no lawless void.
The acceptance of "international custom" as a source of law in Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court ofJustice also demonstrates the fallacy of any
contention of inapplicability based on the absence of specific lex scripta. n
Arguments focusing on the fact that CNA post-dates present prescriptive instruments are similarly fallacious. Precisely this line of reasoning was presented
to the International Court of Justice in Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
that

is

"physical" in

attacks

9

Weapons. In its advisory opinion, the court summarily rejected the assertion that

because humanitarian "principles and rules had evolved prior to the invention of
nuclear weapons," humanitarian law was inapplicable to them.

noted, "[i]n the view of the vast majority of States

as

well

As the court

as writers

there can be

no doubt as to the applicability of humanitarian law to nuclear weapons." 12
There being no reason to distinguish nuclear from computer weapons, at least
on the basis of when they were developed vis-a-vis the entry into force of relevant humanitarian law norms, the same conclusion applies to CNA. Furthermore, a review of new weapons and weapon systems for compliance with
humanitarian law is a legal, and often a policy, requirement. 13 Obviously, this
would not be so if pre-existing law were inapplicable, ab initio, to nascent methods and means of warfare.
This analysis leaves only the third argument for inapplicability of humanitarian law to computer network attack
that it is not armed conflict, at least not in
the absence of conventional hostilities. In exploring this prospect one might reflexively reach, as some have, for the
Charter. 14 Article 2(4) of that constitu-

—

UN

tive

instrument proscribes the "use of force," whereas Article 51 allows for

forceful action in self-defense in the face
tutes a "use

of an "armed attack."

If an act consti-

of force" or an "armed attack" would it not logically be subject to the

laws of "armed conflict,"

i.e.,

humanitarian law? If so,

determine what actions amount to

a use

all

that

need be done

is

of force or constitute an armed attack.
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Such an analysis confuses the jus ad bellum with the jus in bello. Articles 2(4)
and 51 together with Chapter VII of the Charter, are the key prescriptive norms
of the jus ad bellum. They govern when it is legitimate under international law (or
,

at least

face

Charter law) to resort to force, either

of another

State's decision to

do

compliance with the jus

own national interests. A

may subsequently carry out its

in bello,

which,

by the

the actual conduct of hostilities

tool of national policy or in the

so in pursuit of its

State that has unlawfully resorted to force

tions in

as a

as

mentioned

supra,

opera-

governs

For instance, during the

parties.

Falklands/Malvinas conflict Argentina wrongfully invaded British territory, but
generally abided
that

Operation

by the

of warfare. Similarly,

rules

many commentators

ALLIED FORCE, NATO's

1999 Kosovo bombing campaign,

was conducted

in substantial compliance with the

violated the jus ad bellum, but

laws governing armed conflict. 16 Conversely, a State (or
fully resorts to force

example,
it is

it

its

military) that law-

may subsequently violate humanitarian law principles. As an

seems clear that Russia

equally clear that in doing so

is

its

entitled to maintain order in

Chechnya; but

forces have regularly violated both the law of

non-international armed conflict and

rights law. 17

human

The

point

very pragmatically noted

Members of the armed
conflict begins,

and its relevance

this distinction

forces are not

nor whether

it is

concerned with the manner in which

legal or illegal.

The

task at hand, therefore,

Tautologically, the answer
applies.

So

far as

all

is

to

a

they are concerned, the
it

from the

are required to participate therein. 18

when "hostilities" have begun.
commence once humanitarian law

query

that hostilities

is

Common Article 2 to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions provides that

the conventions apply, aside

"to

and they

that the

to military personnel:

law of armed conflict comes into operation and they must abide by
that hostilities begin

is

Green has

jus ad bellum and jus in bello are normatively distinct. Professor Leslie

moment

urge

cases

from

specific provisions that pertain in peacetime,

of declared war or of any other armed

which may arise beeven if the state of war is not

conflict

tween two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
recognized by one of them." 19 The 1977 Protocol Additional I, which, like the
conventions pertains to international armed conflict, adopts the same "armed
conflict" standard, one that has become an accepted customary law threshold for
humanitarian law. 20
the term
conflict,

"armed

The fact that the 1977

conflict,"

21

albeit in the

demonstrates that armed conflict

ture, rather than

its

Protocol Additional
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also

embraces

context of «o//-international armed
is

a

condition determined by

participants, 22 location, 23 or, as

"war," declaration of the belligerents. 24

II

was formerly the

its

na-

case with
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seems relatively

It

clear, then, that

commencement of armed

humanitarian law

the Jus in Bello

activated through the

is

But what is armed conflict? Commentaries
published by the International Committee of the Red Cross to the 1949 Geneva
conflict.

Conventions and the 1977 Protocols Additional take

The former

towards the meaning of the term.

a

define

very expansive approach

armed

conflict as "[a]ny

between two States and leading to the intervention of armed
even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes

difference arising
forces

no

.

.

.

difference

how long the conflict lasts,

.

.

.

covers any dispute

I's

Neither the duration of the

forces.

how much slaughter takes place." 25

commentary provides that "humanitarian
between two States involving the use of their armed

Similarly, Protocol Additional

law

or

conflict,

nor

its

intensity, play a role.

." 26
.

.

commentary describes armed conflict as "the existence
of open hostilities between armedforces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree." 27 The sine qua non in all three cases is commitment of armed forces.
But a dispute or difference resulting in the engagement of armed forces cannot be the sole criterion. Military forces are used on a regular basis against adverconsider aerial
saries without necessarily producing a state of armed conflict
Protocol Additional

II's

—

reconnaissance/surveillance operations as just one example. Further,

it is

now

generally accepted that isolated incidents such as border clashes or small-scale
raids

do not rise

itarian law. 28

proven

term is employed in human-

Accordingly, State practice, supplemented by the writings of pub-

licists, illustrates

has

to the level of armed conflict as that

that Protocol Additional

I's

dismissal

of intensity and duration

slightly overstated.

Instead, the reference to

armed

forces

is

more

logically

understood

form
At the

as a

of prescriptive shorthand for activity of a particular nature and intensity.

time the relevant instruments were drafted, armed forces were the entities that

conducted the contemplated

activity at the requisite level

of intensity; by focus-

ing on the armed forces, the intended ends were achieved. Restated, the rele-

vant provisions of the conventions and their commentaries were actor-based

because
forces

citing

—was,

at

the

actors

engaged in the undesirable

And what was

that conduct?

purposes of humanitarian law.

makes

method

the time, a convenient and reliable

The

A

logical

answer

review of

clear that protecting individuals

who

its

is

combat
(e.g.,

wounded

for regulating

it.

found in the underlying

are not involved in the hostilities

include civilians and civilian objects,

(e.g.,

—armed

instruments and principles

directly, as well as their property, lies at their core. 29
entities

conduct

as

well

Most
as

notably, protected

those

who

are hors de

or captured personnel) or provide humanitarian services

medical personnel). As for the protection they are entitled

framed in terms of injury or death

or, in the case
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to,

it is

usually

of property, damage or
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These Geneva law purposes

complemented by Hague law
generally through restrictions on certain

destruction.

are

norms intended to limit suffering
weaponry and methods of warfare. 30

This excessively abbreviated summarization of humanitarian law's funda-

mental purposes elucidates the term armed

when a group takes measures that injure,

kill,

conflict.

the motivation underlying the actions

is

irrelevant.

or legitimacy. Thus, for example, the party that

by committing such

may be

acts

in hello

are the foreseeable

rather than ad helium,

So too

is

their wrongfulness

commences

the

armed

conflict

acting in legitimate anticipatory (or intercep-

long

tive) self-defense; nevertheless, as
kill,

which they

the jus

is

conflict occurs

damage, or destroy. Also included

are actions intended to cause such results or in

consequences thereof. Because the issue

Armed

the actions

as

were intended

damage, or destroy, humanitarian law governs them.

It

to injure,

should be noted that

given the current weight of opinion, actions that are sporadic or isolated in

would not suffice. Additionally, because the issue is the law applicable to
international armed conflict, the relevant actions must be attributable to a
nature

State. 31

Returning to the topic
tarian

at

hand, and quite aside from a d helium

issues,

humani-

law principles apply whenever computer network attacks can be ascribed

to a State, are

more than merely

sporadic and isolated incidents, and are either

intended to cause injury, death, damage, or destruction (and analogous
or such consequences are foreseeable. This
is

not being employed.

By

airport's air traffic control

oil

through them

causing the

even

if part

on

a large

facilities.

destroy

oil pipelines

by surg-

by manipulation of its computerized
trigger a release of toxic chemicals from pro-

On the

other hand, humanitarian law would not

downloading

financial records, shut-

Internet access temporarily, or conducting cyber espionage because,

of a regular campaign of similar

would not include
It

attack

reactor

pertain to disrupting a university intranet,

down

armed force

of computers governing flow, 32

after taking control

nerve center, or using computers to

ting

classic

system by agents of another State would implicate hu-

meltdown of a nuclear

duction and storage

though

computer network

this standard, a

would an attack intended to

manitarian law. So too
ing

so even

is

effects),

injury, death,

should be apparent

that,

acts, if the

foreseeable consequences

damage, or destruction.

given advances in methods and means of warfare,

especially information warfare,

it is

no longer

sufficient to apply

an actor-based

threshold for application of humanitarian law; instead, a consequence-based

one

is

more

would deny,

appropriate. This

is

hardly a jurisprudential epiphany.

for instance, that biological or chemical warfare

involve delivery by kinetic weapons)
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is

subject to

No

one

(which does not

humanitarian law.

A

Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and

consequence-based threshold
conflict has

commenced

also

is

the Jus in Bello

supported by the

fact that

once armed

(and except for prohibitions relevant to particular

weapons), the means by which injury, death, damage or destruction are pro-

duced have no bearing on the

legality

of the causal

civilian or other protected persons or objects

method or means

unlawful irrespective of the

is

bombing,

used. Starvation, suffocation, beating, shooting,

—

even cyber attack
particular

Intentionally targeting a

act.

law based on the

are subject to humanitarian

all

consequence

That

results.

this

fact that a

so counters any assertion that,

is

standing alone, cyber attacks are not subject to humanitarian law because they
are not

on

"armed"

their nature

force.

and

On

the contrary, they

may

or

may

not be, depending

likely consequences.

Computer Network Attack Targets

As has been

discussed,

computer network

attacks are subject to humanitarian

law if they are part and parcel of either a classic conflict or a "cyber war" in which
injury, death, damage, or destruction are intended or foreseeable. This being so,
it is

necessary to consider the targets against

may be

attacks

directed.

A useful starting point
tive

which computer network

norms governing

is

to

frame the conduct that

targeting.

is

subject to the prescrip-

Because most relevant Protocol Additional

provisions articulate standards applicable to Parties and non-Parties

ment of binding customary

I

(as a restate-

law) alike, that instrument serves as an apt point of

departure. 33 Article 48, the basic rule governing the protection of the civilian

population, provides that "Parties to the conflict

only

against military objectives." 34

any military operation, including
tary objectives. In fact,

it

tinely expressed in terms

well
shall

as

.

.

.

shall direct their

operations

On its face, Article 48 would seem to rule out

CNA,

directed against other than purely mili-

does not. In subsequent

articles,

proscriptions are rou-

of "attacks." Thus, "the

civilian

population

as

such, as

individual civilians, shall not be the object of attack" 35 "civilian objects
;

not be

tacks shall

the object of attack" 36 "indiscriminate attacks are
;

be limited

strictly to military objectives" 38

;

and so

forbidden" 37 "at;

forth.

The term

is

means acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or in defence." As a general matter then, the prohibition is not so much on targeting non-military objectives as it is on attacking
expressly defined in Article 49: "'Attacks'

them,

specifically

by the

text

through the use of violence. This interpretation

of Article 51, which

sets forth

population and individual civilians
arising

from

military operations,"

shall

is

supported

the general principle that the "civilian

enjoy general protection against dangers

and which prohibits "acts or
193

threats

of violence
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which is to spread terror among the civilian population,"
as well as the commentary to Article 48, which notes that "the word
'operation' should be understood in the context of the whole of the Section; it
refers to military operations during which violence is used." 40
In light of this interpretation, does computer network attack fall outside the
ambit of "attacks" because it does not employ violence? No, and for precisely
the same reason that armed attacks can include cyber attacks. "Attacks" is a term
the primary purpose of
39

of prescriptive shorthand intended to address

specific consequences.

It is

clear

what the relevant provisions hope to accomplish is shielding protected individuals from injury or death and protected objects from damage or destruction.
To the extent the term "violence" is explicative, it must be considered in the
that

sense of violent consequences rather than violent

or mental suffering
loss

41

acts.

logically included in the

is

of assets, for instance money, stock,

Significant

human physical

concept of injury; permanent

etc., directly transferable

property likewise comprises damage or destruction.

The

point

is

into tangible
that inconve-

mere diminishment in quality of life does not suffice; human suffering is the requisite criterion. As an example, a major disruption of the
stock market or banking system might effectively collapse the economy and result in widespread unemployment, hunger, mental anguish, etc., a reality traginience, harassment, or

cally

demonstrated during the Depression of the 1930s.

suffering, the

If it did cause this level

CNA would constitute an attack, as that term

is

of

understood in hu-

manitarian law.

Other articles within the section sustain this reading. For instance, the rules of
proportionality speak of "loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilians objects, or a

vironment

combination thereof," 42 those relating

refer to "widespread, long-term,

and severe damage,"

protection of dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations

terms of "severe losses

among

the civilian population."

the negotiation of Protocol Additional
constituted an attack arose.

I,

Most agreed

of the en-

to protection

44

43

and the

framed

is

in

Furthermore, during

the issue of whether laying landmines
that

it

did because "there

is

an attack

45

whenever a person is directly endangered by a mine laid." By analogy, a computer network attack which foreseeably endangers protected persons or property would amount to an attack.
Return now to Article 48. In the context of computer network attack, and as
a

general rule (various other specific prohibitions are discussed

would

prohibit those

the article

CNA operations directed against non-military objectives

that are intended to, or

would

foreseeably, cause injury, death, damage, or de-

struction. Unless otherwise prohibited

law,

infra),

by

specific provisions

of humanitarian

CNA operations unlikely to result in the aforementioned consequences are
194
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permissible against non-military objectives, such

of this distinction, the need to carefully
warfare operation
sis

or is not an "attack"

is

of this matter approximated

the population. 46 As a result

whether or not an information

assess

is

as

the Jus in Bello

greatly heightened. In the past, analy-

a res ipsa loquitor

much more ambiguous than traditional military operations,
a

more challenging consequence-based consideration.
While CNA does dramatically expand the possibilities

not attacking) non-military objectives,

CNA

approach. However,

thereby demanding

for "targeting" (but

unfair to characterize this as a

it is

ening of the prescriptive architecture. Instead,

it

is

weak-

simply represents an expansion

of permissible methods and means resulting from advances in technology; existing norms remain intact. Recall, for example, that psychological operations directed against the civilian population that cause
permissible, so long as they are not intended to

motivation for the operations
the objective regime

is

is

no physical harm

terrorize. 47

This

is

so

are entirely

whether the

military in nature or not. Nevertheless, although

a constant, the

advent of

that, unless filled, will inevitably result in

CNA reveals a normative lacuna

an expansion of war's impact on the

ci-

vilian population.

Assuming

CNA

a

operation

lytically, potential targets

and military objectives;

batants
objects.
It is

can be

is

an "attack," what can be targeted?

classified into three

and

2) civilians

broad categories:

civilian objects;

and

3)

1)

Ana-

com-

dual-use

Moreover, particular types of potential targets enjoy specific protection.

useful to address each grouping separately.

Combatants and military
nature valid targets and

objectives:

may be

discussed in the next section,

Those

Combatants and military objectives

directly attacked as long as the

is

by

used, as

consistent with humanitarian law restrictions.

who plan or decide on attacks have an affirmative duty to "do everything

feasible" to verify that intended targets are legitimate,

immunity from

A combatant

attack
is

a

member of the armed

which

are

under

a

.

inter alia, shall

.

.

that they

do not enjoy

forces other than medical personnel

organized armed forces, groups and

command responsible

conduct of its subordinates.
system which,

"all

i.e.,

law. 48

under humanitarian

and chaplains; armed forces include
units

method

are

to [a Party to the conflict] for the

[They must] be subject to an internal disciplinary

enforce compliance with the rules of international

law applicable in armed conflict." 49 Directing computer network attacks against
combatants, for instance by causing a military

mit

false

crash,

is

air traffic

control system to trans-

navigational information in order to cause a military troop transport to
clearly permissible.

Military objectives are defined in Article 52 of Protocol Additional
objects

which by

their nature, location,

195
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as

"those

purpose or use make an effective
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contribution to military action and

whose

total or partial destruction, capture or

neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite advan-

tage." 50 Military

equipment and

facilities,

items, are clearly military objectives,

work

attack.

beyond

other than medical and religious

and thereby subject

However, determining which

these obvious exemplars

taining the required nexus

is

often

to direct

computer net-

objects are military objectives

difficult.

31

between the object

The problem

to

in ascer-

lies

be attacked and military

operations.

The crux of the dilemma is

interpretation of the terms "effective" and "defi-

Committee of the Red Cross, define
them very narrowly. In the ICRC commentary to the protocol, effective contribution includes objects "directly used by the armed forces" (e.g., weapons and
Some, such

nite."

as

the International

equipment), locations of "special importance for military operations"
bridges),

and objects intended for use or being used for military purposes.

"definite military advantage," the

"potential or indeterminate"

commentary excludes

advantage. 53

By contrast,

(e.g.,

32

As

to

attacks that offer only a

the United States,

which

does not dispute the wording of the definition, would include economic targets
that "indirectly but effectively support

and

sustain the

pability," a particularly expansive interpretation.

enemy's war-fighting ca-

04

This difference has interesting implications for computer network attack.

Can

a

banking system be attacked because wealth underpins

sustainability?

a

military's

What about the ministry responsible for taxation? The stock market?

on brokerage firms acceptable because they will undermine willingness to invest in the economy? If a country disproportionately relies on a particular industry to provide export income (e.g., oil), can computer network attack
be used to disrupt production and distribution? The issue of striking economic
targets is a particularly acute one because the operation of most is computer in-

Are

attacks

tense in nature, and thereby very appealing to information warfare targeteers.

The threshold issue, recalling the discussion supra, is whether or not the attack
would cause injury, death, damage, or destruction. Once this determination is
made, the differing interpretations of military objective would come into play,
on the legitimacy of striking the target. On the other hand, if the operation were designed to cause, e.g., mere inconvenience, it would not rise to the level of an attack and would thus be
in

all

likelihood leading to disparate results

permissible regardless of the target's nexus, or lack thereof, to military operations.

For instance,

if

the Serbian State television station had been targeted by

CNA rather than kinetic weapons during NATO

strikes

on Belgrade

in April

1999, there might well have been no consequent injury, death, damage, or destruction; in that circumstance, criticism

196

on the

basis that a civilian target

had
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been

would

hit

likely

have

the Jus in Bello

on deaf ears, thereby probably avoiding the
as well as the pending litigation in the European

fallen

negative publicity that resulted,

Court of Human Rights. 55
and

Civilians

whereas

on

civilian objects:

a civilian object

is

one

Civilians are those not considered combatants, 56
that

is

not a military objective. 57

attacking civilians and civilian objects

col Additional

nearly absolute. Specifically, Proto-

provides:

I

The

Article 51.2.

is

The prohibition

civilian population, as such, as well as individual civilians shall

not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of

which

to spread terror

is

among

the civilian population are prohibited.

Article 52. Civilian objects shall not be the object of attack or of reprisals. 58

Doubts
of finding

as to

the character of an object or individual are to be resolved in favor

civilian status. 59 Again, in the case

threshold question

is

of computer network attack, the

whether or not the attack is intended to, or forseeably will,

cause injury, death, damage, or destruction; if so, the prohibitions set forth ear-

which undeniably

lier,

restate existing

customary law, apply.

Unfortunately, the norms, albeit clear on their face, are subject to interpretive
difficulties.

The

tary objectives
a civilian

differing standards for distinguishing civilian objects

from mili-

have already been highlighted. Similar disparities surround when

may be

attacked. Protocol Additional

I

allows for this possibility only

in the case of a civilian taking a "direct part in hostilities," a standard described in

commentary as "acts of war which by their nature or purpose are likely to
cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the enemy armed forces." 60
This is the illegal combatant problem. Some would limit civilian immunity even
more severely by, for instance, characterizing mission-essential civilians workthe

ing

at a

base during hostilities, though not engaged directly in acts of war,

as le-

gitimate targets. 61
In the context of information operations, the civilian issue

is

an important

one.

Some

tions,

whether those functions involve the maintenance of assets or the conduct

countries have elected to contract out information warfare func-

of operations. Moreover, computer network attack
tasked to

government agencies other than the

is

a function that

military. In the event civilian

tractors or non-military personnel are in a support role that

conduct of operations, for instance maintaining

is

con-

essential to the

CNA equipment, by the latter

would be directly targetable. Further, because they are valid
any injury caused them would not be calculated when assessing whether

interpretation they
targets,

may be
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an attack

is

proportional (see discussion

infra).

On the other hand,

narrowly ap-

would preserve the protection
they enjoy as civilians, though if captured they would be entitled to prisoner of
war status as persons "accompanying the armed forces." 62
plying the "direct part in hostilities" standard

Should

civilians

engage in computer network attack themselves, the problem

becomes more complex.

If the

CNA results,

or foreseeably could result, in in-

jury, death, damage, or destruction, then the "perpetrators"

would be

illegal

combatants. This status attaches because they have taken a direct part in hostilities

without complying with the

illegal

combatants, they

would be

may be

criteria for characterization as a

directly attacked,

any injury suffered by them

and

irrelevant in a proportionality calculation,

capture they

would not be

By contrast,

entitled to prisoner

if the civilians

of war

in the event

of their

status.

involved were conducting computer network op-

erations that did not rise to the level of "attacks," they

would not be illegal comof war that by their nature

would have committed no "acts
likely to cause actual harm to the personnel or equipment of the

batants because they

or purpose are

combatant. As

enemy armed forces." Their civilian status and its corresponding protections
would remain intact. Nevertheless, as with support personnel, if captured while
attached to a military unit and accompanying that unit, these civilians would be
classed as prisoners

of war. 63

Of course, the facility and equipment being used to

conduct the operations might well be valid military objectives and,

as a result,

be

subject to attack; but the operators themselves could not be directly attacked.

As should be apparent, the use of civilians, whether contractors or govern-

ment employees, is fraught with legal pitfalls. Clearly, a prudent approach would
be to employ military personnel for information warfare purposes.
Dual-use

objects:

A dual-use object

purposes. Examples of

common

ports, rail lines, electrical systems,

is

one

civilian population,
If an object

a military objective vulnerable to attack,

work attack. This is

civilian

communications systems,

INTELSAT, EUROSAT and ARABSAT.
it is

both

and military

dual-use objects (or objectives) include air-

duce items for both the military and the
purposes,

that serves

is

factories that

pro-

and satellites such

as

being used for military

including computer net-

true even if the military purposes are secondary to the civil-

ian ones.

whether or not an object is a military objective may turn on whether the narrow or broad definition of the term, a matter
discussed supra, is used. Second, whether an object is dual-use, and therefore a
military objective, will depend on the nature of the specific conflict. An airfield
may be utilized for logistics purposes in one conflict, but serve no military funcSeveral caveats are in order.

First,

tion in another. Third, an object that has the potential for military usage, but
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a military objective if the likelihood

reasonable and not remote in the context of the particular conflict un-

is

derway. Finally, dual-use objects must be carefully measured against the require-

ments of discrimination and proportionality, discussed
definition an attack thereon risks collateral

infra,

because by

damage and incidental injury to

civil-

ians or civilian objects.
Specifically protected objects:

In addition to the general rules regarding the protec-

tion of the civilian population, certain objects enjoy specific protection.
versial category

of specially protected objects

works, such
ditional

facilities are especially

a provision

I,

facilities if

dams, dikes, and nuclear

is

generating stations. Because of their reliance

CNA.

and consequent severe

56 of Protocol Ad-

States, forbids

an attack on these

among

losses

[e.g.,

means of

dangerous forces, a

Conducting
"indispensable
tims,"

when

difficult task

facilities

CNA offers a

without risking the release of

using kinetic weapons.

attacks that starve the civilian population or otherwise

objects," 65

prohibited. 66

is

neutralizing such

water or

the civilian population." 64 This

prohibition applies even if they are military objectives. Interestingly,
fairly reliable

even

if

net-

Article

the attack might "cause the release of dangerous forces

radioactivity]

electrical

on computer and computer

vulnerable to

opposed by the United

A contro-

enemy armed

deny

it

forces are the intended "vic-

Indispensable objects include such items

as foodstuffs,

computer net-

crops, livestock, or drinking water.

Applying

works

food storage and distribution system or a

attacks against, for instance, a

this restriction,

water treatment plant serving the civilian population would be impermissible

even

if military forces also rely

Protocol Additional

I

on them.

further prohibits military operations likely to cause

widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the environment, 67 although the

United

States does

not recognize the provision

as a

restatement of customary

Computer network attacks might conceivably cause such devastation. An
attack on a nuclear reactor could result in a meltdown of its core and consequent

law.

release

of radioactivity. Similarly,

CNA could be used to release chemicals from

or rupture a major

a storage or

production

sibilities for

the causation of environmental

facility

portant to note that the
attack

is

oil pipeline.

Many other pos-

damage through CNA exist. It is improhibition applies regardless of whether or not the

targeted against a valid military objective and even if it complies with

the principle of proportionality.

pected to occur, the operation

is

Once

the requisite

quantum of damage

is

ex-

prohibited.

number of other objects, persons, and activities that enjoy special
protected status, and which are susceptible to computer network attack, but
There

are a

which do not present unique

CNA opportunities or challenges.
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military

and civilian medical units and supplies

ing used

for military purposes; 68

So too
ties,

is

terfered with.

72

71

and

civil

defense shelters,

facili-

Additionally, humanitarian relief activities must not be in-

By these

computer network attack
data bank, deny power to a bomb

prohibitions, for example, a

blood type information in

shelter, or

exempt from attack unless be-

generally true of medical transport. 69

are cultural objects, places of worship, 70

and material.

to alter

the same

are

a hospital's

misroute humanitarian relief supplies would

all

be unlawful.

course, misuse of protected items or locations for military purposes renders
valid military objectives that

may be

Of

them

attacked.

on striking certain objects or individuals in reprisal, including reprisals by computer network attack. Reprisals are otherwise unlawful actions taken during armed conflict in response to an adversary's own
unlawful conduct. They must be designed solely to cause the adversary to act
lawfully, be preceded by a warning (if feasible), be proportionate to the adverFinally, there are limitations

sary's violation,

and cease

as

soon

as

the other side complies with the legal limita-

on its conduct. The right to conduct reprisals has been severely restricted in
treaty law, much of which expresses customary law. There are specific prohibitions on reprisals conducted against civilians; prisoners of war; the wounded,
tions

sick,

and shipwrecked; medical and religious personnel and

equipment;

their

protected buildings, equipment, and vessels; civilian objects; cultural objects;
objects indispensable for the survival of the civilian population;

ing dangerous forces; and the environment.
batants

and military objectives subject to

73

works contain-

Essentially, this leaves only

reprisals.

Of course,

in

most

com-

cases a

computer network attack conducted against them would be lawful at any rate. 74
In fairness,

it

should be acknowledged that certain countries argue that the

Protocol Additional

United

States,

I

restrictions

on

reprisals fail to reflect

while accepting that most

customary law. The

reprisals against civilians

would be

in-

appropriate (and illegitimate), asserts that the absolute prohibition thereon "re-

moves

a significant deterrent that presently protects civilians

victims

on

on

all

sides

precisely the

of the conflict." 73 The United

same point when

and other countries

work

that

attacks are issues

became

have adopted

Kingdom issued a

a Party to the protocol.

this position, reprisatory

reservation
76

For these

computer net-

of policy, not law.

Limits

The

it

and other war

on Striking Legitimate Targets

core prescriptions on striking legitimate targets are based in the principle

of discrimination. 77

It is this

principle

which most

clearly expresses

humanitar-

ian law's balancing of State-centric interests in resorting to force against the
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more broadly based humanitarian interest in shielding non-participants from the
of what

effects

is,

Discrimination

at best,
is

an unfortunate necessity.

bifurcated in nature. Applied to weapons,

it

limits the use

of

between combatants and military objectives on the one hand and civilians, civilian objects, and other protected entities on the other. Applied to tactics and the use of weapons, it requires an effort
to distinguish between the two categories when conducting military operations.
those that are incapable of distinguishing

Protocol Additional

I

articulates this difference in Article 51.4:

Indiscriminate attacks are:
objective; (b) those

(a)

those

which

are not directed at a specific military

which employ a method or means of combat which cannot be

directed at a specific military objective; or

means of combat the

effects

which employ

those

(c)

of which cannot be limited

as

a

method or

required by

this

Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are of a nature to strike military
objectives

and

Subparagraph

civilians or civilian objects

(a)

refers to indiscriminate use,

indiscriminate weapons.

damage and

code

is

a

—

distinction, proportionality,

Computer network

(c)

describe

and minimizing

mounted by a weapon
and a means by which that

attacks are

computer, computer code,

computer itself is not indiscriminate for it
particular computers and networks. The send-

transmitted. Obviously, the

can very discretely send code to
ing of e-mail

is

an apt example.

By

contrast,

perhaps intentionally, indiscriminate.

from computer

to

computer

free

The

code can be written that

classic

example

from the control of its

code, even if an uncontrollable virus, can be targeted
tives, it

and

(b)

incidental injury. 78

Indiscriminate weapons:

system consisting of

whereas

The indiscriminate use aspect of discrimination consists

of three related components
collateral

without distinction.

not indiscriminate on the basis that

is

such code

may be

indiscriminate

on

the

it

ground

is

is

very,

a virus that passes

originator.

Because the

at particular military

objec-

cannot be directed. However,
that

its effects

cannot be limited.

many cases, once viral code is launched against a target computer or network,
the attacker will have no way to limit its subsequent retransmission. This may be
In

true even in a closed network, for the virus could, as an example, be transferred

into

it

by

diskette.

throughout

Simply put, malicious code

civilian systems

One must be

is

prohibited

as

likely to

be uncontrollably spread

an indiscriminate weapon.

Note that Article 51.4
cites "methods and means of combat." A means of combat is defined in Protocol Additional I's commentary as a "weapon," whereas a method of combat is
the way a weapon is used. 79 The plain meaning of "weapon" is something that
careful not to overstate the restriction.
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can be used to

an adversary. Drawing on the analysis supra regarding the

attack

humanitarian law term "attacks," computer code

tem when

it

can cause the

effects

encompassed in

damage, and destruction (including related
terror, suffering, etc.). In the

event

is

and thus would not be prohibited,

that

—

term

effects like severe

cannot,

it

only part of a weapon sys-

it is

injury, death,

mental suffering,

not part of a

weapon

system,

not on the ground that

at least

it

is

indiscriminate.

The

Distinction:

manitarian law,

is

principle of distinction,

set forth in

the conflict shall at

all

hibition

Protocol Additional

I,

Article 48: "[T]he Parties to

times distinguish between the civilian population and

combatants and between
shall direct their

unquestionably part of customary hu-

civilian objects

and military objectives and accordingly

Whereas the pro-

operations only against military objectives."

on attacking

civilians directly

targets off-limits, the distinction

rendered

category of potential

a specific

requirement extends protection to cases in

which an attack may not be directed against civilian or civilian objectives specifically, but in which there is a high likelihood of striking them nonetheless. An example would be firing a weapon, though capable of being aimed, blindly.
This is a particularly relevant prohibition in the context of computer network
attack. For example, it would embrace situations where it is possible to discretely target a military objective through a particular means of CNA, but instead a broad attack likely to affect civilian systems is launched. Such an attack
would be analogous to the Iraqi SCUD attacks against Saudi and Israeli population centers during the 1990—91 Persian Gulf War. 80 The SCUD is not an inherently indiscriminate weapon. Indeed, it is easily capable of being aimed with
sufficient accuracy against, for instance, military formations in the desert.

ever, use of
Iraqi intent

SCUDS
was

against population centers

How-

was indiscriminate even

if

the

to strike military objectives situated therein; the likelihood

striking protected persons
targets that the use

and objects so outweighed

that

of

of hitting legitimate

was improper. Given the interconnectivity of computer sys-

tems today, computer network attacks could readily be launched in an analogous fashion.
Proportionality: Scienter distinguishes the principle

of distinction. Distinction

and those in which there
trast,

is

limits direct attacks

on protected persons or

culpable disregard for civilian consequences.

proportionality governs those situations in

sons or objects

purpose.

The

is

of proportionality from that

which harm

is

derstanding of what

is

as a result of:

1)

being attacked;

2)
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its

intended

in

an unintended but

lack of sufficient

knowledge or un-

most often violated (sometimes

culpably negligent fashion)

By con-

to protected per-

the foreseeable consequence of an attack, but not

principle

objects

an inability to surgically

craft the
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amount of "force" being applied against a target; and 3) the inability to ensure
the weapon strikes precisely the right aim point. 81 All three pitfalls could surface
in the context of computer network attack.
As

set forth in

Protocol Additional

the principle of proportionality
loss

of civilian

tion thereof,

life,

when

injury to civilians,

which would be

and

relatively close [;]

.

.

.

an attack is indiscriminate
it

"may be expected

damage

as violative

of

to cause incidental

combinathe concrete and direct

to civilian objects, or a

excessive in relation to

military advantage anticipated." 82
tial

I,

A concrete and direct advantage

is

"substan-

advantages which are hardly perceptible and those

which would only appear in the long term should be disregarded." 83 Moreover,
the advantage calculated is that resulting from the overall operation, not the individual attack

itself.

84

Basically, the principle
is

especially difficult to

v. military

common

of proportionality mandates

conduct because differing

system of valuation.

cal grid that serves

that

and damage

computer network attack on an air traffic control sys-

when shutting down an electriboth military and civilian purposes? Can computer network
is

acceptable

be conducted against telecommunications

emergency response
is

entities (suffering

—one

How should civilian passenger lives be weighed

How much human suffering

attacks

balancing test

advantage) are being compared against each other in the absence of a

against military aircraft in a

tem?

a

if

they result in degrading

services for the civilian population?

Complicating matters

the fact that the answers to these and similar questions, assuming there are any

"right" answers,

is

contextual because the military advantage resulting from an

attack always depends
difficulty

involved in

on the state of hostilities at the time. 85 Acknowledging the
making these types of determinations, the Protocol Addi-

commentary notes that "[p]utting these provisions into practice
will
require complete good faith on the part of the belligerents, as well as the desire to
conform with the general principle of respect for the civilian population." 86
tional

I

.

Further complicating matters
effects

is

the issue of reverberating effects,

i.e.,

.

.

those

not directly and immediately caused by the attack, but nevertheless the

—

problem of the effects caused by the effects of an attack. The most cited example involves the attack on the Iraqi electrical grid
during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Although it successfully disrupted Iraqi
command and control, the attack also denied electricity to the civilian population (a "first-tier" effect), thereby affecting hospitals, refrigeration, emergency

product thereof

it is

the

when NATO struck at Yugoslavia's electrical supply
Operation ALLIED FORCE, one consequence was shutting

response, etc. Similarly,

network during

down

drinking water

pumping

stations. 87

Such

attacks set off "second-tier"

suffering (a reverberating effect) of the population. Obviously, precisely the
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same

CNA.

effects

could have resulted had the attacks been conducted through

much larger in com-

Indeed, the problem of reverberating effects looms

puter network than kinetic attacks due to the interconnectivity of computers,
particularly that

between

Reverberating
considered

effects

when

military

and

civilian systems.

bear on proportionality analysis because they must be

balancing collateral damage and incidental injury against

and whether reverberating or direct, it is
difficult to assess such damage and injury when caused by computer network
attack absent an understanding of how the computer systems involved function
and to which other systems they are linked. Despite this obstacle, planners and

military advantage. Unfortunately,

decision-makers have an affirmative duty to attempt to avoid collateral damage

and incidental injury whenever

feasible, a

duty that necessarily implies an

effort

88

damage or injury from an attack. Given the complexity of computer network attack, the high likelihood of an impact on civilian systems, and the relatively low understanding of its nature and effects on the part of
those charged with ordering the attacks, computer experts will have to be availto ascertain the resultant

and incidental

able to assess potential collateral

planning process.

89

effects

throughout the mission

Additionally, modeling and simulation, like that already

conducted for nuclear weapons, would prove invaluable in identifying possible

them prior to the outbreak of hostilities
and pace of war would be well advised.

reverberating effects; conducting

from the

—

fog, friction,

Minimizing

collateral

damage and

incidental injury: Proportionality

may be

—

free

determina-

However,
even if the selected target is legitimate and the planned attack thereon would be
proportional, the attacker has an obligation to select that method or means of
warfare likely to cause the least collateral damage and incidental injury, all other
tions establish

whether

a military objective

attacked

at

all.

things being equal (such as risk to the forces conducting the attack, likelihood of

weapons inventory, etc.). 90 Additionally, whenever a choice is presented between military objectives that can be attacked to achieve a desired
result, the attack which risks the least collateral damage and incidental injury
must be chosen. 91
The availability of computer network attack actually expands the options for
minimizing collateral damage and incidental injury. Whereas in the past physical
destruction may have been necessary to neutralize a target's contribution to the
success,

enemy's

efforts,

now

it

may be

possible to simply "turn

it

off."

For instance,

bombing an airfield, air traffic control can be interrupted. The same
of power production and distribution systems, communications, indus-

rather than
is

true

trial plants,

and so

forth.

be concerned about

Those who plan and execute such operations must

collateral

damage, incidental
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still

and reverberating
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with conducting

CNA.

classic kinetic

Additionally, depending

example

supra),
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but the

warfare are mitigated significantly through

on the desired

result,

ply interrupt operation of the target. This tactic

it

may be

would be

system

mediately preceding and during an
as

down for a short period,

assault.

possible to sim-

particularly attractive

in the case of dual-use objectives. Consider an electrical grid.
militarily necessary to shut the

risks associated

It

might only be

for example,

im-

The system could be brought back up

soon as the pressing need for its interruption passed, thereby limiting the nega-

on the

Along the same lines, because targets are
not physically damaged, and thus do not need to be repaired or rebuilt, the civilian population's return to normalcy at the end of the conflict would be
tive effects

civilian population.

facilitated.

There
fact that

is,

from

a

humanitarian point of view, one theoretical downside to the

CNA may sometimes cause less collateral damage and incidental injury

than kinetic attacks

—

it

might actually encourage

attacks.

This would be so in

the case of an attack that could not pass the proportionality test if conducted
kinetically,

if accomplished

but could

by computer network

attack.

Should the

CNA result in any collateral damage or incidental injury (albeit not enough to
outweigh the resulting military advantage), the net result would be greater civil-

While this is true, the better question from the humanitarian point
of view is whether CNA causes more or less collateral damage and incidental in-

ian suffering.

jury overall, not merely as to a single operation. So long as the various limitations

of the principle of discrimination are complied with, and without the benefit of a

draw on in making the assertion, it would seem that in humanitarian terms computer network attack is probably a step forward.
Perfidy: Although the core normative constraints on computer network attack derive from the principle of discrimination, several other related aspects of
track record to

humanitarian law are implicated by
bition

on

perfidy. Perfidy

is

this

new means of warfare. One is the prohi-

the feigning of protected status in order to take ad-

vantage of an adversary. Examples include pretending to be

enjoy non-combatant

status,

wounded or sick,

to

or to surrender, and improperly displaying symbols

that signify protected status, such as the red cross or red crescent. Perfidy

is

dis-

which are acts intended to mislead an adversary and cause
but which do not involve false claims of protected status.

tinguished from ruses,

him

to act recklessly,

Ruses

are lawful.

Information warfare, including computer network attack, opens
portunities for ruses

convey

false

false data,

and perfidy. This is because both techniques

many op-

are intended to

information. For instance, lawful ruses might include transmitting

meant

to

be intercepted by an adversary, regarding troop disposition
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or movements. Alternatively,

it

might involve

telligence databases, sending messages to

altering data in an adversary's in-

enemy

headquarters purporting to be

from subordinate units, or passing instructions to subordinate units that appear
to be from their headquarters. 92 All such activities would be perfectly legitimate.

On the other hand, any action intended to mislead the enemy into believing
that one's forces

enjoyed protected

enemy would be

illegitimate. 93

status in

order to

kill,

injure, or capture the

For instance, medical units and transports

use codes and signals established

may

by the International Telecommunications

Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International
Maritime Consultative Organization to identify themselves. 94 Falsely transmit-

more likely prospect in the computer network attack
context, causing adversary systems to reflect receipt of such signals would be
clear examples of perfidy. The Department of Defense has also opined that using
ting such code/signals or, a

"computer 'morphing' techniques
informing

state

would be

signed"

An

his troops that

interesting

through

to create an

image of the enemy's chief of

an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been

war crime if false. 95
prospect would be routing

a

civilian systems, or

otherwise feigning

a

computer network

a civilian source.

attack

This might be

mask the source of attack or to inspire confidence in the target that
the transmission was benign. Doing so would be prohibited both by the Protodone

to later

col Additional

I

and customary law. 96 This

is

a

very sensible restriction because

response to an attack apparently originating from

a civilian

a

source could be

kinetic in nature.
It

must be noted

that the protocol's restriction

on perfidy

is

limited to con-

The
commentary thereto notes this limitation, but suggests that "there is more to
an international treaty than the literal reading of all the words in the document
may suggest; it represents one step forward in the ongoing evolution in relations between States." 97 Be that as it may, as the law stands today it would be
duct calculated to

facilitate killing, injuring,

or capturing an adversary.

permissible to disguise information warfare operations as civilian in origin if

they were not related to killing, injuring, or capturing one's adversary. This
standard
"attack."

such

as

employed supra regarding "armed" conflict and
Moreover, the prohibition on misuse of protective codes and signals,

is

consistent with that

those designed to identify medical

facilities,

are absolute,

i.e.,

they ap-

ply regardless of the abuser's intent. As an example, usage merely to avoid attack

is

forbidden.

Civilian Shields: In theory, a

work

computer

attack

might

utilize a civilian net-

to shield itself against a response, either kinetic or

cyber attack.

If the latter did

through

a

counter-

not cause death or injury to civilians or damage
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or destruction of protected objects, and therefore was not an "attack" in the

humanitarian law sense,

it

would be

permissible.

On the other hand,

if it

might

damage or incidental injury, then any such effects on the civilian population would have to be considered in a proportionality analysis; civilians and civilian objects do not lose the protections of the law of armed conflict
cause collateral

by the wrongful
wrongful;

98

acts

of others.

Of course,

the use of civilian shields

is

itself

the party that subjects the civilian population or protected objects

by using them as shields is culpable under humanitarian law. This principle applies whether the attack is kinetic or computer in nature.
Mercenaries: Since computer network attacks can amount to both armed conflict and, in individual cases, an attack, restrictions on mercenaries may apply to
to risk

who

those

Additional

conduct them.

Mercenaries are specifically addressed in Protocol

although the restrictions contained therein are not customary in

I,

nature, a position strengthened

by the absence of any mention of mercenaries

in

the Statute of the International Criminal Court.

By

(a) is

(b)

mercenary

Article 47 of the protocol, a

is

any person who:

abroad in order to fight in an armed

specially recruited locally or

conflict;

does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;

(c) is

motivated to take part in the

gain and, in

fact,

compensation
similar ranks
(d) is

is

hostilities essentially

by the

desire for private

promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material

substantially in excess

of that promised or paid to combatants of

and functions in the armed forces of that Party;

neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory

controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is
(f)

a

not

a

member of the armed

has not been sent by a State

member of its armed

forces of a Party to the conflict;

and

which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as

forces."

While Protocol Additional I does not actually prohibit mercenarism, because
they are not combatants, mercenaries are not entitled to prisoner of war status.
Therefore, like any other noncombatant who directly engages in hostilities, they

may be

tried

under the domestic law of the State that captures them. 100

Given the complexity of conducting computer network

attacks,

it is

quite

conceivable that States might hire non-nationals possessing the requisite expertise to

mount them.

would be taking

If the

CNA

amount

to an "attack," these individuals

Assuming they met the other
mercenaries, the Protocol Additional I provisions would

a "direct part in the hostilities."

qualifying criteria for

apply. Interestingly, there

is

a financial incentive to

207

outsource

CNA because in

Michael N. Schmitt

many

cases hiring

computer

attack expertise

would be

far

more

cost-effective

than hiring conventional attack mercenaries or even acquiring weapons for
one's

own

forces.

Conclusion

By and large,

norms

ian prescriptive
objects,

information warfare capabilities increase, existing humanitar-

as

will suffice to maintain the protection civilians, civilian

and other protected

entities enjoy.

CNA do pose new and sometimes
use of cyber warfare during

However,

certain novel aspects of

troubling quandaries.

NATO's

campaign

The unease over

against Yugoslavia in

1999

compelling evidence that the question of how humanitarian law bears on
remains unsettled.
First, in

the
is

CNA

101

order to apply extant norms to

CNA,

it is

necessary to accept vari-

ous interpretive premises. Most important are the consequence-based inter-

"armed conflict" and "attack." Absent such understandings, the
applicability, and therefore adequacy, of present-day humanitarian law principles would fall into question. Interestingly, consideration of computer netpretations of

work

attack in the context of the jus ad bellum also leads to consequence-based

interpretation. 102

Second, even accepting the parameters resulting from the interpretations suggested, normative lacunae exist.

ian objects that
requisite level

do not injure,

Most notably,

kill,

attacks against civilians

damage, or destroy

civil-

produce the

of suffering) are by and large permissible. Given that kinetic

tacks usually have such effects, civilians

and

civilian objects

tion during conventional military operations.
attack,

(or otherwise

and

because

it

may

not amount to an

attack,

at-

enjoy broad protec-

However, computer network
opens up many possibilities for

targeting otherwise protected persons and objects.

The incentive for conducting

such operations grows in relation to the extent to which the "war aims" of the
party conducting the

CNA are coercive in nature; the desire to, e.g., "turn out

the lights" to a civilian population in order motivate
to take, or desist

from

it

to pressure

for

leadership

taking, a particular course of conduct (a step suggested

NATO's air commander during Operation ALLIED FORCE)
means

its

doing so expand.

103

This

is

an especially negative

will

reality in

grow

as

by

the

humanitar-

ian terms.

Third, and

more encouraging,

is

the fact that

achieve desired military objectives with

CNA may make

less collateral

it

possible to

damage and incidental

jury than in traditional kinetic attacks. Indeed, in certain cases, military

manders

will

be obligated to employ their cyber

208

assets in lieu

in-

com-

of kinetic weapons
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when collateral and incidental effects can be limited. 104 That said, it will be critiimportant to carefully analyze the

cally

their reverberating effects,

effects

of such operations, particularly

when assessing an attack's compliance with the prin-

of proportionality. This will require planning,

ciple

to operate in concert
Finally,

much as

CNA challenges existing notions of "attack,"
of combatant

technology and

computer. Failure to

strictly

status.

know-how

to

This

results

it

seeks to protect

and even though

it

offers the

such protection, significant prescriptive
to

from the use of typi-

limitations

and weaken humanitarian law norms.

suffices to safeguard those

attack,

will also test

conduct military operations via

So the jury remains out. While humanitarian law in

work

it

on the participation of
heightened endangerment of the ci-

comply with the

civilians in hostilities will inevitably lead to

vilian population

and computer experts

throughout the targeting cycle. 105

traditional understanding
cally civilian

legal,

from the

its

present form generally

effects

of computer net-

promise of periodically enhancing

fault lines

do

exist.

Thus,

as capabilities

conduct computer network attacks increase, both in terms of sophistication

and

availability,

continued normative monitoring

must avoid losing

sight

of humanitarian principles,

is

absolutely essential.

lest

We

the possible in warfare

supplant the permissible.
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to terminate such support.

56.2.
54.2. See also

Rome

Statute, supra note 58, art. 8.2(b) (xxv).

65.

Id., art.

66.

PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY,

supra note 26, para. 2110.

However, the

prohibition does not apply to objects used solely for the sustenance of enemy forces or "in direct

support of military action." Protocol Additional

would be
67.

a agricultural area

Id., arts.

35.3

& 55.

I,

supra note 10,

art.

54.3.

An example of the latter

used for cover by military forces.

See

also

Rome

environmental damage during armed

On the

Statute, supra note 58, art. 8.2(b)(iv).

conflict, see

issue

of

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF

LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (Jay E. Austin & Carl E Bruch eds.,
2000); Michael N. Schmitt, Green War: An Assessment of the Environmental Law of International
Armed Conflict, 22 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-109 (1997); PROTECTION OF

WAR:

THE ENVIRONMENT DURING ARMED CONFLICT AND OTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS
(Richard J. Grunawalt, John E. King & Ronald S. McClain eds., 1996) (Vol. 69, US Naval War
College International Law Studies).
68. Protocol Additional
for the extension

58,

art.

69.

arts.

supra note 10, art. 12.

of protection to

&

8.2(b) (ix)
Id.,

I,

civilian facilities. Id., art. 12.2.

its

The

extent of the protection varies depending

Id., art.

53.

71.

Id., art.

62.3.

72.

Id., art.

70. Special provisions as to

73.

Rome

GC

I,

An

on

the category of

when

such operations are entitled to the protection

Statute, supra note 58, art. 8.2(b) (hi).

supra note 19,

IV, supra note 19,

art.

art.

46;

GC

II,

supra note 19,

33; Protocol Additional

example of an attack on
forbidden weapon, such as poison.
74.

Rome Statute, supra note

location.

70.

apply.

See

that there are specific criteria
also

(xxv).

21-31.

transportation and

However, note

a

I,

combatant

art.

47;

supra note 10,
that
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GC III, supra note 19, art.
arts.

13;

GC

20, 51-56.

would be unlawful

is

one

that

employs

a
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75. Soafer, supra note 33, at 470. For the official

Handbook,
76.

The

US

position

on

reprisals against civilians, see

& 6.2.3.1—3.

supra note 54, paras. 6.2.3

reservation reads:

The obligations of Articles 51 and 55 are accepted on the basis that any adverse party against
which the United Kingdom might be engaged will itself scrupulously observe those
obligations. If an adverse party makes serious and deliberate attacks, in violation of Article
51 or Article 52 against the civilian population or civilians or against civilian objects, or, in
violation of Articles 53, 54 and 55,

United Kingdom

on

objects or items protected

by those

Articles, the

will regard itself as entitled to take measures otherwise prohibited

Articles in question to the extent that

it

by the

considers such measures necessary for the sole

purpose of compelling the adverse party to cease committing violations under those
Articles, but only after formal warning to the adverse party requiring cessation of the

been disregarded and then only

violations has

government.

after a decision

taken

at the

highest level of

Any measures thus taken by the United Kingdom will not be disproportionate

and will not involve any action prohibited by the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 nor will such measures be continued after the violations have
ceased. The United Kingdom will notify the Protecting Powers of any such formal warning
given to an adverse party, and if that warning has been disregarded, of any measures taken as

to the violations giving rise there to

a result.

Reprinted on the International Committee of the

Red

Cross Treaty Database website,

www.icrc.org/ihl.
77.
For a comprehensive review of the principle, see ESBJORN ROSENBLAD,
International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Some Aspects of the
Principle of Distinction and Related Problems (1979).
78. This typology is adopted from Christopher Greenwood, Tl\e Law oj Weaponry at the Start
the
New Millennium, in THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM
of
185 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green eds., 1998) (Vol. 71, US Naval War College
International Law Studies). By contrast, the US Air Force employs the categories of military
necessity,

humanity, and chivalry, with proportionality folded into necessity, whereas the

US

Navy uses necessity, humanity and chivalry. Compare DEPARTMENT OF THE AlR FORCE.
International Law The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations (AF

—

1-5-1-6 with Handbook, supra note 54, para. 5-1.
Additional Commentary, supra note 26, para. 1957.

Pamphlet 110-31, 1976),
79.

Protocols

at

On the attacks, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF
WAR (Title V Report to Congress) (1992), at 623, reprinted in 31 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
80.

MATERIALS 612
81.

(1992).

An expanded

Twenty-First Century

discussion

War and

its

is

in

Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum:

Possible Implications for the

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
82. Protocol Additional
see WilliamJ. Fenrick,

I,

Law

Tlie

of Armed Conflict, 19

US View of
MICHIGAN

1051, 1080-81 (1998).

supra note 10,

arts.

51.5(a)

& 57.2(a)(iii) & (b). On proportionality,

The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol Additional I in Conventional Warfare, 98
91 (1982); Judith G. Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International

MILITARY LAW PREVIEW

American Journal of International Law 391
Protocols Additional Commentary, supra note

Law, 87
83.

A number

(1993).
26, para. 2209.

of understandings/declarations/reservations have been issued on this point by
Parties to Protocol Additional I. For instance, the United Kingdom made the following reservation
when ratifying the protocol in 1998: "In the view of the United Kingdom, the military advantage
anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advantage anticipated from the attack
84.
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considered

as a

the Jus in Bello

whole and not only from isolated or particular parts of the

attack."

ICRC website,

supra note 76.

85.

An

additional

problem

is

complex. For instance, culture

that the valuation process itself is

may determine the value placed on an item or the value of an item may shift over time. The issue of
valuation paradigms

more
37

fully in

Michael N. Schmitt, War and

the

Environment: Fault Lines

Archiv des Volkerrechts 25 (1999).
86. Protocols Additional Commentary,
87.

NATO

damage during armed

explored, in the context of environmental

is

Denies Targeting Water Supplies,

in the Prescriptive

conflict,

Landscape,

supra note 26, para. 1978.

BBC WORLD ONLINE NETWORK, May

24,

1999, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_351000/351780.stm.
88. See generally, Protocol Additional
89.

supra note 10,

I,

art.

57.

The Joint Warfare Analysis Center currently is engaged in modeling foreign infrastructures

and contingent outcomes.
90.

Id., art.

91.

Id., art.

92. Article

57.2(a).

57.3.

39 of Additional Protocol

I

prohibits the use of the enemy's military emblems,

which the United States disagrees with except when it
engagement {see Handbook, supra note 54, para 12.1.1, fn 2), does not

insignia or uniforms. This prohibition,

occurs during the actual

extend to the use of codes, passwords, and the

Waldemar A.
Article

Solf,

38 prohibits the misuse of protective

93. Protocol Additional
8.2(b)(vii)

&

(xi).

MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL J. PARTSCH

Convention

(1982).

&

However,

37. See also

Rome

Statute, supra note 58, art.

Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct.

18,

23(b)7, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consolidated Treaty Series 277,

art.

I,

art.

(IV) respecting the

ROBERTS & GUELFF,

94. Protocol Additional

Conflicts

signals.

supra note 10,

I,

1907, annexed Regulations,
reprinted in

like.

New Rules for Victims of Armed

supra note 10, at 73, prohibits treacherous killing.

supra note 10, annex,

art.

11.

Department of Defense, An Assessment of Legal Issues in
Information Operations (Nov. 1999). The paper is appended to this volume as the Appendix.
96. Id., art. 37.1(c); US Army Judge Advocate General's School, Operational Law Handbook
95. Office of General Counsel,

5-16 (2000).
97. Protocols Additional
98.

GC IV, supra note

Commentary,

19,

art.

supra note 10, paras. 1492—94.

28; Protocol Additional

Statute, supra note 58, art. 8.2(b) (xxiii);

Hans

Handbook of Humanitarian Law

I,

supra note 10

51.7. See also

art.

Rome

P. Gasser, Protection of the Civilian Population, in

in

Armed Conflict

THE

209, 218 (Dieter Fleck ed.,

1995).

The United

99. Protocol Additional

I,

supra note 10,

47.1. This

is

problematic because States Party to the International Convention

art.

47.2.

States does

not support Article

47.

100.

Id., art.

and Training of Mercenaries, albeit limited in number
and though the convention is not yet in force (it has only secured 21 of the 22 necessary ratifications
as of October 2001), are obligated to amend their domestic laws to outlaw mercenarism. GA Res.
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing

44/34 (1989), art. 5.3, ICRC website, supra note 76.
101. For a description of hesitancy to use CNA during Operation ALLIED FORCE, see
Bradley Graham, Military Grappling with Rules for Cyber Warfare: Questions Prevented Use on
Yugoslavia,

WASHINGTON

POST, Nov.

8,

1999, at Al.

102. See Schmitt, Computer Network Attack, supra note 7.
103. Consider the

the air
I

comment of Lieutenant General Michael

war during Operation ALLIED

felt that

on

the

first

night, the

Short,

USAF, who commanded

FORCE:

power should have gone

off,

and major bridges around

Belgrade should have gone into the Danube, and the water should be cut off so that the next
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morning the leading citizens of Belgrade would have got up and
this?" and asked Milosovic the same question.

asked,

"Why are we doing

Craig R. Whitney, The Commander: Air Wars Won't Stay Risk-Free, General Says,

YORK TIMES, June

18, 1999, at

Al.

PROTOCOLS ADDITIONAL COMMENTARY,

104.

the duty of Parties to the conflict to have the

any

case,

prevent
105.

it is

reprehensible for a

itself

THE NEW

means

supra note 26, para. 1871, notes that "it

is

of the Protocol. In
Party possessing such means not to use them, and thus consciously

from making the required

available to respect the rules

distinction."

A typical Information Operations cell

is

illustrated in Joint

Pub 3-13,

supra note 2, at figure

IV-4 and accompanying text. It includes an IO officer fromJ-3; representatives fromJ-2, 4, 5, 6, 7,
supporting combatant commands, and service and functional components; a judge advocate; and
public

affairs,

counterintelligence, civil

affairs,

targeting, special operations, special technical

operations, electronic warfare, psychological operations, military deception, and operations
security experts.
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he advent of the computer has enormously increased the efficiency of

modern economies, lending computational prowess

to the organization

of industrial production, inventory, communications, the integration of power
grids, the control

of financial transactions, and transportation routing. The

decentralized architecture of the personal computer, and

its

Internet platform,

have linked economic actors screen-to-screen, allowing direct communications

and disintermediated transactions, bypassing
wholesale and

retail agencies.

ten texts through e-mail and

The

real-time

a costly institutional structure

communication of common writ-

document formats

has strengthened coordination

within and between organizations, permitting consultative processes to
staggered time. Cybernetic

life

of

has also brought

work in

new problems in public and pri-

vate law, including data privacy, jurisdiction for regulating speech and the protection of intellectual property.

Challenges for the law in a cybernetic age will extend to the
netics

battlefield.

have transformed war. In data-sharing, military planners were the

gineer joint access to a

common

pool through the

forerunner of the civilian sector's Internet. In
forces,

air

Cyber-

first

"D ARPANET,"

to en-

fabled

operations and even for ground

computer and sensor technology can eventually be used

to construct a

among

friendly forces.

real-time picture of an integrated battlespace, to be shared

and

Proportionality, Cyberwar,

the

Law

Computers, supporting sensors and global positioning
precision of weaponry and maneuvers, supplementing
ital

assessments.

cal

matches of

projectiles

The

of cruise

missiles

curement

cycles

satellites will

and

points.

human judgment with

and reconciling the

trajectory,

(Even in the

last

real coordinates

of

ten years, the navigational capabilities

may slow down

the implementation of this virtual battlespace,

A shared system of observation and control will support the

adjustment of tactics, the dynamic targeting of the adversary's

weapons

gration of multiple

platforms,

vanced electronics and computing

command and

and safeguards

capabilities also

assets,

the

against friendly

The

full intefire.

Ad-

hold the promise of confusing

control, disrupting his operating systems,

ing his view of the battlespace.

on

dig-

have been transformed.) Though budget constraints and pro-

the prospects are clear.

an adversary's

enhance the

accuracy of kinetic weapons will be improved by using opti-

targets

and aim

War

of

and mask-

future of national missile defense also depends

the extraordinary computing capabilities that can handle massive data

on

launch speed, trajectory, and atmospheric perturbations.

Computer technology will also continue
portation, communications, and logistics

to support

—

and sustaining a combat force, so often the

American military

trans-

essential in mobilizing, deploying,

Achilles' heel

of lesser military forces.

The American military is a far-flung force, deployed around the globe, conducting exercises, patrols, and peace operations in numerous theatres
to

common

data

and immediate communications can integrate

at

once. Access

a decentralized

force structure.

But the luxury of a new technology also can create vulnerabilities, and enhancement can become dependency. The sophistication of American military
operations may invite a new mode of asymmetric attack. Opposing forces whose

own

organization

jiu-jitsu.

is

The same

far

more

primitive

may

attempt an electronic version of

technological doors that permit easy communication also

allow unwanted foreign entry.

The

portals for adjustment

of operations

may

permit deliberate disruption. Encryption of data and communications has

grown in power, but code-breaking has
bionics. Protecting sensitive information

also benefited

from number-crunching

through compartmentalization

is

more

when access may be gained through trap doors and undetected keyThe quickly changing design of software and hardware, and the Penta-

difficult

holes.

gon's frequent reliance
operations, also
nerability

means

on commercially

available products for "non-critical"

that information technologists

of the systems they employ. Rather

derstanding

is

like

may

not fathom the vul-

war-gaming, defensive un-

often gained only after a simulated attack.

The

advantages of

cybernetic organization for military campaigns must be weighed against the

dangers of compromise and disruption.
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new

Military law must also address the

the

ill fit

architecture of cyberwar, including

of existing normative structures for electronic warfare.

lenge for military thinkers

is

what to do about

civilian safety.

the operational harshness of warfare has been challenged
tionality

and discrimination. These

mented by

commanders and

military

distinction

between

tage always

must be measured

new

ideals

civilian

A primary chal-

Over the

by the

ideals

centuries,

of propor-

of the profession of arms, imple-

their legal advisors, ask for a critical

and military

targets,

and teach that military advan-

against civilian loss. Cybernetic conflict

may pose

hazards to civilian safety, taxing our traditional notions of the division be-

tween the

battlefield

and

civilian

well to consider

life. It is

some of these prob-

lems in advance in order to construct the necessary safeguards. 1
Discrimination

knowledging

tween

among

that there

is,

targets

is

norm of

military law, ac-

ultimately, an important distinction to

and military

civilian objects

fundamental

a

assets.

be made be-

The idea of discrimination is rooted in

the belief that warfare should be effective, rather than punitive, and that wars can

be

won without deliberately harming civilians. The moral

do not extend

(even where, in their political
right to

life

Noncombatants

to unnecessary cruelty.
lives,

they

may have

compromises of war

are considered innocent

favored a war) and enjoy a

protected even in warfare. Apart from the ethical claim, there

is

a

The reciprocal practice of discrimination
greater assurance that his own family members will sur-

practical reason to observe this scruple.

means

that a soldier has

vive the conflict.

A military operator also will see discrimination as the practical

application of economy of force, saving one's firepower for targets that matter.

The norm
tion

is

—armed

further supported
conflicts

may end

by

where defeated soldiers can reintegrate
which there is something to return to. Re-

earlier

into a workable civilian society, in

newal of the

conflict

working hypothesis about war termina-

a

may be more

likely if civilian society

is

left destitute

and

a

generation reared seeking revenge.

beyond the ban on delibdominant intention is not enough in

Proportionality extends the protection for civilians
erate targeting. Proportionality argues that

Even with a military target directly
in view, there must be some balancing between the advantage to the war effort
from a target's destruction and the foreseeable "incidental" damage to civilians.
choosing the objects of destruction in

The

terms of trade in

relative

this

a war.

moral exchange are not

weighting of military gain and

civilian

terribly clear, to

harm

is

a

be sure

—

complex judgment

the

that

involves both battlefield expertise and situational ethics. But at the limit, there

is

an admitted case in which an ephemeral military advantage could not outweigh

enormous harm.
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of

In the idealized account of the law of war, the operational code ofjus

in bello is

no matter who was at fault in starting the conflict.
In this view, the operational norms regulating how a war is fought do not vary
according to the purpose of the war. The same tactics govern a virtuous or condemnable war. Jus in bello binds a combatant despite his status as invader or as a
equally binding

on both

sides

victim defending his homeland.

The perceived

third party or protecting power can

value of this separation

The

that a

monitor the observance of humanitarian law

without venturing into the hotly disputed territory of casus
the underlying dispute.

is

on the

international limits

belli

and the merits of

initiation

of warfare, jus

ad bellum, are placed in a separate normative framework. (The practical tolerance

of political publics for this attempted distinction is another matter. Indeed, in the
preparation for the

Nuremberg trials,

at least

one prominent scholar argued

any use of force by the Axis, even against traditional military

targets,

that

should be

considered a war crime, since each use of force aided the Nazi war of aggression. 2

The obverse

conclusion, that any tactic was permissible to defeat Nazism,

was not openly mooted, but may underlie some of our practical assessments.)
Protecting civilians is harder than it sounds on paper for a number of reasons. First, in

modern warfare,

the mobilization of national economies and

production makes industrial plants and infrastructure into

Economic

assets are

fort. Critics

a

second

war

battlefield.

considered military targets for their support of the war ef-

have questioned the efficacy of particular

air

campaigns, but the le-

gitimacy of weakening an adversary's industrial base and war production
facilities is

generally accepted. Unless an air campaign can be confined to

night-time bombing, the targeting of war industries will endanger workers in
the plants, even though they are technically noncombatants. Locating
dustries in

sion

urban areas

bombing

is

is

also likely to

endanger residential

lenged the protection of civilians.

The

involve camouflaging insurgent forces

has

been

a

in-

areas, unless preci-

used.

Second, the rural conflicts of the Cold

tection against

war

more powerful

War

and decolonization

also chal-

techniques of guerrilla warfare typically

among

the civilian population as pro-

adversaries. Distinctive military insignia or dress

long-standing requirement of legitimate warfare in order to distin-

guish civilians from combatants and the failure to identify forces traditionally

deprived the disguised combatants of the protections of the law of war, includ-

But the norm of self-identification was derided as a
of wars against "colonial domination." 3 Undermining this rule

ing prisoner of war

luxury in an era

status.

of combatant identification poses obvious dangers to innocent civilians. 4 In
civil war, terrorist tactics against civilians also have been deliberately used as a
powerful advertisement that the established government cannot guarantee
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protection. Governments, in turn, have used terror to persuade civilian
lations to

withhold support from insurgents.

The problem of target masquerade
since combatants are
cilities.

popu-

extends even to conventional warfare,

sometimes tempted to disguise military

assets as civilian fa-

Secreting a weapons cache inside a school building serves to collapse the

attempted distinction between civilian and military

sites,

and is an

act

of perfidy

war crime. Misuse of a civilian facility deprives the target of its
protected status, but the damage remains because it makes combatants less inpunishable

as a

clined generally to respect the protection guaranteed to civilian

The

stemmed from nuclear
of deterrence through mutu-

third source of heightened danger for civilians

confrontation in the Cold War, with
ally

sites.

its

strategies

assured destructive capability, flexible response, and counterforce targeting.

Even with
sile silos,

the confinement of nuclear targeting to military objects such as mis-

troop concentrations, and ports and

tion, electromagnetic pulse,

and

a

airfields,

the externalities of radia-

broad radius of immediate destruction meant

would have been gravely endangered.
Since the end of the Cold War, the proliferation of ethnic conflicts has continued to pose grave hazards to civilians. In a war whose target is the civilian
population itself, atrocious acts are often committed against noncombatants as
one way of causing populations to flee. The war aim of creating a mono-ethnic
that civilian populations

territory

on

is

used to justify terror

civilians are

tactics in

not incidental, but

order to displace populations. Attacks

rest at the

center of the conflict, serving the

war aim of purging minorities and ethnic rivals. Where advantage may be
gained by the rapid consolidation of territory, the employment of terror against
central

civilians

is

hard to contain.

Even with the most worthy war aims,
itary

and

civilian targets

avoid terror

tactics).

may be under

between milstill mandatory to
the 1999 Kosovo

the principled distinction

pressure (though

it is

In a humanitarian intervention such as

campaign, designed to stem the gross mistreatment of civilian populations, responsible leaders must seek to
sist,

using war

as a

undermine the

transgressing adversary's will to re-

mode of coercive diplomacy. Winning such a limited conflict

from the unconditional surrender sought in the great land campaigns of the world wars. Striking mobile military vehicles, tanks, and artillery
pieces in a mountainous terrain is exceedingly difficult, and (in a humanitarian
is

quite different

intervention designed to thwart genocide) an expedited end to the conflict

be urgent. At

may

one high Yugoslav official has suggested that the Kosovo
campaign was abandoned by Belgrade because Milosevic doubted the ultimate
loyalty of the Yugoslav military. This disaffection was caused in part by the military's

least

concern about

how the steady destruction of Serbia's infrastructure would
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affect the welfare
civilians

and

of their own families. While there

must not be

is

of

War

widespread consensus that

deliberately reduced to starvation or other life-threatening

one

conditions, at least

Law

the

analyst has suggested that the rule

of discrimination

should permit the disabling of facilities that sustain some conveniences of modern civilian
fication

life.

The danger of a slippery slope is evident

and sewage

beyond

disposal, for

—

the loss of water puri-

example, could cause devastating disease and

Yet the problems of stopping a war
that seems remote to the controlling polity are also evident, and the limit of
"mere inconvenience" does not abandon the broader norm of protecting civil-

lies

the pale of easy ethical analysis.

The troubling question of how to persuade an adversary to desist has
not been made easier as well by the last decade's record of ineffective employment of economic sanctions as an alternative instrument of coercion.
ian survival.

Another

difficult

by the new precision of guided muniWith navigation by global positioning and optical recognition, aim points

tary objects has
tions.

and

challenge to the conceptual categories of civilian and mili-

target

urban

been created,

may be

impact

area.

as

ironically,

exact

as

the particular courtyard of a building in an

Targeting has an exactitude, and therefore

a transparency

of inten-

unknown to other wars. The targets sought in an air campaign are evident
and public. The five-mile radius of uncertainty that surrounded the aerial deliv-

tion,

Second World War served to obscure the target aim,
knowledge of the campaign plans. But precision-guided mu-

ery of munitions in the
apart

from internal

announce

nitions

masked

their destination,

and pose the questions of target distinction

in earlier wars.

Finally, there

is

the serious

lem of distinction between

dilemma of dual-use

military

and

civilian objects.

infrastructure of modern economies. Military
for electricity, natural gas,

and

targets.

and

populations. In the

Kosovo and

press anti-aircraft capability

lee

of a

surance of safe

power

grid.

air

The

hill,

Iraqi air

Mobile

To

is

there a

disable the fa-

campaigns,

allied forces

facilities,

needed

to sup-

in order to allow safe al-

camouflaged and positioned

even in

clear weather.

The only

as-

may lie in pulling the plug on anti-aircraft by disabling a

legitimacy of doing so depends

tionality. Vital civilian functions

may

Rarely

need

may unavoidably burden the local civilian

are difficult to target

space

facilities.

and ground radar guidance

lied entry into hostile airspace.

under the

stems from the joint

oil to sustain their basic services.

that sustain a military adversary

again a prob-

is

civilian facilities share a

dedicated infrastructure exclusively serving military
cilities

It

This

such

as schools,

on

a

judgment about propor-

old age homes, and hospitals

depend on electrical power. The civilian harm from their temporary
disability must be conscientiously weighed against the military advantage. The
merger of military and civilian electrical infrastructure shows the difficulty of a
also
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strict
ity.

principle of distinction,

and the quandaries ofjudgments on proportional-

Oil and gasoline supplies, too, present a dual-use dilemma. Loss of refining

and storage
visions for

facilities

can severely limit an adversary's

extended operations. Yet

di-

may be necessary for the winter

oil supplies

heating of civilian dwellings in urban areas.

armored

ability to field

The

ability

of a regime to deprive

its

population in favor of continued military capability makes the linkage

civilian

even more
ciple can

painful.

be

None

of these real-world problems of ethics, law, and prin-

easily solved, 5

even while the law of armed

conflict

must maintain

the ideals of discrimination and proportionality.

The

legal texts that

have accompanied these

note, as a preliminary matter.

historical

changes are worthy of

The Hague Rules of 1907 were modest

in their

scope, anticipating in the Martens Clause that a changing technology and the
unsettled practice of States might

make codification difficult. 6 The Hague Rules

on undefended towns, and require sparing, "as far as
possible," cultural and medical institutions. Arms "calculated to cause unnecessary suffering" were also banned. But some of the modern operational dilemmas
lay beyond anticipation or consensus.
Operational targeting was incidentally addressed in the 1949 Geneva Conforbid pillage and attacks

ventions, through the establishment of protections for hospitals and neutralized

zones for civilians

who

"perform no work of a military character,"

right of evacuation of children
8

was signed but not
rity

has

ratified

the

and aged persons from encircled areas. But in the

new attention both to a broader definition of

proportionality and the nature of civilian targets.
I

as

7

1977 Geneva Protocols, there was
successful for Protocol

well

as

The

effort

was not altogether

been disputed in several of its features. The Protocol

by the United

States,

and was excluded by the Secu-

Council from the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the for-

mer Yugoslavia

as a direct

source of law for the tribunal.

proportionality has been modified further in the

manent

Rome

Its

formal definition of

negotiations for a per-

international criminal court.

Article 51(b)

of Protocol

pected to cause incidental

I

loss

deems an

attack "indiscriminate" if it

of civilian

ian objects, or a combination thereof,

life,

injury to civilians,

which would be

"may be ex-

damage

to civil-

excessive in relation to

the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."

The

International

Criminal Court (ICC) treaty limited the language, noting that military advantage

is

to

military

be assessed in the context of an "overall" military campaign

commanders and operators

objectives. 9

to seek

more

distant, as well as

—allowing
immediate

A military advantage, for example, need not be "temporally or geo-

graphically related to the object of the attack." 10 In addition, the

notes that the military

commander

breaches
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ICC

treaty

where the

and
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incidental loss of civilian

life

Law

the

or injury to civilians

of

War

"clearly" excessive. 11

is

"Knowledge" is an essential element. The uncertainties of war are legendary,
and the commander's assessment must be based on the information he has available at the time. Only where a commander, based on the information available
to him at the time, "knew" the damage caused would be clearly excessive, is
there a criminally culpable act. 12 This may include self-conscious knowledge of
the breaching of a legal limit, as well as knowledge of the actual facts of the campaign. As noted by the committee of experts advising the prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia:

It is

than

much
it is

to apply

it

to a particular set of circumstances because the

between unlike

often

innocent

of proportionality in general terms

easier to formulate the principle

human

quantities

and

opposed

lives as

values.

One

cannot

comparison

So, too, the text of the 1977 Protocol defining civilian objects

incomplete by the

Rome

parent

the "civilian population

shall

clarity, that

I

13

was deemed

says,

with ap-

such, as well as individual civilians,

not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose

of which
ticle

negotiators. Article 51(2) of Protocol
as

of

easily assess the value

to capturing a particular military objective.

is

is

to spread terror

among the civilian population are prohibited." 14 Ar-

52 prescribes that "civilian objects

prisals,"

shall

not be the object of attack or of re-

but notes, tautologically, that "[cjivilian objects are

not military objectives

as

defined in paragraph 2." 15

The

objects

all

which are

search for specificity

is

not greatly aided by the next bundle of negotiated language. Paragraph 2 of Article

52 notes broadly that "military objectives are limited to those objects which

by

their nature, location,

tary action

and whose

purpose or use make an effective contribution to mili-

total

or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in

the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."

The

difficulties

ations for the

of definition were implicitly recognized in the

The implementation of
requiring proof that a commander

permanent international criminal

Article 51 noted the centrality of intention

"intended" that

civilians as

—

court.

such be "the object of the attack"

ing specific intent to cause such

Rome negoti-

—arguably

harm and knowledge of the

requir-

legal status

of the

protected persons.

The Rome
cle 52,

drafters also

condemning

jects, that

is,

objects

attempted to

attacks

which

where the "object of the

I.

attack"

is

implicitly

In Article 54, starvation of civilians
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16

implement Arti-

was

"civilian

ob-

But the difficulties of
acknowledged elsewhere in
as a method of warfare is

are not military objectives."

distinction in regard to dual-use assets

Protocol

craft a criminal rule to

Ruth Wedgwood

prohibited, and

it is

equally prohibited to attack or destroy "objects indispens-

able to the survival of the civilian population"

where the

"specific

deny them

to the civilian population.

the asset

used in "direct support of military action," unless

is

starvation or forced

But

attack

is

purpose"

is

to

concededly permitted where
this

would

cause

movement.

How do these principles apply to computer attacks and computer defense, in
an age of cyberwarfare?

The requirement of

discrimination between civilian and military objects

presents a substantial challenge in cyberwarfare-

—complicated

as

well by the

mode, the United States were the victim
of an attack on vital computer systems, the temptation to respond in kind would
be considerable. Yet the ultimate source of a computer attack can be acutely difficult to determine
a problem magnified by the deliberate use of "looping" or
question of neutrality.

in a defensive

If,

—

"weaving"
attack
ship,

is

—using

likely to

and

another's server to disguise the origination of the attack.

An

be sent through an unrelated server in order to mask its author-

a response in

may end up damaging or disabling the "looped"
servers may be largely dedicated to civilian functions,

kind

The intermediate
and may even be in a country other than the originator of the attack. Even where
server.

the retaliatory response successfully limits
gin, the counterattack

may end up

its

impact to the ultimate point of ori-

disabling civilian functions.

use a civilian platform for convenience or in order to

even though the

latter

could qualify

In a world of real geography,

it is

of unauthorized use of platforms.
the misuse of its territory.

is

its

simpler to frame a response to the problem

A sovereign State

is

is

held responsible to police

a counterattack across the

abandoned or was unable

and governing

in private hands,

civilian authorities.

and has no

bor-

to discharge the duty to

own soil. The same duty could be imposed on the proprietors

tronic space

space

mask State-sponsorship,

An insurgent force cannot launch cross-border attacks

that the harboring State

police

attacker can

as perfidy.

with impunity, and one rationale for permitting
der

The

of elec-

But the organization of cyber-

single authoritative source

of police.

Misappropriation of a server can be accomplished quickly and secretly, and even
if a server's vulnerability

has

been detected before, not every

trespass

on

a server

worth preventing. Unless the involvement of a nation State is evident, say by
advertising an available "free zone" for cyberpirates, a retaliatory response may

is

be disputed.
In addition,

it

may be

far

harder to confine the effects of the counterattack

than in a land-based response. Cyberspace counterattack

some because
terra incognita,

the topography

is

is

especially trouble-

unknown. The shape of cyberspace

is

truly

including a server's network linkages to civilian structures. In
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of

conventional military campaign employing land forces or

air attack against

an

adversary, the proximity of civilian structures and other protected objects can

be mapped by surveillance
tion

may be

aircraft,

imperfect, and there

harm, but there
prepared target

some

may

cases in order to

itself

in cyberspace, there

civilian

to

difficulty that the

firewalls into the

a hostile act.

before

it

it

A

estimates

may be

map

its

geog-

Nonetheless, one

of "benign" or "humanitarian"

order to contain the consequences
feasibility

of this

is

open

to ques-

may be detected.
scruple may be to build

very act of intrusion

very instrument of intrusion.

duct benign mapping in advance,

attack.

harm should munitions go

For any form of cyber counterattack, one necessary

map

incidental

to a target

to intrude in order to

map cyberlinks in
counterattack. The technical

with the added

device

all

often a rapidly changing architec-

is

to propose a defeasible duty

—attempting

of a defensive
tion,

minimize

be detected and considered

might be inclined
espionage

to avoid

The method of approach

and control, and the attempt

ture of linkage

way

realistic

some relative idea of the likely consequences of an
list or "bombing encyclopedia" is designed to permit

wide of the mark. But
raphy

may be no

is

of probable civilian casualties.
altered in

The informa-

drones, or ground spotters.

may be

Where

it is

not feasible to con-

conceivable to have the intrusion

by characterizing the content of files
destroys them. This might help to distinguish between military and cior

filter as it

goes, for example,

Another palliative may be to conceive of
proportionality as a dynamic matter. Greater damage to civilian objects may be
tolerated in order to eliminate a security threat, so long as the damage is revers-

vilian objects linked to the

ible or, indeed, aid

An

additional

is

same

given in

problem

server.

its

restoration.

17

in applying proportionality

is

criminal acts and acts of war. In the midst of a major conflict
tional

between
fought by conven-

the twilight

means, any accompanying electronic attack will be regarded

utter gravity, justifying a strong response against the actor,

as a

matter of

even with ensuing

more ambiguous setting, for example, where a State
actor is gathering information that would facilitate illicit entry and hostile operations, there is no predicate that provides a classical justification for the use ot
collateral

damage. But in

a

overwhelming force in response. To be sure, intrusions even by non-State actors, where they cause serious interference with vital operations or loss of life,
would fit the ordinary understanding of terrorism. But Washington has chosen
to emphasize the tools of criminal law in responding to most forms of terrorism,
attempting to arrest and indict members of international networks, rather than
treating them as combatants in an undeclared private war. Force is fully warranted to capture an international terrorist or thwart
nal

law creates

a set

a

planned attack, but crimi-

of expectations that are often frustrating to an effectively
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fought conflict. Criminal law withholds any justification of punitive force until
after

proof has been mustered in court and

ent fact finder.

Its

a verdict

is

rendered by an independ-

proceedings are public, and the sources of evidence are often

compromised during a trial by the public disclosure of the methods of surveillance. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is an appropriate standard for protecting
domestic liberty in a

culture.

sumption

The

extraordinary difficulty of detaining an

worthy price to pay in order to preserve a libertarian poBut criminal law's demanding standards are founded on the as-

individual offender
litical

civil society.

is

a

that civil society enjoys the underlying fidelity

of the relevant

International politics and the security decisions of nation States

proceed on more ambiguous indicators.

actors.

must sometimes

18

In addition, the invocation of criminal law creates the expectation that action taken abroad will defer to local State consent. Because criminal processes
are public,

any related government action abroad

is

likely to

become known.

Actions taken for intelligence purposes that do not enjoy the consent of the

may do especially grave damage to bilateral relations if
Thus, when invoked, the criminal law paradigm tends to

foreign territorial State

they are broadcast.

dominate Washington's response to

a situation, since all

other modalities must

be weighed in light of the cost of their public disclosure. (Sometimes

mere

fact

of publicity that will cause

to an international security

a foreign

government

it is

the

to react strenuously

measure out of a perceived affront to

its

public dig-

nity or amour propre.)

Recent negotiations for a convention on cybercrime illustrate the point.
Lengthy talks were conducted through the Council of Europe, with the participation of the United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia. The draft treaty requires each participating country to criminalize various forms of computer
misuse, including deliberate denial of service through distributed network attacks, and to create real-time methods of preserving and gathering relevant
proof. 19 This

is

may be possible
One of the treaty's

especially important since tracing an attacker

underway and the actor is still on line.
more controversial features would require Internet service providers
only while the attack

information

at

is

to preserve

the request of a State party. Nonetheless, a successful criminal in-

quiry will depend

on

attacker loops his

communication.

cyber adversary to

the treaty cooperation of each country through

filter his

It

will not take

much

which an

sophistication for a

messages through countries outside the treaty re-

Any direct response to the attack, through counterattack or disabling
measure, may be resented by the treaty States in the loop as "derisive" of the
gime.

treaty

regime and discourage their

ment jurisdiction of local

later

authorities

is

cooperation. Deference to the enforcea

premise of the treaty architecture, and
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yet

may be unworkable

sures. Private hackers in

Gulf War, and, in
nal

and

the

for intelligence operations

Europe offered

Law

of

War

and national security mea-

their services to Iraq during the Persian

a similar situation, the

slow and deliberate processes of crimi-

law may not be adequate for infrastructure protection.

Even

if there

is

a decision to treat

rather than crimes,

it

will

State-sponsored cyber attacks

as acts

of war

remain difficult to identify these more serious incidents

been observed, it may be
hard to distinguish the spread of natural pathogens from deliberate acts of contamination. The same difficulty can arise in distinguishing a prankster or technological sociopath from an international adversary. The difference is surely
important in assessing whether the attack is likely to escalate as the diversionary
prelude to other more deadly methods of warfare. The ambiguity of sponsorship
that one saw in the surrogate conflicts of the Cold War is likely to plague cyber
in a timely

defense

way. In biological warfare,

it

has recently

as well.

The dilemmas of civilian protection in cyber conflict are a circumstance to be
lived with. Technology may solve some of the problems it has created. And the
technological superiority of the United States in all modalities of conflict may
mean that we can afford to accept some risk for the sake of maintaining a moral
high ground. The best answer to the Solomonic cyber quandaries will require
the continuing collaboration of technologists, warfighters, ethicists, and,
forget, experts in the

lest

we

law of war.
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another possibility that
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disrupt an adversary's military communications, military mobilization, the processing of targeting

information, and other
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The same

But the attack may
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preventative measures of benign espionage and a

231

Proportionality , Cyberwar,

and

the

Law

of

War
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un r^

here

is

nothing

new

1

about revising neutrality;

it

has

undergone an

almost constant process of revision in detail," Philip Jessup con-

cluded in 1936. 2

.

.

.

He

also

believed

[N]othing could be more fallacious than the attempt to

rules

of neutrality by the principles of

compromise and of experience,

logic has

development and cannot properly be used

Over half a century into
vations,

the

test

logic.

Since they are products of

found

practically

no place

in their

in their application. 3

UN Charter era,

little

would change

even in the information warfare (IW) 4 context.

have appeared, 5 including the Charter

the application of

itself;

New

these obser-

considerations

the process of analyzing the law of

neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. Principles
neutrality for maritime warfare have

been seen

to

be

less rigid,

from an

of

historical

perspective, than those for air or land warfare, 6 for example.

Some claim neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence. " 7 A major reason,
ing to those
is

accord-

who say future applications of the law of neutrality will be minimal,

an argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the old law of

neutrality. 8

can be no

Another argument is

state

that since the Charter has

of war, and therefore there

is

no need

outlawed war, 9 there

for a

law of neutrality. 10

Neutrality and Information Warfare

(This position might be considered in light of the Pact of Paris [1928], outlawing
aggressive war. 11

World War

II

began

decade

a

later.)

Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, maintain that
the law of neutrality continues to exist.
neutrality.

12

The 1992-96

The San Remo Manual recognizes maritime

International

Law Association Committee on Maritime

Neutrality studied neutrality, and the 1998

ILA conference accepted the Commit-

13
Individual researchers assert that neutrality
tee's final report.

remains a valid legal

concept, albeit modified by the impact of the Charter and other considerations. 14

Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of neutrality's demise in
the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated,

as

the ensuing analysis of the ap-

plication of neutrality principles to information warfare demonstrates.

Application of the Principles of the
to Information

The law of warfare

Law

of Neutrality

Warfare

armed
conflict involving IW. The Charter applies across the board to all treaties, and
perhaps customary law as well. 15 Although there are a few treaties with some
bearing on transmission of information, e.g., Hague V and XIII, in most cases
the analysis must proceed from general custom, general principles, and analysis
by analogy. General principles of law occupy an anomalous position among
sources of international law. Although the Statute of the International Court of
Justice lists them among primary sources that may be cited in cases before the
Court, 16 and some commentators include them among primary sources for deriving rules of law, 17 others accord them secondary status, perhaps as
gap-fillers. 18 Whichever view one might take, in a new and fast-moving area of
the law where there are few guideposts, resort to general principles of law, and
commentators that discuss them, 19 may be the only sources that are available.
What then should be the method of analysis for IW issues?
The first and primary rule should be application of mandatory Charter norms,
e.g.,

has

little, if

any, direct reference to problems of

the right of self-defense, with, e.g.,

tionality for reaction in self-defense,

20

or

its

limitations of necessity

and propor-

UN Security Council decisions.

next level of analysis should employ the mixture of treaties, custom,

must apply

in specific neutrality situations.

For example,

if

Hague

V

21

The

etc. that

and XIII

principles applicable to telecommunications are customary law, they should

be applied, perhaps alongside general law of armed conflict (LOAC) principles
such

as necessity

and proportionality

prohibitory rule,

e.g.,

no

first

proportionality or necessity

in a given situation, except

use of poison gas, for

qualifications. 22 In
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modality of transmitting Internet messages, States will indirectly affect use of and

The

messages through the Internet.
based messages
cessity

there

is

must be had

necessity

factors.

no "hard law,"

to general

i.e.,

black-letter rules governing conduct, re-

customary

LOAC principles, i.e. military objective,

in self-defense responses. 23

different

plied in the law of land, sea, air

and space law. As

(LOS) and the law of naval warfare may

IW

similar principles to

will

offer the

treaties

for these situa-

and principles ap-

be seen, the law of the sea

most and best analogies

for

situations.

Neutrality, Land Warfare,

The

from

The content of the law

might be informed by analogies from custom,

neutrals in

used for Internet-

telephone or telegraph messages can be ne-

and proportionality, which may be

be observed
tions

as traditional

and proportionality

Where
sort

well

as

may be

fact that cables

implications for

IW

and Information Warfare

from the law of neutrality

relating to neutral land

The Charter may impact decisions on the law of neutrality,
and treaty suspension or termination principles may apply for international
agreements other than those dealing with warfare. 24 The Security Council may
make legally binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, and
therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles 41-42 to take action that
might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality principles. The Council also
may make nonbinding "califs] upon" Members under Articles 40-41. It also
may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40. If Council deciterritory are several.

sions differ

from

traditional neutrality principles, the latter

Council or General Assembly resolutions are
trality principles,

and

at

must give way. 25

If

variance from traditional neu-

customary or other binding sources of law, 26 these

restate

resolutions also will affect the traditional law of neutrality. 27

Thus, Council decisions

may compel

traditional neutrality practice
acts

behave inconsistently with

by requiring what would otherwise be belligerent

or by restricting rights neutrals traditionally enjoy. 28 Nevertheless, belliger-

ent attacks must be conditioned
tive, necessity,

A neutral
tions, base,
e.g.,

a State to

and

on general warfare

principles of military objec-

proportionality. 29

has a duty to prevent use of its territory for a belligerent's opera-

or

as a sanctuary.

30

The

activity,

depending on personnel involved,

belligerent forces operating the Internet computer,

the neutral's territorial integrity under the Charter.

reason to

know

of activity within

its

31

may be

If a neutral

a violation

knows

or has

territory involving Internet use that

non-neutral in nature, the neutral must act to end that activity under the
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and may invoke the Charter

if

territorial integrity. If a neutral

the activity involves a violation of the neutral's

may be required to mobilize forces to

from crossing into neu-

fillment of its responsibility to prevent belligerent forces

neutral

from

may mobilize

its

act in self-defense, 32

and thus

tral territory,

territory,

or order

even

and supplies belonging

by analogy

it

may be argued

forces to counter an Internet attack

its

that a

conducted

not involved. If war materials

if a belligerent's forces are

to a belligerent, either as a matter

ployed in an Internet attack while situated within

ensure ful-

of title or

use, are

em-

a neutral's borders, the neutral

can act against the materials and supplies. If belligerent forces operate the computers, etc., the case for neutral action

the

may take proportional action,

LOAC,

the neutral
ligerent

either

under the law of self-defense or

to counter these Internet activities. 33

may

and

assert a violation

of its

Of course,

territorial integrity

resort to self-defense measures. 34

belligerent's prior notice to the neutral

to

stronger.

does not or cannot effectively enforce compliance, an aggrieved

If a neutral

belligerent

is

there

is

a risk that

by the aggrieved

bel-

In these situations, an aggrieved

may be prudent, unless the neutral is seen

be cooperating with the offending belligerent.
If belligerents

may

not build radio stations on neutral

territory,

by analogy

they cannot use Internet "stations" in neutral territory, and a neutral must shut
these

down. 35

does not have the means, or the willingness to do

If a neutral

aggrieved belligerent
that if neutrals

may

take proportional

need not control

their

ing in a private capacity, 37 then there

action. 36 It

own stations,
is

so,

an

would seem, however,

or acts of their nationals act-

no obligation

to

do the same

for Internet

information thus passed to a belligerent under the Hague law. Query whether
the pattern of neutrals' controlling radio stations in

dence to establishing

a

two World Wars 38

gives cre-

customary norm obliging neutrals to do so in future

conflicts.

The land warfare rules for railway rolling stock offer an interesting
Hague V provides that belligerents may not requisition railway rolling
companies chartered by
ever, if a private

a neutral State

company

as

though

it is

if absolutely necessary.

enemy

enemy character and may be

belligerent uses for carrying

may

gency, but that

How-

seized and ap-

State property. 40 If a belligerent

neutral-owned rolling stock unless absolutely necessary but may

belligerent

stock of

39

chartered by a neutral consents to the stock's use for

warlike purposes, the stock acquires
propriated

except

parallel.

war goods, could

it

may

not use

seize stock a

not be argued by analogy that

a

not "seize" neutrals' Internet transmissions except in emer-

if the neutral

allows the Internet to be used for messages harmful

to the belligerent, those aspects

of the Internet are
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fair

game?
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Humanitarian law allows

from belligerent forces

a neutral to authorize passage

if vehicles

transporting

of wounded and sick

them carry no combatants or war

materials. If a neutral allows passage, the neutral assumes responsibility for

viding for control and safety of these personnel.
authorize passage for belligerents' sick and

41

neutral may, but

is

If a neutral has discretion to

wounded armed

while assuming responsibility for their control and

pro-

safety,

it

forces personnel

would seem that the

not required to, allow Internet messages regarding belligerent

sick

and wounded,

war

is

if

the neutral can be sure that

no information

affecting the

passed home. 42 Similarly, a prisoner of war staying in neutral territory 43

may not be allowed

Internet access to send information

belligerent activity, any

telephone, televise,

home

that

amounts

to

more than the prisoner of war should be allowed to mail,
such information.

etc.,

Neutrality at Sea, Naval Warfare,

and Information Warfare

The same Charter principles applicable to land warfare
cluding any

IW

must pay due

regard 45 to

component. 44

Oceans

users,

apply to war

whether neutral or

at sea, in-

belligerent,

other oceans users' rights and freedoms besides the rules

of naval warfare, which apply in armed conflict situations through the

LOS con-

ventions' other rules clauses. 46 Treaty suspension or termination principles also

may

apply.

Although many

treaties

may bear on IW

issues,

during armed con-

to perform, 47

may be impossible
fundamental change of circumstances
48
may intervene, or there may be a material breach. 49 Jus cogens norms, e.g., perhaps the inherent right of self-defense, 50 may trump treaty law. 51 War, or armed
conflict, may end or suspend treaty obligations. 52 General principles of necessity
flict

they

and proportionality in attack govern

as

as in

land warfare. 53

Hague XIII, governing maritime neutrality, imposes virtually
Hague V, governing land warfare, in forbidding belligerent

ports

and waters for erecting wireless telegraphy

communicating with
waters

as a

treaties

use of neutral

any apparatus for

belligerent forces. Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or

base of operations. 54

these principles in land warfare to
uations. 55

stations or

the same rules

The same
I

W

issues

considerations and applications of

should apply in maritime warfare

Moreover, because these principles appear in two major

and the regional Maritime Neutrality Convention,

their

sit-

multilateral

common prin-

ciples are strengthened. 56

There

is

an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to

movement of belligerent

troops across neutral land territory and

belligerent naval forces into neutral ports

movements

is

and waters. The duty

absolute, while the duty to detect
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movement of
to repel troop

and oust belligerent naval
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forces

is

subject to the neutral's having the

means

to

do

so.

"entitled," not required, to intern a belligerent warship

When

neutral waters. 58

should have departed

signed in 1907, there were

many

the

countries that

57

A neutral

when

is

only

that warship

Hague Conventions were

may

not have had naval forces

or detection capability sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force or to intern

There must have been

presumption that any State could use

a

it.

military or

its

other forces, perhaps police, to repel a belligerent troop movement, but that

might not be the case for naval incursions. The same
neutrality principles,

it

on the

counter

is

as, e.g.,

Not

every country has computer and related systems

case,

computer-sophisticated nations like

the United States must be held to the same duty,

which might be

posal of the United States,

i.e.,

use of means

at

belligerents can operate to seize or destroy Internet connections in
in areas subject to

no

the dis-

quite considerable.

view

that

enemy

ter-

Principles governing destruction of undersea cables strengthen a

and

as

the United States, and these countries should not be held

Such being the

to an absolute duty.

ritory

IW

IW warfare from within its territory not absolute, but condiability of the neutral to detect IW activity and to be able to act to

this activity.

sophisticated

true today. For

could be argued that the duty of a neutral to act to pre-

vent belligerent
tional

is

State's sovereignty, e.g., the

high

seas, if a bel-

ligerent controls that area, e.g., for blockade. Belligerents can seize or destroy

cables connecting

in

enemy

enemy

territory.

i.e.,

must be observed.

No

tronic emissions

distinction

World Wars

by

but only

a

terminus
cases

of

general principles of necessity and proportionality^ 9

cables. 60 Neutrals' control

waters during two

territory,

These cables may be seized or destroyed only "in

absolute necessity,"

owned

with neutral

territory

61

is

made between

publicly and privately

of radio broadcasting within their

is

territorial

another example of proper control of elec-

neutrals within their territories. If neutrals

tion for radio, the "Internet" of the day,

is it

had

this obliga-

not also true for today's World

Wide Web of communications?
Issues related to contraband, visit

and search or diversion, and the

possibility

of destruction of neutral merchant ships that have acquired enemy character 62 or
ships or aircraft that are believed to

be aiding the enemy although otherwise ex-

empt 63

do with IW. However,

ciples

might seem to have

little

to

might be derived and used

in the

IW

context.

Given Internet technology's exponential growth,
narily useless to

go through

ment listing prohibited
as

a

certain general prin-

it

would seem

extraordi-

lengthy treaty negotiation process to draft an agree-

Internet behaviors or actions that

would be as out of date

the computers that began to produce the treaty at the start of the drafting and

negotiation

process.

This

has

been the experience of trying
238

to
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The

from contraband law is that in a fast-developing or
ever-changing scenario, trying to go beyond general principles is rarely wise, except in the obvious, "hospital ship" or poison gas situation, where everyone
contraband.

lesson

on the rules, at least for hospital ships if they are not used to further an enemy war effort, and for poison gas as long as there is no use. 64
If we analogize dealing with Internet messages to neutral merchantmen on
the high seas, could an electronic "visit and search," followed by appropriate
agrees

proportional and necessary action, perhaps electronic diversion, be devised for
belligerents to use
If

an Internet message or "hack" contributes to

war-sustaining
acts as
is

with neutrals? 65

efforts, assists

enemy

war-fighting or

an enemy's armed forces intelligence system, or

an auxiliary military or naval channel of communication or information,

not the attack and destruction option available, subject to necessity and pro-

portionality principles? 66

To be sure, perhaps special principles analogous to the
passenger and crew safety rule when a merchantman must be destroyed, 67 might
be devised. For example,

if messages relating to safety

of civilians are involved,

can they be electronically isolated and allowed through?

Might an

electronic "firewall" analogous to blockade principles in the law of

naval warfare 68 be devised to

let

appropriate messages get through?

The

Internet

might be used for traditional blockades and other interdictions, besides the usual
Notices to Airmen
lished, e.g.,
Is it

by

(NOTAMs)

and Notices to Mariners

lists

cause of their

pub-

radio.

useful to think in terms of specific

Hague XI

(NOTMARs)

exemptions for neutral Internet usage?

enemy vessels exempt from capture and possible destruction benature, among them a debatable exemption for mails as distin-

guished from mail ships. 69

Would it be

exempted computer
systems, kinds of messages, or Internet systems exempt from "capture" and possible destruction unless used to aid an enemy? What about generally exempt
ships, e.g., hospital ships unless they aid an enemy, that send Internet-based messages that might be construed by a belligerent to be encrypted messages? Would
this raise a suspicion, however unfounded, such that use of Internet-based messages by neutral exempt vessels should be banned or somehow restricted? Can
system segregation be done with today's technology? Is it too early for this?
Could the Internet itself be used to advise of these exemptions, if a case by case
basis

helpful to develop

seems appropriate?

Might

commanders consider declaring control of immediate areas of
military operations on the Internet, analogous to the immediate area of naval operations? 70 To be sure, this kind of declaration may invite more trouble than it is
worth, i.e., it could tell adversaries where to go. The Internet can, of course, be
military
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used to send these notices, besides

means

ditional

who lack Internet capability,

for addressees

sion and receipt,

NOTAMs and NOTMARs sent by more tra-

where there

i.e.,

a possibility that

is

or to assure transmis-

an Internet-based message

did not go through.

Although

it is

not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare tem-

porary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including

These maneuvers can be conducted during armed
tive right

vers"?

more

air operations. 71

conflict. Is there a correla-

"IW maneu-

of declaring temporary use of part of the Internet for

IW maneuvers be posted on the Internet besides
e.g., NOTAMs or NOTMARs? (As in the case of

Might notice of these
traditional

means,

warning of immediate area of naval operations during war, such

whether by

a notice,

NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the Inter-

net, invites attention.)

Could or should an "Internet exclusion zone" be
trals

declared, 72

warning neu-

of higher risk if they "surf in the area or otherwise use the "zone"? Like no-

tices for

immediate

the Internet,

NOTMARs.

as

areas

well

of naval operations, these warnings could be posted on

by more

as

means,

traditional

e.g.,

NOTAMs

(Notice of blockade, immediate area of naval operations, or ex-

clusion zones, must be effective; 73 while the Internet might be a valuable

munication medium,

methods

until

it

has

as, e.g.,

Could

become as universal as more

spectrum, analogous to

risk

treaty
tles

that are not as

this

may be a

advanced in Internet tech-

temporary "defense zones" for
a

for an area of naval

self-defense. 74

now might be

parts

high seas defense zone or cordon

and

of self-defense responses? This

dent of

means;

traditional

the United States.)

States declare

announced

com-

cannot replace more traditional and widely available

it

problem for vessels flagged in countries
nology

and

And

air
is

operations, to

not

a feature

down

the road

down, could agreements modeled on the

sanitaire that

may be

warn other countries of a

of naval warfare but an inci-

because the technology

premature, 75

of the Internet

is still

when and

INCSEA

emerging, and any
if the

problem

agreements

76

set-

be con-

sidered to minimize confrontation? Longstanding treaties promoting safety at
sea offer another

Might

states

model. 77

proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (HZ) for parts of the

Internet spectrum, analogous to an

ADIZ? 78 The

IIZ

would be

a

warning, per-

haps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice, of a possibility

of interception

if

Internet users approach too close to a neutral State's vital

interests (analogous to

fense

its

territory, the

anchor for an ADIZ), including,

and central economic communications systems. The
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ADIZ

is

e.g.,

not an

deair
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warfare feature;

it

serves as an identification

method.

An IIZ might have a similar

function.

do not have technical competence to respond to these questions, or perhaps
ask others, but might they be asked? Some inquiries may be far-fetched or imI

to

practical,

but given the exponential growth of technology, some of which

be shrouded for national security reasons,

I

may

ask them.

The Internet is like a merchant shipping system or the US public highway sysno regulation of the Internet akin to systems regulating radio and
television broadcasting. It is up to the individual or government as to the nature
of vehicles used (the computers) and, beyond a small access charge paid Internet
access providers, the user is largely on its own as to how the Internet is employed
tem. There

as to

is

content and destination. Therefore, although there

may be belligerent and

by analogy to those for naval warfare as I have posited
them, there are relatively few positive duties, apart from a requirement to respect belligerents' and neutrals' rights, however those may be stated.
As a final point, the due regard principle, derived from the LOS and its law of
naval warfare counterpart, 79 might be part of the analysis; i.e., belligerents must
neutral rights, perhaps

have due regard for rights of Internet users that are neutral, even

as

Internet users

must have due regard for others on the Net in the absence of armed conflict.
even

as belligerents

day's wars at sea,

must have due regard

for the maritime

And

environment in to-

might they be required to have due regard for the general

Internet environment?

Neutrality, Aerial Warfare,

As

in the cases of land

situations. 80
air

and

and Information Warfare

may apply in given
may apply. 81 Besides

sea warfare, Charter principles

Treaty suspension or termination principles

warfare rules, belligerents must observe principles of military objective, ne-

cessity,

and proportionality applying to

all

modes of war. 82

Like neutrality rules for land and sea warfare,

air

warfare rules require respect

for neutral airspace; belligerent military aircraft cannot enter

it.

83

When coupled

with identical treaty-based neutrality rules applicable to land and sea warfare,
this principle

is

strengthened. 84

The Hague Air Rules

principle, the

same

as

those for land warfare but differing from the weaker requirements for neutrals
for naval warfare,

not be construed

is

that actions taken

as a hostile act.

protect the neutral in

its

85

by

a neutral to enforce neutral rights,

can-

Since two branches of the law of neutrality

actions to enforce neutrality, particularly since Internet

activity necessarily ultimately involves the land in terms

of sending and recep-

tion of messages, and the flight of Internet messages through lines might be
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analogized to aircraft

should not be deemed
warfare has

it?

A

should not the rule be that actions taken by

flight,

and not an unfriendly one,

a hostile act,

neutral might enforce

retorsion, 86 a lesser action in that

it

the law of naval

by an unfriendly

rights

does not involve proportional

an unlawful act designed to compel

There

its

as

a neutral

act, i.e., a

reprisals, i.e.,

compliance. 87

an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to

is

movement of belligerent

movement of
or movement of belliger-

troops across neutral land territory and

and waters,

belligerent naval forces into neutral ports

The duty

ent military aircraft into neutral airspace.
absolute, while the duty to detect

and oust belligerent naval or

means

ject to a neutral having the

to repel troop

do

to

so. 88

When

the

movements

air forces

is

is

sub-

Hague Conventions

were signed, many countries may not have had naval forces or detection capability sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force. The same assumption may underlie
the 1923 Hague Air Rules regarding intruding belligerent military aircraft and
their internment. There must have been a presumption that any State could use
its

military or other forces, perhaps police, to repel belligerent troop

move-

ments, but that might not be the case for every country for naval or military
craft incursions.

The same

true today. For

is

IW

neutrality rules,

it

air-

could be

IW from within its territory is not absolute, but conditional on the neutral's ability to detect IW activity
argued that a neutral's duty to act to prevent belligerent

and to

act to

phisticated

counter it.

as, e.g.,

Not every nation has computer and related systems as so-

the United States, and these countries should not be held to

an absolute duty. Such being the

United

States

must be held

the United States,

A neutral's

to the

case,

same duty,

which might be

duty to prescribe

tions for aircraft ordered

by

a

computer-sophisticated nations like the
i.e.,

use of means at the disposal of

quite considerable.

route

away from

a belligerent

89

belligerents' military opera-

might be seen, by analogous prece-

dent for IW, to say a neutral must prescribe Internet "routes" not to interfere

with military operations. The qualifying phrase in the Hague Air Rules, that
neutral

must exact guarantees,

however. For IW,

indicates a possible

if a neutral prescribes a

weakness of the prescription,

"route," can the neutral enforce the

prescription, given the Internet's decentralized nature?

principle that a neutral must,

vent

aerial

neutrality
disposal,

prevent

The Hague Air Rules

commensurate with the means

observation of belligerent operations, 90

law for IW say that

a neutral

a

is

in the

at its disposal,

same

vein.

pre-

Should

must, commensurate with the means

at its

IW observation, through reading Internet traffic, of belligerent

military operations?

The Hague
commander to

Air Rules, like naval warfare

rules,

allow

a belligerent's force

prohibit neutral aircraft from passing in an immediate vicinity of
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commander's forces or to make aircraft follow a particular route, if the commander considers the aircraft is likely to prejudice success of military operations.
91
In
If an aircraft, once notified, refuses to comply, a belligerent may fire on it.
the IW context, might a belligerent assert a similar right to prohibit Internet activity in an immediate electronic or physical vicinity of military operations, or
direct that Internet traffic follow routes? Can the belligerent "shoot down" nona

complying Internet

traffic,

using proportional means,

coming

close to military

Might notice of these areas of operations be
posted on the Internet besides more traditional means? (A correlative problem is
Internet operations, after notice?

that

any radio or Internet message invites attention to the location of belligerent

forces.)

Although

it is

not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare tem-

porary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including

These maneuvers can be conducted during armed
right of declaring

air

operations. 92

conflict. Is there a correlative

temporary use of part of the Internet for

"IW

maneuvers"?

Might notice of these "maneuvers" be posted on the Internet? (As in the case of
the warning of the immediate area of naval operations during war, such a notice,
whether by NOTAM or
through traditional media or the Internet,

NOTMAR

invites attention.)

Exclusion zones for neutral

aircraft as

well

as ships,

reasonable in scope and

duration and which are properly noticed, are a valid method of warfare

They

day.

are not free-fire zones but are designed to

heightened danger

if they

similar qualifications

being "fired on"

enter a

warn

neutral aircraft of

Might an "IW exclusion zone" with

be declared to warn Internet users of a heightened

if they

of these zones by

tice

zone. 93

at sea to-

risk

of

venture into certain "areas" of the Internet? Might no-

NOTAMs and NOTMARs be posted on the Internet be-

more traditional means?
Could States declare temporary "defense zones"

sides

for certain parts of the

Internet spectrum, analogous to a high seas defense zone or cordon sanitaire that

may be announced for an area of air operations,
of self-defense responses? This
self-defense.

for

Here too

parts

States

warn other countries of a risk

not a feature of air warfare but an incident of

is

INCSEA and safety of life at sea treaties could be models
situations. 94

advance agreements for these

Might

to

proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (HZ) for certain

of the Internet spectrum, analogous to the

ADIZ? 95 The

IIZ

would be

a

warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice,

of a

possibility

of interception

if

Internet users approach too close to a neutral

State's vital interests (analogous to

ing, e.g.,

its

its

territory, the

anchor for an ADIZ), includ-

defense and central economic communications systems.
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is

not a feature of air warfare;

have

it

serves as an identification

method. The IIZ might

a similar function.

Neutrality

There

is

new

little

and Information Warfare

tion of

Space

"hard law" in norms applicable to conflict in outer

space, 96 other than applying Charter law, 97 the
treaties, 98

in

law of suspension or termina-

and general principles of necessity and proportionality, and

perhaps due regard in some cases, applying to armed conflict anywhere. 99

There

is

no

special neutrality

Any law of neutrality
from these other

law

like that applying to land, sea, or air warfare.

applicable to

sources, as

IW

was the

must be derived by analogy
before agreements like the Outer

in space

case

Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention,
100

And

etc.,

methodology that may be the most
useful. If law for outer space could be derived by analogy from other systems
before formal treaties appeared, cannot the same be said for IW? Which legal
system(s) should supply the model (s)?

were negotiated.

it is

this

general

Conclusions: Appraisal of Neutrality in the Charter Era
in

the Context of Information Warfare

As the manned space

mended

flight era

became

commentators recom-

applying other, well-established law to space age situations by analogy.

UN Charter law applies to situations in space,
at sea,

a reality,

and in the

air.

as it

does for interactions on land,

Today treaties, and practice pursuant to them, govern many

other aspects of space interactions, but not

all

of them. These agreements are

subject to Charter law primacy and to law of treaties rules for suspension or ter-

mination.

Beyond the treaties, some space law issues remain unresolved, and ap-

plying other systems of law by analogy seems to be the norm.
Internet warfare issues involving neutrals, and the law to be applied to them,

seem

close to the situation for warfare in space. Charter-based norms, e.g., pro-

hibition against violating States' territorial integrity or political independence,

the right of self-defense and the primacy of Security Council decisions, must be
applied.

There

are telecommunications treaties to

which Charter norms and law

of treaties rules for suspension and termination are subject.
ples, e.g.,

Some LOAC princi-

those related to telegraphy, will apply to Internet messages

as

well

as

more conventional communications, although these are also subject to Charter
norms, e.g., self-defense. Beyond these relatively well-established norms, there
are many principles, primarily in the law of naval warfare but also some from the
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law of land and

air

warfare, that

may be cited by analogy in IW situations involv-

ing neutrals.

Undeniably neutrality as

The claim,

pre-Charter era.

concept has

that there

is

a

as

much vitality today as in the

customary right to

assert

an intermedi-

of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency,

ate status

may have been
tors

a general

strengthened since 1945, although most States and commenta-

do not recognize

those in the

two

last

it.

The

precedents in some cases are almost identical with

centuries.

Even

if nonbelligerency

cannot be asserted

customary norm, the overlay of principles of self-defense, retorsion,

reprisals

involving use of force, and state of necessity apply to support actions

with

a practice

of strict neutrality in the traditional sense.

at

as a

not

variance

101

Because of options under the Charter for non-binding resolutions by the Security

Council and perforce the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions

even with

a

binding Council decision and the opportunity for claims of neutral-

Charter
—perhaps modified by new non-belligerency concept
"Far from being moribund,
neu—remains
and
apply
conditions of
wars" —
type
1945 — even more
of
have
than
in the

a

ity

era

these traditional rights [of

large.

limited

logically in

self-defense]

trality

beset the planet since

conflicts that

the

rigorously

in

conditions of total war. 102

The advent of information war may
lished in

1936

when

for the next one.

103

call for

modifying Jessup's remarks pub-

from a world war and preparing
Transoceanic communication was dependent on undersea
the world was recovering

cables for urgent messages, although radio signals could also reach across the seas.

The most advanced countries had cross-border telephone and telegraph access
by landlines. Most transoceanic communications went by ship, although the first
were beginning for transoceanic and transcontinental communications. However, the usual means of communication then for
most messages was what we call "snail mail" today. The Internet was a Cold War
creation. 104 Today, Jessup might say that although the basic neutrality rules remain in place and they apply for IW, their application for IW must be by

international air mail deliveries

analogy.

One

option

is

a

non-law

analysis 105

although that alternative

ionable today, given a tendency to find
there

is

no customary law,

tors correctly assert that

of law applies to
correlative

is

some law (perhaps

States' use

almost universally accepted that

that the considerable

body of traditional

as

106

views

if

Commenta-

If that

neutrality law,

is

body

true, a

some of it

now almost universally rec-

declaring custom, and the rest in customary
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than fash-

considerable

of force in cyberspace contexts. 107

restated in treaties of longstanding duration that are

ognized

a

less

publicist's

treaty, or general principle available).

it is

is

norms or general
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principles, also exists. If we

choose to operate in the context of law, under

a rule

of law, the law of neutrality developed for more traditional warfare modalities
offers useful analysis

governing

by analogy where there

are

law

to the traditional

and collective

right to individual

the primacy of

UN

armed

which predates the Charter.

common

108

Another might be human

conflict because

conflict. 109

law of neutrality

as

it

The

although perhaps limited in

treaties,

of their terms or because of general

applies to land, sea,

and

air

issues

warfare re-

denominators and differences. For example, belligerents have

duty not to cross neutral's land territory by land or
(i.e.,

and

a State's territorial integrity,

of treaty suspensions or termination, are another. 110 Analysis of IW

in a context of the

seas

the inherent

rights treaties' derogation clauses reflect traditional

of peacetime telecommunications

application during

veals

e.g.,

of suspension or termination during international armed

policies

rules

Charter law,

Security Council decisions.

human

although

is

self-defense,

Others include prohibitions against violating

rules

positive standards, e.g., rules

cables.

Today one exception

rights,

no

a

air,

or to use neutral land or

111

A neutral's duty to repel

the territorial sea) for a base of operations.

by land, there is
apparently an absolute duty, at least to try. If the incursion is by belligerent air
or naval forces, the neutrals' duty is relative. It must use the means at its disposal to counter an incursion, including means at its disposal to intern an inthese incursions varies with the modality of incursion. If it

A

truding aircraft and those aboard.

warship that has remained in port

doubtedly the 1907 Hague

neutral

when

drafters,

may

it is

is

elect to detain a belligerent

Un-

not entitled to stay there.

and the 1923 Commission of Jurists

that

prepared the Hague Air Rules, believed every country had some semblance of

ground

forces to repel a belligerent's troop

movements

across neutral lands, but

had the means of detecting or repelling incursions by air or
or of interning belligerent military vessels or aircraft. 112 The "means at a

that not every State
sea,

neutral's

disposal"

belligerents'

IW incursions;

disposal to detect
tive right

erent

should be the

principle

for

a

neutral's

the neutral should be held to apply the

and repel these incursions. Such being the

of a belligerent aggrieved by

may

test

duty for

means

at its

case, the correla-

IW incursions should be

that the bellig-

take such actions as are necessary in the territory of a neutral that

unable (or perhaps unwilling) to counter

enemy

IW

force activities,

is

making

unlawful use of that territory, a principle from the law of naval warfare. 113

Beyond
modes, the

these general rules applying to neutrality in a context of all warfare
rules

begin to diverge

the closest kinship being seen
fare, particularly

among

the different kinds of armed conflict,

between the law of naval warfare and

naval warfare.

From

a

aerial

war-

geographic perspective, these mediums
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more persuasive reasons for analogy to IW. Both are concerned
with "fluid" mediums, like the Internet's electronic pathways. 114 The law of naval warfare is concerned with warfare on the high seas, a part of the globe that is
no nation's property. It also is concerned with ocean areas over which coastal
for

combat

States

may

offer

exercise sovereignty,

i.e.,

the territorial sea; or jurisdiction,

i.e.,

the

economic zone (EEZ). There is also a relatively well-developed set of
rules or general principles in the LOS and the law of naval warfare upon which
analogies for IW may be drawn. 115 Closer examination of the LOS and the law
exclusive

of naval warfare in connection with and its interfaces with Charter law, the

and

treaty termination or suspension principles

for developing

The

LOAC

may produce

analogies suitable

IW principles.
is

replete with notice requirements. 116

The new technology

might be employed to give notice, adequate under the circumstances, in
tional warfare situations in addition to the usual

means of doing

so.

technology's fluidity and exponential growth, the relative lack (thus
tice in

LOS

tradi-

Given

far)

IW

of prac-

IW situations, and the relatively minimal number (again thus far) of claims

and counterclaims 117 in the worldwide electronic arena, any international

on IW would likely be obsolete in terms of hardware and practice
before their ink would be dry. 18 Haphazard as the prospect may be, rules for IW
should be left to developing customary norms and general principles, perhaps
with help from commentators, 19 before serious consideration of a treaty begins.
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American Journal of International Law 586 (1972) (States may respond only after
being attacked. US policy is that States may respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to
necessity and proportionality principles, and admitting of no other alternative. ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, fflf 4.3.2-4.3.2. 1 George K. Walker, Anticipatory
.

Collective Self Defense

in THE LAW OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS: LlBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT (Michael N.
Schmitt ed., 1998) (Vol. 72, US Naval War College International Law Studies) discusses drafting of
Article 51, UN Charter. The right of self-defense also inheres to belligerents' warships while in
in the

Charter Era:

What

the Treaties

Have

381-86, 351-59,

Said, 365, 379,

neutral waters, or neutral warships in belligerents' waters as well as
Principle

&

5.1.1

cmt., supra note

13,

506.

at

Some

on

the high seas, Helsinki

defense treaties are not published,

UN

18, § 312 r.n.5; see also 1 US Code. § 112a(b) (1994).
be published in United Nations Treaty Series if parties wish to
invoke them before a
organ; Covenant of the League of Nations, art. 18, required members to
register all treaties with the League; they were not binding until registered. Article 18 was among
US President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. GOODRICH ETAL., supra note 9, at 610-14;
SlMMA, supra note 9, at 1103—16. National legislation may require publication of agreements or

RESTATEMENT
Charter,

art.

(THIRD), supra note

102 requires

treaties to

UN

notifying the national legislature of all international agreements,

Some commentators believe jus cogens,

e.g.,

US Code

e.g., 1

§

112b (1994).

may trump treaty law:
INTERNATIONAL LAW

perhaps the right of self-defense,

See Carin Kahghan, fus Cogens and the Inherent Right

to

Self-Defense, 3

Students Association Journal of International and Comparative Law 767, 827
(1997).
21.

UN Charter,

arts.

25, 48, 103 (Council decisions). See also Lalive, supra note 5, at 78-81;

Sydney D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council ch. 1.5
(3d ed. 1998); Jorge Casteneda, Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions ch. 3
Amoia

(Alba

note

9, at

trans. 1969);

GOODRICH ET AL.,

284, 407-18, 605-36, 652;

290-314; SlMMA, supra
Nonbinding Assembly or

supra note 9, at 126, 144,

CASTREN,

supra note 5, at 434.

a preexisting norm to evidence its existence and vitality or
new norm. BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 14-15, 694; 1
at 47-49; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 103(2)(d),

Council resolutions can add strength to
can contribute to development of a

OPPENHEIM,
cmt.

supra note 17, § 16,

c, r.n.2.

22.

Helsinki Principles

SUPPLEMENT,

1.4,

3.1,

4,

supra

8.1-8.1.3; San

note

13,

at

500,

503,

505;

ANNOTATED

Remo

Manual, supra note 12, ffl| 34-42, 44, 46.
fflf
Protocol for Prohibition of Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, & of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, with US no-first-use reservation, June 17, 1925 & Apr. 10,
1975, 26 U.S.T. 571, 94 L.N.T.S. 65 (gas, bacteriological warfare).
23. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
24. One example of Charter law modifications is the
Charter, art. 103, treaty trumping
supra note 5,

UN

provision.
25. Helsinki Principle 1.2

Law of Naval Warfare,
26.
27.

& cmt.,

supra note 13, at 499; Dietrich Schindler, Commentary, in

supra note 14, at 211.

PJESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 103.
Cf Helsinki Principle 1.2 & cmt., supra note 13,
251

at

499.
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UN

Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47
American Journal of International Law 365, 371-72 (1953). Permanently neutral
countries have supported UN action. See, e.g., GABRIEL, supra note 5, at 132—33 (Swedish, Swiss
economic aid and/or support during Korean War); ROSS, supra note 5, chs. 7-9 (Swedish, Swiss
28.

Charter,

art.

2(5);

actions against Rhodesia).

Helsinki Principles

29.

1.4,

3.1,

4,

note

supra

13,

at

500,

503,

SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, fflf 8.1-8. 1 .3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note

505;

12,

ANNOTATED

34-42, 44, 46.
fflf

law prohibits belligerents' hostile acts in neutral territory, including a
and internal waters, territorial sea, and airspace, or using neutral territory as a
sanctuary. Convention Respecting Rights & Duties of Neutral Powers & Persons in Case of War
on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 1, 36 Stat. 2310, 2322 (Hague V); Convention Concerning Rights &
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 2, 36 Stat. 2415, 2427 (Hague XIII);
Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 28, 1928, art. 3, 47 Stat. 1989, 1991, 135L.N.T.S. 187,
196 (Maritime Neutrality Convention). The United States is party to it and to the Convention
Regarding Rights of Neutrals at Sea, July 22, 1854, 10 id. 1105, in force among Nicaragua, the
former USSR and the United States. TIF, supra note 15, at 445-46, 470-71. See also General
Declaration of Neutrality of the American Republics, Oct. 3, 1939, ^f 3(a), 3 BEVANS 604, 605
(General Declaration), among 21 Western Hemisphere countries including the United States;
Declaration for the Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of Neutrality, May 27, 1938, arts. 8-10,
11, 188 L.N.T.S. 294, 301, 308-09, 315, 321, 329 (Nordic Neutrality Rules), among Denmark,
Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. Commission ofjurists, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, Dec.
1922 - Feb. 1923 (Hague Air Rules) art. 40, reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER &JIRI TOMAN,
THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 207, 214 (3d ed. 1988). See also Helsinki Principle 1.4, supra
30. International

neutral's land

at 500; 3 HYDE, supra note 5, § 887; 2 HOWARD S. LEVIE, THE CODE OF
International Armed Conflict 785 (1985); Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, 1
7.3; SAN P^EMO MANUAL, supra note 12, fflf 17-18; US Department of the Air Force,
International Law
The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations ^| 2—6c (1976) (AFP

note 13,

—

Hague V, supra, reflects custom as to its rules on neutral territory; ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ^flj 7.3 n.22, 7.3.2 n.32. Where the Maritime Neutrality Convention,
supra, parallels their terms, it too can be assumed to restate custom. Hague Air Rules, supra, are
110-31).

generally regarded as declaring customary law.
31.

UN

Charter,

arts. 2(4),

103; see also note 9, Pact of Paris, supra note 11; United States

439 (1998) (TIF); GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at
614—17; SlMMA, supra note 9, at 1116—25. Commentators and countries continue debating
whether anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a response with force that is necessary, proportional and
admitting of no other alternative, is permitted in the
Charter era. Compare, e.g., Nicaragua
Case, supra note 20, at 14, 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANIMAR A. ALEXANDROV,
Self-Defense Against the Use of Force in International Law 296 (1996); Bowett,
supra note 5, at 187-93; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 127; KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY,
supra note 5, at 27; McCORMACK, supra note 20, at 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302; MCDOUGAL
& FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 232-41; SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at 152-55; SHARP, supra note
4, at 33-48 (real debate is the scope of the anticipatory self-defense right; responses must be
proportional); STONE, supra note 20, at 3; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 127; Bunn, supra

Department of State, Treaties

in Force

UN

note 20,

at

69-70; Greenwood, Remarks,

in

Panel, supra note 20, at 158, 160-61; Linnan. supra

65-84, 122; Lowe, supra note 14, at 127-30; McHugh, supra note 20. at 61;
Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 20, at 93, 109-14; Murphy, supra note 20, at 241 Reisman, supra
note 20, at 25, 45; Robertson, supra note 20, at 89, 101; Turner, supra note 20. at 43. 62-80;
note 20,

at 57,

;

Waldock,

supra note 20, at 451,

496-99

of necessity, proportionality observed)

366-67; DlNSTEIN, supra note

5, at

(anticipatory self-defense permissible, as long as principles
with, e.g.,

BROWNLIE,

supra note 5. at 257-61, 275-78,

182-87, 190; HENKIN, supra note 20,

252

at

121-22; JESSUP. supra

George K. Walker

note 20,
156;

at

166-67;

RlFAAT,

O'CONNELL,

36—37; Kolosov, supra note 20,
at

supra note 20, at 83, 171; 2

supra note 20, at 126;
at

SlMMA,

after

War Under Present

International

Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, supra note 20,

see also

supra note 5, 52aa, at

232, 234; Kunz, supra note 20, at 872, 878; Lagoni, supra note 20,

161, 162; Tucker, The Interpretation of

29—30;

OPPENHEIM,

supra note 9, at 675—76; Farer, swpra note 20, at 30,

USSR

being attacked). The former

supra note 20, at 234; Mullerson

&

586

at

Law, supra note 20, at 11,
(States may respond only

generally subscribed to the restrictive view. Kolosov,

US

Scheffer, supra note 20, at 107.

policy

is

that States

may

respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and proportionality principles, and

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

admitting of no other alternative.

supra note 5,

4.3.2-4.3.2.1.

ffl[

Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 103, declined to address the issue.
32.

UN Charter,

arts.

51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31.

self-defense alliance, permitted
target

by

UN

Charter,

art.

may

51,

A neutral member of a
assist

an alliance

collective

member

that

a

is

of aggression by joining the self-defense response. If that occurs, whatever neutrality the

assisting State

might have claimed

is

lost,

and

it

becomes

a cobelligerent against the aggressor.

On

member to declare neutrality and confine its responses
to retorsions and nonforce reprisals. If so, this may be a violation of the alliance treaty, but that is a
matter between the neutral and the target of aggression. If a belligerent attacks enemy forces taking
refuge on neutral territory, or these forces are there for other purposes, 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note
the other hand,

5,

it is

possible for the neutral

§ 320, at 685, says this

is

not

hostilities against a neutral,

"but are mere violations of neutrality;

," citing id. § 362. Besides a
and they must be repulsed, or reparation must be made for them,
violation of neutrality law, it is submitted that an attacking belligerent, unless attacking under a
Charter, art. 2(4), rendering it susceptible to
theory of necessity, has committed a violation of
self-defense or other responses by the invaded neutral; cf. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 326.
33. In naval warfare, for example, if a neutral cannot or will not enforce its duty to require
belligerent forces to cease and desist from the conduct of hostilities while in that neutral's waters, an
.

.

.

UN

may

aggrieved belligerent

Principle 2.1, supra note

O'CONNELL,

act against those belligerent forces present in neutral waters. Helsinki
13,

supra note 5, at

1

at

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

501;

118-19

(Dresden, Altmark incidents); 2

supra note 5,

OPPENHEIM,

f

2

7.3;

supra note 5,

§§ 325-25a (same).
34.

UN Charter,

35.

Under Hague V,

and accompanying text.
and Hague XIII, Art. 5, the latter applying to naval warfare,
belligerents may not "(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or
other apparatus for
communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea; [or] (b) Use any
installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for
purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages."
.

Hague V,

.

arts.

51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31, 32

Art. 3,

.

supra note 30;

Hague XIII, supra note 30. Under Hague V, Arts. 8—9, "A neutral Power is
restrict the use on behalf of belligerents of telegraph or telephone

not called upon to forbid or

cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to

Every measure of restriction or prohibition

A neutral Power must see to the same
owning

.

.

.

it

or to companies of private individuals.

must be impartially applied

... to

both

obligation being observed by companies or

telegraph or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus."

Rules echo these principles, adding that belligerent mobile radio

.

.

.

.

.

belligerents.
.

individuals

The 1923 Hague Radio

must abstain from using
their apparatus. Commission ofjurists to Consider & Report Upon Revision of Rules of Warfare,
Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, Feb. 19, 1923, arts. 2-4 (Hague Radio Rules),
reprinted in

LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE,

stations

supra note 14, at 367, 368.

and accompanying text.
37. A neutral cannot, however, allow belligerents to establish intelligence offices on its
territory. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 356, at 748-51; see also 1 1 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at
36. See supra note 33

220.
38. See supra note 35.
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39.

Laws

Hague V,

supra note 30,

19,

art.

& Customs of War on Land, July 29,

LEVIE, supra note 30,

at

41.

OPPENHEIM, supra note 5,
Hague V, supra note 30, arts.

42. This

^f

is

Stat, at

2326; compare Convention with Respect to

1899, Regulations,

art.

54,

32

id.

1803, 1823;

see also

2

832.

40. 2

supra note 5,

36

§ 355, at 747.

13-14, 36

Stat, at

2324-25;

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

7.3.1.

by analogy from the

rule that vehicles transporting sick

and wounded carry no

combatants or war materials and rules for belligerent radio stations on neutral

territory. See supra

notes 35—36 and 39—41 and accompanying text.

and accompanying text.
103. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
art.
1833
U.N.T.S.
1982,
221,
3, 489 (LOS Convention); Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, art. 1(1), 26 U.S.T. 765, 767,
970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212 (Intervention Convention); see also 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: A COMMENTARY fflf 221 1-221 .9(h) (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds.,
1991); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1006-8. The 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions and the
LOS Convention "other rules" clauses, repeated in the navigational articles, have almost
universally been said to mean the LOS is subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations. Compare,
e.g., LOS Convention preamble (matters not regulated by Convention to be governed by rules,
principles of international law) arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19(1), 21(1), 31 (innocent passage), 34(2)
43. See supra note 41
44. See

UN Charter,

art.

.

,

(straits transit

interfere

passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or

with "navigation and other

rights

and freedoms of other

States as

provided in

this

Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at
"other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of

sea;

and historical nature"), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 398, 400, 404-05, 408, 410,
419, 431-32, 446, 517, with, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, preamble, art. 2, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. 11, 82 (High Seas Convention), (treaty restates customary law)
Convention on the Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17, 22(2),
15 id. 1606, 1608, 1610, 1611, 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 206-08, 214, 216, 220 (Territorial Sea
Convention). Although the other 1958 law of the sea conventions do not have other rules clauses,
they say they do not affect the status of waters above that are part of the high seas, for the
continental shelf; or other high seas rights, for high seas fisheries. Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1, 3, id. 471, 473, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 314 (Continental Shelf
Convention); Convention on Fishing & Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, Apr.
29, 1958, arts. 1-8, 13, 17 id. 138, 140-43, 559 U.N.T.S. 285, 286-92, 296 (Fishery Convention);
Territorial Sea Convention, supra, art. 24(1), 15 id. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220 (contiguous
zone). Thus the High Seas Convention regime, including its Article 2 other rules provision, is
incorporated by reference into these Conventions, which modify some High Seas Convention
principles but not the Article 2 other rules clause. The LOS Convention, supra, art. 33, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 409, governing the contiguous zone, refers to an ocean belt contiguous to the
territorial sea, which is part of the high seas except declared EEZ, fishing or continental shelf areas,
objects of an archaeological

otherwise subject to the high seas regime. See
3;

also JESSUP, supra

note

2; JESSUP

& DEAK, supra note

W. Alison Phillips & Arthur H. RtiEDe, Neutrality: The Napoleonic Period
Edgar Turlington, Neutrality: Its History, Economics and Law (1936).
45. The LOS conventions also promote a due regard principle for shared ocean uses; one user

(1936);

must observe due regard for other users' rights, e.g., a right to lay cables that might carry Internet
messages. Compare LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 87, 112—15, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433. 440
with High Seas Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 26-29, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 2319-20. 450
U.N.T.S. at 82, 96-98; Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables. Mar. 14. 1884, 24 Stat.
989; Declaration Respecting Interpretation of Articles II & IV, Dec. 1, 1886, 25 id. 1424; see also

254

,

George K, Walker

COLOMBOS, supra note 5, §§ 399-400; 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ^ 87.9(k) (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 1995);
Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, | 2.4.3; 2 O'Connell, supra note 5, at 796-99,
819-24; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, §§ 285, at 789; 310-11; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 18, § 521(3); Bernard H. Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837-88 (1984); Horace
B. Robertson, Jr., The "New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, 273—74, in
Readings on International Law from the Naval War College Review
1978-1994 (John N. Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 1994) (Vol. 68, US Naval War College
International Law Studies). Due regard clauses apply to other sea areas. See, e.g., LOS Convention,
supra note 44, arts. 27(4) (territorial sea), 39(3) (a) (straits transit passage), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3) (EEZ),

79(5) (cables, pipelines), 142(1), 148 (the Area),

234 (ice-covered areas), 1833 U.N.T.S.

41 1-12, 418-20, 430, 448, 450, 493; Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 44,
15 U.S.T.

at

473, 499 U.N.T.S.

at

at

407-08,

arts. 1,

312, 314 ("reasonable measures for exploration

.

.

3-5(1),
.

[and]

exploitation" of continental shelf balanced against right to lay, maintain submarine cables,
pipelines; continental shelf exploration, exploitation

with" navigation, high
note 44,

art.

19(4), 15

interests); see also

seas fishing,

U.S.T.

must not

oceanographic research); Territorial Sea Convention, supra
1611, 516 U.N.T.S.

at

RESTATEMENT

result in "unjustifiable interference

at

216-18 (due regard

for navigation

(THIRD), supra note 18, §§ 511(b)— 511(d), 514-15. LOS
311(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 519, declares it supersedes the

Convention, supra note 44, art.
Continental Shelf, High Seas and Territorial Sea Conventions, supra note 44, among parties to the
LOS Convention. Recent commentaries advocate a due regard standard for belligerents during
war; e.g., they must pay due regard to neutrals' high seas, continental shelf and EEZ rights and
duties besides observing other

503, 505; San
1.4,

LOAC

rules.

Remo Manual, supra note

Helsinki Principles 3.1, 4

& cmts.,

supra note 13, at

^| 34-36; Robertson, supra at 303. Helsinki Principle
due regard standard in a context of requiring
where neutral territory, waters or airspace might be

12,

cmt., supra note 13 at 500-01, recites a

proportional attacks under the

LOAC

involved.
46. See supra note 44
47.

and accompanying

text.

A country creating the state of impossibility of performance cannot invoke the principle.

Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 61, 1155 U.N.T.S., at 346; BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at
623; T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974); RESTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note

18,

International

Commission

§§ 102-03, 128-30; Helsinki Principle 1.3

Law Commission, Report on

to the

General Assembly

,

the

Work

of

UN Doc. A/6309/Rev.

&

cmt., supra note 13, at 499;

Eighteenth Session, Report of the
reprinted in 2 (1974) YEARBOOK OF

Its

1,

the International Law Commission 225-26 (ILC Report); 1 Oppenheim, supra note 17,
§ 650; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 336 cmt. c & r.n.3; George K. Walker, Integration
and Disintegration in Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map of the Continent, 6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1
65-66 (1993); but see LORD McNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 685 (2d ed. 1961) (no separate
impossibility doctrine).
48.

Fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked to suspend or terminate

humanitarian law treaty obligations, particularly their reprisal provisions, or by

a party

causing the

Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347; see also
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 39 (art. 62 a customary norm);
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (same); BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 623-26;
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657, 662-63 (1935); Helsinki Principle 1.3 & cmt., supra

problem.

at 499; McNAIR, supra note 47, at 685-91;
OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, § 651;
Restatement (Third), supra note 18, §§ 336, 339; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 20 (2d ed. 1984); David Bederman, The 1871 London

note 13,

1
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Rebus

Declaration,

Sic Stantibus

and

a Primitivist

View of the Law of Nations, 82

AMERICAN JOURNAL

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1988); Gyorgy Harsatzti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of
Circumstances, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE De DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1, 21
(1975); Walker, supra note 47, at 66-68; compare ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY

TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 895 (1967)
approach) with ELIAS, supra note 47,

at

119-28

and Changed Circumstances,

61

Vienna Convention
stantibus approach no longer

(criticizing

(traditional rebus sic

admissible today).
49.

Vienna

Convention,

Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
I.C.J. 4, 47;

MCNAIR,

supra

Project, supra

BROWNLIE,

note

note 48,

supra note 17, at

supra note 47, ch. 36;

art.
60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see also
39 (Article 60 a customary norm); Namibia, 1971
622-23; ILC Report, supra note 47, at 253-255;

20,
at

OPPENHEIM,

1

supra note 17, § 649;

SINCLAIR, supra note 48,

at

20, 166, 188-90.
50.

Kahghan, supra note 20,

retorsions.

TUCKER,

or sanction.
conflict

at

767, 827. Belligerents can respond by non-force reprisals or

supra note 5, at 199 n. 5. Reprisal has

Most commentators

been characterized as

breach of a trade treaty to compel

e.g., deliberate

comply with

kind of self-help

say reprisals involving force against a State not engaged in

with the acting State are not lawful in the Charter

unlawful,

a

international norms,

is

era.

a State

However, other coercion

armed
that

is

engaging in unlawful conduct to

admissible. Anticipatory reprisal using force

is

forbidden.

A

must first call upon an offending State to mend its ways. Compare
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, ^flj 1 3,
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294,
1297 (1970); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 48, at 54; Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 14,
127; Air Service Agreement of 21 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443; BOWETT, supra
note 5, at 13; J.B. BRIERLY, The LAW OF NATIONS 401-02 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed.
State considering reprisal

,

UN

supra note 5, at 281; GOODRICH ETAL., supra note 9, at 340-47; ROSALYN
The Development of International Law Through the Political
Organs of the United Nations 217 (1963); Annotated Supplement, supra note 5,

1963);

BROWNLIE,

Higgins,

^j

6.2.3.1; 2

OPPENHEIM,

supra note 5, at

supra note 5, §§ 43, 52a, at 152-53;

286—87; Roberto Ago, Addendum

to

SlMMA,

STONE,
U.N. Doc.

supra note 9, at 105;

Eighth Report on State Responsibility,

A/CN. 4/318 & Add. 104, (1979), 2(1) YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 13, 39, 42 (1981); Roberto Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in ANTHONY CASSESSE.
The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 79 (1986); D.W. Bowett,
Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20
(1972); Rosalyn Higgins, Tl\e Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in

CASSESSE,

supra, at 435, 444;

DlNSTEIN,

supra note 5, at

GREENBERG

ETAL.,

Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, supra note 20,

215-16

using force admissible in Charter

is

a target State's lawful

unfriendly practice or act whether

at

586-87; with

LAWRENCE T.

illegal

(1998).

but unfriendly response to another State's

or not, to coerce the latter to discontinue that practice or

Retorsionary responses must be proportional. BRIERLY,

Hall,

era);

INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27

Retorsion, or retortion,

act.

(reprisals

supra, at 399;

WILLIAM

EDWARD

A Treatise on International Law

§ 120 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 2
FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 27 (1971); 7
MOORE, DIGEST § 1090; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 135; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 18, § 905 & r.n.8; SlMMA, supra note 9, at 104; STONE, supra note 5, at 288-89; Waldock.

HYDE,

supra note 5, § 588;

supra note 20, at 451, 458.

Vienna Convention, supra note 20, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344, 347.
Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or
51.
52.
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terminate
e.g.,

treaties,

ILC Report,

depending on the nature of the

and the circumstances of the conflict. See,
The Effects ofArmed Conflict
280-82
Annuaire
278,
61(2)
(1986); Regulations
treaty

supra note 47, at 267; Institut de Droit International,

on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985,

arts.

11,

2, 3, 5,

Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, 1912, arts. 1 4, 7-10, reprinted in 1 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Karnuth v. United
INTERNATIONAL
,

LAW

79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techtv. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), cert, denied, 254 U.S.
643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); George B. Davis, The Effects of War Upon
International Conventions and Private Contracts, 1927 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-29; G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Judicial Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73
States,

Recueil des Cours de L'Academie de Droit International 255, 307-17 (1948);
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657, 662-64 (1935); Cecil J.B. Hurst, The Effect of War on
Treaties, 2 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37, 40 (1921); James J. Lenoir, The
Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions, 34

GEOREGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

173-77 (1946); Walker,

129,

supra note 47,

at

68-71.

Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances claims

may

termination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change,

the only bases for termination or

etc., are

suspension for treaty relations between belligerents and neutrals. Herbert

J.

Lissitzyn,

Treaties

W.

Briggs, The Attorney

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36
(1942); Oliver

war suspension or

overlap

and Changed Circumstances, 61

INTERNATIONAL LAW 911

(1967); Walker, supra note 47, at 68-69.
and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
55. See supra notes 30—33 and accompanying text.
56. Hague V, Hague XIII, Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30; Vienna
Convention, supra note 20, preamble, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333, 341; BROWNLIE, supra note
17, at 5; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, §§ 10 at 28, 11, at 32-36; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
53. See supra note 33

,

note 18, § 102(3) & cmt. f
57. Hague V, supra note 30,

art. 5,

36

Stat, at

2323; Hague XIII, supra note 30,

2432; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30,

L.N.T.S.
30,

arts.

at

arts. 4(a),

26, 47

196, 208; General Declaration, supra note 30, 3(c), at 605;

42, 47, at 214—15;

AFP

110-31, supra note 30, f 2-6c

(air

id.

at

art.

25,

id. at

1991, 1994, 135

Hague Air Rules,

operations principle;

supra note

Hague Air

HYDE, supra note 5, §§ 855, 856A, 888; 2 LEVIE, supra note 30, at 788;
Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, 1 7.3; 2 Oppenheim, supra note 5, §§316, 323, 325;
TUCKER, supra note 5, at 260—61; but see Helsinki Principle 2.2, supra note 13, at 502 (neutral
Rules, supra, not cited); 3

"must" take measures to enforce warship

transit,

sojourn

rules).

enemy prize is brought to a neutral port under distress
when directed, its crew must be interned. Hague XIII,

58. This includes interning crew. If an

or similar conditions and does not leave
supra note 30, arts. 21, 22, 24,

note 30,
4(1),

art.

17,

47

188 L.N.T.S.

exception to

Stat, at
at

36

Stat, at

this rule,

customary law;

at

299, 305, 311, 319, 325.

art.

see also

Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra

204; Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 30,

Hague

XIII, supra note 30,

art.

art.

23 provides for an

entry of prizes under other than distress conditions, but several nations,

including the United States, reserved to
are

2431-32;

1993, 135 L.N.T.S.

23

is

art.

Hague XIII, arts. 21-22
now applying to more States

23. See 36 Stat, at 2432, 2438.

not because of US and

UK reservations,

Appam, 243 U.S. 124, 150-51 (1917); 3HYDE, supra
note 5, §§ 862, 864; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 328a; 333, at 706; 345; Symposium, State
Succession in the Former Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (1993); Walker, supra note 47. Neutrals must allow belligerent
warship entry for asylum, distress or other purposes if they comply with innocent passage rules.
LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404 (innocent passage in distress,
through treaty succession principles. The

S. S.
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i.e., LOAC); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note
U.S.T. 1608, 1610, 516 U.N.T.S. 206, 214; Helsinki Principle 2.2, supra note
13, at 502; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ^ 3.2.2.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§
343-46; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ^f 21.

but subject to other rules of international law,
44,

14, 15

arts. 1(2),

Convention Respecting Laws & Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Regulations,
36 Stat. 2227, 2308. This is limited to land warfare when a belligerent occupies enemy
territory and seizes or destroys landing ends of cables connecting that territory with a neutral State.
59.

Art. 54,

COLOMBOS, supra note 5, § 569.
60. COLOMBOS, supra note 5,

§ 576; United States Department of the Navy, Law of Naval
10-2 ^ 520b (1955 through Change 6, 1974) (NWIP 10-2); compare Institute of
International Law, The Laws of Naval War Governing the Relations Between Belligerents, art. 54

Warfare:

NWIP

(1913), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 30, at 857, 867 (Oxford Naval Manual).
Modern manuals do not analyze the issue thoroughly, probably because of disuse of cables. See SAN
Remo Manual, supra note 12, | 37. Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ^f 1.6, at 24
discusses cables in an

LOS

context; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.

38 and accompanying text.
merchant ships acquire enemy character and may be treated as enemy merchant
if they operate directly under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction.

61. See supra note
62. Neutral
vessels

Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, f 7.5.2; San I^emo Manual, supra note 12, 112-17.
See also Helsinki Principle 5.1.2(4), supra note 13, at 507; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ^
fflj

8.2.2.2;

SAN

REMO MANUAL,

supra note 12,

If

67.

63. E.g., hospital ships, medical aircraft; see generally Helsinki Principles 5.1.2(5)-5.1.2(6),
supra note 13, at 507;

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

supra note 5,

f

8.2.3;

SAN

REMO MANUAL,

^J 47—52, 136—40, 146, 151—52, citing treaties, custom (hospital ships; small coastal
vessels granted safe conduct; vessels carrying cultural property; liners carrying only

supra note 12,

rescue

craft;

passengers; ships

on

religious, non-military scientific or philanthropic missions; small coastal

fishing boats, coastal traders; vessels that have surrendered;

life rafts, life

boats). Neutral aircraft

carrying passengers, or serving as medical or cartel aircraft, are also protected. See

ANNOTATED

supra note 5, J 8.2.3; San Remo Manual, supra note 12, fflf 140-45, 153-58.
Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modern Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in
Robertson, supra note 5, 362, 370; New Technologies and Armed Conflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSE
Journal of International Law and Commerce 678, 704 (1988). This may mean that
trying to define IW methods or means that are per se unlawful will fail, particularly when

Supplement,
64. Cf.

technology

is

developing exponentially.

65. For a discussion of high seas visit
supra note 13, at 509, 511;

MANUAL,

supra note 12,

66. See supra note

and search,

see generally

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

fflf

Helsinki Principles 5.2.1, 5.2.7,

supra note 5,

fflj

7.6-7.6.2;

SAN REMO

116, 118-24.

62 and accompanying

text.

and crew in safety before destroying an enemy
Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the

67. E.g., requirements for placing passengers

merchantman. Proces- Verbal Relating

to

Treaty of London of 22 April 1930, Nov.

6,

& Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr.

22, 1930,

65, 88. See also

MANUAL,

1936, 3 298, 173 L.N.T.S. 353; Treaty for Limitation
art.

22(2),

46

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra Bevans note 5,

Stat.
ffl[

2858, 2881, 112 L.N.T.S.

8.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.4;

SAN REMO

supra note 12,

^ 151.
68. Neutral merchantmen must observe blockades that are duly established and notified and

are eflfective

and

impartial. Helsinki Principles 5.2.10, 5.3, supra note 13, at 513;

Supplement, supra note 5, fflf 7.7.1-7.7.5; San Remo Manual, supra note
69. Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907,
supra note 63 and accompanying text.

arts.
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1-2,

36

Stat.

12,

ANNOTATED
ffl[

93-104.

to Exercise

of the

2396, 2408 (Hague XI). See

also

George K. Walker

70. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt., supra note 13, at 505;

note

5,

fflf

SAN REMO MANUAL,

7.8-7.8.1;

supra note 12,

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

1 108

& cmt.

supra

108.1. Helsinki Principle

3.2, 5wpra at 504, declares:

Neutral ships should be aware of the
hostilities

risk

and

peril

of operating in areas where active naval

take place. Belligerents engaged in naval hostilities must,

however, take

reasonable precautions including appropriate warnings, if circumstances permit, to avoid

damage

to neutral ships.

This does not authorize converting a naval operations area into a free-fire zone and does not
obliterate the

customary rule that belligerents must warn away neutral shipping from operational

The Helsinki rule might come into play if there is a chance encounter of belligerent forces.
Myres S. McDougal & William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans
753-63 (1962); Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, f 2.4.3.1; Restatement (Third),
areas.

71

.

John H. Pender, Jurisdictional Approaches to Maritime Environments: A
15 JAG JOURNAL 155-58 (1960); US Delegation Paper, UN Conference on

supra note 18, § 521, cmt. b;

Space Age Perspective,

the

Law of the

Sea, Legality of Using the

High Seas

Connection with Nuclear Weapons Tests

in

No. US/CLS/Pos/48 (2)-(3), Annex
Marjorie M. Whiteman, Digest of International
Ocean, Doc.

Pacific

72. Helsinki Principle 3.3

& cmt.,

supra note 13,

II

(Feb. 20,

in the

1958), reprinted

Law 546, 549 (1968).
at 504; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

in

4

supra

105-08; WALKER, supra note 1, 403-10;
SAN I^EMO MANUAL, supra note 12,
Vaughan Lowe, The Impact of the Law of the Sea on Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 657, 673 (1988); W.J. Fenrick, The Exclusion Zone in
the Law of Naval Warfare, 1986 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 124-25
note

%

5,

7.9;

ffl|

might come into play if there is a chance
on exclusion zone declarations. See also supra note

(1986). Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra note 13, at 504,

encounter of belligerent forces and has no

effect

70.

and 72 and accompanying text.
Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, fflj 1-4, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, 137-38, amended by
Agreement Supplementary to Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, ^f 1-3, id. 149, 151 appears to
73. See supra notes 68, 70,

Nyon

74.

be the

first

instance of announced high seas defense zones.

1982 Falklands/Malvinas War; the United
See

O'CONNELL,

supra note 20, at 80, 168,

Goldie, Commentary,

Maritime

in

States

The

belligerents declared

announced them

172 (1979);

LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE,

WALKER,

in the

them

in the

1980-88 Tanker War.

supra note

1,

398-400; L.F.E.

supra note 14, at 489, 493-95; Goldie,

War Zones and Exclusion Zones, in Robertson, supra note 5, at 156, 192; O'Connell,
Law and Contemporary Naval Operations, 44 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF

International

INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-56

(1970).

64 and accompanying text.
Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on & Over the High Seas, May 27, 1972,
USSR-US, 23 U.S.T. 1168, 852 U.N.T.S. 151 (INCSEA); Protocol, May 22, 1973, 24 id. 1063;
see also Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989, USSR-US,
T.I.A.S. No. 1485, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 879 (1989). Other countries had INCSEA treaties with
the former USSR. Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ^| 2.8 n.110. These may be subject to
treaty succession principles. Symposium, supra note 58; Walker, supra note 47.
77. E.g., Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20,
1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459; International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, Nov. 1 1974, 32 id. 47,
in force for most States with many amendments. See generally United States Department of State,
Treaties in Force 406-09 (1998) (TIF).
75. See supra note
76. E.g.,

,

78.
into

its

Public

The

legal basis for

territory.

AFP

Order in

an

ADIZ

is

a nation's right to establish

MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND
Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ^ 2.5.2.3;

110-31, supra note 30, % 2-lg;

Space 307-09

(1963);

reasonable conditions for entry
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RESTATEMENT
Air Defense

(THIRD), supra note

Identification

18, § 521, r.n.2;

Zones: Creeping Jurisdiction

INTERNATIONAL LAW 485

(1978).

US ADIZs

NWIP

10-2, supra note 60,

are published in

If

422b; Note,

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
14 C.F.R. part 99 (1999). Cf

in the Airspace,

18

Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 3, 8, 11,61
Stat. 1181-83, 15 U.N.T.S. 298, 300, 304, requiring non-military aircraft to submit to rules for
entering another State's territory unless there has been a prior agreement.
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80.
Charter, art. 103; see also supra note 15 and accompanying text.
81. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or
terminate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty and the circumstances of the conflict. See,
e.g., ILC Report, supra note 49, at 267; Institut de Droit International, The Effects of Armed Conflict
on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts. 2, 3, 5, 11, 61(2) Annuaire 278, 280-82 (1986); id., Regulations

UN

Regarding the Effect of War on Treaties, 1912,

INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-55

arts. 1, 4,

7-10,

reprinted in 7

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

(1913); Clarkv. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Karnuth

v.

United

79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), cert, denied, 254
U.S. 643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); Davis, supra note 52, at 124-29;
Fitzmaurice, supra note 52, at 255, 307—17; Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
States,

supra note 52,

art.

35(b), at 662—64; Hurst, supra note 52, at 37, 40; Lenoir, supra note 52, at 129,

173—77; Walker, supra note 47,
claims

68—71. Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances

at

may overlap war suspension

or termination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change,

etc.

are the only bases for termination or suspension for treaty relations

between

neutrals. Briggs, supra note 52, at 89; Lissitzyn, supra note 52, at 911;

Walker, supra note 47,

belligerents

and
at

68-69.
82.

Helsinki Principles

SUPPLEMENT,
see also supra

83.

supra note 5,

1.4,

fflf

3.1,

note 45 and accompanying

LOS

4,

8.1-8.1.3;

art.

14, 15

note

13,

at

500,

arts.

U.S.T.

18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S.
at

1610, 516 U.N.T.S.

International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944,

15 U.N.T.S.

298;

295,

ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,

O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at
at

1

18.

40, at 214;

188 L.N.T.S.
supra note 5,
18.

AFP

at

^f

34-42, 44, 46;

fflf

supra

404; Territorial Sea

at
at

214; Convention on

arts. 1, 3,

note

5,

^

61

Stat.

^flj

3(a), 3(f), at

605;

1180, 1181,

2.3.2.1,
art.

Hague Air Rules,

at

2-9;

14,

47

1

Stat,

supra note 30,

10-31, supra note 30, f 2-6c; Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 30, art. 8,
301, 309, 315, 321, 329 (air ambulances excepted); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,
1

7.3.7; 2

During World

supra note 5, at

ANNOTATED

505;
12,

Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30,

1993; General Declaration, supra note 30,

art.

503,

REMO MANUAL, supra note

text.

Convention, supra note 44,

Convention, supra note 58,

supra

SAN

OPPENHEIM,

War

II

supra note 5, § 341a;

SAN REMO MANUAL,

neutrals prohibited belligerent military aircraft entry.

supra note 12, ^

1 1

WHITEMAN,

357—58.

art. 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18. §§ 102-03.
Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 48, at 215, with Hague V, supra note 30, art.
10, 36 Stat, at 2324 and Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 26, id. at 2433 ("unfriendly act").
86. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
87. Today, most commentators say a State cannot invoke a reprisal involving use of force,

84. I.C.J. Statute,
85.

except

when a

State

with the law, with

a

is

a belligerent

and wishes to respond,

after request for the offender to

comply

proportional reprisal against an enemy. See supra note 50 and accompanying

text.

and accompanying text.
from a company or person in neutral territory, the neutral
must prescribe a route for the aircraft away from the neighborhood of military operations ot the
belligerent's opponent and "must exact whatever guarantees may be required to ensure that the
88. See supra note 57

89. If a belligerent orders an aircraft
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aircraft follows the

route prescribed." General Declaration, supra note 30,

Rules, supra note 30.
90.
30,

13,

art.

art.

Hague Air Rules,
188 L.N.T.S.

3(f), at

605;

Hague Air

46, at 214.
supra note 30,
at

art.

47, at 215; see also

Nordic Neutrality Rules,

303, 309, 315, 323, 329; Harvard Draft Convention

Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War,

INTERNATIONAL LAW

^j

art.

6,

33

supra note

&

on Rights

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF

175, 245 (Supp. 1939) (Harvard Draft Neutrality Convention); 2 LEVIE,

supra note 30, at 827.

9 1 Compare
.

2-6b

(aircraft

Hague Air Rules,

supra note 30,

art.

30, at 2 1 2 with

AFP

1 1 0-3 1

,

supra note 30,

entering area of immediate air operations subject to "damages" from

^f

hostilities;

deny neutral aircraft access to international airspace even if bound for enemy
Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ^J 7.8—7.8.1; San Remo Manual, supra note 12, ^J
108 & cmt. 108.1 see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra at 504,
might come into play if there is a chance encounter of belligerent forces.
92. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, J 2.4.3.1; see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
belligerents cannot
territory);

;

93.

105—08;

Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, % 7.9; San P^emo Manual, supra note
see also supra

note 72 and accompanying

12,

fflj

text.

74 and accompanying text.
78 and accompanying text.
notes 83, 89 and accompanying text.

94. See supra note
95. See supra note
96. See supra
97.

UN Charter,

art.

103; see

also supra

notes 9, 15, 25 and accompanying text.

and accompanying text.
82 and accompanying text.
100. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28 id.
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (Registration Convention); Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 id. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (Liability
Convention); Liability Convention; Treaty on Principles Governing Activities in Exploration &
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 6-8, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 2415-16, 610 U.N.T.S. 209 (Outer Space Treaty); Agreement on Rescue of
Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, & Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (Rescue & Return Agreement).
101. See supra notes 2-53 and accompanying text.
102. 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1 142. Some limited, or localized, wars may have been total
war from the belligerents' perspectives, but on a world scale basis, they might be considered local or
limited in nature. One recent example is the 1980—88 Iran-Iraq conflict, the maritime aspects of
which are examined in WALKER, supra note 1, ch. 2.
103. JESSUP, supra note 2 at 156 ("There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has
undergone an almost constant process of revision in detail.") See also supra notes 2—5 and
accompanying text.
104. See generally ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 830-38 (E.D.Pa. 1996)., affd, 521 U.S. 844,
849-53 (1997); g. burgess alison, the lawyer's guide to the internet (1995);
98. See supra note 81

99. See supra notes 45,

Philip

Baczewski et

al.,

The Internet Unleashed (1994); Katie Hafner &
Late: The Origins of the Internet

Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up

George Johnson, From Two Small Nodes, a Mighty Web Has Grown, NEW YORK TIMES,
at Dl; for historical analyses of the development of computers and the Internet. As
World War 11 ended, Vannevar Bush suggested the basic idea of a personal computer; he traced the
history of calculators, discussed speech-controDed typewriters, and advocated document storage
on super fine grain microfilm shuffled by mechanical fingers. Bush believed that new logic and new
symbolism would be necessary. Although he missed the idea of electronic communication, much
of what Bush wrote in this perspective, futuristic article has become reality, albeit in different
(1996);

Oct. 12, 1999,
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Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, 176 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 101 (July 1945);
Mechanical computers were used aboard warships before World War II to supply
fire control solutions to naval guns through electrical circuits. Although most firing corrections on
these computers were made aboard ship by telephone communications among gunners and fire
control personnel who operated visual or radar-assisted gun directors and ship's combat
information centers (i.e., a room aboard ship where radar repeaters portrayed shell splashes), shore
bombardment effects and recommendations for corrections sometimes came by radio
communications between ships and shore spotters, e.g., Army or Marine Corps forward artillery
observers on the ground or in aircraft. The ship's computer "stored" prior information that had
been inserted and retained this information until it was changed by operators. Information might
be relayed through internal ship communications, perhaps to other computers aboard ship, but
there was no data transfer among external computers, i.e., those on other vessels. Antisubmarine
warfare systems, shipboard torpedo attack systems, and submarine fire control systems for torpedo
attack employed similar fire control solutions, using electronics-based systems (e.g., sonar, radar)
and mechanical devices operated in similar fashion, but there was little, if any, information
exchange between an attacking ship and other stations. These systems operate in similar fashion
today, although electronics-based computers have replaced mechanical systems, and missiles have
replaced gun projectiles in many cases.
105. "When the legal community first considered the .... regime that governed state activities
and military operations in Cyber Space, some U.S. government attorneys stated rather boldly that
(applying) modern information systems technology to military purposes was so new that no law
applied." SHARP, supra note 5, at 5. A policy behind this approach is national sovereignty. See
Charter, art 2(1); S.S. Lotus (Fr. V. Turk), 1927 PC. I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 4,18.
106. Cf. I.C.J. Statute, Art 38(1); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) supra note 18, at 102-03.
107. E.g. Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment of International
Legal Issues in Information Operations (Nov. 1999). The paper is appended to this volume as the
modalities.
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108.
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arts. 2(4),
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25,48, 51, 103; see

International

Convention on

SHARP,

also supra
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supra note 5, at 5.

notes 2-44 and accompanying test.

Political Right,

Dec.

16, 1966, arts. 4,

of
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, 177, 178; European Convention for Protection of Human
Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2) (derogation clauses), 8(1)
(correspondence), 10 (right of free expression regardless of frontiers), 213 id. 221, 228, 230;
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 13(2)(b), 27 (derogation clauses), 13
(freedom of expression regardless of frontiers) 14 (right of reply), 9 I.L.M. 673, 679-80, 683
19(3)(b) (derogation clauses), 17 (forbidding interference with correspondence), 19 (freedom
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(1970). Banjul (African) Charter on
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Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981,

receive information, disseminate opinions within the law), 21
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subject,

however, to the usual law of

etc.

EMERGENCY

12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25,

Minimum

Standards of

MCDOUGAL
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Human

HUMAN

Rights

9 (rights to

60 (1982) has no derogation
on impossibility of

treaties principles
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performance,

See also

id.

art.
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210-11(1989) (analyzing International
Norms in a State of Emergency (1984)); MYRES S.
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(American Society of International Law
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Fitzpatrick, Protection against Abuse of the "Concept of Emergency, "
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Studies in Transnational Policy., louis henkin &john lawrence hargrove eds.
1994); HENKIN, International Human Rights as "Rights" 1 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 446-47 (1979);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 12, 19, 27 U.N.G.A. Res. 217
(1948), reprinted in DIETRICH RAUSCHNING ET AL., KEY RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946-1996, at 321-22 (1997). Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
at

239-40, observed that "the protection of the (Civil
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& Political Rights Covenant) does not cease

George K. Walker

in times of war, except by operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may
be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not such a
.[T]he right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also during
provision.
then falls to be determined by the
.[W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life
hostilities.
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus
the [LOAC]
applicable lex specialis
whether a particular loss of life, through use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an
the Covenant, can only be decided by
the [LOAC]
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to
and not .... from the terms of the Covenant." To the extent that human rights treaty norms
represent custom, law of treaties analysis does not apply. However, derogations from custom like
the persistent objector rule do, and will apply to Declaration norms having status as custom. "The
United States has long denied that any obligation rests upon it when a neutral to attempt to control
expressions of opinion by private persons within its territory and adverse to the cause of any
belligerent," although the US Government has appealed to its citizenry to refrain from partisanship
during war. 3 HYDE, supra note 5, § 874.
110. These might be applied through the analogy of the due regard principle, taken from the
LOS and applied during armed conflict by analogy. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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.

.

.

.
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.

accompanying text.
accompanying text.
113. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
114. Outer space also has this characteristic, but beyond the Charter and general principles
applicable to any situation, there is little law from which analogies for neutrality law in the IW
context might be drawn. See supra notes 96—100 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., supra notes 68, 70—72, 78, 89, 91—93 and accompanying text.
117. Myres S. McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49
American Journal of International Law 356-58 (1955).
118. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. The law for dropping projectiles from balloons
comes to mind. See Declaration Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles & Explosives from Balloons,
Oct. 17, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, still in force for 28 countries including the United States, and perhaps
111. See supra note 30 and

112. See supra notes 57, 58 and

more

if treaty

Symposium,

succession principles are taken into account. See TIF, supra note 15, at 450;

supra note 58; Walker, supra note 47.

119. 1.CJ. Statute,

art.

38(1);

RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 20

notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
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way for

where we come

W;

ar fighting has

No

the world to be destroyed,
in;

most experts

we're computer professionals

come

a

long

way from

.

agree,

is

by

acci-

We cause accidents.

?

the days of swords and shields.

longer must armed forces rely completely on "arms," or even

"forces," to gain victory

on the

battlefield.

Today, computers are becoming

weapon of choice for the military warrior. Forget the old standbys of the
M-16, Abrams tank, Nimitz-class carrier, or F-16. As forces become more
the

computer and technologically dependent,
completely different look.

2

In

some

militaries

respects, this

of the future will have

should not surprise

us.

a

Tech-

means and methods of warfare,
but the pace of transformation has increased dramatically in the past few
decades. While laptops and cyber chips may never completely displace guns
nological change has always transformed the

and

bullets in the warfighter's arsenal, they certainly will

become an

increas-

ingly critical part.

Nowhere

is

this

technological transformation

more evident than

in the areas

of military space resources and information operations. Lasers, electronic pulses,
pinpoint sensing equipment, and a vast array of other sophisticated space systems
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becoming an ordinary part of our day-to-day military experience. As the latmicrochip and computer network capabilities become an integral part of at-

tacking and defending those space systems, the future will be fraught with

new

dramatic

possibilities.

Yesterday's science fiction

is

becoming

today's

reality.

Background
This

new reality is already a significant threat to the US national security infra-

structure.

Consider the evidence. According to former Deputy Defense Secre-

John Hamre, one particular Department of Defense (DoD) computer
network is penetrated as often as 10-15 times a day by computer hackers. 3 With
more than 2.1 million computers and 10,000 local area networks, DoD was the
target of more than 250,000 detected intrusions in 1998. 4 That figure is even more
astounding when you consider that the Defense Information Systems Agency
(DISA) estimates that only one intrusion out of every 150 is even detected. 5 In
February 1998, while the US was preparing to deploy forces to the Persian Gulf,
a computer attack known as "Solar Sunrise" was initiated against computer systems throughout the Department of Defense. 6 The potential implications of the
attack were sobering:
tary

Someone, or some group of people
status,

on over 20 important

we

subsequently,

.

.

logistical

.

gained root access, systems administrator

computers throughout the Air Force and,

Navy and Army. They could have

learned throughout the

therefore crashed the systems.

They downloaded thousands of passwords and they

And for days, critical days, as we were trying to get
forces to the Gulf, we didn't know who was doing it. We assumed therefore it was
Iraq. We found out it was two 14-year-olds from San Francisco. Was that good

installed sniffers

news or bad?

and trap doors.

If two 14-year-olds

could do

that,

think about what a determined

foe could do. 7

"Eligible Receiver"

was

a

cyber attack exercise in June 1997, which was

launched by the Department of Defense against
tems detected and responded to the

attack.

itself to see

how

well our sys-

For days, the attack went undetected.

enemy to

computer
operations of major military commands, create large-scale blackouts, and interrupt emergency phone service in Washington, DC. 8 These types of cyberspace
intrusions are not limited to the domain of criminals or terrorist hackers. States
have been, and will continue to be, engaged in the use of information
This exercise demonstrated the ability of a potential
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They recognize,

operations.

does the US,

as

value in protecting national secu-

its

There have been reports that during the NATO-led Operation
FORCE campaign against Serbia, Serbs hacked into the NATO

rity interests. 9

ALLIED
World Wide Web
messages.

10

US with pro-Serb

pages and flooded e-mail accounts in the

The reported

Serbian actions, and others like them, demonstrate

Both the White House and DoD are certainly convinced. In response to the threat against DoD communications systems and other government computer data, the Clinton Administration issued a
White Paper in May 1998 setting forth policy and goals on critical infrastructure
that the threat

of cyber attack

is

protection. 11 In addition, the

Network Defense

real.

DoD

created the Joint Task Force -

Computer

12

(JTF-CND), which maintains a 24-hour operations center
to provide warnings of cyber attacks on DoD systems. 13
Couple the dangers of cyber attacks with our heavy reliance on space systems
and the threat becomes all the more sobering. It is more than just an axiom that
outer space

is

the proverbial high ground. 14 Access to, and control

space are fundamental to our nation's economic and military security.

we

over,

more space-based systems

tions alike.

lance,

and

16

These systems

a host

of other

civilian use. Friends

Therein

lies

Modern

will

it is

More-

US

estimated that within the next 10 to 20

be available to friendly and unfriendly na-

will provide

communications, weather, surveil-

critical services that will

have both

a military

and

and foes will be able to use the same space systems. 17

one of the dangers.

military forces rely heavily

on dual-use telecommunications media,

including telephones, faxes, and e-mail that travel over civilian
ated networks. In fact, 95 percent of all

over public networks.
bility

outer

can no longer take that access and control for granted. While the

dominates outer space activity today,
years

of,
15

18

DoD

owned

telecommunications

Telecommunications are

or oper-

traffic

flows

a particularly acute vulnera-

because of this high degree of dependence by modern militaries. 19 This re-

liance permeates every facet of society, thus allowing exploitation

throughout

the conflict spectrum at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. 20 Because

of their data transfer capacity and mobility, telecommunications are increasingly
important
directed.

The

as

the critical media

threats are real, the vulnerabilities potentially grave,

technology

is

largely responsible. Information operations

tions are uniquely intertwined
ity to,

From
to

by which our national instruments of power

are

21

new computer

and outer space opera-

through their mutual reliance on, and vulnerabil-

computer technology. Moreover,
a military

and

that

technology

is

changing rapidly.

operation or infrastructure protection perspective,

keep pace with such rapid developments. Equally daunting
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is

it is

difficult

the effort to
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new technologies. Both information operamilitary force in a way that challenges tradi-

apply existing legal regimes to these
tions

and space operations apply

norms. Admittedly, such a topic

tional international legal

than can be adequately addressed here. Therefore,
as a basic

this

raises far

chapter

is

more

issues

intended only

primer to introduce the reader to the international law applicable to in-

formation operations that

affect military space systems.

Scope and Definition of the Information Operations Concept
readily apparent

It is

how wide-ranging

national security infrastructure can be.

It

the

computer

can include

jamming, information

fensive and defensive electronic

attack threat to our

activities

denial,

such

as of-

manipulation

of data, morphing of video transmissions, destruction of hardware, or

myriad of other techniques

to render military

or unavailable

tive, inoperable,

—including

weapons and systems

at a critical time.

a

ineffec-

In the legal context, infor-

by individuals, organizations, or nations;
actions motivated by goals ranging from monetary greed to terrorist revenge;
and operations with military objectives touch both international and domes-

mation operations

threats

—

law.

tic

For our purposes, discussion of information operations

on behalf of, nation

by, or

many

space

a starting point,

tions"

is

US

not

a

it is

a universally

and the

DoD

itself,

agreed upon meaning. Indeed,

do not use consistent terminol-

ogy. For example, in the glossary of Doctrine

adopts the

DoD

Document

definition of "information operations"

2-5, the Air Force

found in

tive 3600.1: "actions taken to affect adversary information

systems while defending one's

Yet the Air Force
it calls

"a

more

gain, exploit,

relating to outer

necessary to define terms, since "information opera-

term of art with

military services,

own

DoD

Direc-

and information

information and information systems/-'

takes the unusual step of qualifying that definition with

useful

are

regulations that apply. 22 In-

we examine those aspects of public international law
that may have an impact on information operations.

stead,

the

limited to actions

Moreover, domestic laws and regulations

States.

not our focus, although there are certainly

As

is

working

what

definition," namely, "[t]hose actions taken to

defend or attack information and information systems and in-

clude both information-in-warfare and information warfare (emphasis added)." 24

Even though

the Air Force and

DoD

definitions emphasize different aspects of

information operations, their concepts,
vices, include

as

well

as that

of the other military ser-

both offensive and defensive operations. While

we

use the term

"information operations" in a very broad sense that includes attacking or
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defending information and information systems, for the purpose of this chapter

we

place particular emphasis

The Importance
The

electron

of

IO

on computers

means of doing

so.

to Military Operations

may well be the ultimate precision guided weapon, 25

mation is becoming a strategic resource
of the term "information operations"

prove

that could

as

signifies a

for infor-

valuable and influen-

and labor were in the

in the post-industrial era as capital

tial

the primary

as

industrial age. 26

Use

new way of thinking that recog-

nizes the central importance of modern information systems as force enhancers,
as vitally

be used

important

targets, as a

means of defense, and

as

cyberweapons

that

may

to attack certain targets. 27

While both netwar and cyberwar28 revolve around information communications
matters, at a deeper level they are forms

of war about "knowledge"

knows what, when, where, and why, and about how
regarding

Netwar

knowledge of itself and

its

its

It

means trying

population "knows" or thinks

it

secure a society or a military

is

adversaries.

refers to information-related conflict at a

nations or societies.

—about who

to disrupt,

knows about

grand

between

[strategic] level

damage or modify what

itself and

the world around

a target

it.

It

may

involve public diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns,
political

and

and

cultural subversion, deception

to

efforts

promote

of or interference with local media,

movement

a dissident or opposition

across

computer

networks. 29

Daniel Kuehl, Professor of Military Strategy
sity's

fare

at

the National Defense Univer-

School of Information Warfare and Strategy, notes that information war-

is

intended to "influence the enemy's will and

stop fighting and

Information
use

is

you

aimed

ability to fight so that

they

win." 30

at affecting

the enemy's cognitive and technical abilities to

information while protecting our

information environment. In some ways

own

it is

—

to

control

and exploit the

technologically independent in that

operations can be conducted in any of the media of war, not just cyberspace, to
attain that

key objective of weakening the enemy's

will,

but in other ways the

new medium of cyberspace offers a particularly rich environment through which
we can reach those elusive targets, the enemy's will and capability, via the various
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entry ways and connecting points in the information environment, whether they

be hardware, software, or wetware

The

[the

human

mind]. 31

objective of offensive warfare has always been to deny, destroy, disrupt,

—

enemy

employment of forces or in retaining the
support
Mao Tse-Tung believed that "to win victory we must try
our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf, and to
create confusion in the minds of the enemy commanders." 33 Information operaor deceive the

either in

its

of its people. 32

tions are particularly well suited to sealing the eyes

and ears of the enemy. By dis-

rupting or denying the flow of information between the enemy's military forces

and

its

command and

render sightless any

The Importance

control elements, information operations can essentially

enemy commander. 34

of Space Systems to Military Operations

Space denial is an important tenet ofour national defense
that tenet

is

the recognition that control of outer space

today's battlefield. Certainly, space

from merely being a
adjunct." 36

power

is

strategy. 33 Inherent in

essential for victory

has evolved over the

last

on

ten years

no less than an "indispensable
one author, "the contemporary reality is that the US

useful force multiplier to being

According

to

armed forces could not prevail, even
support of space systems."

37

against a modestly

competent

foe,

Air Force Chief of StaffGeneral Michael E.

without the

Ryan gives

an excellent example of the practical use of space assets in a deployed environment.

When a U-2

reconnaissance aircraft goes on

a

mission, the planes can send raw

surveillance data via satellite to intelligence specialists in the

can analyze

it

and send

to

States,

who

Operation Allied Force's Combined Air Operations

The data can then be sent to a pilot flying a strike mission.
can be done within minutes and reduces the number of airmen who have

Center at Vicenza,
All this

it

United

Italy.

to deploy. 38

During Operation ALLIED FORCE in the Balkans, a variety of space assets
were used to support the NATO effort. According to Brigadier General Mike
Drennan, Commander of the 21st Space Wing at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, navigation, strike indicators, search and rescue, communications, and
weather images represented just some of the space systems support provided

commanders
cruise missiles
as certain

in the theater. 39 Additionally,

and

Tomahawk land-attack
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both conventional air-launched

missiles

other precision guided weapons,

to

owed

launched from

ships, as well

their success to the Global
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S.

Positioning System (GPS). 40 While

Defense

as a

tiveness of

dual-use system,

US

its

GPS was

designed by the Department of

primary purpose has been to enhance the effec-

and coalition military

forces.

Our national space policy expressly recognizes that US national security is dependent upon an

maintain access

ability to

national security interests

may

mation operations can play

a

to,

and use

of, space.

41

At

times, our

require denial of space to our adversaries. Infor-

key role in space control and

denial.

For instance,

computer network and manipulation of key data
can prevent a space launch, move an opponent's communications or remote
sensing satellites out of orbit, or preclude satellite data from reaching command

intrusions into an adversary's

and control

centers.

World Wide

Availability of Space

Data Information

One of the realities of space denial and space control objectives within our naand military doctrine

tional space policies

have exclusive access to space.
are obtaining space assets

oping space program,

as

is

US

that the

does not, and will not,

A growing number of nations and organizations

and systems of their own. 42 China has

does Japan, India, Brazil, and, of course, Russia. 43

France, India, and Israel have capabilities in high-resolution

technology, and

any
de

nation. 44

la

Terre]

this

type of data

The US

a rapidly devel-

is

now commercially available for purchase by

Landsat and the French

SPOT

imaging systems have been around for

continues to improve and

satellite surveillance

become more widely

[Systeme Pour V Observation

years,

but their technology

available. 45

For instance, the

French are currently marketing ten-meter resolution images, while some commercial

satellites are

now capable of one-meter resolutions. 46 More recently, the

European Space Agency has developed Earth Resources Satellites (ERS) 1 and
2, and marketed their synthetic aperture radar (SAR) images. Canadian Radarsat
and the Helios reconnaissance satellite owned by France, Spain, and Italy may
also have future commercial availability. 47 A further example of the public commercial availability of space system technology is the US' hugely successful GPS,
which, until recently, enjoyed

a

near monopoly in space-based navigation tech-

nology. Besides the availability of GPS, Europe
ellite

is

planning to launch

its

own sat-

navigation system called Galileo, projected to be operational in 2008.

As non-US

satellite

systems

navigation

are

developed and launched,

additional legal issues and national security concerns arise.

monopoly on
GPS, space

When a virtual US

particular space systems exists, such as there used to be with

denial or control

information from our

own

is

merely

a

matter of interrupting or encoding the

systems so that other nations are unable to use
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it.

48

Information Operations in the Space

However, when other nations have
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similar space systems, or can purchase the

information they produce, space denial or control

may require more

means of information operations. The commercial
sensitive data creates

obvious

"Islamic Jihad could get

its

hands on

a

three-dimensional image, combine
to

Baghdad, where

could await

it

of potentially

According to one

analyst,

one-meter resolution picture of a

US Air

risks to national security.

Force General's headquarters in Turkey,

it

availability

aggressive

convert the shot to a precise

with data from

a

GPS device, and transmit

purchased secretly from China

a primitive cruise missile,

49
its targeting coordinates."

Information operations, used to assure
others, will certainly raise

US space control by denying its use by

eyebrows and

stir

heated debate in the international

employ a military option, especially one affecting outer space or space systems, must weigh political concerns and sensitivities, a consideration of world opinion on the subject is useful.
community. Since any decision

to

International Opinion on the Weaponization of Space

Since the Soviet launch of Sputnik in 1957,

many nations

in the

world com-

munity have been ardently concerned about preventing the placement of weapons in outer space, particularly with respect to
result,

new weapons

any potential use of offensive information operations

technology. As a
in,

or affecting,

outer space will likely aggravate international concerns.

The debate

has been polarizing, frequently pitting practical national secu-

rity objectives against the desire to

free

from military

conflict. Early

one environmental realm
General Assembly resolutions generally

maintain

UN

at least

sought to provide that outer space would be used exclusively for "peaceful
purposes," but the term was never defined. 50 While nearly
to

all

voices claimed

be in favor of peaceful purposes, they were not so harmonious on the degree

of military activity that concept included. The

domain of the

reality,

of course,

is

that outer

and has been of significant
importance to the military to the present day. Today, some advocates of the
non-weaponization of space seek to impede further military development of
space with the ultimate hope of curtailing an arms race in outer space. While
space has been a

military since 1957

opponents of this view are not against "peaceful purposes" per
the need to be prepared for
In general, the

two views

war

as

the best

way

includes

members on both

has taken an active role in international space law
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they

stress

to protect national interests."'

are irreconcilable, although there

ment on specific issues.
The United Nations, which

se,

is

1

room for agree-

sides

of the debate,

from the very inception of the
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S.

done so primarily through the work of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).
space age.

It

has

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
In 1959, the United Nations established
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses

COPUOS 52

to

of outer space. Since

enhance internaits

creation,

it

has

been the primary forum for the development of international space law. In fact,
COPUOS was the architect for each of the existing five space law treaties. Of
those, four have

been

ratified

by most space-faring nations; together, they com-

body of international space law. 53
From its inception, COPUOS has promoted the use and maintenance of
outer space for peaceful purposes. Early work resulted in the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 1721 on December 20, 1961, which stated that "the
common interest of mankind is furthered by the peaceful uses of outer space." 54
General Assembly Resolutions 1884 and 1962, adopted two years later, continued that theme. 55 Today, the Committee continues to encourage research and
distribution of information on outer space matters, sponsor various programs and

prise the core

conferences, and study the legal issues arising out of space exploration and activity. 56

As

its

name implies and its work

that outer space should
that

confirms,

COPUOS starts from the premise

be maintained for "peaceful uses." While

everyone has adopted,

as

noted earlier, there

is

meaning. Past practice has demonstrated that most

this

is

a

term

strong disagreement about

its

COPUOS members believe

military activity in outer space, as potentially contrary to the goals of international peace
sion, the

and

security,

must be

closely scrutinized. In fact, at

UN General Assembly passed Resolution

its fifty-first

ses-

51/44, "Prevention of an

arms race in outer space." Included in that resolution was the statement that the
General Assembly recognizes "that prevention of an arms race in outer space

would
eral

avert a grave danger for international peace

Assembly resolutions contain

and security." 57 Other Gen-

similar language. 58

The large number of early space treaties and General Assembly resolutions
would ordinarily reflect a committee that works well together. However, that
been the case with COPUOS. Its early success in obtaining the first four
treaties was due largely to the fact that compromises on space issues were easier

has not

to obtain before the full potential

of space exploration had been

fully

under-

However, fundamental rifts soon developed within COPUOS, and
have continued, between space and non-space powers. 60 More recently, the
United States has found itself on the minority side of several General Assembly

stood.

59

resolutions intended to de-militarize outer space.
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From

the perspective of the

UN

Charter, these resolutions are merely

non-binding recommendations. 61 However, some commentators have asserted
that the "peaceful use"

law, 62 and, to the

extent

of outer space concept
it is

reflects

referenced, therefore believe the General Assembly

resolutions contain legally binding principles. 63 This
larly helpful since

it

customary international

argument

is

not particu-

does not address the meaning of the peaceful use concept.

more practical concern about these

resolutions

is

A

whether the underlying view-

point will ultimately lead to the development of another space law treaty which
significantly limits military activity, including information operations, in or

transiting outer space.

Conference on Disarmament
Closely related to

COPUOS

is

creation of the United Nations,
eral

it

the Conference

on Disarmament (CD). Also a

was established

in

1979

as

UN. The CD

disarmament negotiating forum of the

the single multilathas

grown from

its

64

membership of 40 nations to 66, including the United States. As with
COPUOS, disagreements between CD members exist. These differences were
clearly evident in 1985 when an Ad Hoc Committee, formed to find a means to
original

curtail the

arms race in space, held 20 meetings over a three-month period with-

out reaching agreement on any of their objectives. 65

forming the

a

proposal for an arms control treaty for space, the United

argued that there was no need for such

sufficient. In contrast, the

to

catalyst in

Ad Hoc Committee was the US "Strategic Defense Initiative" pro-

gram. 66 In debating
States

The primary

former

socialist

a treaty since existing treaties

block nations indicated

were

a willingness

conclude an agreement that would not only prohibit space attack weapons

then under development, but would also require the destruction of existing

weapons. While the Soviet Union accused the United

"hampering" the
China's tone was

ratification
at least as

.

.

.

emphatic. China

and proposes

space' at the present stage." 67

of "disrupting" and

of several important arms control agreements,

made

plan must not be carried out" and that "China
in outer space

States

to achieve

is

first

it

clear that "the 'Star

Wars'

firmly opposed to an arms race

de-weaponization of outer

'the

The nonaligned and

neutral States consistently

supported the idea that space weapons must be prevented in outer space

at all

costs. 68

A more recent example

of this

split

of opinion

is

found in General Assembly

Resolution A/52/37, passed in 1997. That resolution called on the

re-examine the idea of establishing another
issue

Ad Hoc Committee

of militarization of space. This issue had re-captured the
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of recent developments in lasers and perceptions that the

weaken

the Anti-Ballistic Missile

objections of the

(ABM)

ain,

Treaty. 69 Despite the efforts and

US, the resolution was supported by 128

China, Russia, Canada, Japan, Australia, and

and France were among the 39

nations, including

New Zealand. The US, Great Brit-

abstentions. 70

General Assembly resolution called for the

US was seeking

CD

Even more

recently, another

Ad Hoc

to reestablish the prior

Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Adopted on December 4, 1998, by an overwhelming vote of 165 to 0, the US was one of four abstentions. 71

China has been

particularly active in the

CD in

weapon-free. In addition to co-sponsoring several
lutions,

it

its

efforts to

keep outer space

UN General Assembly reso-

has also sought to obtain a legally binding international agreement to

ensure outer space remains free of all weapons. In

Paper in July 1998 to outline

fact,

China published

a

White

views on the weaponization of outer space. 72

its

"China stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons deployed in outer space." 73 Additionally, it seeks a

According

to this paper,

"ban on the use of force or conduct of hostilities

China

also

wants to preclude

in,

from, or to outer space."

countries from experimenting with any space

all

weapons systems that would provide strategic advantages on the ground. 74
While its latest White Paper does not refer to information operations, the principles
outlined therein seem to imply that China would oppose the use of information operations that could

be seen

as a

"use of force," the "conduct of hostilities," or

as

"a

weapon of any kind" in outer space. Despite this strong language, it is not surprising
to read China's most recent statements, which express an intention not only to use
information operations for military purposes, but to extend their use into space. 75

During its 1998

session, the

CD included in

its

agenda the frequently revisited

topic of the "prevention of an arms race in outer space." 76

During

that session,

Canada proposed that the CD create an Ad Hoc Committee, referred to earlier,
with the mandate to negotiate a convention for the non-weaponization of outer
space. 77 The Canadian proposal makes two important admissions. First, it recognizes that currently there is no multilateral international agreement that prohibits the deployment of weapons in outer space other than weapons of mass
destruction. This recognition

is

consistent with the longstanding

US

position.

Even more important, however, is the statement that "[w]e acknowledge that
there is currently no arms race in outer space. We accept the current military uses
of outer space for surveillance, intelligence-gathering and communications." 78
Despite these two major concessions,

world disagrees with current
that

it

US

it is

nonetheless clear that

national and

DoD

much of the

space policy to the extent

does not expressly denounce the weaponization of outer space.
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US

and

DoD

Law Arena

Space Policies

The Clinton Administration announced the latest version of the National
Space Policy on September 19, 1996. 79 The National Security Space Guidelines
include the principle that the US will conduct its space activities in a way that asdeny our use of space and preserves our ability to conduct both military and intelligence space-related activities. This makes some in
the international community uneasy. 80 The National Space Policy also makes
clear what has been obvious for quite some time
that access to and use of space
"is central for preserving peace and protecting US national security." 81
sures hostile forces cannot

—

In terms of information operations, nothing in our current policy prohibits or

even

limits use

of such technology to support our space security guidelines. In
the

fact, it obligates

sion aspects,"

82

DoD to "protect critical space-related technologies and mis-

and maintain the

capabilities to

execute traditional mission areas

of space support, force enhancement, space control, and force application. 83

The

use of information operations to protect our communication systems and

data links, while being able to interfere with the
versaries,

is

wholly consistent with National Space Policy guidelines.

Assurance of space access by the
Defense's

new

on July

9,

1999,

Policy,

it

ity." 85

communications and data of ad-

US

space policy set forth in
this

is

also

DoD

included in the Department of

Directive 3100.10. 84

policy not only echoes the guidance of the National Space

also specifically refers to the

need

to maintain "information superior-

Moreover, the wide variety of information operations

to defend against attacks

consistent with

Announced

upon our space systems and

that could

be used

to assure space control

is

it.

Recalling the position of

many

nations involved in

COPUOS

and the

CD, many of the US national and Department of Defense space policy statements may run counter to the concept of de-militarizing space. 86 Perhaps
most significantly, the first sentence of the DoD policy unequivocally announces that "space is a medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall

and the
rather

be conducted." 87

Many nations represented in COPUOS

CD do not view outer space as analogous to "the land, sea or air," but

more

clude nearly

When

like Antarctica,
all

where they have expended much

effort to ex-

military activities.

the statements of scholars and politicians from other nations are

compared generally

to those in the

US,

a clear difference

of opinion regarding

the proper role of the military in space, including the use of information operations, emerges.

While information operations may or may not be

consistent

with international opinion, they are consistent with both the national and
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DoD space policies. Having considered world opinion on the issue, we turn to
the applicable international law

information operations in or

as it relates to

transiting space.

Overview of Space Law Applicable to Information Operations

There currently
specific

shalt nots" in space

law which
fact,

specifically re-

there are very

military activities of any kind that are restricted or prohibited. 88 For

one

instance,

no "thou

term or concept of "information operations." In

fer to the

few

exist

will not find

erence to space

among the

weapons, kinetic energy guns, or informa-

lasers, anti-satellite

tion operations. For the

most part, when examining space law provisions,

work with

practitioner needs to

current space law treaties any specific ref-

fact-specific basis. Therefore,

a legal

general principles that must be applied

on

a

we will focus on those laws having a general appli-

cation to the concept of information operations and then apply

them to

specific

scenarios.

One means

of using information operations to protect our national security

interests in space

is

by controlling our adversaries'

access to information through

techniques that will interrupt, interfere with, or deny
times, this can be particularly sensitive since

does not

own its own

system. This, in turn,

space system

may

may

critical satellite data.

At

denying data to an adversary that

require disrupting a third party's space

disrupt access to data for other users

who may not be

involved in the conflict with the US. Using information operations for such

purpose requires careful consideration of the law

a

national policy and

as

well

as

of US

GPS

data.

security interests.

US

on GPS Data Interference

Policy

One

such national policy

accessed in

two ways. The

relates to the use
first is

through the

standard positioning service (SPS). This

method

GPS data can be
normal operation mode of the
allows access by

all

users,

but

it

US to downgrade the data provided to certain users through use

also enables the

of various degradation technologies and cryptography. The second means of access

is

DoD

the
users

GPS

Precision Positioning Service (PPS),

and enables them to receive

GPS receivers.

Thus, the

igational signals released

a clear signal

which

is

granted only to

with properly encrypted

US military could seek to intentionally impair the navby

its

global navigation system in the

SPS mode

to pro-

Such interference would only temporarily
and others from obtaining the same quality of

tect national security interests.

prevent commercial users

89
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information the

by

US needs for its military operations.
warning other

a public notice

Since

this particular

It

would

also

be preceded

of the intentionally impaired

signals.

GPS belongs exclusively to the US, the United States can set

on

appropriate limits

users

Law Arena

its

use by third parties.

However, on March 29, 1996, the Clinton Administration announced a new
national policy that would eventually remove prior military restrictions on the
management and use of the US-owned GPS. As part of that new policy, the US
committed itself to "discontinue the use of GPS Selective Availability (SA)
within a decade in a manner that allows adequate time and resources for our military forces to

prepare fully for operations without SA." 90

that

GPS would be provided free

uses

on

a

continuous

of charge to the

designed to impair or interrupt

terms, the policy allows the

is

used for peaceful

policy directs the

of the world for peaceful

US to

DoD information operations ac-

US GPS

signals

civil,

when

necessary.

By

its

continue selective availability measures until

alternative measures allow military forces to operate

data

policy also stated

basis.

This current policy should not unduly limit
tivities

rest

The

commercial, and

without them, even

scientific purposes.

if the

Secondly, the

DoD to develop measures to prevent the hostile use of GPS, 91

including defensive information operation measures. Finally, in the case of actual

armed

conflict, this internally

imposed policy decision would not preclude

military use of information operations to affect an adversary's ability to use the

GPS

system, if deemed necessary for national security purposes.

United Nations Treaties and Pronouncements
Outer Space Treaty

1.

Although
space,

has

92

the

become

it

was not the

first

international agreement to refer specifically to outer

Outer Space Treaty which entered into force on October

be over emphasized.

as

the

"Magna Carta" of outer space, 94 its

tion of Principles,

95

has

several provisions that

been the

set forth earlier in the

basis

non-binding 1963 Declara-

of subsequent space law

countries" and provides that
this

it is

impose any

and contains

and

in the interest

"the province of all mankind."

of

Some schol-

language means that States cannot encroach upon, or

interfere with, the lawful activities

ever,

treaties,

have general application to information operations.

Article 1(1) obligates parties to use outer space "for the benefit

have asserted that

significance cannot

provides the basic framework of international space law, in-

It

corporated many of the principles

ars

93

the cornerstone multilateral agreement dealing with the use of space.

Frequently described

all

10, 1967,

of other States. 96 This language does not, how-

legal constraints

on

military operations properly authorized
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under international law. For example, military action pursuant to
Security Council resolution

and in the

interest

is,

of course, an authorized

a

Chapter VII

activity for the benefit

of all countries, given the UN's authority to use force to propeace and security.

tect international

Article 1(2) expands

on

the use limitations of the

first

outer space shall be "free for exploration and use by

all

paragraph, stating that

States

without discrimi-

nation of any kind." This language affirms the principle of free access to space

and prohibits interference with that access. 97 The language of paragraph two

also

contains an important condition that the use of outer space be "in accordance

with international law." Thus,
it is

if the military

action

is

otherwise lawful, the fact

conducted in outer space or through information operations does not violate

this provision.

Closely related to the freedom of access principle
principle contained in Article
to national appropriation

II,

which provides

is

the non- appropriation

that outer space "is not subject

by claim of sovereignty." While

this

language might

suggest that information operations used to interfere with satellite signals or data
are an act

goes too

of unlawful appropriation of another

State's space system, that

Interference with a sovereign object

far.

is

not the same

as asserting a

sovereign interest over outer space should that object be located there.
latter

would

violate the non-appropriation principle of Article

view

II.

Only the

The Law of

the Sea Convention has similar language regarding claims over the high seas, 98

but

it

jects)

clearly has

allowed use of the high

by military warships (sovereign ob-

without recognizing that interference with them constituted a claim of na-

tional appropriation over the high seas.

high

seas

seas,

interference with warships

Absent

a

claim of sovereignty over the

on the high

seas has

equivalent to an unlawful appropriation. In both cases,
assertion

of

what

is

prohibited

is

the

territorial claims. 99

Another potential limitation on information operations
cle IV.

not been deemed

This

article contains the

key provisions

is

contained in Arti-

relating to military activity in

from orbiting, installing on celestial bodies,
or stationing in outer space any nuclear weapons or "any other weapons of mass
destruction." The meaning of the term "weapons of mass destruction" (WMD)
has "typically been defined as weapons that are intended to have indiscriminate
effect upon large populations and large geographical areas." 100 It is generally accepted to include nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. 101 Even though

space. Paragraph

WMD could

1

prohibits nations

also include

other weapons, notwithstanding the Russian position

statement to the contrary, 102 the use of an information

viewed by the

US as a weapon of mass destruction. 103

be controlled so

as

weapon is not likely to be
Ordinarily,

its

effects

can

not to destroy large numbers of people. For example, the
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by information operations of a particular computer system
does not come within the meaning ofWMD in Article IV.
For the most part, Article IV, paragraph 2, deals with the moon and other ceselective disabling

Among other restrictions, it states that,

lestial

bodies.

lestial

bodies shall be used by

purposes."

all

States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for peaceful

also states that "[t]he use

It

moon and other ce-

"[t]he

of military personnel for

scientific research

or for any other peaceful purposes shall not be prohibited." Despite the fact that the

"peaceful purposes" language does not expressly refer to the
space, historically the

US and other nations have generally agreed that activities

in outer space should also

has

been the

domain of outer

be confined to peaceful purposes. 104 Nonetheless,

it

US view that the peaceful purpose language does not preclude law-

ful military activity. 105

While

this

conclusion seems

determining which

clear,

military activities in outer space are considered "peaceful" 106 has

contentious debate. Indeed, from the
drafted, the international

community

moment

a topic

of

the Outer Space Treaty was

been divided on

has

been

this issue. 107

Advocates for the position that the "peaceful purposes" language excludes

all

military activity other than scientific research often cite to similar language in the

Treaty of 1959 108 and the conforming practice of nations in

Antarctic
Antarctica.
Article

1

,

However, such

paragraph

1

comparison

is

both misleading and inappropriate.

of that treaty states that "Antarctica

purposes only." While

ful

a

this

portion of the treaty

is

shall

be used for peace-

similar to the "exclusively

for peaceful purposes" language

of the Outer Space Treaty, the

What many of these

fail

advocates

to

mention

is

analysis

is

additional language that

inapt.
is

not

found in the Outer Space Treaty. Immediately following the reference

to

"peaceful purposes," the text of the Antarctic Treaty states that "[t]here shall be
prohibited, inter

alia,

any measures of a military nature

.

.

.

." It is

the additional

language contained in the Antarctic Treaty, and not found in the Outer Space
Treaty,

that

distinguishes

the

interpretation

of the "peaceful purposes"

language. Furthermore, State practice in Antarctica in 1959,
drafted,

was exclusively non-military while

when the

treaty

State practice in space in 1967,

was

when

the Outer Space Treaty was signed, was overwhelmingly military in nature.

The US view

IV does not preclude lawful military activity is also
supported by the historical context in which the Outer Space Treaty came into
existence. When the Outer Space Treaty was signed, its two primary drafters,
the

US

poses.

and the Soviet Union, were already using outer space

It is

for military pur-

unlikely that the Outer Space Treaty was intended to proscribe exist-

two primary drafters. 109 The idea that "peaceful purposes"
some military use was also consistent with the US space policy at

ing practice by

meant

that Article

at least

its

the time. For instance, President Eisenhower declared to Congress,
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National Aeronautical and Space Administration
the

and

(NASA) was

established, that

US was committed to the principle that "outer space be devoted to peaceful
purposes." 110 Similarly, the Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958

scientific

contained language that

"it

is

the policy of the United States that activities in

space shall be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." 111

Despite use of such language, that same act provided for military departments to

conduct space

including the development of weapons systems, mili-

activities,

tary operations,

and the defense of the US. Thus, the

mean only

"peaceful purposes" to

US

has never interpreted

non-military activity. Rather, the

US

posi-

tion has consistently been that the concept of "peaceful purposes" only prohibits
aggressive military activity contrary to international law. 112 In 1962, Senator Al-

bert Gore, Sr. stressed this distinction before the

urged that the

"test

of any space

non-military, but whether or not
obligations of law." 113

While

activities
it is

this

General Assembly.

must not be whether

consistent with the

view

represent the international consensus

UN

115

is

not held by

and

is

He

military or

it is

UN Charter and other

all,

114 it

now

appears to

consistent with Article

III

of the

Therefore, any information operations undertaken in

treaty, discussed later.

self-defense pursuant to a Security

Council resolution, or in accordance with

any recognized lawful purpose, would not be prohibited by either Article IV or
other portions of the Outer Space Treaty. Moreover, during any period of inter-

would even apply between the belligerents who were parties to the treaty. While there are several
views as to the test for when a treaty is abrogated or suspended by war between
belligerent parties, the fundamental principle is the compatibility between the
particular treaty provisions at issue and a state of war or armed conflict. Since the
issue depends on the "intrinsic character" of the treaty provisions in question, 116
to the extent the Outer Space Treaty provisions being discussed here are incompatible with the object and purpose of armed conflict, they would most likely be
national

armed conflict,

it is

unlikely that these provisions

suspended.
Finally, Article

IX

has the

most

direct application to the issue

operations that interfere with the use of outer space

language of this

article

of information

by other nations. Indeed, the

echoes principles enunciated earlier in the 1963 Declara-

tion. In addition to requiring

all

States to

conduct their

"with due regard" for the interests of other

States,

it

activities in

outer space

goes on to declare the

following:

If a State Party to the

planned by
interference

it

or

with

its

Treaty has reason to believe that an activity or experiment

nationals in outer space,

activities

.

.

.

would cause

potentially harmful

of other States Parties in the peaceful exploration and use
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of outer space,

... it shall

proceeding with such

Through

Law Arena

undertake appropriate international consultations before

activity.

.

.

.

(emphasis added)

Outer Space Treaty made legally binding the 1963
Declaration's principle of prior consultation based on the potential for harmful
interference in the space activities of another State.
Although the provisions cited above are likely to be interpreted in the international

this provision, the

community

two important

The

to

is

prohibited, there are

limitations to this prohibition as applied to information operations.

space by other States.

It is

of other States

tary force.

that "harmful interference"

that the interference

first is

activities

mean

The second

must be directed toward the "peaceful" use of

clear that a State

may lawfully interfere with the

space

when such activities are pursuant to a lawful use of mililimitation

is

that the interference to the space system

of

another must be "harmful." Information operations that intrude upon, tap into,
or monitor other space systems communications or other data for a military pur-

pose can arguably be conducted without "harming" the space system of the
other State, and to the extent they do no harm, they do not violate Article
the Outer Space Treaty. 117

Of course,

IX of

regardless of such an argument, the State

whose system was intruded upon would probably beg to differ. In fact, even if
the intrusion were deemed not to violate Article IX, the political fallout could
be extremely problematic.
Article III

perhaps the most important and illuminating of

is

Space Treaty provisions, the one which puts

all

text. Article III states that the Parties "shall carry

tion and use of outer space

.

.

.

in accordance

all

the Outer

the others into proper con-

on

activities in the

explora-

with international law, including the

Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace

and security

.

.

.

."

(emphasis added)

It is

oft-cited concept of peaceful purposes, that
ties in

is

this standard, far

central to

more than

whether or not

the

activi-

outer space comply with the Outer Space Treaty. While academic dis-

cussions will invariably center around the peaceful purposes language, military

commanders, planners, and operators who are considering activities in outer
space should focus instead on whether the military activity is lawful under the
traditional law of armed conflict. If a nation's military activities are conducted
"in accordance with international law" and the Charter of the UN, then the
Outer Space Treaty recognizes that such activities can be in the interest of international peace and security. Consequently, it is Article III, not Article IV,
Charter is one of
that should be the primary focus of attention. Since the

UN

the standards cited in Article

III,

it

is

instrument.
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UN Charter
Article

1

UN Charter expressly states that the purpose of the UN

of the

"maintain international peace and security." Accordingly, military

aimed at restoring peace and conducted pursuant to
consistent with the Charter

would be

a

Council

is

39 of the

if a threat to

peace, a

such that measures to restore inter-

among

national peace and security are required. Included
that the Security

activities

for a peaceful purpose. Article

exists

to

UN mandate or otherwise

Charter authorizes the Security Council to determine

breach of peace, or an act of aggression

is

the lawful measures

authorized to direct in restoring peace and security

are those set forth in Article 41

,

which include "the complete or partial interrup-

and other means ofcommunication"
(emphasis added). Clearly, information operations which have the effect of in-

tion of.

.

.

rail, sea, air,

postal, telegraphic, radio,

terrupting communications, and

would not only be
tional peace

lawful but an act

conducted pursuant to Article 41,
undertaken to maintain or restore internaare

and security. Therefore, such information operations would also be

consistent with the

The

which

Outer Space Treaty.

UN Charter goes even further in allowing for military action to maintain

or restore international peace and security. Article 42 authorizes "such action ... as

may be

when Article

rity"

necessary to maintain or restore international peace and secu-

41 measures would be, or have proven to be, inadequate.

the Security Council has the authority to direct

means"

to carry out

its

1990

and Security Council Resolution 1264

tained this language.
rity

to "use

all

necessary

Chapter VII peace enforcement measures, and, indeed, past

resolutions such as Security Council Resolution
118

members

By it,

Coupled with the

"all

678

(East

(DESERT STORM)

Timor) in 1999

necessary

119

as

have con-

means" language of a Secu-

Council resolution, Article 42 allows information operations of

scope than merely interrupting communications,

in

far greater

authorized by Article 41. In

determining the lawfulness of a particular information operation,

it is

necessary to

evaluate the factual context, not just the type of information operation conducted.

Information operations can also be undertaken for purposes of individual or
collective self-defense, an inherent right
cle

of all nations clearly recognized by Arti-

The mere fact that information operations affect space sysor are conducted from outer space, does not make those operations illegal.

51 of the Charter.

tems,

International Consortia and Other International Agreements

1.

International Telecommunications Convention (ITC)

The ITC

is

UnThe ITU

the basic charter for the International Telecommunications

ion (ITU), one of the oldest existing international organizations.
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directly oversees the

communications

satellite industry,

portant sector of outer space activity. 121
tions since 1945,

122

cooperation in space

A specialized agency of the United Na-

UN

been used by the
to promote international
through the regulation of telecommunication services

has

it

123

arguably the most im-

and allocation of radio frequencies.
Article 45(1) of the

Geneva

in

ITU

most recent

Convention, which was adopted in

1992 and amended by the Plenipotentiary Conference

1994, requires that

all

telecommunication

stations operate so as

at

Kyoto

not to cause

"harmful interference" to the radio service or communications of other
bers.

124

The convention

in

Mem-

defines "harmful interference" as "[interference

which endangers the functioning of

a

radionavigation service or of other

safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a

radio-communication service operating in accordance with the Radio Regulations." 125

According

to at least

one

term

scholar, the

is

intended to be broadly

interpreted and covers "any kind of damaging or destructive activity." 126
this interpretation

may have some academic

consistent with the express language of the

the position of the United States.

Information operations, such
cations

nign,

value,

it is

not widely held,

While
is

not

ITC, and certainly does not represent

127

as

implanting a trap door into the

network of a potential adversary or

setting

communi-

up another type of then be-

but potentially destructive, cyber agent in the telecommunications

system of another State, might be seen by some
guably, because the purpose of its presence

provide destructive capability

when

is

as

"harmful interference." Ar-

to enable harmful interference or

needed, the

fact that

an information oper-

mechanism is currently benign does not mean it is non-harmful. It would
be difficult to show that this type of interference endangered the functioning
ation

of

a service, seriously

degraded

were found

it,

or served to repeatedly interrupt

it.

be "harmful interference" from the

How-

ever,

even

if the

implanting of latent viruses or other cyber instruments were taken against

a military

ITC

if

there

network of another

restrictions

provide

a

State, there

would be no ITC

activity,

violation.

recognized exception for "military radio

tions" through Article 48(1).
affects a

to

The

installa-

A more difficult situation arises when the activity

dual-use civilian telecommunication system, one used for both civilian

and military purposes.
Finally, the

ITC does not provide for its continued application between Party

belligerents during

armed

conflict. Since

its

provisions are not compatible with

the object and purpose of such hostilities, they will likely be considered sus-

pended between the belligerents throughout the duration of any international
armed conflict. 128 Thus, the only time the provisions in the ITC would apply
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types of information operations

would be when they

a conflict level.

INTELSAT Agreement of 1973

Through the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
(INTELSAT) the US initiated the first worldwide commercial telecommuni,

cations satellite system. 129 Created to encourage global nation-to-nation public
satellite service,

130

example, within

INTELSAT reflects the US view of space law and policy. For
basic structure, the

its

own shares in the

consortium allows nations to invest and

organization, instead of it being organized along the old one-

nation, one-vote concept. This voting

positions that space

is

to

and profit sharing formula reflects the US

be used for the "benefit of mankind," and that the

"province of mankind" does not require an equal apportioning of space
wealth. 131 Despite these "American" views of space law, the Soviet

Union

INTELSAT in 1991
there are currently 143 member countries.
INTELSAT operates the world's most extensive global communications satel132

joined

lite

;

system in existence, and

vent.

DoD

has been a user of the system

from

its

ad-

133

and

Articles III (d)

INTELSAT

(e)

of the

INTELSAT Agreement describe military use

of

on using
"specialized telecommunications services" for military purposes. However, that
proscription does not preclude INTELSAT from providing standard "public
services.

These provisions

set forth a clear proscription

telecommunications services" to a military force for
fact,

according to

a

a military purpose. 134 In

COMSAT legal opinion, aside from the limitation on using

INTELSAT Agreement that prohibits or discourages the use of INTELSAT for either US national security or in"specialized" services, "there

is

nothing in the

telligence purposes." 135

The more difficult issue is the interruption,

denial, or

even destruction, of the

from an INTELSAT system. There is nothing in the
INTELSAT Agreement 136 that specifically prohibits interference with commu-

data or data links

nication systems, although

it

certainly

is

implied throughout the agreement. 137

For example, Article XIV(d) of the agreement requires
consult with the Assembly of Parties and furnish

using an

all

a party or signatory to

relevant information prior to

INTELSAT space segment in a way that might prejudice the establish-

ment of direct telecommunication

links

of other members.

INTELSAT's requirements of prior consultation and disclosure in advance of
an operation would be completely unfeasible in the context of a military information operation. Absent some agreement with the members to the contrary, a Security

Council resolution authorizing

285
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Chapter VII action, or some other lawful justification,

this

INTELSAT

provi-

sion could serve to require disclosure and thus limit peacetime military information operations activities that interrupt, deny, or destroy another's data

INTELSAT service. However,

as

from an

with the other international agreements, dur-

ing a period of international armed conflict, these limiting

INTELSAT require-

ments will likely be viewed as suspended between the parties to the

conflict, thus

allowing jamming, destruction of ground stations belonging to an adversary, or
other information operations. 138

3.

INMARSAT Convention
The

International Maritime

Satellite

Organization

(INMARSAT)

was

formed
extend the INTELSAT framework to include maritime
communications and certain maritime nations excluded from INTELSAT. 140
While its purpose was to provide space connections necessary to improve maritime and aeronautical communications, it has expanded into other systems, such
in 1976 139 to

as

mobile communications. 141

INMARSAT Convention 142 provides that "the Organization shall act exclusively for peaceful purposes." Initially, INMARSAT took the
Article 3(3)

of the

view that military uses per se were not compatible with peaceful purposes unless
they were for distress and safety or purposes recognized by international humanitarian law. 143 Much like the Outer Space Treaty, the INMARSAT Convention, in Article 12(l)(b), obligates the INMARSAT Assembly of Parties to

UN Charter. INMARSAT'S "peaceful purposes" language must therefore be read in the context of the UN Charter.
ensure

its

When

that

activities are consistent

is

done,

it

becomes

with the

clear the

INMARSAT

Convention does not

prohibit military action conducted under the auspices of the

UN

Security

Council, legitimate individual or collective self-defense, or military action that is
otherwise consistent with international law.

A recent privatization development, however, may have rendered the entire
discussion over the

On

meaning of "peaceful purposes"

April 15, 1999, the assets and

liabilities

mental organization were transferred to
better term,

"new INMARSAT."

144

of the

a private

in the

convention moot.

INMARSAT

company

intergovern-

called, for lack

of a

The new company's legal obligations arise

(MO A) and the Public Services Agreement (PSA) between it and the residual INMARSAT organization. The MOA
requires new INMARSAT to "have due regard" for certain principles, includout of its

Memorandum

of Association

ing the "peaceful purposes" principle, but

COMSAT's

position that this language only requires the
into consideration.

145
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Similarly, while clause 2.3

of the

PSA provides

exclusively for peaceful purposes," the

that "[t]he

INMARSAT

Company shall act

Assembly believed

this

language was political in nature and without an enforcement mechanism for
leged violations.

146

Therefore, according to the April 15, 1999,

"COMSAT

al-

COMSAT

no circumstances in which
the 'peaceful purposes' principle would be invoked as a reason to deny service to
the US Department of Defense or units thereof." 147 That opinion, however,
does not address whether "harmful interference" with a member's
INMARSAT space segment or communication link would constitute a violaGeneral Counsel Opinion,

envisions

new organization is still based
clear to what extent a member might

tion of its "peaceful purposes" language. Since the

on the

INMARSAT Agreement,

it is

not

seek to claim a violation of the provisions of that agreement.
since

vate
tial

new

On the other hand,

INMARSAT now privatized, perhaps the only remedy to the priis

company

would be

shareholders

contractual in nature. Regardless, poten-

disputes with offended nation shareholders will likely be avoided if the

proposed military action

is

taken pursuant to the

UN Charter or other interna-

tional law.

4.

Arms
Arms

Reduction Treaties
reduction treaties also contain provisions affecting the use of informa-

tion operations. For instance, the

ABM Treaty, in Article XII(2), was the

first

to

preclude any activity which interfered with the "national technical means of
verification" of treaty compliance
treaties,

While

such

as

SALT

II

by the other Party. Most other arms reduction

and the

START

Treaty, have similar language. 148

these formerly bilateral treaties are limited in the

number of Parties

in-

volved, and there are concerns about what constitutes an unlawful interference

with the national technical means of verification, the interference
tainly problematic.

Although

this

confines of this chapter, suffice

ducted so

as to

it

issue

is

cer-

matter merits further elaboration beyond the

to say that information operations

must be con-

avoid interfering with national verification means during times

other than international armed conflict.

5. Principles

of the

Law

Readily apparent in

of Armed Conflict

overview of space law applicable to information
operations is that despite all the sophisticated technology involved and the
potential application of additional treaties and consortia agreements, by and
large, the legal principles are the same as those applicable to other places and
means of warfare. Just because military operations are planned for a unique
domain space using a unique method information operations does not

—

this

—

—
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change the fundamental
imperative,

as

with

all

legal constraints

with which

militaries

must

abide.

It is

military actions, that a particular information operation in

space or affecting a space object be conducted pursuant to a lawful purpose and

way.

in a lawful

armed

conflict

It is this

(LOAC)

second aspect of lawfulness that

raises

the issue of law of

Notwithstanding the claims of some infor-

principles.

mation operations supporters that this method of warfare transcends the scope of
existing law,

LOAC

applies readily to information warfare techniques. 149

Any

offensive use of electronic

The

principle of military necessity

means during military operations would implicate the traditional law of armed conflict principles. These include the counterbalancing principles of military necessity and the avoidance of superfluous
injury, as well as the corollary principles of distinction of combatants from noncombatants, proportionality, and chivalry. 150
what

is

not

a

proper subject of attack.

with their equipment, are always

LOAC principle.

overriding
a direct

a

would produce

used to distinguish between what

151

It

recognizes that

Similarly, civilians

and

The

targeteers
a

may have some vague

In a long and protracted conflict,

to attack a civilian

to the

attacking

it

may be hard to

economic

targets.

it

computer system, such
target,

as

merely because

enemy's economy and research

and development capabilities may well undermine
limited conflict

but

on the enemy.

effect

damage

difficult,

civilian non-targets. Therefore,

banking system, university, stock exchange, or similar

their attacks

commonly

Dual-use systems complicate the de-

from purely

must resist the temptation

make

advantage 152 or accomplish a

presence of a dual-use system,

analysis.

lineation of purely military targets

forces, along

civilian property that

found in the arena of space systems, makes targeting analysis more
does not change the fundamental

and

may be attacked, as long as their damage or

a significant military

legitimate military objective. 153

enemy

is

proper subject of attack absent some other

contribution to the war effort

destruction

is

articulate

its

war effort, but in a short and

any expected military advantage from

154

Accordingly, proposals to target civilian information systems must be examined closely to determine whether there

Other potential

as

which the

data

is

navigation

as

or

ARABSAT.

consortium organizations will

either not parties to the

satellites

and

legal analysis

could in-

or public communications

provided through an international consortium such

INTELSAT, EUROSAT,

tional

a military necessity for the attack.

targets requiring close operational

clude dual-use systems, such
systems, in

is

armed

Attacking data systems of interna-

likely affect

conflict or

288

who

many users of the

data

who are

are declared neutrals. Basically,

Douglas

S.

Anderson and Christopher R. Dooley

the target analysis will be the same
against space systems as

it is

when

using information operations directed

using other means against other targets;

it

will just

be

more complex.

A complementary principle to military necessity
ous injury.

155

is

the avoidance of superflu-

International law "forbids the infliction of suffering, injury or de-

accomplishment of legitimate military

struction not actually necessary for the

purposes. This principle of humanity results in a specific prohibition against unnecessary suffering [and] a requirement of proportionality." 156

It is

the principle

of superfluous injury that has led nations to agree to ban certain weapons. 157 In
the context of information operations,
that has the potential

uses require

it is

difficult to

imagine any specific use

new

of causing superfluous injury, but

commanders

technologies and

to consider this principle.

Another important LOAC principle, distinction, demands that combatants
be distinguished from noncombatants, and that military objectives be distinguished from protected property or places. 158 Only combatants and military objectives are to be attacked. 159 Additionally, indiscriminate attacks and methods
and means of combat are

also prohibited.

A further aspect of this principle

is

that,

with very limited exceptions, only members of a nation's regular armed forces

enemy. 160

To

between combatants and noncombatants, the rule developed that combatants must wear a distinctive uniform. 161 In the case of an information operation initiated from a
distant computer terminal, there is no practical need for the operator to be in
uniform. However, this does not mean that the distinction between combatants
and noncombatants during an information operation should not be retained.
are entitled to use force against the

If a

distinguish

computer network attack is launched from a location

far

be of no practical significance whether the "combatant"

from its

is

target,

wearing

a

it

may

uniform.

Nevertheless, the law of war requires that lawful combatants be trained in the law

of war, that they serve under effective

command of officers
retaining

the

international
forces.

The
from

discipline,

and that they be under the

responsible for their conduct. This consideration argues for

requirement that combatant information operations

armed

conflicts

during

be conducted only by members of the armed

162

principle of proportionality requires that any civilian injury resulting

a legitimate use

of military force not be disproportionate to the military ad-

vantages anticipated. 163 International law recognizes that attacks
tary

targets

can

result

noncombatants and

in

unavoidable

civilian property.

164
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injury

on lawful miliand damage to

While the commander ordering the
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attack

is

responsible for

making

this

proportionality judgment, the defender has

a responsibility to properly separate military targets
vilian property. 165
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from noncombatants and ci-

may be legitimate military targets, but an

Information systems

damage and the damage from attacking them must take
into account whether, and to what extent, they provide essential services to
noncombatants. 166 This will require thorough intelligence information on an
adversary's computer systems and networks to aid a decision that must be made
on a case-by-case basis.
The final principle, chivalry, prohibits treachery or perfidy during armed
conflict. 167 It demands a certain amount of fairness in offense and defense, as
well as a certain mutual respect, honor, and trust between opposing forces. 168
When stratagems of war are developed, belligerents must be cautious not to
estimate of collateral

subvert humanitarian safeguards to effect purely military goals. 169 For example,

using a computer "morphing" technique to create an image of an

enemy

leader informing his military that an armistice or cease-fire agreement has been
signed,
act.

when

no such agreement

in fact

exists,

would be an

illegal perfidious

170

Due

to the complexity of applying

LOAC

principles to information opera-

tions against space systems, specific targeting proposals should be

approved in accordance with the
dures established by the National

rules

of engagement in place and the proce-

Command

Force Commander, usually through

reviewed and

a Joint

Authorities

(NCA)

or the Joint

Targeting Coordination Board. 171

must be conducted consistent with the Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) and may be used in individual or unit
Overall, information operations

self-defense

(as

defined in the

SROE)

Application of General

Having
tions

set forth the

Law

NCA approval. 172

to Specific Scenarios

framework

applicable to information opera-

we now want to apply that
While we hope these scenarios

conducted in outer space or upon space systems,

framework
are

general legal

or with

to a series

somewhat

of escalating

realistic,

factual scenarios.

they are not intended to imply that the United States or any

other nation engages in such operations or even has the capability to do

Scenario

1

Nation

:

A

Implanting Sniffers and Trap Doors
has a security organization that obtains information

A

is

especially

from the

from other nations' computers. Naconcerned with the activities of Nation B, which has been

Internet and attempts to gain information
tion

so.
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Consequently, Nation A's security organization has directed

covert activities toward Nation B.

Both nations

are industrialized

well-developed infrastructures. Additionally, both nations have
that includes surveillance

and telecommunications

satellites

a

and have

space program

with ground-based

downlinks which provide data to the computers.

A security agent of Nation A reports to his supervisors that he has gained access,

through the Internet, to the computer system that serves one of Nation B's

unclassified military

communications networks. This network uses space

He

to ensure connectivity.

assets

proposes implanting a trap door and "sniffer" that

will,

once in-place, remain inert and harmless, but which can be used to monitor

data

coming

into this network.

Discussion

Obviously, gathering unclassified information readily available to the pub-

However, implanting a trap door and "sniffer" which can be used to
monitor space communication systems of another nation is more questionable.
Most likely, such intrusions would violate the domestic laws of the offended
State, but there is very little authority that, during peacetime, it would violate
international law. 173 This type of information operation is likely to be viewed
much as peacetime espionage is viewed, namely, of no significant concern unless
serious practical consequences are shown. 174 As such, except for having to
weather the diplomatic costs of protest and political rhetoric by Nation B, assuming they are able to ascribe the intrusion to Nation A, international law neither provides a remedy nor imposes any sanctions.
Specific space law provisions similarly provide no legal restraint on this intrusion. The Outer Space Treaty only applies to activities in outer space, the moon,
lic is legal.

and other

celestial

bodies and

is,

therefore, not applicable to an intrusion into a

ground system. Assuming Nation
is

a

B

is

an

ITU member and the system intruded
ITC applies.
ITC prohibits

system regulated by the ITU, then some might suggest that the

They would be

in error.

"harmful interference"

—

As noted above, Article 45(1) of the
that which "endangers the functioning" of

a radio-

navigation service or "degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts" a radio

munication

service.

Trap doors and

interrupt communications.

"sniffers"

Moreover, such

a

do not degrade,

would not violate

the

service.

UN Charter. Implanting a moni-

toring device that establishes a passageway for future intrusions

formation operation
the

command and

entails.

Such implanting

is

is all

that this in-

akin to a covert intrusion into

control center of another country and placing

291

obstruct, or

cyber intrusion arguably does not

"endanger the functioning" of the communication
Likewise, such an act

com-

a

monitoring
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device on the phones. This action

would
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neither endanger international peace

UN

and security under Article 2(3) of the
Charter, nor would it constitute a
threat to the political independence of any State under Article 2(4). While this
type of computer penetration might constitute a threat to the territorial integrity

of a

UN member State,

it

will likely

be treated much like espionage, which State

As such, it can be accomplished with
of prosecution under international law or
sanction. The fact this

practice has clearly accepted, at least tacitly.
little risk

UN

particular intelligence gathering activity
tions that impacts data

is

conducted using information opera-

from a space system, rather than more traditional means of

espionage, does not change the basic equation.
In sum, this

first

scenario does not present any legal obstacles or limitations

under either space law or international law. Nonetheless,
atile in

the political arena and

be made by the

would present

it

could be highly vol-

a delicate policy decision that

must

NCA.

Scenario 2: Interruption of

Command and

Control Networks

A and B increase, but have not risen to the level of armed
conflict. At this point, another security agent from Nation A gains access to one
Tensions between

of B's unclassified military communications networks through the trap door
previously implanted.

He temporarily jams the network so that contact with B's

orbiting satellites will be interrupted for a period of approximately 30 minutes.

After about twenty minutes, Nation B's space technicians regain control of their

network and restore normal communications. There
the satellite or permanent disruption of its functions.
satellite

is

no damage

to

Discussion
Since

this

has not occurred during an

terfering with the satellite
cle 45(1)

armed

conflict,

some might argue

that in-

network of Nation B would constitute a violation of Arti-

ITC if the 20-minute interruption of communications is deemed to
interference." The ITC definition requires that the interference en-

of the

be "harmful

danger the functioning of a radionavigation service or other safety service, or

seri-

ously degrade, obstruct, or repeatedly interrupt a radio- communication service.

Whether or not

a

20-minute interruption of satellite communication constitutes

serious degradation or obstruction

a

might depend on the precise nature of the com-

munications that were interrupted. For instance,

if critical search

and rescue

tems were interrupted thereby resulting in the

of life of Nation

B citizens,

loss

sys-

then

would be seen as harmful, even though the space system itself may not have been damaged or harmed.

perhaps the interruption
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UN Charter, there

Under the

some

is

legal basis for the proposition that tak-

may

ing control of another nation's communications system or space assets
terfere in the internal affairs

Charter. This

noted above.

of that nation thus violating its

under the

UN

would be especially true if the interruption resulted in loss of life as
It

might also be true

if the

important to Nation B's defense, such
termination that rights under the
as it will

rights

in-

space system interrupted was particularly

as a missile early

warning system. Any de-

UN Charter were violated or not will depend,

under the ITC, on the precise nature of the system that is interrupted. In

this scenario,

Nation A's interruption of one of Nation B's unclassified

nication systems was temporary and

it

commu-

did not detract from sensitive military sys-

damage or injury, an armed response in
self-defense by Nation B would not appear to be justified. Most likely, the primary costs of this scenario would be political in nature.
tems. Absent at least resulting moderate

Scenario 3: Moving an Adversary's Satellite

Nation

A

knows

that

Nation

B

Out

of Effective Orbit

has a military reconnaissance satellite with

high resolution capability that can provide Nation B with

on

critical intelligence

movements of Nation A's troops. Nation A is concerned about recent bellicose statements made by Nation B toward Nation A and wants to mobilize sev-

the

eral

thousand troops along their shared border. In anticipation of the outbreak of

armed conflict, Nation A covertly obtains internal access to B's classified military
computer system and uses information operations to send false data instructions
to the Nation B satellite. While this false data does not damage the satellite, it
does cause the satellite to move into another orbit where its surveillance capabilities

are rendered completely ineffective.

Discussion

As

in the prior

volved with the
arisen.

two

damage or destruction inor systems of Nation B and armed conflict has not yet

scenarios, there

satellite

Unlike Scenario 2 though,

ellite will

require Nation

prior orbit before

B

at a militarily critical point,

tage should

armed

asset,

the

physical

with Nation B's military

to take steps to "recover" the satellite
effect, the satellite has

providing Nation

sat-

and restore

its

been "kidnapped"

A with a distinct military advan-

conflict occur.

Since this scenario involves
or

no

this interference

can be effective. In

it

is

a military satellite

INTELSAT Agreement
all

INTELSAT system

does not apply. Therefore, there

quirement under Article XIV(d) of the
tation or to provide

and not an

is

no

re-

INTELSAT Agreement of prior consul-

relevant data regarding the interference. Furthermore, as
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long

as

the

satellite

was not engaged

in

conducting Nation B's "national techni-

means of verification" of arms control

cal

not violate the
175

sions,

ABM

The problem

obligations, the interference

Parties.

UN

from the
Charter. Asof Nation B's "sovereignty" or

raised in this scenario derives again

suming Nation B's

considered part

satellite is

"territorial integrity,"

would

Treaty or similar arms control treaty verification provi-

A and B were

assuming

Law Arena

Nation A's actions

could be viewed

as a

pendence of any

state" in violation

"threat

.

.

.

to involuntarily

move

it

out of orbit

against the territorial integrity or political inde-

of Article

2(4). If so, the Security

Council,

under Article 39, would be authorized to decide what appropriate measures to
take against Nation A to restore international peace and security. Given the national security

importance of this reconnaissance

satellite to early

warning, the

"armed atunder Article 51

Security Council might determine that this act rises to the level of an

tack" sufficient for Nation

B

to

invoke

its

right

of self-defense

UN Charter. In addition, Nation B might determine independently that

of the

the action requires

it

to

invoke

its

inherent right of self-defense without waiting

UN determination.

for a

Scenario 4: Destruction of Adversary's Satellite

As

armed

anticipated,

conflict has

now

broken out between Nations

A and B.

Nation A's troops, previously amassed along Nation B's border and heavily armed,
have crossed into Nation B. Numerous reports indicate Nation A's troops have

been

firing at

emergency

Nation B's military forces

session

as

they approach the nearest town.

of the Security Council has been called to address the

against

is

it is

anticipated.

Nation B's

targeteers

space communications system of Nation
less.

situation,

UN response has yet been authorized. Moreover, since Nation A a close
of a permanent member of the Security Council, a veto of any UN action

but no
ally

An

They plan

to

with

a device that,

disable

all

satellite,

A and render

maneuver one of their own

Nation A's telecommunications

satellite.

when activated,

will

propose to destroy
its

satellites

This "killer"

a

key hub in the

connected computers use-

within close range of one of
satellite

has

been equipped

emit an electro-magnetic pulse which will

electronic devices within a ten-mile radius. Destruction of the targeted

located in geosynchronous orbit over the area of armed conflict, will render

Nation A's entire communication system inoperable.
Discussion

armed conflict situation that very likely renders
the Outer Space Treaty, the ITC, and any arms control agreements
This scenario presents

a clear
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whether these international agreebe suspended or terminated during armed conflict, Nais

to

any doubt

as to

B could make a prior declaration that it considers each of them inapplicable

during

period of armed conflict with Nation A.

this

B

Nation

and exercise

could choose, for policy reasons, to
its

right of individual self-defense, or

"an act of aggression" under Article 39 of the
sanctions through the

available peaceful
futile.
less,

it

could

an "armed attack"

treat A's incursion as

UN Charter and seek Chapter VII

UN. Before Nation B can exercise its right of self-defense

through use of force, Article 33 of the
177

treat this as

means of settlement,

UN Charter requires
unless,

of course, such

it

to exhaust any

efforts

would be

Seeking action through the Security Council would likely prove

since

Nation A

is

Regardless, Nation B's
tionate to the

wrong

of a permanent

a close ally

armed response must be

suffered.

Given the military value

to

member with veto

necessary, timely,

fruit-

authority.

and propor-
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Nation A of this

satellite

system, there

a legitimate military necessity in attacking this space asset.

would be

Destruction of Nation

would put the military aggressors at a distinct disadvantage in obtaining and disseminating intelligence and communication data without resulting in

A's

loss

satellite

of life. Additionally, since the targeted space communications system is used

for military

communications, even though

gitimate military reason to attack

make

it.

The

it

also has a civilian use, there

to

be gained and weigh

against their best estimate

population.

The

their best estimate

extent of injury or

a le-

principle of proportionality requires

Nation B's commanders
it

is

damage

of the military advantage to
of the

effect

on

the civilian

to the civilian population

from

in-

communication system through information operations is likely
to be significantly less than from kinetic weapons. Additionally, this particular
information operation, used as a weapon, is neither illegal per se under international law, nor are its effects necessarily indiscriminate. Indiscriminate weapons
are those whose effects cannot be controlled, such as chemical and biological
weapons. The wide area in which this weapon's effects will be felt do not make it
indiscriminate, especially since its effects will be short-term, and limited to disterruption of a

abling electronic devices.

Readily apparent from each of these scenarios

is

the importance of making a

case-by-case assessment under international law, and
principles.

As with any

LOAC assessment,

a

more

particularly,

proper determination of a specific

information operation can only be obtained by applying the specific
general legal framework.
directed at or

LOAC

facts to the

What makes the assessments of information operations

from space systems more

difficult

practice to rely on.
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Practical Considerations in the Application of Information

Operations

in

Space

In addition to the legal regime applicable to information operations in outer
space, military planners should also factor the

and the

political

consequences of specific military decisions into their calcula-

we

tions. In this final section,

ations.

rather

unique physical aspects of space

have attempted to

set forth a

few such consider-

Keep in mind however, that they are not based on legal constraints, but
on the physical properties of outer space and the political climate of the
community. Additionally, these considerations are not intended to
commander's discretion as to the appropriate military action to be

international

preclude a

taken given the specific military situation faced.
First,

any attack upon

space object without resorting to
gravity

and

friction,

should seek to disable the

a physical target in space
its

physical destruction. Absent the effects of

fragments from physical destruction of space objects pres-

ent a significant problem in outer space. Those fragments will naturally spread

throughout the
not

orbital path they

in an unavoidable pattern that

Their velocity and mass will make them

dissipate.

space vehicles and
cult, if

came from

satellites.

Confining the

effects

a threat to

our

may

own

of that debris will be dim-

not impossible. Certain information operations in space can provide an

alternative to the military planner to outright physical destruction
sary's space object

by destroying the computer

may be

Thus, "killing" of the object
spread of fragments to our

Second,

if a

to destroying

it

own

links

and data

of an adver-

(its life

support).

possible without creating a dangerous

space systems.

space system needs to be destroyed, consideration should be given

by attacking

its

ground segment, and thereby severing

access to

its

on ground segments of communications systems have received long-standing public acceptance in the international community as an authorized means of conducting armed conflict as long as the target is a legitimate
military target. A direct attack on a space segment in space, even if done consistent
"life

support." Attacks

with international law,

may

not enjoy the same public acceptance. Given the im-

upon national leaders and their
avoid undue public outcry in making

portance of international opinion

citizens, military

action often attempts to

target selections.

Therefore,

if there

is

a choice,

it

may be

better to take out an adversary's space ob-

by attacking and destroying its ground segment.
Third, destruction through "jamming" of a communication

ject

to destruction

enemy's

signal

is

of the adversary's space object and accomplishes the same

inability to use that system. Just as

ground

ceptance, so too has the technique of jamming.
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recognized

clearly

as a legitimate

of avoiding undue public outcry, jamming should be considered as an al-

for reasons

ternative to the outright physical destruction

ming

of the space object. Additionally, jam-

avoids the problem of unnecessary space debris.

Fourth, a
netic

means of attack. As such, and

kill.

means of attack is often preferable to a kican be a better means of avoiding detection while

intrusive electronic

less

Electronic attack

"masking" the identity of the perpetrator.
desired for political reasons, or if there
attack, electronic

means can be very

is

a

When subtlety

need

to delay

or plausible denial

is

enemy detection of the

When an adversary's system goes

effective.

down, they will not necessarily know it was the result of an intentional act by an
enemy. This is especially so if the system is left operable, but has been manipulated so that the system data is, or appears to be, false. Depending on the system
attacked, this manipulation can cause military planes to crash, artillery to miss

enemy leaders to make poor decisions.
doubt, many other practical approaches to the

its

target, or

No

tions in outer space or directed

here.

Those offered

use of information opera-

toward space objects have not been mentioned

are but a limited start for planners

and

strategists

when con-

two technologically driven realms (informaduring armed conflict.

sidering the unique aspects of these

tion operations and outer space)

Conclusion

We began this chapter with the observation that when the technological transformations inherent in outer space systems are combined with that of information
operations, yesterday's science fiction can quickly

keep pace

for militaries to

is

obvious. These technological transformations will re-

quire innovative approaches to an ancient reality

warfighting scenarios that can, in turn,

and planners

as to

and lawyers forge

As
Still

for

what

relevant

armed

conflict,

is

lawful and

a partnership to

meet

modern

what

traditional analysis

conflict

is

space systems have created

not.

It is

imperative that operators

environment, there are few

customary international law, treaty obligations, and the

futuristic threats, there are

The
litical

surprises.

under well-known principles of the law of

Charter. Aside from the need to apply the existing analytical

tions in or

between belliger-

this challenge.

legal in the outer space

is

is

what

—armed

new
create confusion among military command-

ent nations. Information operations and

ers

become today's reality. The need

few

legal limitations

framework

to

UN
new

impacting information opera-

through outer space.

comes in understanding the expansion of international poweapons in space and information operations directed at or

real challenge

sensitivities to
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from outer space. During times of armed conflict, those sensitivities will not create violations of international law, but they can impede our actions through the
political and diplomatic process. We should not underestimate the degree to
which politics and diplomacy place limits upon otherwise lawful military activity. Thus, with only a few exceptions, from a legal standpoint, information operations in space are virtually no different than those conducted on the ground, in
the

or

air,

at sea.

The primary

difference

lies

in the diplomatic

and

political re-

sponse of the international community.

Moreover, the
military

"CNN factor" has had a large role to play in the decisions of

commanders

to

employ ground,

sea,

and

air assets in

recent armed con-

We can expect the influence of the "CNN factor" to grow exponentially

flicts.

commanders choose to employ information operations against objects
in outer space, a much more sensitive arena. Indeed, because of this, commanders may find their authority to choose targets and the means of attacking those
targets withheld by the NCA in this arena more than any other.
All that aside, however, once the political decision has been made, commanders
should apply the same principles of international law they do in more conventional
settings. They must avoid the dizzying distraction created by the vast array of new
if military

technological tools available to the military in the space arena; they must

temptation of expecting that these apparent

futuristic tools require a

whole new

of laws; and they must be willing to apply old laws and principles to
scenarios. If they

can do

that,

This

is

new

not a matter of science

fiction;

it is

military

set

military

then tomorrow's commanders can maintain the

high ground of warfare, while controlling the

the

resist

legal

high ground of outer space.

reality.
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(1958)

.").

The words of a former Commander-in-Chief of USSPACECOM, General Howell M.

Estes, are indicative

of this view:

commander, have to say that somebody is going to threaten them (our space
and when they [do], we [should] have armed forces to protect them.
[I] fthere was
ever a threat to our national security [in space] the best - and only - way to solve the problem
I,

as a military

assets);

.

.

.

,

is

to take

Cited in Jose

weapons

into space.

Filho, Total Militarization of Space and Space

Outer Space Treaty,

Outer Space

Law: The Future of Article IV of the '67

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF

358, 360 (1997).
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G.A. Res. 1472 (Dec. 12, 1959). Actually, COPUOS began as an Ad Hoc Committee on
September 18, 1958. Its first report, adopted as Resolution 1348 on December 13, 1958, stressed
52.

be used only for peaceful purposes. The next year, General Assembly
Resolution 1472 made the Ad Hoc Committee a permanent
committee.
that outer space should

UN

Those four treaties are: (1) The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
(known as the Outer Space Treaty of 1967), done]zn. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No.
6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205, (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967); (2) Agreement on the Rescue of
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space
(known as the Rescue and Return Treaty of 1968), done Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570,
T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119, (entered into force Dec. 3, 1968); (3) The Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (known as The Liability
Convention of 1972), done Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S.
187 (entered into force Sept. 1, 1972); and (4) The Convention on Registration of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (known as The Registration Convention of 1975), opened for
signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (entered into force
Sept. 15, 1979). A fifth
sponsored space treaty is The Treaty Governing the Activities of
States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (known as The Moon Treaty of 1979). It has
only been ratified by 9 nations and none of the major space powers.
54. G.A. Res. 1721, U.N. Doc. A/5100 (1961). See also John E. Parkerson, Jr., International
53.

UN

Legal Implications of the Strategic Defense

Initiative,

116

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

67, 95 (1987).

U.N. Doc. A/5515 (1963).
56. The Committee has two standing Subcommittees of the Whole: the Scientific and
Technical Subcommittee and the Legal Subcommittee. The Committee and two Subcommittees
meet each year to discuss and study questions put to them by the General Assembly. They in turn
make recommendations to the General Assembly and provide information from their meetings
and studies in their annual reports. See the COPUOS web page at www.un.or.at/OOSA/
55.

copuos.html.

G.A. Res. 51/44 (Jan. 7, 1997).
G.A. Res. 53/583 (Dec. 4,1998); G.A. Res. 52/56 (Feb. 12, 1998); G.A. Res. 51/123
(Feb. 10, 1997); G.A. Res. 51/122 (Feb. 4, 1997); and G.A. Res. 49/34 (Jan. 30, 1995). Also of
interest is what these resolutions do not address: namely, the important contribution of military
activity toward promoting international peace and security, such as reconnaissance satellite data
that allows for the more effective verification of arms control agreements.
59. Nathan C. Goldman, American Space Law: International and Domestic
26 (2d ed. 1996). Goldman also notes that more nations became aware of the values of space and
sought to join the committee to protect their interests. COPUOS tripled in size in 1982, from 18
members to 53. According to Goldman, the "drastic increase in size alone would guarantee a
57.

58. See

harder time for obtaining consensus."
60. Id. at 25.

61.

The

UN

Charter does not grant the General Assembly legal authority to make binding
General Assembly Resolutions and Outer

substantive international law. See Andrei D. Terekhov,

Space Law,

UN

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE

97 (1997).
62.

The following principles derived from the four major space treaties have also been generally

accepted
(1)

as reflecting

customary international law:

That outer space

is

free for exploration

national appropriation
(2)

That

activities in

and use by

all

nations; that

it is

not subject to

by any means;

outer space

shall

be conducted with due regard for the

States;

302

interests

of other

Douglas

(3)

That States
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S.

that launch space objects are liable for

damage caused by "space

liability

standards established for

damage done to
damage done on the

objects;" a fault-based standard that applies to

items in space and an absolute

liability

standard that applies to

surface of the earth or to aircraft in flight;
(4)

any damage they may do in space, in the

or on the surface of the Earth. That there are two

air,

and

Outer space activities are subject to general principles of international law, including the

UN Charter.
See Office of General Counsel,

Department of Defense,

An

Assessment of International Legal

Information Operations (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter

Issues in

appended to this volume as the Appendix.
63. See Terekhov, supra note 61.
64. See the Conference on Disarmament web page

DoD/GC

at

Paper].

The paper

is

www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/

disconf.htm.
65. P.K. Menon, The United Nations' Efforts to Outlaw the Arms
Outer Space 65 (1988).

Pj^ce in

66. Id.
67. Id. at 66.
68. Id.

69. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed on May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435, 944
U.N.T.S. 13, TIAS 7503 {ratified by the US on Sept. 30, 1972); Rebecca Johnson, Multilateral Arms
Control: Can the CD Break the Impasse?, www.armscontrol.org/ACT/novdec97/johnson.htm.

70. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 6.

DoD/GC

71. See

72.

Paper, supra note 62.

China Defense White Paper, July 1998, http://russia.shaps.hawaii.edu/security/ china-

defense-julyl998.html (on

file

with authors).

73. Id. at 24.
74. Id.
75. In an article published in the Liberation

Communist Party-run

political

Army

Daily, official

Chinese newspaper of the

department of the Peoples Liberation

"Bringing Internet Warfare Into the Military System
Air Power," China seems to have changed

its

Is

Army

(PLA), entitled

of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and

view about the use of information

operations.

According to the Beijing article, China is preparing to "carry out high-technology warfare over
the Internet and could develop a fourth branch of the armed services devoted to information

The

warfare."

article also stated:

It is essential to have an all-conquering offensive technology and to develop software
and technology for Net offensives so as to be able to launch attacks and countermeasures on
the Net, including information-paralyzing software, information-blocking software, and

information-deception software.

The

article

Modern

went on

to apply this

new means of warfare

to outer space:

high-tech warfare cannot win without the Net, nor can

In the future there must be a coordinated land, sea,

air, space,

it

be

won just on the Net.

electronic and

Net warfare, and

the state's determination will be fully expressed in this mysterious theater space (emphasis

added).

Quoted

in Bill Gertz, China Plots Winning Role in Cyberspace,

17, 1999,

76.

THE WASHINGTON

TIMES, Nov.

atAl, A8.

Agenda item number

3,

Assembly of the United Nations,

Report of the Conference on Disarmament
at

2 (Sept.

8,

1998).

303

to the General

Information Operations in the Space

77.

CD/1487, Working Paper Concerning

Law Arena

CD Action on Outer Space

(Jan. 21,

1998).

78. Id.
79. Space Policy, supra note 41, at 4 (Sept. 19, 1996).

80. See Filho, supra note 51, at 358; see also

Maurice N. Andem, Implementation ofArticle IV of the

Outer Space Treaty of 1967 During the 21st Century,

Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space
81. Space Policy, supra note 41, at

PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTIETH

338 (1997).

1.

82. Id. at 5, para. (6)(b).
83. Id. at 5, para. (6)(a).

84.

DoD Directive 3100.10, paragraph 4.3., states that "[t]he primary DoD goal for space and

space-related activities
States has the space

is

United
That includes assuring
and ensuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our use of space (para.

to provide operational space force capabilities to ensure that the

power

access to space (para. 4.3. 1

to achieve

.2.)

its

national security objectives

.

.

.

."

4.3.1.4.).

Memorandum for Secretaries

85.

of the Military Departments, July

9,

1999,

at

2 (on

with

file

authors).

September 1994, former Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall stated, "Certainly,
is control of space, our ability to deny the use of space if necessary."
Filho, supra note 51, at 359;
General Joseph W. Ashy, former Commander-in-Chief of
USSPACECOM, declared in 1996; "We are going to fight in space. Some people don't want to
hear this, and it isn't in vogue.
but — absolutely — we are going to fight in space." Id.
86. In

part of the Air Force mission

.

DoD

87.

.

Directive 3100.10, supra note 84, at para. 4.1.

88. Prohibited military activities in outer space that are specified in multilateral agreements

include the following:

on celestial bodies, or anywhere
Outer Space Treaty);

placing nuclear weapons in earth orbit,

(1)

space (Article IV, paragraph

placing

(2)

1,

weapons of mass destruction

outer space (Article IV, paragraph

IV, paragraph 2,

of any weapons on the
Outer Space Treaty);

on

moon

2,

the

moon

in

or other celestial bodies (Article

or other celestial bodies (Article IV, paragraph

moon

conducting military maneuvers on the
paragraph

(6)

on celestial bodies, or anywhere
Outer Space Treaty);

Outer Space Treaty);

(4) testing

(5)

outer

in earth orbit,

1,

establishing a military base or installation

(3)

else in

2,

or other celestial bodies (Article IV,

Outer Space Treaty);

carrying out nuclear

weapons explosions

in outer space (Article 1.1(a), Limited Test

Ban

Treaty);
(7)

military or hostile use of environmental modification techniques that could

widespread adverse
II,

89.

effect in either the earth's

atmosphere or outer space

produce a
I and

(Articles

Environmental Modification Convention).

Carl Rochelle,

Coming Soon:

Global

Navigation for

Consumers,

March

29,

1996,

29,

1996,

www.cgi.cnn.com/US/9603/global_satellite/index.html.
90.

White House Fact

Sheet, U.S. Global Positioning System Policy,

March

http://gauss.gge.unb.ca/poHcy/Fact_Sheet.
91.

Id.

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under
Water ("The Test Ban Treaty"), signed in Moscow August 5, 1963, 14U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S.
92.

October 10, 1963).
93. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, signed in Washington, London, and
Moscow on January 27, 1967. Its full title is actually much longer: "The Treaty on Principles
43, T.I.A.S.

5433

(entered into force
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Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies." This treaty was a byproduct of the Legal Subcommittee of
COPUOS and was largely based on the Declaration of Legal Principles governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, which had been adopted in 1963 by General
Assembly Resolution 1962.

MENON, supra note 65, at 43; Peter Jankowitsch,
Legal Aspects ofMilitary Space Activities, SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 143, 146 (1992).
94. See

95.

Andem,

supra note 80, at 339; see also

UN General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVII) was approved by acclamation on October

13, 1963.

MENON,

See

supra note 65, at 40.

international legal guidance

Declaration was a

no binding legal

which

It

was one of the

earliest efforts to

provide

related to the issue of interference with space systems.

The

UN effort to restrict a future arms race in space, even though the resolution had

effect. It set forth

the principles of co-operation and mutual assistance, calling for

nations to conduct their activities in outer space with due regard for the interests of other nations,

it

then stated the following about interference with space systems:
If a State has reason to believe that

nationals

would cause

an outer space activity or experiment planned by

it

or

its

potentially harmful interference with activities of other States in the

peaceful exploration and use of outer space,

it

shall

undertake appropriate international

A

which has
would
the peaceful exploration and use of

consultations before proceeding with any such activity or experiment.

State

reason to believe that an outer space activity or experiment planned by another State
cause potentially harmful interference with activities in

outer space

may

request consultation concerning the activity or experiment.

While not prohibiting "harmful

1963 Declaration required prior
The language of the Declaration,
however, only protected activities from interference that were consistent with "the peaceful
exploration and use of outer space." While clearly such general language could be seen as a
interference,"

the

consultations before a State could lawfully engage in that activity.

limitation

on some information

operations,

it

would not preclude

all

information operations,

especially those in response to an aggressive, hostile act of another State that was clearly outside the
bounds of "peaceful exploration and use of outer space." Information operations in self-defense,
for example, would not contravene the 1963 Declaration of Principles.
96. Gyula Gal, The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - After the Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
Tenth Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 129 (1967); see also Bruce A.
Hurwitz, The Legality of Space Militarization 137 (1986); Mark G. Markoff, The
fudicial Meaning of the Term "Peaceful" in the 1967 Space Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH
Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space 34 (1968).

97.

HURWITZ,

supra note 96, at 138.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
62/122 (1982), 21 I.L.M. 126-354 (1982).
99. This does not mean to imply that an assertion of sovereignty can only be done by means of
an expressed statement. Certainly a nation can take actions which clearly express an intention to
assert ownership over another nation's sovereign territory. However, the situation at issue here is a
temporary interference with another nation's sovereign object. Actions that interfere with an
object only temporarily are not likely to be construed as an assertion of sovereignty.
100. John C. Kunich, Planetary Defense: The Legality of Global Survival, 41 AIR FORCE LAW
REVIEW 1 19, 129 (1997), citing W. Thomas Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of
Weapons of Mass Destruction in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW
REVIEW 308 (1967).
101. See Robert L. Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON
LAW REVIEW 649, 656 (1980) (referencing the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on
the Outer Space Treaty and the testimony of United Nations Ambassador Goldberg in response to
98. Article 89,
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a

question by Senator Carlson that a weapon of mass destruction

of annihilation to
weapon.").

nuclear weapon, bacteriological ...

a

it

Law Arena

"is a

weapon of comparable ability

does not relate to a conventional

102. See Report of the Secretary-General, Developments in the field of information and
telecommunications in the context of international security, U.N.G.A. 54/213 (Aug. 10, 1999).
In response to an invitation to inform the Secretary-General of its views and assessments, the

Russian Federation stated that "the use of information weapons against vital structures is
comparable to the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction." Russia is also seeking

UN

new international guidelines and the banning of
weapons. In comments submitted to the
Secretary
General published last month, Russia warned that information operations 'might lead to an
escalation of the arms race.'" Bradley Graham, Military Grappling With Guidelines For Cyber Warfare,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 8, 1999, at A10.
103. There is no official US government policy as to whether an information operation is a
weapon of mass destruction. Anders Eriksson, a senior analyst with the Defence Research
Establishment, Stockholm, Sweden, argues that information operations are neither weapons of
mass destruction, nor disruption, but rather of "precision disruption." See Eriksson, supra note 6,
support for a

resolution "calling for

UN

particularly dangerous information

at 1.

104. See Parkerson supra note 54 at 81.

Within academic

circles,

there have

been two primary

views on whether the peaceful purposes language should have application at all to
space since the express reference to peaceful purposes

is

limited to "the

moon

activities in

and other

outer

celestial

Those who advocate the broader interpretation look to other pertinent clauses in the
preamble of the Outer Space Treaty. Advocates of a narrow interpretation note that when the
treaty drafters wanted a provision to apply to outer space in other articles, they specifically used the
words "outer space." Thus, the absence of the term "outer space" in the second part of Article IV,

bodies."

is even more telling. See Morgan, supra note 19, at 300.
During the drafting of the Outer Space Treaty, delegations from India, Iran, Austria,
Japan, Brazil, and Mexico tried to include language that would completely demilitarize outer
space, but their proposals were rejected by both the Soviet Union and the US. Kunich, supra note

dealing with "peaceful purposes,"
105.

100, at 137; Parkerson, supra note 54, at 82.
106. See

Morgan,

supra note 19, at

240—241 The
.

self-defense constitutes a "peaceful purpose."

US view has been that use of outer space for

Id. at n.

366. In addition, use of communication,

navigation, remote sensing, and reconnaissance satellites have also

considered to be for "peaceful purposes."
107. See Douglas S. Anderson,

A

Id. at

Military

Look

into Space:

The Ultimate High Ground,

LAWYER 19, 28 (1995); see also Morgan, supra note 19, at 299.
108. An excellent example is that cited by Parkerson supra
Professor Bin Cheng,

who

become an accepted

practice

308, 317.

note 54,

ARMY

at n. 99, referring to

in stating that the treaty's language provides that "Antarctica shall be

mention the additional clarifying language not included in
the Outer Space Treaty. Antarctic Treaty, done at Washington, December 1,1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,
Convention
402U.N.T.S. 71, T.I.A.S. 4780 (entered intoforce on June 23, 1961). Similarly, the
on the Law of the Sea also provides that the high seas shall be reserved for "peaceful purposes," yet
there has been no attempt to prohibit military ships from the high seas. The practice of nation States
demonstrates that the non-aggressive use of the high seas is consistent with a peaceful purpose. See
used for peaceful purposes only,"

fails

to

UN

Parkerson, supra note 54,

at 84.

109. Parkerson, supra note 54.
110. Statement by the President of the United States
reprinted in
at

on

International Cooperation in Space.

Senate Committee on Aeronautics and Space Sciences;

136-137.
111. 42

US Code

sec. 2451(a).
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112. SeeKunich, supra note 100, at 131; Anderson, supra note 107, at 27; Parkerson, supra note
54, at 82; Bridge, supra note 101, at 658.

113. See Bridge, supra note 101, at 658.

A more extreme view is held by Professor Mark G. Markoff, Professor of International
Law, University of Fribourg, Switzerland, who believes that the Outer Space Treaty was intended
to completely demilitarize space. According to Professor Markoff, all parties to the Outer Space
Treaty have agreed, through Article I, not to engage in any space activity that is not in the common
interest of all other nations. Since any military activity, even that for self-defense or other
non-aggressive purposes, cannot be for the benefit of all nations, the Outer Space Treaty does not
authorize any military activity in outer space. See Anderson, supra note 107, at 26; Parkerson, supra
114.

note 54,

at 83.

115. See Parkerson, supra note 54, at 82;
116.

Rymn James

Parsons, The Fight

to

Morgan,

supra note 19, at 303.

Save the Planet: U.S.

Armed

Forces "Greenkeeping"

and

Law Pertaining to Environmental Protection During Armed Conflict, 10 GEORGIA
International Environmental Law Preview 441, 470 (1998). Historically, treaty

Enforcement of the

were suspended during armed conflict between them. 2
A Treatise 302 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed. 1952).
Currently, the compatibility of particular treaties during a state of armed conflict is assessed on a
case-by-case basis. D. P. O'CONNELL, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW 268 (2d ed. 1970);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, sec. 336,
Reporter's Notes, 221-22 (1986).
117. Many might argue that copying, diverting, modifying, or otherwise tampering with data
of another does constitute "harm" and would be a violation of international law.
118. S.C. Res. 678 (Nov. 29 1990).
119. S.C. Res 1264 (Sept. 15 1999).
120. GOLDMAN, supra note 59, at 28. The organization had its beginnings in 1865 when
co-operative regulations were initiated by the Geneva Telegraphic Convention in Paris. That first
agreement was modified and extended, culminating in the ITU in 1932 as a result of the
combining of similar conventions. See 1 MANUAL ON SPACE LAW 225, n. 1 (Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana and Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1979).
obligations

between

belligerents

Oppenheim's International Law:

121.

GOLDMAN,

supra note 59, at 28.

Manual on Space Law, supra note 120, at 196.
123. SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE 23 (Nandasiri Jasentuliyana ed., 1992).
124. The US signed the Convention on December 22, 1992, and signed the 1994 amendments
122.

1

Kyoto on October 14, 1994. For a discussion of the 1992 ITCand 1994 amendments, see Marian
Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 91 AMERICAN

at

Journal of International Law

93 (1997).
125. Annex, para. 1003 of the 1992 ITC. This language is identical to that found in Annex 2,
para. 2003 of the 1982 ITC.
126. Eilene Galloway, International Institutions to Ensure Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, IX ANNALS
of Air & Space Law 323 (1984).
127. The US position, according to Michael W. Zehner, Air Force Deputy General Counsel
(International Affairs), follows the more restrictive language of the ITC provision. Interview with
Mr. Zehner (Dec. 20, 1999).
128.

Supra note

116.

An

interesting

comparison can be made to

non-interference language contained in the 1982

virtually

identical

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS

Convention). In Article 19(2)(k), the LOS Convention prohibits "any act aimed at interfering
with any systems of communication" during innocent passage in a foreign territorial sea. No one
has argued that similar non-interference provisions contained in the

during periods of lawful military

activity.
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130.

GOLDMAN,
GOLDMAN,

131.

Id. at

50.

132.

Id. at

53.

129.

supra note 59, at 50; see also

supra note 19, at 253.

supra note 59, at 53.

133. Agreement Reached on
19, at

Morgan,

Law Arena

Intelsat,

SPACEDAILY,

Feb. 13, 1998, at2; see

also

Morgan, supranote

293-94.

The former Defense Communications Agency (DCA), now

134.

Information Systems Agency (DISA), concluded that although there
military use of "specialized" services,

all

INTELSAT

currently offered

called

no

is

the Defense

restriction

on the

services are considered

"public telecommunications services" available to military forces for military purposes. Morgan.
supra note 19, at 293-94.

135. Letter of Warran Y. Zeger, Vice President,

Division (Feb.

1989) (on

3,

file

with authors).

Law Department,

COMSAT

a

is

COMSAT World Systems

public and private

seq,

and

is

the

US

representative to both

INTELSAT

and

INMARSAT.

See

satellite

US Code 701

corporation created by Congress in 1962 by the Communications Satellite Act, 47

GOLDMAN,

et

supra

Communications Commission (FCC) and receives its
instructions on how to vote on INTELSAT and INMARSAT issues from the US government. See
Morgan, supra note 19, at n. 291.
136. Agreement Relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization, 23
U.S.T. 3813, T.I.A.S. No. 7532 (1973).
note 59,

at 50. It

is

regulated by the Federal

137. For example, Article III sets forth the organization's prime objective to be that "the space
segment required for international public telecommunications services ... be available on a
non-discriminatory basis to all areas of the world." Thus, interference through information
operations with multidirectional channels such as telex, telephony, and data transmission would
affect the availability on a non-discriminatory basis of international public telecommunications.
See, Martin A. Rothblatt, Satellite Communication and Spectrum Allocation, 76 AMERICAN
Journal of International Law 56, 64 (1982).
138. Supra note 116.
139. Space Law Development and Scope, supra note 123, at 102; see also 1 Manual on
SPACE LAW, supra note 120, at 441.
140. Unlike INTELSAT, which is limited in its membership to ITU members, INMARSAT is
open to all nations. SPACE LAW DEVELOPMENT AND SCOPE, supra note 123, at 102.

3,

GOLDMAN,

supra note 59, at 58.

141.

Id. at

142.

Convention on the International Maritime

102; see also

Satellite

Organization, opened for signature Sep.

1976, 15 I.L.M.1051 (1976) (entered into force July 1976).

INMARSAT

Convention, Article 3(3) (March 29, 1988), (filed with
INMARSAT following consultation with Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, France, India, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Oman, Singapore, UK, and USA), reprinted in Memorandum of Law on The
"Peaceful Purposes" Requirement and Inmarsat use by Armed Forces, Wolf D. Von Noorden,
143. Guidelines for

Special Counsel to

INMARSAT,

June 29, 1994,

cited in

Walter Gary Sharp,

Aggressor's License to Kill Military Forces Serving the United Nations:

Making

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TRADE
144. Neal T. Kilminster,

COMSAT

1, n.

Sr.,

Revoking an

Deterrence Personal, "

22

221 (1998).

General Counsel opinion (April 15, 1999) (on

file

with

authors).
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The enemy
with an

.

bombs.

and

No

.

.

AK-47 or the Semtex bomb

in cyber space
logic

will be different.

attack using the

.

.

.

longer will
the

it

be the simple terrorist

armed

new threat will be groups who will bond

new weapons of war:

viruses, bugs,

worms and

*

ftp*
he front cover of a recent Armed ForcesJournal has an American soldier on
rope bridge suspended over a chasm with the

a

This

a

is

of US

Armed

Forces

as

the world

moves

into the uncharted waters of the

new

3

Institutionally, the national security structure

challenges. Configured to

meet the Soviet

community,

as

The

question posed above, however,

the intelligence

ready for the next threat.

how should we be

of the United States
threat, the

Armed

are realizing that changes

well

as

"Ready for What?" 2

key question for national security policy makers regarding the mission

millennium.

many

title

is

is

facing

Forces, as

must be made. 4

relevant regarding the issue of being

What are the threats that face our national security and

organized functionally to meet those challenges, particularly

they relate to the dimension of cyberspace?

The

geopolitical

logical lines,

is

world of the 20 th Century, drawn along colonial and ideo-

fading into the past.

The

threats faced

by the United

States today
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are not just standing industrial age armies, but international criminals, terrorists,

and

State

and non-State actors using

relatively inexpensive

technology to manufacture weapons of mass destruction.

Throughout

man

history,

has

waged

and

easily attained

5

warfare, conducted

commerce, and

established an international political regime in a three-dimensional environ-

ment. Mankind has faced and conquered the land, the

sea,

and the

air

above,

moving freely about in these dimensions. Yet mankind has created another dimension which will shape its evolution well past the start of this millennium.
That dimension is cyberspace.
telligence communities,

It is

among

in this

dimension that both the

others, will

legal

have to develop an

and in-

ability to

operate.

Among the practices of States, intelligence gathering is accepted as a necessity
in

relations. 6

conducting foreign

collecting information

and

friendly

rival States.

on the

Throughout

history, State actors

intentions, capabilities,

and

have been

policies

of both

7

In the information age, intelligence plays an increasingly important role. 8 In-

formation is the

new strategic high ground. For the past fifty years or so the intel-

community of the United States focused on the Soviet Union and its
9
allies, mainly the Warsaw Pact countries.
The mission was clear and the community organized itself accordingly to provide critical information to the National Command Authorities 10 on Soviet capabilities and intentions. 11 This
organizational model, however, may no longer be valid. 12

ligence

Due
hard

to the ever-increasing challenges in gathering that information against a

target, the

bilities.

community began

Imagery intelligence and

to rely

more and more on

signals intelligence

age and monitoring of Soviet communications and

its

technical capa-

provided spectacular cover13
critical strategic targets.

At

times this was at the expense of the other intelligence collection methods such

human-source
Century,
role. 15

intelligence

HUMINT

(HUMINT).

14

In the asymmetric world of the 21st

and open source intelligence (OSINT)

will play a

key

This role will not change in the dimension of cyberspace and computer

network

attack or defense. 16 Additionally, the

computer

tool for an intelligence operative or analyst to use.

Throughout our

history,

some

open society.

citizens,
19

will

become

a useful

17

however, the role of intelligence in defending our

nation has been misunderstood. 18
can, to

as

The methodologies of intelligence

gathering

appear to run counter to the basic principles of a free and

Though Americans are fascinated by the capabilities of the com-

munity, they have an unrealistic romantic view of the often dangerous and dirty

world of intelligence gathering. 20
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The Role of Intelligence

in

the United States

US intelligence played a minor role in protect-

Until the Second World War,

Only during time of war did an intelligence service
commander in the field. After the emergency, the intelli-

ing our national security.

emerge
gence

to support the

capabilities

of the

US

diminished or were disbanded. 21

Counterintelligence played even
prior to the First

World War.

22

of

less

a role

and was largely nonexistent

Domestically, the counterintelligence service

became a profession in the 1920s with the advent of the Bureau of Investigation
in the Department ofJustice (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and the
creation of various service counterintelligence organizations. 23

The

intelligence

community

has also had an

awkward

relationship with the

Congress. Until the mid-1970s, Congress deferred to the executive branch on
issues

of national security as a constitutional prerogative of the President acting as

Commander-in-Chief. 24 In the
intelligence
gressional

community caused

early 1970s, allegations
a public outcry

and presidential scrutiny. 25 The

gressional intelligence oversight

of wrongdoing by the

and resulted in long-term con-

result

was the creation of the con-

committees and presidential guidelines on the

proper conduct of intelligence operations, particularly as they related to
sons. 26

gence

Those

policies

and regulations are

still

in place

US per-

and govern the

intelli-

activities discussed later in this chapter.

Thus, the

US

community

intelligence

designed to operate in three dimensions. 27

truly
It

was

a creature

of the Cold

was created and designed to counter

Soviet hegemony, largely an industrial age threat.

With

the dissolution of the

Soviet Union, and the advent of the information age, the intelligence
nity, a large

and cumbersome bureaucracy, has to evolve into

forward thinking, and

asymmetric

threats,

agile

War

a

commu-

quick reacting,

grouping of agencies ready to respond to various

including computer network attack. 28

The Challenges Ahead

(or

US

Intelligence

and Cyberspace

The need for information by policy makers and warfighters will only increase.
The National Command Authorities and the geographic Commanders-in-Chiefs
will demand more real time intelligence for strategic and tactical planning. 29
The present reactive stance of the community will have difficulty providing
current intelligence on the broad and diverse spectrum of transnational issues

and

threats.

This reactive stance

organization of the

community

amount of data generated by

is

The first is the
management of the huge

exacerbated by two problems.

itself,

the second, the

the various intelligence agencies. 30 Overlaid
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these

two problem areas is this fourth dimension of cyberspace,

of the future.

the battleground

31

Though the current legal paradigm of international and domestic law regarding armed conflict was developed over the past few centuries,

time being,

legal principles allows, for the

which

to operate in the fourth

this

evolved

a practitioner sufficient

dimension of

set

of

leeway upon

cyberspace. 32

In short, the major hurdles regarding espionage and computer network attack
are not legal, but organizational

and technical. Some of the

legal challenges re-

volve around intelligence oversight and the collection of intelligence on
persons, as well as the law of war.

The

intrusive nature of computers

US

and the

Internet and their use as tools of espionage, and even warfare, cause legal scholars

and practitioners in national security some concern, not from the lack of precedent, but of policy.

The Current Domestic Legal Framework

The

current legal framework stems from statutory and regulatory guidance of

the late 1970s, due to the improprieties

by the

US

intelligence

community

in

on US
Centered on the National Security Act
of 1947 and Executive Order 12333, intelligence organizations in the United
States have been directed to follow certain prescribed procedures regarding the
persons. 33

collecting information

conduct of intelligence

The National

activities. 34

Security Act of 1947, particularly Title V, gives authority

for various departments

and intelligence agencies

gathering, laying out parameters as to

not do in the

process. 35

and

gress currently

ducted.

conduct intelligence

to

what these organizations can or cannot

One of the key statutory conditions is to keep the Con-

fully

informed on

intelligence activities being con-

all

36

Executive Order 12333, signed by President Reagan,
missions of the intelligence

conduct intelligence
this

community and

activities.

37

lays

out the various

gives specific guidance

on how

to

Each department promulgates and expands on

guidance through departmental regulations. 38 Additionally, there are inter-

nal policy directives that further refine the

community can
These

rules,

collect this intelligence.

methods by which the

intelligence

39

coupled with international law, allow the intelligence agencies

to operate properly in cyberspace. If given the proper mission

and authority,

intelligence organizations can collect information (conduct espionage) in this

fourth dimension. These operations can be done in peacetime, pre-hostilities
(intelligence preparation

of the

battlefield),
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and during armed

conflict.
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The

challenge

is

developing policy that allows the community to conduct es-

pionage in cyberspace. Proper guidance

methods

are not

and

essential to ensure that sources

is

compromised, the operational environment

is

secure, proper

counterintelligence concerns are addressed and monitored, and there

is

proper

oversight to ensure that the civil rights of US persons are not violated.

Some

Policy Considerations

Operationally, cyberspace will pose the same challenges that a

would

face in a three-dimensional battle.

surprise, taking the

among others,
operate with
sea,

—

or air

dominance.

all

as

commander

Concepts of speed, mass, maneuver,

command and control, and forward support,
cyberspace. The Commander will need to be able to

high ground,

apply in

much familiarity and precision in this realm as he would on land,

integrating

all

four dimensions seamlessly in achieving full spectrum

He will also have to keep in mind, the four operational concepts es-

poused in the concept for future joint operations: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, and focused logistics. 40

Underlying

all

of the operational concepts

and emerging technologies

will give joint

listed

US

above

is

the premise that

new

forces information superiority in

any given mission. Information superiority is no longer a theory, but rather operational doctrine. Information superiority can

force that gains information

be likened to the new high ground.

A

dominance in the battlespace can shape it by making it

not only more lethal for the adversary, but survivable for friendly forces.

A

cornerstone in achieving

this

high ground

is

proper intelligence prepara-

tion of the battlespace itself using various methodologies, systems, and tech-

commander

dominant

in his

maneuver, precisely

engaging the enemy in whatever dimension, supported by

agile, innovative, fo-

niques to allow the

to be

cused personnel and organizations. Joint Publication 3-13, Joint Doctrine for
Information Operations, describes intelligence preparation of the battlespace
"... the continuous process used to develop a detailed
sary system use of information

The

intelligence

knowledge of the adver-

and information systems." 41

community's challenge

is

to

determine

how far it can go

prepare that battlespace. Policy and operational concerns begin to surface
transition takes place

from

a third

fourth dimension of cyberspace.

making

political,

the

In attempting to understand the information

economic,

process; geographic strengths

chological

as

to

dimensional conflict to operations in the

environment, the operator will need knowledge
formation systems;

as

social,

of, inter alia,

the adversary's in-

and cultural makeup; decision

and weaknesses; and biographical/psy-

profiles. 42

315

.

Fourth Dimensional Intelligence

Methods

to achieve proper intelligence preparation

of the battlespace could

be intrusive, thereby butting up against privacy and oversight

restrictions that

could hamper and even impede the gathering of this intelligence. Intelligence
oversight and review organizations will have to be aware
training
ples

of,

and add within their

and review methodologies, information operations,

to include princi-

of computer network attack and defense.

The

potential for the inadvertent violation of civil rights of

due

great

to the

that these intrusive techniques

means"

is

tionality concepts

As

persons

is

proper operational use. The term

a standard in intelligence collection, similar to the

found in the law of armed

intelligence organizations plan

battlespace, policy

must be noted, however,
many years and the oversight

have existed for

rules are generally sufficient to ensure

intrusive

US

intrusive capabilities of these tools. 43 It

"least

propor-

conflict. 44

and execute operations

makers will have to determine

how

far

to prepare the

the intelligence

operator can go to prepare for any situation along the conflict spectrum.
Misinterpretation by a potential adversary that this preparation could be indeed

no inadvertent response by an aggrieved party on our information or economic
an attack requires careful planning and oversight to ensure that there

is

infrastructure.

Concluding Thoughts

It is

.

.

not constructive to change for change's sake. Faced with

law moves slowly, but in most instances the
versy to ripen and be properly

day and age, where

a

resolved. 43 In

lapse

new issues,

of time allows for the contro-

the past this could take years. In this

"web-year" of three months governs the business of the in-

formation market, the law could quickly become irrelevant and certainly

commerce and

drance to both
Practitioners

the

a

hin-

possibly our national security.

must balance the need

for a careful

development of the law

in

the area of information operations with the fast-paced reality of the information
age.

The

velop

intelligence

a strategic

community

itself,

like the legal profession, also

must de-

plan akin to the vision of the Department of Defense in order to

move

steadily

more

collaborative and streamlined information systems to support operations

forward in improving organizational structures and developing

in cyberspace.

Where

all this

will

end up

is

anyone's guess. As in

reactive quick fixes will in the long run cause

all

things new, over-

more confusion and potential harm

to this nation's security. Additionally, treating information operations as a "dif-

ferent" operational tool for a

commander in
316

the field

is

a mistake.

The

doctrinal
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and policy decisions by the Joint Staff to

fully integrate

information operations in

operational planning are certainly steps in the right direction.

Operators and the legal community must continue to

work for careful change

domestically and provide leadership internationally to create appropriate rules in

which

future operations in cyberspace

may be conducted

within proper legal

norms.

As former Secretary of Defense William Cohen declared:
you can shut down our

If

financial system,

if

you could shut down our

transportation system, if you could cause the collapse of our energy production

and distribution system just by typing on
this globalization to

we

a

computer and causing those

links to

break down, then you're able to wage successful warfare and

have to be able to defend against

that.

46
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Some

Legal Dimensions

John

M:

ost

of the contributions to

F.

Murphy"

this

"Blue Book" focus on the

-computer network attacks by States

as a

formation warfare and the kinds of responses that
the constraints of international law.

from the use of force by

1

States to criminal acts

becomes

the

possibility

of

methodology for so-called in-

may be taken consistently with

In this chapter, however, the focus shifts

not under the sponsorship or control of a
cable legal regime

Terrorists:

State.

committed by

private individuals

With this shift of focus,

the appli-

international criminal law rather than provisions of

UN Charter governing the use of force and the maintenance of international

peace and security.

To be sure, "international criminal law" is an area of considerable definitional
ambiguity. Some eminent commentators have denied its very existence. 2 Other
commentators, the majority, have defined international crimes
that constitute a crime against international
risdiction to apply that

ample they

cite.

law seeking only

law and punish the criminal. Piracy

In response, the sceptics

view piracy

is

as certain acts

a tribunal

with ju-

the prototypical ex-

as solely a

municipal law

crime, the only question of international law being the extent of a State's jurisdiction to apply

its

torial jurisdiction

criminal law to an accused foreigner acting outside the terri-

of the prescribing

State. 3
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Even for those crimes arguably constituting crimes under international as well
as

municipal law,

court

—

to

it is

employ

—

necessary

in the absence

of an international criminal

national law enforcement officials and national courts for

purposes of apprehending, prosecuting, and punishing offenders. Accordingly,

another dimension of "international criminal law" involves international cooperation in the enforcement of municipal criminal law.

ward

Although most

efforts to-

international cooperation in the enforcement of municipal criminal law

have been on

a bilateral

or regional

basis,

the United Nations has played an in-

creasingly important role in this area.

Considerable definitional ambiguity also surrounds the terms "terrorism" and
"international terrorism." Despite strenuous efforts to

Nations nor

its

specialized agencies have

"international terrorism."

4

Rather,

United Nations has adopted

been able

we

as

do

so, neither the

to agree

on

United

a definition

the

shall see later in this chapter,

piecemeal approach to the problem through the

a

adoption of separate conventions aimed

suppressing particular manifestations

at

of terrorism. Although these treaty provisions are often loosely described
"antiterrorist," the acts that they

a particular case, they

Even

at

national terrorism

definitions that serve a variety
eral level, there

is

as illustrated

a tricky proposition.

is

"terrorism."

as

US experience, defining interUnder US law there are a variety of

by the

of purposes. 5 Most important,

no crime of "terrorism" per

se.

Rather, the

matic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 provides

over the killing

of,

6

to, a

Although the relevant chapter of the Act

risdiction over Terrorist Acts

Abroad

against

no requirement that the killing or violent

(e)

on

the fed-

Omnibus Diplo-

criminal jurisdiction

US national outside the United
is

entitled "Extra-territorial Ju-

United

States Nationals," there

of a

elements of terrorism

as a

prosecutorial discretion:

LIMITATION

ON PROSECUTION.

No

prosecution for any offense

described in this Section shall be undertaken by the United States except on

written certification of the Attorney General or the highest ranking subordinate

of the Attorney General with responsibility for criminal prosecutions

judgment of the

certifying official,

intimidate, or retaliate against a

is

act include the traditional elements

terrorist act. Instead, the legislation incorporates the

limitation

US

at least at

or an act of physical violence with intent to cause serious

bodily injury to or that results in such injury
States.

as

cover are criminalized regardless of whether, in

could be described

the domestic level,

of

that, in the

such offense was intended to coerce,

government or
324

a civilian

population.
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The conference

report

on the

act

Attorney General or his designate

final

it

clear that the certification

of the

and not subject to judicial review. 7 The

meaning of the term

report also clarifies the
it

is

makes

"civilian population"

by noting that

"includes a general population as well as other specific identifiable segments of

society

such

nationality.
civilian

.

." 8 It is

.

membership of

the

as

religious

a

faith

of

or

particular

a

not necessary that either the targeted government or the

population be that of the United

States.

9

working definition for this chapter, I shall employ the definitions
of terrorism utilized by the US Government for statistical and analytical purposes
As

a general

since 1983:

The term

•

"terrorism" means premeditated, politically motivated violence

perpetrated against noncombatant 10 targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.

The term

•

"international terrorism"

The term
significant

been subjected

subgroups that practice, international terrorism. 11

Monty Python

not a

new phenomenon, and

this chapter,

I

some not

it is

a topic that has

so scholarly) analysis.

have asked myself what

question: does the prospect of

terrorists constitute

new

is

to substantial scholarly (and

Accordingly, in preparing

by

group" means any group practicing, or that has

"terrorist

International terrorism

the

citizens or

of more than one country.

territory
•

means terrorism involving

something "completely

I

would

computer network

different,"

12

or does

it

call

attacks

amount

no new issues of law
and policy? The answer, it appears, is that the possibility of computer network
attacks does raise some new issues, although many of the old conundrums still
only to

a

technique of attack for

terrorists raising

pertain.

combat international terrorism may take place at three different
The first, and ideal, stage is before a terrorist attack has occurred. Here the

Efforts to
stages.

effort

gets

is

to prevent a terrorist attack, either

tar-

of terrorist attack or through intelligence work that allows law enforcement

officials to learn

The second
ress,

through the hardening of possible

bringing

panic

of a planned attack in advance and intercept

it.

stage involves responding to a terrorist attack while
it

among the

to an end,

minimizing the damage

general population. As

we

shall see,

it

causes,

it is

and preventing

terrorist acts
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fair

procedures, and,

attacks

have suc-

necessary to apprehend them, submit

prosecution before a tribunal with jurisdiction and

in prog-

computer network

may present special challenges at this stage.
The third and last stage is where the perpetrators of the
ceeded in their mission, and

it is

them

to

if they are

.
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found

guilty,

Terrorists

punish them. Here, too, computer network attacks

may present spe-

cial challenges.

some of the possible problems of combatting
international terrorism at these three stages raised by the prospect of computer network attacks by terrorists. The final section sets forth some concluding observations.
In the sections that follow,

I

address

Prevention

The Threat

of

Computer Network Attacks

Other chapters

in this "Blue

attacks at great length

and with

Book"

discuss the nature

substantial authority.

of computer network

No attempt is made to

plicate these efforts. Rather, this contribution attempts to discuss the

computer network
be engaged in by

To

13

concept of

of international criminal activity that might

terrorists.

end it may be useful

this

other context,
tions.

attacks as a type

du-

to distinguish, as

between computer network

Michael Schmitt has done in anattacks

and information opera-

As explained by Schmitt, "information operations" should be defined

expansively to "encompass,

among an

array of other activities, virtually any

nonconsensual actions intended to discover,
data stored in a computer, manipulated

computer network."

14

by

alter,

computer, or transmitted through

a

Moreover, information operations

defensive and offensive information operations.

within the

latter

destroy, disrupt, or transfer
a

are subdivided into

Computer network

attacks

fall

category and consist of "(o)perations to disrupt, deny, degrade,

or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the

computers and networks themselves." 15

So defined, computer network

may

attacks

could be limited to the copying of sensitive

take a variety of forms.

data,

They

which, depending on the

cir-

cumstances, might constitute espionage, or include techniques for altering or
destroying data and programs. Other computer network attacks might result in
physical destruction, such

as,

most ominously, the "meltdown" of a nuclear

actor as a consequence of interference with

control system.

its

Still

other possible

examples of computer network attacks have been suggested by Schmitt:

1

Trains are misrouted and crash after the computer systems controlling

them are

maliciously manipulated.

2.

An

information blockade

is

mounted

information into or out of a target State.
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to

limit

the

re-

flow of electronic
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3.

Banking computer systems

An

4.

automated municipal

causing massive

traffic jams

are

broken into and

traffic

and

their databases corrupted.

control system

frustrating responses

compromised, thereby

is

by emergency

fire,

medical,

and law enforcement vehicles.

5.

Intrusion into the

computer system controlling water

open and

intruder to rapidly

distribution allows the

close valves. This creates a

hammer

effect that

eventually causes widespread pipe ruptures.

A

6.

bomb

logic

imbedded

upon

set to activate

in a municipal

of mass casualty operations

initiation

emergency response computer system.

As he recognizes, some of these examples

is

16

are realistic while others

may

stretch credulity.

There

moreover, the question of the technical capability of individual

is,

ter-

engage in such computer network attacks without State support or

rorists to

sponsorship. In the past, the United States and other potential State targets of ter-

have benefitted from the

rorist attack
terrorists.

nized

as

17

For

incompetence of the

many years now, however, computer systems have been

being especially vulnerable to

expert, "(t)he

relative technological

terrorist attack.

18

And,

in the

growing sophistication of high school students

words of one

now entering col-

lege will ensure an ever greater pool of persons capable [of engaging in

network

attacks]."

Another useful

work attacks

recog-

computer

19

distinction to

that (1)

may

keep in mind

between those computer net-

is

cause disruption of vital systems leading to widespread

inconvenience, possibly to some degree of public alarm, but that do not directly
threaten

human
first

life,

life.

20

and

(2)

those that directly threaten or appear directly to threaten

Most computer network

attacks are

more

likely to

fall

within the

category than within the second. 21

A major difficulty facing all
attacks

is

that they can

efforts to

prevent or combat computer network

be carried out remotely and often from great distances.

Since anyone can access the Internet from anywhere in the world, law en-

forcement

officials

may have no

idea

where the

attacker

circumstances, law enforcement officials will not
attack or the identity of the attackers.

Even

if

know

is

located.

Under such

the motive behind the

they succeed in tracking the

source of the attack to an Internet Service Provider (ISP), this ISP

mere conduit, or the

attack

may

actually

that service.
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have originated with

a

may be

a

subscriber to
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Hardening of Targets
Identification

and hardening of critical

long been recognized

—

preventing

as a crucial step in

every major network

of possible

targets

—communications,

terrorist attack has

terrorist attack. 22 Virtually

power, pipelines,

electrical

and

The vulnerability of many of these networks, however, depends on the would be attacker being able to identify the
critical nodes. For example, taking out one refinery would have little effect on
data

vulnerable to terrorist attack.

is

the oil industry.

But

attacks

on

certain pipelines could have devastating effects.

Computer systems, on the other hand, are especially vulnerable, and "(i) it
would not be difficult to seriously disrupt the Social Security System, nor would
23
it be impossible to inflict vast harm to the Federal Reserve."
This special vulnerability makes

works

it

especially difficult to

harden computer net-

against attack. Electronic vulnerabilities are often harder to guard than

"traditional" vulnerabilities against terrorist attack. Part of the

vastness

and complexity of the information

infrastructure.

problem

As of 1996,

for

is

the

exam-

the defense establishment reportedly had over 2.1 million computers,

ple,

10,000 local networks, and 100 long-distance networks. 24 Moreover, although
it is

clear that this infrastructure

number of reported

incidents

is

is

subjected to a large

probably just the

tip

cording to estimates, only about one in 150 attacks
ported. 25

The same pattern is likely present
Government and in the vast private sector.
Security technologies and products

smart cards

27

—may

ditionally, as

new

afford

—such

of the iceberg because, acis

actually detected

and re-

US

for example, firewalls 26

and

foolproof. 28

Ad-

some protection, but they are hardly

security tools are developed,

the

other sectors of the

in

as,

number of attacks,

computer network

how to defeat them or exploit other vulnerabilities.
Human failings greatly compound the problem, as when

attackers

learn

untrained users accidentally publicize their passwords or

chosen which can be

easily guessed.

Accordingly,

it is

inexperienced or

weak passwords

generally agreed that train-

ing in information security for personnel, including top management,

element for

a

good information systems

are

is

a crucial

security program. 29

Intelligence Operations

There

is

general agreement that the collection and use of intelligence

fective tool in

combating terrorism.

Ideally, the gathering

preventive role and enables law enforcement
early stage, before they inflict injury

officials to

on persons or
328

is

an ef-

of intelligence serves

a

intercept terrorists at an

property.

However, even

John F. Murphy

with respect to
puters, this has

Problems
there

is

terrorists

who employ more

proven to be

may

a difficult task to accomplish.

arise at the national level.

In the United States, for example,

evidence that constraints imposed on intelligence

1980 may have adversely affected the timing and

and

and

seizures

to the

stances.

intel-

which violence or other

Constitution prohibits unreasonable
to

law enforcement searches of

States.

Intelligence Surveillance

surveillance of foreign

of preventive

to

concerns would be especially great under such circum-

risk to privacy

The Foreign

US

would apply

clearly

computer data bases in the United

The

from 1975

declined. 30

The Fourth Amendment
searches

activities

availability

ligence to the extent that the proportion of cases in

crimes were prevented

com-

conventional methods than

Act of 1978 31 regulates electronic

powers and the agents of foreign powers and defines "for-

eign power" to include "a group engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor." 32
trict judges

rants.

The

exclusively

The

act sets

up

a special court consisting

dis-

who hear and determine applications for electronic surveillance warstatute allows warrantless electronic acquisition

between foreign powers not involving

the surveillance will acquire the contents of any

United

of seven

States

person

is

a

of communications

a substantial likelihood that

communication

to

which

a

party. 33

The United States Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does
not apply to searches and seizures abroad of property owned by non-US citizens
or permanent residents. 34

However, search and seizure of material located in
computers abroad may be viewed by foreign sovereigns as a violation of their
territorial sovereignty. Moreover, the standard techniques for obtaining criminal evidence abroad
letters rogatory and mutual legal assistance treaties, for
example
those

—

who

—

are designed to assist in apprehending, prosecuting,

have already committed crimes, not

as a

and punishing

device to gather intelligence

regarding the possible future commission of a crime.

Under
gence

these circumstances, then, cooperation

between

US

and foreign

intelli-

would seem vital. Nonetheless, foreign laws protecting privacy are, if
more stringent than those of the United States. Therefore, in either the

officers

anything,

domestic or the international context, the challenge to balance privacy and individual rights concerns

with the requirements of law enforcement

Management

of

an On-going

is

Terrorist Incident

The goals of counter-terrorism efforts during an ongoing
would at a minimum be threefold: (1) to bring the terrorist
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formidable. 35

terrorist incident

attack to an end;
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minimize the damage caused by the

(2) to

A

restore order.

computer network

attack;

attack

by

This would especially be the case

if the

and

(3) to

prevent panic and

would probably com-

terrorists

and make fulfillment of these goals more

plicate

Terrorists

difficult.

computer

attack

was widespread and

well coordinated and involved both governmental and private sector targets.

Suppose, for example, that simultaneous computer attacks disrupted the

command and

US

control infrastructure so that individual military units were un-

communicate with each other or with a central command; air traffic control systems were also disrupted, causing planes to crash with substantial loss of
life; a "computer worm" or "virus" traveled from computer to computer across
a network, damaging data and causing systems to crash. Assume further that the
able to

sources of these attacks could not be easily located.
thorities seeking to bring the attacks quickly to a halt

The
and

challenges facing au-

to prevent panic

would

be monumental.
Panic might be particularly pronounced because

many

otherwise informed

people tend to dismiss the prospect of computer network attacks

According

to

[CEOs of big

Web

shutting

I'm talking about people shutting

down

911

You

die. It's as

bad

black out a
as

down

shutting

systems,

city,

down

die.

being attacked by bombs.

ring, the trains don't

to

a city's electricity,

telephone

people

from now a President goes forth and orders troops
phones don't

Infra-

corporations] think I'm talking about a 14-year-old hacking into

sites.

of people

risk.

and Counter-Terrorism at the National Security Council:

transportation systems.
lots

minor

Richard Clarke, the National Coordinator for Security,

structure Protection,

their

as a

networks

Black out
.

.

.

lots

Imagine

a

of cities,

few years

move. The lights go

move. That's what we mean by an

and

out, the

electronic

Pearl Harbor. 36

Apprehension, Prosecution, and Punishment

Apprehension
Before

a suspect

can be apprehended, he or she must be located. As has often

been noted elsewhere

in this

frustrate investigatory efforts

"Blue Book," computer network attackers can

by "looping and weaving"

their attacks

several foreign countries, thus greatly complicating the efforts

follow their

trail.

law enforcement
tody.

If the suspect
officials

is

located,

it

through

of investigators to

then becomes necessary to induce

of the place where he

is

located to take

him

into cus-

They will not do so unless the computer network attack in question would
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be a crime under their local law. 37 This requirement would also have to be met
a condition

virtually

as

of extradition because of the "double criminality" requirement in
extradition treaties. 38

all

Prosecution and Punishment
If the suspect

is

apprehended abroad, the

issue arises

whether, and

if so

where,

he will be prosecuted. At present, no multilateral antiterrorism convention expressly covers
is

possible that

attacks. 39

However, depending on the circumstances, it
one of the existing conventions e.g., the Convention for Sup-

computer

—

pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation 40 or even the not

yet

in

force

Bombing

41

International

—could

Convention

for

the

of Terrorist

Suppression

apply. If so, the extradite or prosecute approach that

is

the

keystone of these conventions would govern the rights and obligations of the
States parties.

Under

this

approach a State party that apprehends an alleged offender in

him

territory

must

purposes

of prosecution. 42 Strictly speaking,

either extradite

tions alone creates

an

obligation to extradite;

leged offenders for prosecution

Moreover,

extradite.

or submit his case to

its

own

its

authorities for

none of the antiterrorism convenby requiring the submission of al-

if extradition fails,

a legal basis for extradition

they contain an inducement to

provided either in the con-

is

vention or through incorporation of the offenses mentioned in the convention
into existing or future extradition treaties

parties.

To

varying de-

conventions also obligate the parties to take the important practical

grees, the

step

between the

of attempting to apprehend the accused and hold him in custody. 43

The most important
accused.

To

this

goal of these provisions

is

to ensure prosecution

end, the conventions state quite strongly the alternative obliga-

tion either to extradite or to submit the accused for prosecution.

however,

is

of the

not to try the accused,

much

case to be considered for prosecution

less to

The

obligation,

punish him, but to submit the

by the appropriate national prosecuting

authority. If the prosecuting State's criminal justice system lacks integrity, the
risk

of political intervention in the prosecution or

tion

may prevent

the

trial

at trial exists.

or conviction of the accused, or act

Such interven-

as a

mitigating in-

fluence at the sentencing stage.

Even
rity, it

cused

if

the prosecuting State's criminal justice system functions with integ-

may be very difficult to obtain the evidence
when the alleged offense was committed in

practical

impediment

to conviction can

necessary to convict the ac-

another country. This very

be removed only by patient and sus-

tained efforts to develop and expand "judicial assistance" and other forms of
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Terrorists

cooperation between the law enforcement and judicial systems of different
countries.
as will

The conventions

create an obligation to cooperate in this regard, but,

be demonstrated in greater

detail later, this obligation

is

often difficult for

countries with different types of legal systems to meet, even assuming that they
act in
is

complete good

faith.

The

difficulty

may be even greater when cybercrime

involved.

Many, perhaps most, instances of computer network attack would not be
covered by the antiterrorist conventions. In such cases, the United States would
need to engage in a process of rendition to get the suspect before a US court. Besides extradition, the

forms of rendition include exclusion, deportation, and ab-

duction. 44 Subject perhaps to very limited exceptions, abduction

is

illegal,

45

and

exclusion and deportation involve unilateral action by the State of refuge and are
relatively informal

tion

is

measures subject to

of legal limitations. Extradi-

a relative lack

generally recognized as the only process of rendition that satisfactorily

protects the rights of an accused.

Assuming that the United

States did

could not convince the State of refuge to deport the accused,

The

tradite her.

obstacles to the success of this endeavor,

it

not wish or

would

try to ex-

however, could be

considerable.

Barriers to Extradition
First,

the requested country

an extradition treaty between

would be under no
it

and the United

obligation to extradite absent

States.

46

Although the United

more than 100 bilateral extradition treaties and to the
Inter- American Convention on Extradition with 13 parties, 47 the absence of an
extradition treaty has been a problem in some high profile cases. 48 Moreover, although the United States would be entitled to use most of the antiterrorist conventions for purposes of extradition, it has chosen not to do so. 49 The United
States

is

a party to

States also will

not

of an extradition

Even with an
difficulties.

itself extradite a

person to

a

requesting country in the absence

treaty. 50

extradition treaty, the extradition process

As already noted, many,

if not

most,

that the action in question be a crime in

US

is

often fraught with

extradition treaties require

both the requesting and requested

country for extradition to take place. This dual criminality requirement can
pose major problems in computer crime

amended

its

cases.

Although the United

States has

criminal code to penalize a wide range of computer crimes, other

countries have been slow in doing the same. 51 This has resulted in cases

the United States has identified the location of a perpetrator of a

where
computer

crime, but has been unable to secure her extradition because the act in question

was not

a

crime under the law of the country where the perpetrator was
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between the United

found and the extradition

treaty

question contained a dual

criminality requirement. 52

States

and the country

Although there

spread recognition that countries need to reach a consensus

puter related activities should be criminalized,

this

as to

is

in

wide-

which com-

a process that will take

is

53

some time.
Under the

number of countries,

extradition law of a

it is

necessary for a re-

questing country to present the requested country with satisfactory (to the re-

quested country) evidence that a crime covered by the treaty has been

committed. 54 This has especially been the case with

common

law countries.

Great Britain, for example, traditionally required prima facie evidence of a crime

covered by the extradition

treaty.

For countries on the continent of Europe,

which had no such requirement, this posed a "mystery" as to precisely how
much evidence was required to meet this standard. 55 In 1982, approximately a
third of the applications made to the United Kingdom under its extradition treaties failed and the most common cause of failure was the requesting State's inability to satisfy the

prima facie requirement. 56 Because of this record of failure in

the extradition process, Great Britain

amended its

extradition law in 1989 to ex-

clude selectively the prima facie requirement in relation to certain States, and

then

ment.

by

57

Instead, the

a certificate

and

European Extradition Convention, which has no such require-

ratified the

a

convention requires only that the request be accompanied

of conviction or the warrant for

copy of the necessary

laws. 58

The US

test

The prima

facie

ates as a necessary

to another State

covered by the

prima

facie

not proven to be

of "probable cause," which re-

a barrier to extradition. 59

requirement has been defended on the ground that

protection for the individual

merely because he

extradition treaty. 60

is

Be

who

network

gathering evidence in such cases,

as

otherwise

that as

it

may, there
difficult.

already noted,

of some countries, especially those with

a civil

may be removed

is

no doubt

This difficulty

that the

may be

may be

substantial.

terrorists

may be

the refusal

law background, to extradite their

of the grounds advanced by Libya in refusing to surrender two

Libyan members of the Libyan secret service
of the District of Columbia in
sion of Pan

oper-

attacks are involved because the barriers to

Another barrier to the extradition of international

One

it

suspected of having committed a crime

requirement makes extradition more

especially great if computer

nationals. 61

statement of the offense

make it proper that an accused be

quires only that there be reasonable grounds to
tried for the crime, has

arrest, a

Am flight

who were

November 1991

for the

indicted by a grand jury

December 1987 explo-

103 over Lockerbie, Scotland that killed 270 persons, in-

cluding 189 Americans, was that the Libyan Constitution prohibited the
extradition of Libyan nationals. 62
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The

Austrian Supreme Court has gone so

Terrorists

claim that the provision in

far to

the Austrian Constitution prohibiting the extradition of nationals reflected "a
generally recognized rule of international law." 63

United Kingdom reserves the right not

Even

the

to extradite nationals

extradition treaty with the requesting State and the latter

when

European Union concluded

Nationals. 65

dition

is

no

seeking the fugitive's

Europe, however, the situation changed substantially in 1996,

least in

the

is

where there

a multilateral, antiterrorist convention. 64

return under

At

government of the

a

Convention Relating

to Extradition of

The first paragraph of Article 7 of that convention provides that extra-

may not be refused on the ground that the

"person claimed

is

a national

of

Member State." But the second and third paragraphs of Article 7 of
convention permit a five year rolling reservation allowing member States to

the requested
the

refuse extradition of their nationals.

Report "makes
[F]irst, that

clear several matters:"

the Nordic

domiciled aliens

members of the European Union

as nationals for

that the protection

by the requesting

no longer

classify

the purposes of intra-EU extradition; secondly,

State will

by entering a reservation that any sentence imposed

be served in the requested

States are constitutionally prohibited

that they

will

of nationals might be achieved by those States which do not

ordinarily extradite nationals,

some

According to Geoff Gilbert, the Explanatory

given that

own

nationals,

from extraditing

review the scope of the restriction

finally, that reservations are

State; next, that

once every

at least

not indefinite and

their

five years; and,

can lapse. 66

In other words, even with the conclusion of the 1996 convention civil law
countries

resist

On the
that civil

extraditing their

other hand,

law

States are

own

nationals.

as to certain international

crimes, there

is

some evidence

beginning to relax their previous practice of never extra-

diting their nationals, at least in their extradition relations with
States.

common

For example, the 1983 extradition treaty between the United

Italy specifically

tionality

and

countries. 67

is

aimed

at

combatting the coordinated organized crime in the two

Further, the increasing practice of repatriating prisoners to serve

own

country has reportedly convinced some

countries in Europe to extradite their nationals to

Outside of Europe there has

treaty that

and

provides that extradition shall not be refused on grounds of na-

their sentences in their

tentative. In

States

law

1979 the United

also

States

common

civil

law

law countries. 68

been some movement,

albeit

it

slow and

and Colombia concluded an extradition

allowed for the surrender of nationals. 69

The

treaty

was

a

the inability of the United States to secure the extradition of
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who had imported illegal drugs, especially cocaine, into the United
States and who had so corrupted Colombian law enforcement officials that trial
in Colombia was not possible. The new extradition treaty was extremely unnationals

popular in Colombia, however, and in 1988 the Colombia Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional. 70

Repeated efforts by the United States
resulted in Colombia passing a new law allowing for the extradition of its na71
and at this writing Colombia has extradited two drug suspects
tionals in 1997,
to the

United

States.

72

Mexico concerning the possible exhave been especially tortuous. 73 Under the

Relations between the United States and
tradition of

Mexican

US-Mexican

Extradition Treaty, 74 neither party

is

required to extradite

an alternative to extradition, and from 1978 until 1996 Mexico,

policy, refused to extradite

edly

its

na-

Rather, Article 9 of the treaty gives both parties the option to prosecute

tionals.
as

nationals

as a result

that the

its

citizens to the

United

States.

75

Moreover,

of corruption among Mexican law enforcement

United

matter of

as a

alleg-

persons

officials,

sought to extradite, especially for drug trafficking, were

States

Mexico surrendered four of its
for prosecution, two of them for drug trafficking. 76

often not prosecuted in Mexico. Finally, in 1996,
citizens to the

United

States

Nonetheless, since that time, Mexico's record, from the
unsatisfactory, 77

Mexican

US perspective,

has

been

and there have been recent court challenges to the extradition of

nationals that

may have

to

be resolved by Mexico's highest court. 78

Recognition by the requested country that the requesting country has jurisdiction to try the accused

is

and criminal jurisdictional

a prerequisite to extradition.

issues in cyberspace,

The complexity of civil

however,

is

just

beginning to be

recognized. 79
In recent years, at both the state and the federal level, the United States has

extended the death penalty to more and more crimes, including

terrorist

80

By contrast, since World War II, opposition to the death penalty has
resulted in many countries including clauses in extradition treaties that exclude
crimes.

extradition

where the requesting

State retains the death penalty

and

is

unwilling

or unable to provide assurances that this penalty will not be carried out

accused

is

extradited.

81

This development has greatly complicated

US

if

the

extradi-

tion relations with other countries, including cases involving terrorist crimes. 82

Another important development

in recent years has

portance of human rights considerations
sition to the death penalty in the

on

as

limitation

Western European

on

extradition. 83

States

is

Oppo-

based in large part

human rights values. On the other
noted by John Dugard and Christine Van den Wyngaert, "[t]oday states

the belief that

hand,

as a

been the increasing im-

it

violates

fundamental

are irreconcilably divided over the morality
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penalty," 84 and as a result

Under

law.

imposition

its

certain circumstances,

position of the death penalty

ment or punishment, and

The

best

known of these

man
The
the

however, according to some
constitute cruel,

authorities

is

US

Rights,

which

im-

treat-

European Court of

West German national,
the United Kingdom. In

United Kingdom.^ Soering, a

request, the

States. Soering,

authorities,

inhuman, or degrading

the decision of the

his girlfriend's parents in Virginia

response to a

United

not prohibited by general international

thus violate general international law norms.

Human Rights in Soering v.
murdered

may

is

Terrorists

and

fled to

United Kingdom ordered

his extradition to the

however, petitioned the European Commission of Hu-

referred his case to the

court held that the United

European Court of Human Rights.

Kingdom had an

obligation under Article 3 of

European Convention of Human Rights, which prohibits torture and inhu-

man

or degrading treatment or punishment, not to extradite Soering to the

where there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman
or degrading treatment by being kept on death row for a prolonged period in the
state of Virginia. Eventually Soering was extradited to the United States when
the United Kingdom received assurances from US officials that he would not be

United

States

subjected to the death penalty. 86

Although

not

it is

a judicial

binding on parties to

body

established

to supervise

Canada^

body with authority

a dispute, the

Human

to

hand down

Rights Committee, which

by the International Covenant on Civil and

implementation of the covenant by

that California's practice

a decision

Political

States parties,

is

the

Rights 87

found in

Ng

v.

of executing by gas asphyxiation, which

might take over ten minutes to cause death, resulted

in

prolonged suffering con-

stituting cruel

and inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7 of the

On

the basis of this finding, the committee was of the opinion that

covenant.

this

way, had violated

its

obligations under the

Ng

would be executed
covenant by extraditing him

to

which

is

Canada, which could reasonably have foreseen that

in

the United States.
In 1980 Alona Evans identified the political offense exception,

grounded,

at least in part, in

extradition law.

90

At

human

rights considerations,

that time, the political exception

89

as

the "hot issue" of

was regarded

the primary barrier to the extradition of international terrorists. 91

as

But

perhaps

in recent

years States have taken a variety of steps to limit or even to eliminate the political

offense exception as a defense to extradition, 92
cal offense

As an

exception remains

a

and

it is

unclear whether the politi-

major barrier to extradition

at

the present time. 93

alternative to or a substitute for the political offense exception, extradi-

may permit the accused to

claim that he will not receive a

fair trial in

the requesting country. Article 3(a) of the United States-United

Kingdom

tion treaties
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Supplementary Extradition Treaty of 1985, 94 for example, expressly permits a

whether the extraditee

judicial inquiry into

will

be "prejudiced

at his trial

punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race,

or

reli-

gion, nationality or political opinions." This so-called "humanitarian exception"

was inserted because of the concern of some
the political offense exception effected

would

result in

responsibility

tions. 95 In practice,

make

Canada have held
simply

As

By

US

courts normally apply, under

make

a finding that

On

which the

down

courts defer

the decision as to the validity of such allega-

would

reflect

States

on the

have been extremely

standards of justice in the

the other hand, courts in both the United States and

that the rule

if the likely

treaty

giving the courts the

the treaty waters

trial,

however, courts in the United

Kingdom. 96

be followed

by the supplementary extradition

of ruling on allegations of an unfair

to the executive branch to

United

Senators that the elimination of

inadequate protection for extraditees.

the rule of noninquiry

reluctant to

US

of noninquiry

is

not absolute and that

treatment in the requesting State

it

will not

would be shocking or

unacceptable. 97

of these

a result

many barriers,

the extradition process has been described as

Former US Attorney General Benjamin
R. Civiletti was of the view that extradition laws belong to "the world of the
horse and buggy and the steamship, not in the world of commercial jet air trans"a creaking steam engine of an affair." 98

portation and high speed telecommunications." 99
that

law enforcement

officials

It is

therefore not surprising

have often turned to alternative forms of rendition

in their efforts to bring alleged offenders to a

forum

for prosecution.

Alternatives to Extradition

One
in

been employed with some frequency

alternative to extradition that has

Europe

is

"hot pursuit."

State to cross the borders

100

This approach allows the police authorities of one

of a neighboring State in hot pursuit of a fleeing fugi-

open borders that the European Union has followed since 1993. Also, the Schengen Accord of 1990, 101
concluded among Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Luxemtive,

and

it is

consistent with the policy of internal

bourg, and the Netherlands, allows the police agencies of the States parties to
cross borders in hot pursuit, although the precise scope
ter of dispute. 102

widely utilized

Outside of Europe, the doctrine of hot pursuit

as a

method of rendition.

The methods of rendition most
as

is

a

mat-

is

apparently not

as alternatives to

extradition are

103

often utilized

exclusion and deportation. 104 Exclusion

hended

of this authority

may occur when

fugitives are appre-

they attempt to enter a country, and deportation
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when

fugitives are arrested within a country's territory. In

many of these

prisingly,

US

practice,

exclusions and deportations have involved

not sur-

Canada and

directed towards persons accused of drug trafficking. 105

Mexico and have been

Both exclusion and deportation
trol

Terrorists

con-

are civil processes, designed for irnmigration

and dominated by the executive. As

a

consequence, exclusion and deportation

proceedings utilized for rendition purposes do not apply criminal justice standards,
either

with respect to the

of the

interests

States

involved or to protection of the ac-

cused. Unlike extradition, exclusion and deportation rarely involve a formal re-

quest

by

of the alleged offender.

a State seeking a return

exclusion and deportation are effected

at

was the

Doherty,

a

as

an alternative to extradi-

case of Joseph Doherty. After unsuccessful attempts to extradite

member of the

Provisional Irish Republican

Army, from the United

United Kingdom, where he was wanted for his

States to the

the contrary,

the instance of a territorial State. 106

Perhaps the most controversial use of deportation
tion

On

role in the death of a

US courts
that his offenses fell within the political offense exception in the US-UK extradi-

British soldier

and for

tion treaty, 107 the

Northern Ireland

his escape

United

after

from

States

Supreme Court upheld

long and complicated

the deportation of Doherty was handled

as a

some commentators have argued

it is

dures,

US

as a

deportation to

purely internal matter and not in re-

Kingdom

that

his

legal proceedings. 108 Apparently,

sponse to a request from the United

other to deport an individual

by

prison, because of decisions

that

he be deported. Although

improper for one

State to request an-

means of circumventing extradition proce-

courts have repeatedly held that the existence of an extradition treaty

between the United States and another country does not bar the use of other
means to obtain custody over a criminal located abroad. 109 In contrast, complicity between the French government and another government to use deportation
as

an alternative to extradition

may

reportedly be the basis for dismissal of the

prosecution. 110

The most

controversial alternative to extradition has, of course,

tion or kidnaping of alleged offenders.

Both commentators and

State practice

support the general proposition that international law prohibits

sending

its

been abduca State

from

agents into another State to abduct an individual residing there with-

out that other State's permission. 111 Abductions would seem prima facie to violate a principal rule

of international law, which

sovereign within the boundaries of its

There

is

at least

international law

own

states that a

is

absolutely

territory.

an argument, however, that abduction

may be consistent with

under certain extraordinary circumstances. Despite the prohi-

bition against the use of unilateral force in Article 2(4) of the
cle 51 allows a

nation

UN Charter, Arti-

victim of an armed attack to use force to defend
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by the Security Council. 112 Justification of a government sponsored ab-

action

duction of a fugitive necessarily requires characterizing the actions of the fugitive
as

an "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 51. 113 This characterization

has

most often been applied

to cases of terrorism

and drug

trafficking. In 1989,

expressly repudiating an earlier opinion to the contrary in 1980, 114 then Assistant

Attorney General William Barr produced
allowed

US law enforcement

officials to

a legal

make

opinion that international law

extraterritorial arrests

tain circumstances. 115 Testifying before Congress,

under cer-

Barr stated on behalf of the

Department of Justice:
[T]here are instances where extraterritorial arrest without the host sovereign's

consent

may be justified under international law. For

actual or threatened terrorist attack,

principles of international

example, in response to an

we would have good grounds under general

law to justify

extraterritorial

law enforcement actions

over a foreign sovereign's objections. Moreover, in appropriate circumstances we

may have

a

sound

basis

under international law to take action against large-scale

drug traffickers being given

safe

direct extraterritorial arrests
as a

may well be that the President will choose to
only when he believes that he is justified in doing so

Thus,

their criminal enterprise.

haven by a government acting in complicity with
it

matter of self-defense under international law. 116

The

of Mr. Barr's proposition has been subject to sharp debate. 117 In

validity

practice,

however,

at least as

extraterritorial arrests

sovereign.

The 1987

of alleged

by

US

In contrast, the
ficking cases.

119

US Government has made

without the consent of the

terrorists

a

US

agents.

ship in the Mediterranean after

no

territorial

sting operation that resulted in the apprehension

Younis took place on
lured there

of this writing, the

of Fawas

Younis had been

118

US Government has made extraterritorial arrests in drug traf-

The most

controversial of these

was the 1990 apprehension and

Humberto Alvarez-Machain by MexiUS Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). Dr. Alvarez-

deportation to the United States of Dr.

can agents paid by the

Machain was a prominent Mexican gynecologist who had been indicted for the
kidnap and murder of Enrique Camarena, a DEA agent stationed in Guadalajara.
After strong protests by the Mexican Government, and a circuit court opinion
holding that the abduction violated the

US Supreme
treaty

and

Court ruled

that

US

extradition treaty, 120 the

was not barred by the extradition
courts could exercise jurisdiction over the case. 121 Although

the majority opinion
lated

US-Mexico

all

that the abduction

but conceded by

norms of customary

way of dicta

international law,
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122

that the abduction vio-

the court did not address the issue
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of whether

this

might constitute

US

a basis for

Terrorists

courts to decline jurisdiction.

Courts in several other countries have ruled that they have discretion in such
cumstances to refuse to exercise jurisdiction.

The Supreme

Court's decision in Alvarez -Machain has been subjected to

sharp criticism. 124

Be

that as

the Court's decision

cally,

it

may, Geoff Gilbert has suggested

may "hasten

alleged international criminals, for

it

has brought to the fore this attempt to au-

Bush Administration quickly responded with

wake of Alvarez -Machain,

assurances that

of either increasing or institutionalizing the practice of
tions. 126 Also, in

1994, the United States and

Prohibit Transborder

Abductions 127

yet been sent to the Senate for

its

this

is

dition of the accused

Moreover, the

abduc-

Treaty to

a

of this writing has not

is

used, once an accused

beyond

a

is

before a

reasonable doubt. But

if the

located abroad, and cannot be obtained, the successful ren-

may be

legal

a pyrrhic victory.

mechanisms

criminal proceedings are

mechanism,

had no intention

extraterritorial

as

the

advice and consent to ratification).

necessary to prove his guilt

evidence to do

it

Mexico concluded

(which, however,

Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
Regardless of what method of rendition
it is

paradoxi-

that,

the demise of State sponsored kidnaps of

thorize the 'manifestly illegal.'" 125 Indeed, in the

US court,

cir-

123

less

for obtaining evidence abroad for use in

than satisfactory. 128 Letters rogatory, the standard

are especially ill-suited for obtaining evidence regarding

computer

crimes. Letters rogatory require an application to a foreign court and usually pro-

vide for advance notice and participation by opposing parties. Hence, the proce-

dure

is

relatively public, as

investigations

under the

compared

veil

to the

US practice

of grand jury secrecy.

It is,

of conducting criminal
moreover, even under

the best of circumstances extremely slow, and foreign tribunals

or

no

assistance at the pre-indictment phase

of foreign tribunals to respond favorably
rogatory practice

is

is

of a

case. In

may give limited

any event, the decision

purely discretionary, since the

letters

based on comity considerations rather than on binding inter-

national legal norms.

Because they create binding international
ties,

legal obligations for the States par-

Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) may be of greater

November

15, 1997, the

United

States

had 23

MLATs in force.

129

value.

As of

They provide

prosecutors with a channel for sending requests for assistance in obtaining evi-

dence through

a

Central Authority in one country 130 to a corresponding prose-

cutorial authority in the other country,

the request.

Under MLATs,

which oversees the prompt execution of

foreign prosecutorial authorities will normally seek
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mandatory process under
keep

their law,

when

necessary, to execute the request

and

confidential to the extent possible.

it

The US MLATs

contain a provision that obligates a requested country to

conduct searches and seizures on behalf of a requesting country if the request includes information justifying such action under the laws of the requested coun-

few of these MLATs, however, apply broadly to all law enforcement
investigations and prosecutions, rather than only to certain types of offenses such
try.

as

Only

a

money laundering.

drug trafficking and

ception

is

often available in

MLATs and can be a barrier to

sary evidence. Finally,

even though the

than letters rogatory,

we have seen,

as

Additionally, the political offense ex-

MLAT

process

is

obtaining the neces-

much

usually

faster

evidence of computer crime can be rapidly

transferred out of the jurisdiction of the requested country to other countries

with

whom the

United

no

States has

MLAT.

Especially for the collection of electronic evidence,

provement on
aptly

letters rogatory, are

posed by Michael Sussmann:

tronic evidence that

may be

unequal to the

"How

task.

MLATs, while an imThe problem has been

does law enforcement collect elec-

scattered across several different countries, can

deleted or altered with one click of a mouse,

may be

encrypted, and will ulti-

mately need to be authenticated in another country's court?" 131

atively rapid procedures available

under

MLATs

The

ability to

mouse renders even the

delete or alter electronic evidence with the click of a

be

hopelessly slow and

rel-

cumber-

some. Accordingly, in Sussmann's view:

[W]hen
as a

electronic evidence

is

sought, there

may be

a

need

for

mechanisms such

"preservation of evidence request" or "protected seizure,"

work

as follows.

Where

there

electronic evidence, a country

is

a particularized

which would

concern about the

loss

of

would make an informal international request that

number of

the data immediately be preserved. This could be accomplished in a

ways, from having a telecommunications carrier or ISP

[Internet

Service

Provider] copy and store a customer's data, to actually seizing a criminal's

computer and securing, but not searching,
is

(sic)

protected from

loss,

it

for a short period of time.

Once

data

expedited processes would provide the foreign

country with formal documentation to authorize the issuance of
search warrant or similar process.

a

domestic

132

As Sussmann notes, the US Code provides for a form of "preservation of evidence" request. 133 Most other countries apparently do not have such provisions
in their laws,

principle.

although the need for them has recently been recognized,

Once such

provisions are in place,
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may be

at least in

necessary to revise the
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MLATs

to ensure that the

treaty will

law enforcement

Terrorists

officials

of the other party to the

be able to take advantage of them.

Transborder searches and seizures are an especially
electronic evidence

is

problem when

difficult

involved. Although paper documents are normally lo-

cated in the same country

the person being investigated, this

as

the case with electronic evidence.

is

not necessarily

To the contrary, electronic data may be stored
keep them beyond the reach of law

in another country or countries to

enforcement.

Transborder searches consist of a law enforcement officer in
country accessing

a

computer

his or

her

own

in another country to obtain electronic evi-

134

Such searches may take place unknowingly. For example, if an investigator searches the computer of a domestic corporation, the data accessed
through that search may be located in another country unbeknownst to the investigator. Unconsented to transborder searches of electronic evidence may be
dence.

viewed by the country where the search occurs as a violation of its sovereignty
or even of its criminal law, subjecting the individual investigator to possible
criminal liability. From a law enforcement perspective, it is necessary for countries to agree on principles permitting transborder searches under clearly defined but broad circumstances. 135 Others

may be of the view

that the

need

to

protect data in a particular country outweighs law enforcement concerns. Al-

though

this issue

outcome

far

is

is

currently being debated in several international forums,

from

If an investigator succeeds in accessing electronic evidence,

be located, the evidence may be unintelligible because
scrambled to protect

ognized

as

its

certain. 136

its

confidentiality.

The need

it

is

it

may

encrypted,

i.e.,

wherever

is

widely rec-

traffic,

stored data,

for encryption

necessary to protect the confidentiality of e-mail

and commercial transactions. However, when criminals use encryption for

communications or data
tions

storage, they

by preventing timely

Hence, law enforcement

concerned

officials are

groups, and defense counsel,

137

the

investiga-

of seized or intercepted
that they

data.

be able to obtain the

In contrast, privacy advocates, cyber-rights

among

others,

oppose granting law enforcement

to Phillip Reitinger, the principal legal obstacle to

law enforcement access to "plaintext"
is

hamper criminal

this area.

Moreover, according
and keys

severely

access to the content

"keys" to decrypt encrypted data.

broad authority in

may

Fifth

Amendment

(i.e.,

unencrypted or decrypted

privilege

text)

against self-incrimination. 138

Reitinger concludes that a grand jury subpoena can order the production ot
the plaintext of encrypted documents and the production of documents that
reveal keys.

He

further concludes, however, that
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can compel production of keys that are only known, rather than recorded,

an open

At

is

question. 139

this writing,

Congress has passed, and the President has signed, the

"Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept

and Obstruct Terrorism

(USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.

This highly controversial legislation, which
overzealously and
eral

harm innocent people,

141

critics

140

have argued could be used

provides, for the

first

time, for fed-

monitoring of computer communications, allowing investigators to track

the sending and receiving of e-mail and Internet connections.

They

will not,

however, be able to read the content of such computer communications without

first

investigators to

by terrorism
tions

suspects

and

to share information

with intelligence agencies for the

There

also

is

cure laws that
this

The legislation will also, among other things, allow
conduct unannounced searches of property owned or occupied

obtaining a warrant.

debate

is

first

from

federal criminal investiga-

time.

controversy over the efforts of law enforcement

would permit them
resolved, there

is

to sidestep encryption. 142 Regardless

need

a

officials to se-

to reach

agreement

at

of how

the international

on decryption support services. As Michael Sussmann has pointed out,
only the more modern of US MLATs contain provisions that are flexible
enough to accommodate such newer forms of assistance as decryption services. 143 Even these MLATs do not specifically address the subject of decryption, and there currently are no international commitments to provide decryption support. Although there are discussions and negotiations underway in

level

various international forums designed to resolve the problems of access to

computers by law enforcement persons and encryption along with related
sues, the final

outcome of these

efforts

is

uncertain

at this writing.

is-

144

Some Concluding Observations

From

the foregoing discussion, one

may

safely

conclude that the prospect of

computer network attacks by terrorists has only recently begun to receive the attention
from statesmen, law enforcement officials, and scholars that it de-

—

serves.

—

Moreover, although international terrorism has long been

intense scrutiny, the prospect of

computer network

attacks

by

a subject

of

terrorists intro-

duces legal and operational complications for those engaged in efforts to prevent,
contain, and punish terrorist attacks.

Law and

the legal process has traditionally lagged technological develop-

ments and the computer revolution

no exception. In particular, the speed
with which computers operate and the anonymity of their operators create
is
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challenges for the "snail pace" of traditional law enforcement methods. Also,

we

have seen,

at

the domestic level in the United States there

is

as

currently a sig-

between the perceived needs of law enforcement and protection of the privacy rights of US citizens. At the international level this tension
is likely to be as intense, perhaps even more, than it is in the United States,
nificant tension

since the Europeans, for example, strongly emphasize the protection of privacy

law and

in their

practice. 140

Although there

are strenuous efforts in various international fora to resolve

on computer crime
of these endeavors is by

these problems, including the adoption of a draft convention

under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the success

no means

assured. Nonetheless,

eration

crucial to successful efforts to

is

truism applies a

fortiori

it

has long been a truism that international coop-

to efforts to

combat international terrorism. 146 This
combat computer network attacks by

terrorists.

Moreover, international cooperation

in

combating terrorism has often taken

the form of informal arrangements and liaisons
cials in several

between law enforcement

offi-

countries, rather than the use of formal arrangements spelled out

view of the speed with which law enforcecope with a computer network attack, informal-

in treaties or national legislation. In

ment personnel need
ity

is

likely to

to act to

be required to give law enforcement the

flexibility

it

needs to

operate successfully. At the same time, the need for appropriate restraints

enforcement of the kind provided by

computer crime. The

some time

to

legal regulation

is

struggle to find the right balance

on law

also great in the field
is

likely to

of

continue for

come.
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Meeting the Challenge of Cyberterrorism:
Defining the Military Role in a Democracy

Charles

J,

Dunlap,

Jr.*

eadline grabbing events like the denial of service attacks 1

on "dot com"

2

companies in early 2000 and the excitement over 1999's

Y2K fears 3

have served to turn public and governmental attention to the vulnerability of

computers

in

an

network-dependent,

increasingly

—and

information-oriented

—

US

armed forces have
for some time been grappling with the implications of the metamorphosis
spawned by the enormous advances in computer technologies of the last
twenty years. A general consensus exists that emerging digital capabilities are
stimulating what is popularly known as a "Revolution in Military Affairs," or
RMA. 4 There are many aspects to the RMA, 5 but few would dispute that one
society.

progeny

For their

is

the

part, militaries

rise

especially the

of information operations (IO) 6

as

a

specific military

discipline.

In fact, the threat of cyberattack as a

US armed

forces. In

its

form of IO

is

a

major concern of the

doctrine, the military gives the defense of information

systems open and prominent attention. 7 In military circles,

an asymmetric strategy because

narrow capability
opponent like the United

with

a

as follows:

it

is

viewed

as

presents an opportunity for an adversary

to successfully strike a seemingly
States.

IO

One commentator

explains

more powerful
this phenomena
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No

other country or group can approach the

why many

superiority. This

is

alternative

traditional

terrorists

to

—both

themselves and

of

foreign and domestic

little

Cyber-terrorism

terrorism.

—

conventional-weapon

information terrorism an attractive

terrorists find

forms

US

damage with no harm

to inflict

chance of being caught.

It is

a

allows

way

for the

"weak"

to

to attack

the "strong," particularly to disrupt a stronger force at a key time during an

operation. 8

The

form of IO

threat of cyberterrorism as a

is

especially

troublesome to the

US armed forces because it can strike at vital systems not under military control.
The Department of Defense (DoD)
"dependent upon non-DoD assets

has officially

—

tures, [and]

acknowledged

United

other facilities and services of the private sector," 9 and these could be

can be the great equalizer for

States

"cyberterrorism"

Still,

Pentagon's lexicon.
describes

it

it is

the international and national infrastruc-

of cyberattacks. The Air Force admits that

targets

that today

as

11

as a

heel of the

this "Achilles'

a militarily inferior adversary." 10

term of art does not, per

"Terrorism," however,

is

se,

find a

home

explicitly defined.

in the

The

DoD

"the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful vio-

lence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies

the

in

ideological."

pursuit
12

of goals

are

that

generally

religious,

political,

Cyberterrorism might therefore be understood

as

or

using digital

technologies to achieve the aims of traditional terrorism.

The purpose of this
threat

essay

is

to briefly outline the military's response to the

of cyberterrorism, and to examine some of the emerging policy

tendant to that response. In addition,

I

will discuss a

few

issues at-

issues associated

with

using the tools of the cyberterrorist against America's enemies, and the complications that

doing so presents to democratic

spectives,

I

will

societies. In addressing

be more concerned with identifying

with presenting refined solutions. Having said
discussion

wherever possible

in the context

that,

I

both these per-

areas for further study than

will attempt to

anchor the

of American democracy and

how it

should shape the role of the military in addressing the dangers of cyberterrorism.

The Military Response
For

at least five years,

bility to

cyberattack

Yet according
critical

works

on the

digital

networks upon which the military

relies.

to policy in place since 1995, the responsibility for the security

non-DoD
that can

uniformed leaders have publicly discussed the vulnera13

of

"information systems and computer-based systems and net-

be distributive in nature" remains with
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"must be prepared,

appropriate authorities and within defense priorities, to
tion" if the attack
tions."

on the systems

in concert

assist

with the

in their protec-

"seriously degrades or threatens

DoD

opera-

15

(PDD) 63, issued in May of 1998, 16 provides
expand DoD's responsibility. In that document DoD was

Presidential Decision Directive
a

conceptual basis to

designated
bility for

as

the "lead agency" in the area of "national defense" with responsi-

"coordinating

all

of the

activities

of the United States Government in

PDD 63, however, left the scope of "national defense" undefined.
In addition, PDD 63 established the National Infrastructure Protection Center

that area." 17

(NIPC), an organization physically located within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 18

FBI, other

US

vate sector."

19

NIPC

brings

government

DoD

together with "representatives from the

agencies, state

and

local

governments, and the pri-

NIPC also serves as the US Government's "focal point for threat

assessment, warning, investigation,
critical infrastructures."

and response for threats or attacks against our

20

Paralleling these developments, the individual military services have taken
steps to

enhance defenses against cyberattacks. In 1993 the Air Force established

the Air Force Information Warfare Center with the explicit mission of protect-

ing friendly

command and

planned to confront

control systems. 21

The

(NSA), an element of the Department of Defense,
tion assurance

other services have likewise

a cyberadversary. 22 Further, the

mission." 23

National Security Agency

is

tasked with an "informa-

In executing that mission,

NSA "conducts defensive

information operations, to achieve information assurance for information infrastructures critical to

US

national security interests." 24

In order to further coordinate the military response, Joint Task Force

Com-

25

Network Defense (JTF-CND) was formed in early 1999 with a charter
orchestrate the protection of all DoD computer systems. 26 In a move to

puter
to

JTF-CND was placed under the control of US Space
Command (USSPACECOM) in October of 1999. 27 At the same time, the

bolster

its

effectiveness,

Joint Information Operations Center was placed under
In another effort to increase

its

resources against cyberattack, the Defense

puter Forensics Lab was established in September

among other things,

SPACECOM control. 28

1999. 29 It

the tracing across the Internet of hackers

aims to

Com-

facilitate,

who threaten DoD

systems. 30

Task Force-Civil Support (JTF-CS), an organization assigned
US Joint Forces Command, was established not to defend DoD systems per se,
Finally, Joint

to

but to
act

managing the consequences of any catastrophic
including cyberterrorism. In announcing the new task force,

assist civilian

of terrorism,

authorities in
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DoD conceded that the benign title of "civil support" and the selection of a National

Guardsman

instead of a Regular officer as the

tended to quell the concerns of civil libertarians
out to take over and would trample people's
zation.

commander were both

who

feared that the

civil liberties"

in-

"DoD was

with the new organi-

31

Although the armed forces were quietly developing an offensive IO capability for some time, it has only recently been discussed openly. Offensive IO
embodies

activities

such

as

"operations security, military deception, psycho-

and

logical operations, electronic warfare, physical destruction

special infor-

mation operations, and could include computer network attack." 32 These
types of operations present a plethora of

problems

ALLIED
tions

DoD

well.

as

FORCE

complex

legal issues,

and

practical

has admitted to Congress that during Operation

Kosovo "the conduct of integrated information operawas hampered by the lack of advance planning and necessary strategic
in

guidance." 33 In order to better focus the offensive information operations ef-

USSPACECOM,

an-

nounced in January 2000 that effective October 1 2000 the command
"pick up the computer network attack mission." 34

will

fort,

General Richard Meyers, the commander of
,

The Emerging Policy Issues

US military aims to protect itself against cyberterrorism, facilitate
defense of US interests against that threat, and employ cyber-

Clearly, the
a

broader

technology

as a

means and method of warfare,

albeit for a

What kind

righteous purpose than the cyberterrorist.

presumably more

of policy

issues

should

we

expect to see?

Background
Before considering the specific issues associated with the role of the military
in

defending against cyberattacks,

there

is

a generally

it is

important to understand that in the

accepted division of labor on security

law enforcement agencies handle internal
the military

is,

as

the

security, while the

Supreme Court put

it

in Toth

ready to fight wars should the occasion arise"
endeavor. 35

The

policing duties

is

tradition

excesses of Cromwell's

—

v.

As a rule,

civilian

primary purpose of

Quarks, "to fight or be

ordinarily an externally focused

of ordinarily excluding the military from performing

traceable to the

professional militaries. 36

issues.

US

Founding

Father's deep-seated suspicion of

That suspicion resulted from

their cognizance

of the

New Model Army in England, as well as their loathing of
356

Charles

J.

Dunlap

British regulars used to suppress the colonists'

growing

protests against imperial

For these and other reasons, the scheme for national security found in the

rule.

Constitution principally contemplates not the large standing forces
day, but a rather small

number of regulars augmented by huge

short, in practical terms
a

standing

it is

we have to-

state militias. 37 In

doubtful that the Founding Fathers ever envisioned

army large enough

to function as

any kind of police force on

a regular

basis.

While the

US

civil disorders that

times
sion

is

it

has

been used

military has

overwhelm civilian resources,

been used

for an

it

to time to quell

a

law enforcement- type mis-

War Reconstruction

in 1878. 38

Era that led to the

—which

The Act

criminalizes the

use of the military to enforce the law absent specific authority
principle limitation

on

the

few

was the intemperate behavior of Federal oc-

cupation troops during the post-Civil
passage of the Posse Comitatus Act

from time

the record of the relatively

extended period for

than sanguine. Indeed,

less

successfully

employment of the armed forces

—remains

the

for internal security

purposes.

Of course,
ability to

the Posse Comitatus Act

is

not intended to frustrate the military's

engage in bona fide national security-related

activities.

Exactly what

constitutes a national security activity appropriate for military attention,

how-

became blurred during the Cold War, and especially during the domestic
unrest of the Vietnam era. The result was an unwholesome involvement of the
ever,

military establishment in the personal affairs of thousands of law-abiding
zens. Professor

Loch Johnson

reports, for example, that

fed every single cable sent overseas

Army

intelligence units

US citi-

"NSA computers were

by Americans from 1947

1975 [and]

until

conducted investigations against 100,000 Americans

during the Vietnam War." 39

The

excesses of military and civilian intelligence agencies during this period

led to Senate investigations in the 1970s (the

Church Committee) 40 and sub-

on the ability of military organizations to scrutinize US citizens. 41 Nevertheless, by the early 1980s the nation's drug crisis led Congress to
enact a number of measures to involve the military in efforts to halt the tide of

stantial restrictions

narcotics flowing into the country

lyzed by

42
illicit drugs.

from such

activities as

to help

While the armed

stem the crime explosion cata-

forces are

still

generally prohibited

conducting searches and seizures and effecting

military counterdrug effort

lance activities

and

—amounts

—

especially in technical support

to billions

formed personnel.
As a result of such initiatives, the

arrests,

and border

the

surveil-

of dollars and involves thousands of uni-

traditional reluctance to

in a domestic security role appears to

be eroding.
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incidents occur that demonstrate that the

skills

of the soldier are not necessarily

coterminous with those of the policeman. For example, the

of a Texas high school sophomore by

may well

illustrate that

tragic

1997 shooting

Marine Corps border surveillance patrol
the orientation of the armed forces leads its members to
a

do law enforcement personnel. 44

deal with perceived threats differently than

This difference produces a very distinct approach to security problems.

As

a general rule, soldiers

move on

threats

by

and maneuver with

fire

towards permanently eliminating them; police forces attach

view
the presumption of
a

innocence towards suspected lawbreakers and seek to resolve incidents peacefully

with the ultimate disposition

therefore

—given

left to

the courts.

the military's perspective

—

that a

argued that the Pentagon's "policy of prohibiting
ter cyberattack if

It

should be no surprise,

Pentagon-sponsored report

DoD from mounting a coun45
at risk."

computers are attacked puts the military

its

In re-

sponding to the report's proposal to allow the military to immediately launch
counterattack,

"Does

this

John Pike of the Federation of American

mean

that the

Pentagon

will start frying the

a

Scientists quipped,

home PCs

of American

teen-age hackers?"

According

trusted institution in

jeopardize that trust

and related

more than an

activities that

eryday Americans.

It

poll, 46 the

armed forces enjoy a status as the most
American society. In my opinion, few activities could

1999 Harris

to a

increased involvement in law enforcement

cause military personnel to intrude into the lives of ev-

would not seem

to

make

sense, therefore, to involve mili-

tary personnel in controversial proposals such as the Federal Intrusion Detection

Network (FIDNET). 47
to maintain a
all- volunteer

relations

In an era

when the US remains obliged by world events

sizeable military establishment,

still

and one

that

is

now

an

professional force, the maintenance of harmonious civil-military

ought to be

a

prime concern of democratic

leaders. This

given the troubling reports of a growing estrangement of the

from the nation

it

serves,

is

especially so

US armed forces

notwithstanding the public's evident affection for

those in uniform. 48

Defending Against Cyberthreats

the military's role in fighting

worth considering as we develop policies on
cyberterrorism. Most experts agree that the nature

of cyberterrorism

it is

These lessons of the

later, if

—

ever

is

past are

such that

to distinguish

the high-tech felon

on

a

extremely

—

difficult

at least initially

between the teenage hacker on

a digital

and often
joy

ride,

crime spree, the non-State cyberfanatics seeking to

intimidate, and the nation-State

waging information warfare. Moreover,
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employ techniques

the clever cyberterrorist can often

that innocent parties are the instigators of

that

make

it

appear

whatever chaos they manage to

wreak. Thus, a military organization involved in investigating an attempted act

of cyberterrorism could well find

Even when

the guilty party

is

itself

mistakenly probing innocent persons.

correctly identified,

it

may

often be one

more

properly falling within the jurisdiction of a law enforcement agency, not a military force.

Consequently, the current policy that assumes

an act of cyberterrorism
ties as

opposed to

appropriate.

is

a hostile attack calling for a

—have

Hamre

at

a criminal matter subject to

Moreover, military leaders

of Defense John

—

—

the outset

anyway

—

that

law enforcement modali-

response by the armed forces seems

to include

former Deputy Secretary

repeatedly emphasized that

an active role in law enforcement in response to the
tive to the military, police resources are limited

DoD

is

not seeking

terrorist threat. 49 Still, rela-

and diffused over thousands of

may be satisfactory in the context of ordinary crime fighting requirements, it may be unacceptable if cyberterrorism pres-

jurisdictions.

While

this state

of affairs

ents a threat of truly catastrophic dimensions as

some have claimed.

The magnitude of the cyberthreat has much to do with the appropriateness of
a military response.

A recent study 50

of the Posse Comitatus Act in relation to

the protection of military and civil infrastructure against digital attack concluded
that the military

may conduct what might

law enforcement

activities

otherwise be considered prohibited

under certain circumstances.

against civilians consistent with the act can occur

gency"
pose."

exists

51

or

when

the activity

is

an "emer-

primarily in pursuit of a "military pur-

to national security, the military purpose exception [to

the Posse Comitatus Act]

This brings us almost

may be invoked." 52

full circle to

the central issue:

the level of a true national security threat?

without question the assertion that the
that

inter alia,

Accordingly, "if the primary purpose of an action is to resolve or avert a

problem with a strong tie

rise to

when,

Specifically, action

US

when does cyberterrorism

We

seem

to accept almost

"extraordinarily vulnerable" and

is

"an enemy could systematically disrupt banking, transportation,

government functions and defense." To listen to many pundits, the
virtually at the mercy of any teenager with a Radio Shack computer. The

finance,

US is

reality,

I

terrorism

work

utilities,

53

contend,

—

is

particularly

much different. Specifically,
when conceived exclusively in

attack intended to cripple the nation's

I

believe

that

cyber-

terms of computer net-

economy

or military forces

—

is

much more difficult to accomplish.
To put it bluntly, if cyberterrorism were so easy and cheap to do, why have
we not seen a catastrophic event? If not in the US, anywhere? This is much the
359

Meeting the Challenge of Cyberterrorism

same point that Rand analyst and cyberwar expert Martin Libicki wrote about in
Foreign Policy. 54 In this regard, I think it would be a mistake to make too much of

on commercial

the past denial-of-service attacks

were impeded

sites

the incidents as

may have

caused little revenue

typically lose
result

more than

of the

money on

every

criminal

In the

first

place,

most

many

experts to characterize

mischief." 55

Ironically, the attacks

for only a short time, leading

"little

sites.

Newsweek wryly noted that since "dot-coms
they make, they might come out ahead" as a

loss.

sale

attacks. 56

As Libicki observes, there

is

a great difference

between public commercial

websites, and the sensitive military and civilian infrastructure operating systems

whose

incapacitation

United

States.

on

a

grand scale might stagger even

However vulnerable the former,

for example,

Bruce

F.

if access

somehow

Wollenberg,

University of Minnesota,

Dan Kuehl,

is

insists that

achieved. This

a professor

the

much more secure
independent mode requiring

the latter are

and, in any event, often operate in a closed loop,

unique expertise even

country like the

a

is

a

key reason why,

of electrical engineering

at

the

US power grid "isn't hacker friendly." 57

a respected professor at the

National Defense University, argues

that the reason a full-fledged cyberattack has not

been launched

is

"solely be-

cause no state or non-nation state actor has yet seen sufficient strategic advantage
to

be gained by doing so

agree because

and

much

Saddam

—and

this

condition will not

believe the requisite expertise

I

of that expertise

is

on the

side

is

much

indefinitely." 58

rarer than

of the good guys.

Osama

Husseins, Slobodan Milosevics, and

hell-bent to inflict

last

many

I

dis-

assume,

We live in a world of

bin Ladens,

who

are

harm upon us in any way they can. These are people to whom

the logic of "strategic advantage"

they can manage to accomplish.

is

expressed in the most savage acts of terror

They

are smart, ruthless,

moneyed, and moti-

vated, yet have not achieved a crushing cyberassault.

We tend to

discount too readily our

much was made

of the supposed "hacker"

puter-literate Serbs
tried hard.

at us daily,

result

was

failure:

to Lieutenant

agendas

with keystrokes

J.

on taking down NATO
no NATO combat deaths, and a near-zero
Similarly, despite

all
is

the allegations
that the

to believe that there are thousands

at scores

of the allegedly com-

Donahue, "hackers
networks." 59 Yet, the end

General William

ing attacks in the private sector, the reality

Are we

capabilities

hell-bent

mate military outcome.
roar.

defensive capabilities. Recall that

and others during the Kosovo campaign. Evidently, they

According

came

own

US economy continues to

of malicious people with diverse

of locations around the globe

who

on the ultiof rampant, damag-

are collectively refraining

fully capable

from doing

serendipitously uniform appraisal of "strategic advantage"?
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effect

of devastating us

so because of some

My

assessment of
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human

me

nature leads

—but they

could

J.

Dunlap

conclude otherwise. In short, they "would

to

can't."

Let me emphasize that

certainly

I

do not counsel indifference; I recognize that

cyberattacks will succeed occasionally. Collectively, they are costly
lion in

1999 by one

estimate. 60

some $2

posal to spend

Thus,

billion

I

—$7.6

bil-

think the Clinton Administration's pro-

on various computer

prudent and affordable insurance policy for the nation.
sizeable as the estimated cyber losses are, they must be
a

they

if

61

I

security

programs

is

a

merely point out that

as

understood in the context of

country that each year suffers more than $1 50 billion in costs from motor vehicle

—not

crashes alone 62

jured. 63

to

mention over 40,000

deaths,

and in excess of 6 million in-

we should not unnecessarily divert resources from
on what may be an mistaken analysis of the threat.

simply caution that

I

other pressing needs based

Moreover, in calculating the dimensions of our potential cyberterrorism

problem

we

should not underestimate the power of our

capitalistic free

system to find solutions. In a very real way, America's military prowess

economic

the product of its
are expected to

grow to

success.

Given

is

market
largely

that business to business online sales

$1 .3 trillion by 2003, 64 there

is

a

immense

incentive for

the commercial development of reliable computer security technology for online transactions.
I

believe the tremendous market imperative for secure transactions

incentive

it

creates for effective

computer

security products 65

—

—and

the

will rapidly out-

the resources of individuals or even governments to create methodologies

strip

capable of circumventing improved defensive measures. In discussing the

long-term threat
tator

after the denial-of-service attacks in early

money at stake,

maintained that "[w]ith

Overall,

I

dence that

it

is

at

more than

it is

the real danger

it as

a

the present time to involve the military in
presently tasked.

not so

is

vehicle for destructive

employ

e-businesses will fix this glitch." 66

view that our "enemies best time to conduct
come and gone." 67 All of this is yet more evi-

unnecessary

cyberdefense any

as a

commen-

find persuasive Libicki's

information warfare has clearly

To me,

2000, one

much

that cyberterrorists will use the

computer network

attacks,

I

am

Web

public

There

is

of nefarious

sources to intimidate and harass indi-

viduals or even groups of individuals in the military

reason that the

a variety

convinced that cyberterrorists could gather

enough personal information from

68
sites.

but rather that they will

convenient source of information useful for

purposes. For example,

Web

and elsewhere. This

is

one

DoD has begun to limit the amount of information available on

At

least in the

sufficient

whatever purpose

near term, however, the damage has been done.

information already on the Internet for those disposed for
to

engage

in

such crimes
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In fact,

I

believe
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problem

this

getting so difficult to rectify that in the not too distant future,

is

courts will be adjudicating "identity replacement"

ruptcy

cases. Still, these cyberthreats are, in

—and growing

sibility

much

my view,

as

they

now do

bank-

in

properly within the respon-

—of law enforcement

capability

agencies to resolve. 70

Avoiding the Cyberterrorist Label
As important

defend against cyberattacks,

as it is to

own

ensure that our

a

very

real sense, the flip side

the use of cybertechniques for legitimate offensive IO.

must be

tested against existing domestic

cable ante hello as well as in

General Counsel issued
information operations.
cyberterrorism

per

we

ourselves are

of cyberterrorism is

From the military perspec-

the means and methods of the cyberterrorist are not necessarily malum

rather, they

it is

equally important to

security activities avoid accusations that

engaging in cyberterrorism. In

tive,

it is

employed
se,

Still,

is

hello.

Along

its first

71

this line, in

and international law appli1999 the Office of the

DoD

unclassified assessment of the legal aspects of

In other words, to the military

way of

thinking,

objectionable because of its purposes and the manner in

(e.g., against

in se;

noncombatants and noncombatant

which

objects), not,

because of the techniques themselves.
there are

many legal and policy questions yet to be resolved. For example,

what constitutes, in the layman's vernacular, the proverbial "act of war"? That
is, what measure of peacetime cybermanipulation is tolerable before it amounts to
a "use of force" or "armed attack" that plunges a nation into conflict? 72 While the
definitive answer yet eludes us, there is a growing consensus that once the cyberassault creates consequences indistinguishable from that of a traditional kinetic
attack, the legal status of the cyberevent becomes likewise the same. 73 Conversely, it appears cyberevents that do not reach that threshold would not therefore constitute aggression within the meaning of the UN Charter (although they

may be

violative of other aspects of international or domestic law). 74

Reference to the

UN Charter raises the larger issue of the wisdom of various

suggestions for an international agreement addressing cyberterrorism.
these, like the Stanford proposal,

75

explicitly exclude "activities

military forces of a State party, or State party activities during

Some of

undertaken by

armed

conflict." 76

Others, like the reported Russian proposal, contemplate banning certain infor-

mation weapons altogether. 77

Many would agree that there is a need for greater

international cooperation to confront the unique issues presented

terrorism

78

and

that cooperation

agreement. That
that

may

said,

may need

to take the

by cyber-

form of an international

we ought to be cautious about entering into legal regimes

unnecessarily

hamper what

is,

after
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as

the
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world's foremost digital power,
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may itself have an asymmetric

advantage across

the spectrum of conflict.

To

news

the extent

reports are reliable, the

Kosovo

conflict raised a

of interesting issues about the use of cybertechniques during armed
example, early in the campaign
denial-of-service e-mail

was reported

it

"bomb"

under international law? Likely.

79 Is this

site.

conflict.

For

hacker sent

a

Government website

that flooded the Serb

with 500,000 e-mails, crashing the

US

that a civilian

number

person an unlawful combatant

A cyberterrorist?

Perhaps.

was widely reported in the press that senior policymakers did
not approve a planned cyberassault of Milosevic's personal bank accounts. 80 I do
Additionally,

not

it

know if such a plan ever existed,

If it did exist,

let

alone the reasons

however, one can imagine that

of striking the private property of a

civilian, 82

a

key

issue

was not executed. 81

it

would be

the propriety

notwithstanding his position

the

as

head of State of a belligerent. Given the growing aversion in the international

community

to the use of destructive, kinetic

vilian deaths,

it

weapons

war that may cause

ci-

may be useful to re-examine the prohibition against targeting of

civilian objects via

cybertechniques

if

bloodshed can be avoided through

kind of coercion. John Markoff, writing in the
"cyberwarfare

in

raises a

New

York Times, argues that

fundamental philosophical question

lenge that such warfare

may pose

this

for democratic societies

.

is

.

.

the biggest chal-

that

it

further blurs

between military and nonmilitary targets." 83
There are other complex issues occasioned by emerging cyber capabilities for
the armed forces of a democracy. In the US military, IO embraces a wide range
of technology-empowered activities. Psychological operations, for example, are
important to the military commander imbued in the Clausewitzean tradition to
believe that the ability of an adversary to wage war depends upon the support of
the "remarkable trinity" of the people, the government, and the armed forces. 84
Disassembling the enemy's trinity, that is, undermining his will while preserving
one's own, is an accepted military objective. 85
Some emerging cybertechniques present exciting opportunities for the military professional to sap an enemy's resolve with relatively little violence. 86 As
Hollywood has repeatedly demonstrated, the ability to use digital means to
the distinction

morph

—but

or otherwise create extremely convincing

widely available.

87

Considering such

capabilities,

false

—images

is

now

Thomas Czerwinski, then

a

professor at the National Defense University, posed an interesting question:

"What would happen
jected

it

if you

took Saddam Hussein's image, altered

back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about

Quite obviously,

it

could deceive

a

population about

Czerwinski indicates.
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it,

and pro-

his

own Baath Party?" 88

its

leaders, as Professor
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Few would

such

call

A

"cyberterrorism."

ment
ing

a

is

efforts against a totalitarian or

different issue arises,

when

believe,

I

wholly depraved regime

genuinely democratic one. Consider that

—which

US

the

military

if

the hostile govern-

Internet-based vot-

today 89

experimenting with

is

widespread, the potential exists to manipulate elections in

enemy countries dur-

ing armed conflict via cybersubversion of the voting process

promotes democracy?

90

I

do not think

herent to the democratic peace theory.

Somalia and elsewhere,
zations" thesis far

more

I

find Professor

convincing. 92

I

91

flict

with the

US

—even though

or other Western

democracy ought not

to

so,

even though

Based on

Samuel

P.

I

my own

am not an adexperience in

Huntington's "clash of civili-

accept that there are entire societies that

own

hold values fundamentally different from our
to retain those values

itself.

appropriate in light of US national security pol-

Would such an operation be
icy that

—becomes

—and they would

may lead to con-

the policies they produce

nations. 93

Nevertheless,

be asked to "pay for

itself," so to

freely vote

I

also believe that

speak,

by

necessarily

producing peace.

Democracy as an

UN Charter

94

expression of the principle of self-determination found in the

and elsewhere has an

peace-generating quality. Accordingly,
against an adversary's democratic processes,

It

right to apply cybertechniques

it

is

value independent of any

even in time of war? Certainly it is appro-

of any government, democratic or other-

priate to act to control the hostile acts

wise.

human

intrinsic

seems to me, however, that care must be taken to distinguish between

the use of cyberweapons to address the actions of a democratic government, and

employing them

to

undermine the democratic

processes that

produced

it.

Michael Walzer, perhaps the premier ethicist on issues of war and peace, gives
us another matter to consider.
like

He

points out that, excluding exceptional cases

Nazi Germany, war aims "don't legitimately reach to the transformation of

the internal politics of the aggressor state or the replacement of its regime." 95 In

we must be very cautious in employing advanced digital methodmay destroy the confidence of people in democratic processes.

other words,
ologies that

Consider

also the other vital part

the will of the publics offriendly
ocratic countries,
that Serb radio

Human

and it was

countries. 96

and television

stations

Watch 97 and

warranted 99

since

appears that the

for years. 100

As Air

on April

1999, "Serb radio and

8,

pression. ...

It is

it

This

raised during the

Rights

by

of the Clausewitzean
is

especially a

Kosovo

were bombed

my

others. 98 In
facilities

is

concern tor dem-

operation.

You may recall

in attacks highly criticized

opinion, the attacks were

a

NATO spokesman, explained

an instrument of propaganda and re-

... a legitimate target in this
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were used to whip up ethnic hatred

Commodore David Wilby,

TV

trinity:

campaign."
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incitement to genocide

J.

Dunlap

may itself be a war crime, 102 Wilby's

have merit, assuming the other prerequisites

seem to
of the law of armed conflict were
assertions

met.
If cybertechniques

can neutralize the

we

tion conventional munitions cause,

ment

that could reduce the misery

facilities

without the physical destruc-

should embrace netwar

as a

develop-

of war. Suppose, however, that the enemy

were transmitting not propaganda, per se, but accurate information about US operations that nevertheless was eroding support
among our public or that of allied democracies? 103 For example, in a report on
the attacks on Serb television stations, Patrick L. Sloyan observed that while
radio and television stations

bombing stopped

the "diet of

transmission to the

lies

West of those

could erode public support for
addressing the latter concern

fed Serb viewers,"

it

"curb

also served to

disturbing 'collateral damage' pictures that

NATO's

were the

escalating strikes in the Balkans." 104 If

sole

aim

—

as

opposed

to, for

example, the

limited notion of preserving operational security in a particular circumstance

—would

the attacks be justified? Probably not.

Censorship and exclusion of the press from military operations has long been
erated in liberal democracies during wartime.
onstration that the information
security,

could be suppressed.

it

105

would present a
106

Essentially,

clear

where

country, or that of our

a

dem-

and present danger to national

—

own

is

That concept, however, would not seem to per-

mit the suppression of news reports
cause the information conveyed

there

tol-

via cyberassault or other

would tend

allies.

—

means

simply be-

to demoralize public opinion in

Democracy,

I

believe, has

its

our

price.

Concluding Observations

If this brief

raised

survey has succeeded, the reader will appreciate that the issues

by cyberterrorism

are

many and complex. At

the present time, law and

policy carefully circumscribe the military's role, and to date
ful to stay
sibility.

within those

sue.

There

are,

however,

is

Doing

a civilian

so,

it is

law enforcement problem, not

expanded respon-

To this

end, one innovative proposal

"intruder

is

not a

US

this reversal

calls for a

US

is-

and intelligence

that currently are

persons. 109

policy that presumes the digi-

person," thus permitting "the

States' investigative

However,

a national security

and intelligence communities

barred from use in most domestic cases involving

United

for

contended, would allow that application of the consider-

able resources of the military

tal

calls

DoD has been care-

Some suggest a relaxation of the policy that presumes at least initially that

a cyberattack
108

limits.

107

assets" to

full capabilities

of the

be brought to bear. 110

of the present presumption would apply only to attacks
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deemed by statute to be critical to the nation's
economic and national security interests. 111 Whether such an approach is politically feasible depends upon public perceptions. As already indicated, what role,
if any, the military should play in defending against domestic cyberattacks is embedded in the larger issue regarding the extent to which Americans believe their
way of life is put at risk by the potential of cyberterrorism.
In this regard, I would add one final note of caution. I have often heard a variagainst specified systems that are

ety of senior

Pentagon 112 and national security

way

fective

to

hype the

There
also

is,

is

US into World War II is certainly an ef-

of persons both in and out of uniform towards

interest

our society becomes increasingly

however,

keep in mind. As

a

of the

fears generated, the

—rounded up thousands of

them in detention camps,

We know

tional security.

digitally

dependent.

very dark side of the Pearl Harbor story that

a result

domestic security role
placed

US

and preparedness. The analogy is one plainly worth pondering,

greater vigilance
especially as

the

Conjuring up emotional images of

susceptible to an "electronic Pearl Harbor."

the infamous sneak attack that pulled the

officials 113 insist that

all

in the

US military

loyal

today that the

sacrifice

nese-Americans was wholly unnecessary. Although

it

—

American

name of responding to

we

should

acting in a

citizens

a threat to

and
na-

of the rights of Japa-

may be

fashionable these

days to say that the roundups were simply racism run amok, those that have actually

read Korematsu

sion in his recent

v.

United Sfato, 1

book

1

15

reasonably conclude that

14

as

well

as

ChiefJustice Rehnquist's discus-

may conclude otherwise. From those sources one can
principled men struggling with a real fear of invasion

by an enemy who had already demonstrated his treachery at Pearl Harbor made
what they sincerely believed was a unavoidable decision however wrong-

—

headed

it

appears with the benefit of hindsight.

But, in a sense, the fact that

respectable

people were nevertheless responsible

for the treatment of Japanese- Americans that

we now

find so objectionable

As we consider the growing involvement of the military in countering cyberterrorism, we must never forget that the armed forces is
the least democratic and most unapologetically authoritarian element of our so-

should

itself give us

ciety.

hasten to add that this does not presume anything sinister about those in

I

pause.

uniform or those that advocate an enhanced role for the military
cyberterrorism.

I

merely submit that in

a

democracy, the machinations of the truly
quently

more

in fighting

democracy, and especially American
evil are,

somewhat

paradoxically, fre-

readily corrected than are the misdirected efforts of well-

intentioned, honorable citizens.

Harbor and the sacrifices that followed in its aftermath remain a lesson
us as we consider what role, if any, the military should play in countering

Pearl
for
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cyberterrorism.

mentally

at

On a deeper level we must accept that perfect security is funda-

odds with democratic values. This applies

any other threat against us.

as to

Dunlap

J.

der to have a free society.

as

much to cyberterrorism

We must be prepared to take prudent risks in or-

The

inescapable truth

is

that

we must

likewise ac-

knowledge that from time to time our freedom will exact a harsh price from us
and those we love.
Nevertheless, we must not allow the dread of digital terror to drive us to take
counsel of our fears. As Martin Van Creveld and others have pointed out, terrorism has not succeeded in developed States because it is a characteristic of modernity to have a robust level of technological redundancy and political resiliency so
as to make individual terrorist attacks relatively futile in terms of real effect on capability. 116 While cyberterrorists might be able to inflict costly losses periodically,

they cannot physically imperil our continued existence

Indeed, the

real risk is

fessor Victor

upon

those

who

as a free nation.

challenge the forces of freedom. As Pro-

Hanson explains in his book,

Soul of Battle, 1 17 history shows that the

forces of democracies once aroused are extraordinarily fearsome combatants

who,

notwithstanding the seeming empowering militarism of the opposing forces,

tend to not merely defeat the armies of despots, but to pulverize them and everything that supports them.

So profound is such defeat that the very societies that pro-

duced the forces of tyranny

are left fundamentally

unrecognizable to their former masters.

changed and

virtually

The enemies of democracies ought

to

take note.

In summary, the true threat

is

not what damage cyberterrorists can

inflict

upon our digital systems, but what freedoms they can force us to forfeit. The San
Francisco Chronicle, citing a report by the Commission on National Security /21st
Century, 118 editorialized that "terrorist hackers" and other threats "will proba-

on the military to move into domestic law enforcement, blurring the line between domestic and foreign threats." 119 It soberly warned "it is
better to live with danger than in the security of a police State." 120 Although we
are certainly not yet living in the shadow of a police State, it is a timely reminder
of what is really at stake.

bly put pressure

Notes
*

The views and

opinions expressed in

necessarily represent those
1. See, e.g.,

Brendan

February 21, 2000,
attack,
2.

at

of the
I.

this

chapter are those of the author alone and do not

US Government

or any of

its

components.

Koerner, The Web's Bad Week, U.S.

NEWS & WORLD REPORT,

19 ("The intruder used an elementary method

know

as a

denial of service

which cripples a network by flooding it with too much information.").
"Dot com" is a generic name for companies whose business is integrated with the
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"Y2K" is shorthand for "Year 2000" and refers to the anomaly in some software programs
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In addition, information warfare presents an interplay between domestic and
international law not previously seen. For example, the authority of the United
States to detect, track,

and respond

to an information operation

much by the law governing electronic
tional

—and which

be answered well in advance of an international
Finally,

it

from the

agency

—

are very difficult
also

crisis.

may be difficult to determine whether an information operation is a

hostile attack or a criminal act. This

how

as

by internathe questions of what legal au-

Although beyond the scope of this chapter, these questions must

questions.

about

driven

surveillance of US citizens as

law governing the use of force. Similarly,

thority authorizes an agency to act

is

the

US

US may

ambiguity

raises a

multitude of questions

should respond to such an event. Furthermore,

have unintended consequences,

not be able to predict the

collateral

damage

that

as

a

response

decision-makers

may result. An

may

information op-

one nation's infrastructure may have collateral damage, such as
destroying bank records, that is much more severe than was intended. Given the
interconnectivity of the Internet, a US information operation may blowback
eration against
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Such

a possibility raises several questions

concerning the

privacy and rights of US citizens.
In sum, information operations present
issues.

many complex legal and

operational

To first address them in the heat of an information operation is to risk an-

swering them inappropriately.

The Emergence of Information Operations as a Weapon

Democracy and as a Threat

to

Democracy

in

the Arsenal of

Itself

The benefits of increased efficiency and greater speed brought by the infusion
of computer technology particularly the Internet into the modern economy
come at the price of increased vulnerability to disruption and economic ruin as
the result of a computer attack. 7 The United States, as the world's most techno-

—

—

logically

advanced nation,

is

best situated to develop

mechanisms

that

import

8

information technology into weapons systems and to exploit other countries'

on information technology. Simultaneously, however, the United
States itself is vulnerable to economic paralysis resulting from the crippling of
key US information technology systems. Indeed, as the Federal Bureau of Inreliance

former information technology security director, Jim Settle, has
the United States could be brought to its knees within 90 days by

vestigations'
stated,

10 hackers. 9 Information warfare could eventually usurp the position of biological

and chemical weapons

like biological

"the poor man's nuclear

as

and chemical weapons, information warfare does not require
and chemical weapons,

sizeable financial investment but, unlike biological

potentially easier to use

puter and a

weapon" because,

—

all

that

needed

is

for information warfare

is

a

is

com-

modem.

As with any concept of sudden importance, the terms and

definitions

of infor-

mation warfare have yet to coalesce into an established lexicon. The most succinct
definition

warfare

is

of information warfare

which involves

The US

and

is

military uses the

"Information

a strategic asset

worthy of

term "information opera-

own

information and information systems." 11

"information systems" refers to "the entire infrastructure, organization,

personnel, and
nate,

by Winn Schwartau:

"actions taken to affect adversary information and informa-

tion systems, while defending one's

The term

offered

an electronic conflict in which information

conquest or destruction." 10
tions,"

is

act

components

that collect, process, store, transmit, display, dissemi-

on information." 12 "Information operations"

thus refers to attacks

against such infrastructure, organization, personnel, etc.

The military also uses the term "computer network attack,"

defined

ations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in
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computers
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like to
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and computer networks or the computers in computer networks themselves." 13

whole host of weapons, including Electro
Magnetic Pulse (EMP) and directed energy weapons (such as lasers and highInformation operations include

a

energy radio frequency guns).
Bureaucratic barriers

may have

operations during the Gulf

United

States did

War

obstructed the conduct of

Army

information

and the Bosnia operations. 14 However, the

conduct information operations in the 1999

paign against Serbia.

US

NATO air cam-

General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, confirmed that the

during the Kosovo campaign

US

when he

used information warfare against Serbia
stated that

"you can assume

that

we

in

employed some of our systems, yes." 15 Yet, the DoD's after-action report
on the air war noted that "the conduct of an integrated information operations
campaign was delayed by the lack of both advanced planning and strategic
guidance defining key objectives." 16 Indeed, the DoD apparently was con-

fact

cerned about the
well

as

legalities

of full-scale information operations against Serbia,

the untested nature of the information warfare arsenal;

as a result,

as

the

information operations were apparently constrained. Also, the relative decentralization

of Serbian computer systems limited the potential for success of in-

formation operations.
Serbian

air

US military forces apparently did confuse and disable the

defense system using information operations, but these attacks orig-

jamming

inated with electronic

from ground-based sources. 17
The United States, of course,
tions.

aircraft rather

is

a

prime

than over computer networks

target

of foreign information opera-

Lieutenant General William Donahue, the Air Force's Director of Com-

munications and Information, reportedly stated

that,

during the Kosovo

campaign, hackers from Chinese Internet addresses targeted
after

NATO's

accidental

bombing of the Chinese Embassy

NATO

air

networks

in Belgrade. 18

Other countries also recognize the growing and critical importance of information operations. For example, the Chinese military reportedly recognizes and
hopes to exploit the potential offered by information operations.
ber
ter

2,

1999, Major General

director of the simulation cen-

news conference
launch information warfare against Taiwan by

under the Chinese Ministry of National Defense,

that

China would be

2005. 19
is

Chang Chia-Sheng,

able to

On Novem-

stated at a

An article entitled "Bringing Internet Warfare

Into the Military System

of Equal Significance with Land, Sea, and Air Power," in

Liberation

Army

newspaper of the People's Liberation Army's General
Department, reportedly stated that it was likely that another Chinese

Daily, the official daily
Political

would be needed to conduct information
was quoted as saying, "Modern High-Tech Warfare

military branch, a so-called net force,

operations.

The

article
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cannot win without the net, nor can

it

won on

be

the net. In the future, there

." 20
must be coordinated land, sea, air, space, electronic and net warfare.
Other news reports indicate that China and Taiwan are particularly involved in a
.

growing arms race regarding information warfare. 21
Information operations are thus growing in importance
tions. It

is

likely that the

ture warfare

United

.

for military opera-

States will utilize information operations in fu-

and peace-enforcement operations. Thus, military and

civilian

decision-makers must understand the opportunities and restraints offered by international obligations

A

the conduct of such operations.

Brief Survey of the Process of International

Before looking

how

on

that, first,

helpful to have an appreciation for

at specific treaties, it is

international obligations arise.

Law

Two

principles of international

law are

sovereign States are equal and independent actors in the interna-

tional system, and, second, States

agreeing to do

so. States

may

assume

legal obligations

only by actually

enter into international treaties and agreements

body of "customary" international law, composed of practices that are so widely followed by the majority of

binding the signatory

parties.

There

also exists a

nations that they are considered obligatory for

all.

For example, the

launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen
nations lacked the technological ability to interfere with

as

first satellites

benign, and

satellites; as a result, it

became customary international law that objects in orbit were beyond territorial
claims of any nation and that outer space was open to all nations. These concepts
were later embodied in international treaties concerning outer space, which will
be discussed later in this chapter. As a side note, the development of international
law concerning outer space contrasts with that concerning aviation, in which
nations produced a highly restrictive legal structure creating the concept of air

space and rendering illegal the entrance of aircraft into another nation's airspace. 22

Countries usually cannot unilaterally withdraw from a treaty unless the treaty
provides for such an action, and treaties can only be modified by the agreement

by the Senate and executive agreements entered into by the President are equally binding on the
United States. Also, many treaties are silent on whether they continue to be in
force in the event of conflict or hostilities between the signatory parties; this is
important for discerning whether the US is bound by a particular treaty's obligations in the event of an outbreak of hostilities and a US desire to conduct information operations. 23
of the

parties. It

should be noted that both
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like to

US Information Operations

in

Space

International law concerning activities in outer space
tion operations because outer space
tions.

is

intelligence." 24

As

missile warning, navigation,
a result,

US

informa-

a vital battleground for information opera-

Space-based systems "perform such functions

image recollection,

critical for

is

as

communications

relay,

weather forecasting, and signals

information operations will be aimed in part

Such attacks could manifest themselves in attacks
ground stations, jamming communications links, or attacking the satel-

against space-based systems.

against
lites

in space themselves. 25

Kosovo
a

US

air

campaign,

Furthermore,

satellites

first satellite

apparently occurred during the

can be used to relay transmissions that are part of

information operation against

Since the

as

a

ground-based

target.

was launched by the Soviet Union

have signed four major multilateral space

treaties: (1)

Treaty; 26

Agreement; 27

(2)

Convention;

the 1968
28

and

(4)

Rescue and Return

Outer Space
the 1972 Liability

the 1967
(3)

the 1975 Registration Convention.

ment of 1979 was not signed by

in 1957, States

29

The Moon Agree-

the United States and has in fact only been

signed by eleven, and ratified by nine, countries. 30 Emerging from these four

major space
outer space
to

is

free for exploration

any claim of sovereignty;

and use by

(2) activities in

gard for the interest of other States; and
space are liable for any
the rules

concerning the use of space:

treaties are several principles

damage they

on the use of force such

fully applicable in space.

as

The paper

cause.

States

all

(1)

and cannot be subject

space must be done with due reStates that

(3)

As the

the law of

launch objects into

DoD/GC

war and

also notes that,

the

Paper highlights,

UN

Charter are

while space law contains

the principle of non-interference with other States' space systems, this provision might be inapplicable during wartime if the treaties themselves

do not

re-

31

main in effect during hostilities.
Although these treaties strictly
they do not outlaw

all

mandates that parties

limit the use

military activities per

shall

se.

of space for military purposes,

Rather, the Outer Space Treaty

not "place in orbit around the Earth any objects carry-

ing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass

destruction, install

such

weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner" (emphasis added). 32 The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases and other types of military activities on the moon. 33
The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty provides that no party may "develop, test or deploy" space-based

ABM

systems or components. 34 As the

DoD/GC Paper summarizes, the web of international treaties concerning space
prohibits the stationing, testing, or exploding
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However,
despite the existence of certain limitations, the paper concludes that there is no
legal prohibition on developing and using non-nuclear weapons in space, whether
deployed in orbit or via flight from the earth's surface. 35 Seemingly, this conclusion appears to open space to information operations.
Still, the DoD/GC Paper does not explore one possible way in which the
Outer Space Treaty might ban information operations utilizing satellites. While
the Outer Space Treaty prohibits "objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other
kinds of weapons of mass destruction ... or stationing such weapons in outer
and the deployment of a space-based

any other manner," 36

space, in

it is

anti-ballistic missile capability.

unclear whether information operations

fall

computer

at-

into the category of weapons of mass destruction. For example, a

tack against any national

computer system of critical importance

(e.g.,

key bank-

ing systems, key medical systems, computer systems controlling dams,

and other

refineries,

critical infrastructure installations)

struction" in the sense of widespread loss of life

oil

could wreak "mass de-

and property. 37

To the extent that

weapon is judged to be a weapon of mass destruction not because it falls within a
certain category of what is already accepted as a weapon of mass destruction,
a

namely, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, but rather based on the

weapon's

effect,

information operations could

(if

used

skillfully)

exact a fearful

Of course, even if certain information operations
on both life and
could constitute weapons of mass destruction, it is unclear what constitutes "carrying" or "stationing] " such weapons on a satellite. If a satellite is used simply to
relay data from a computer in the aggressor country to a computer in the victim
country, it is unclear whether such a relay of information would be considered
"carrying" or "stationing" as defined by the Outer Space Treaty. However, one
could imagine a situation in which a particular program for information warfare is
property. 38

toll

stored in a

satellite's

computer, waiting for the proper signal or timing for deliv-

ery to a ground-based target. In this case, the Outer Space Treaty could be inter-

preted

as

prohibiting the use of satellites for information warfare.

If the erratic

development of US policy on

cation, policy regarding information operations in space

for

many

years.

weapons

is

any indi-

may remain

unsettled

anti-satellite

For example, in the early 1980s, the Air Force developed an

anti-satellite missile

designed to be fired from an F-15 fighter flying at

a

high

alti-

was tested in 1985, Congress prohibited the appropriation
anti-satellite weapons to be tested against an object in orbit, leading

tude. After the system

of funds for

to the termination
anti-satellite

weapons program argued

from warfare;
testing

of the program in 1987. Congressional

(2) tests in

that: (1)

space of anti-satellite

critics

of the

outer space should remain free

weapons created space

debris; (3)

of anti-satellite weapons might interfere with arms control negotiations;
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and

the United States did not necessarily

(4)

develop an

anti-satellite

want

weapon system given

its

to encourage other nations to

own

heavy reliance on

satel-

In contrast, supporters of anti-satellite programs argued that the United

lites.

States

should have the

vest in defending

By

its

ability to attack

own

opposing

the early 1990s, anti-satellite technology had

propriated funds for a

test

and should in-

States' satellites

satellites.

and toward lasers. Congress
the

Lightning"

first

moved away from

missiles

prohibited and then later allowed the use of ap-

of a laser against an orbiting satellite. In October 1997,

US Army tested its MIRACL laser against an aging satellite. While the Army

tried to construe the test as purely defensive in nature

of a

fects

lites),

a

laser

on

satellites in

(namely to observe the

order to generate information for protecting

satel-

public uproar followed. President Clinton subsequently used his

then-existing line-item veto authority to strike funds from the

1998

ef-

DoD

Authorization Act for projects related to an

control program. Subsequently, following the

fiscal

year (FY)

anti-satellite

and space

Supreme Court's

ruling that the

line-item veto was unconstitutional, Congress approved funds for anti-satellite

weapons in the FY 1999 DoD Authorization Act. 39 Accordingly,
the increased use of space-based systems
will

as

it is

likely that

instruments in information warfare

engender criticism from opponents of anti-satellite weapons systems,

should not further militarize space. However,

will argue that the

United

the assumption in

999 by US Space

1

States

who

Command of responsibility for information

operations signals that the military will likely integrate space-based systems into

information operations. 40

International Telecommunications

Law and Information Operations

web of bilateral and

International telecommunications law

is

a

The 1992 ITU Convention 42

is

the preeminent treaty in this area,

treaties.

41

multilateral

with over 130 signatories. This convention and others established the International

Telecommunications Union (ITU),

United Nations with the authority

a specialized

to formulate telegraph

agency of the

and telephone regula-

which become binding legal obligations after formal acceptance by ITU
members.
Article 45 of the ITU Convention states that all radio stations, "whatever
their purpose, must be established and operated in such a manner as not to cause
tions

harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Members
or of other duly authorized operating agencies, which carry on a radio service, and

which operate

in

accordance with the provisions of the Radio Regulations/' 43

Annex 2 of the Convention defines harmful
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endangers the functioning of a radionavigation service or of other safety services
or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication
service operating in accordance

with the Radio Regulations." 44 The

DoD/GC

Paper recognizes that jamming or spoofing a radio navigation service would vio45
late this provision.

Therefore, the

ITU Convention

and the entire telecom-

munications multilateral treaty regime would seem to limit information
operations that involve interference with radio broadcasting.
Still, as

the paper notes, Article 48 of the

ITU Convention

provides an ex-

emption for military operations: "Members retain their entire freedom with regard to military radio installations of the Army, Naval, and Air Forces." 46 Article
48 continues, "[nevertheless, these
serve

.

.

.

visions

installations must, so far as possible,

ob-

the measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the pro-

of the Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and

the frequencies to be used, according to the nature of the service performed

such

installations." 47

The DoD/GC Paper also

notes that, in July 1994, the

by

De-

partment of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel relied on Article 48 in deciding
that the

United States could broadcast messages to the Haitian people from mili-

tary aircraft

hazardous

and international

air

space urging

them not

to flee Haiti

by

sea in

vessels. 48

The ITC

also allows signatory States to interfere

with international telecom-

munications in certain circumstances. Article 34 allows members to "stop the
transmission of any private telegram which

of the State or contrary to

its

may appear dangerous to the security

laws, to public order or to decency, provided that

they immediately notify the office of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram

when such notification may appear dangerous to the security of the State." 49 In addition, States may "cut off any other private telecommunications which may appear dangerous to the security of the State or contrary
to its laws, to public order or to decency." 50 And finally, Article 35 allows memor part thereof, except

bers "to suspend the international telecommunications service for an indefinite

time, either generally or only for certain relations and/or for certain kinds of

correspondence, outgoing, incoming or in
notifies

such action to each of the other

Secretary-General." 51
plies

The ITC

Members through

as

the

the

it

immediately

medium

of the

DoD/GC Paper notes, there

is

pre-

treaties are

suspended during armed

for example, the British

Navy cut Germany's ma-

cedent that international communications

During World War I,

provided that

provisions do not state whether the treaty ap-

during armed conflict. However,

conflict.

transit,

jor submarine cables despite the existence of the 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables.

may have

It

should be noted, however, that the United States

entered into bilateral communications agreements with particular
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may be relevant depending on the circumstances of a particular in-

formation operation.

DoD/GC

The

Law

Paper concludes by stating that "International Communica-

no direct and specific prohibition against the conduct of information operations by military forces, even in peace time." 52 However, US
information operations may be carried out not only by military forces, but also
by intelligence personnel engaged in covert action or other intelligence-related
activities. Yet, the ITU Convention's Article 48 exemption for military operations does not appear to allow for such interference in telecommunications by
tions

contains

as intelligence operatives. 33

non-military personnel such

telecommunications treaty regime contains certain notice provisions,

tional

and

Also, the interna-

it is

unlikely that the military

would wish

to publicize

its

information oper-

ations in that way.

A

Checklist of Other

US Treaty Obligations

In addition to international law governing the use of outer space and tele-

communications, various other

treaties

and international obligations could im-

pact upon, interfere with, and possibly even prohibit the conduct of

information operations.

The following

discussion

is

intended

as

a

US

non-

exhaustive checklist for decisionmakers faced with the question of whether to
authorize a particular information operation.

The United Nations Convention on
This convention, which

codifies several provisions

new

One

tional

requirements.

law

is

Article 19,

Law

of the Sea

currently under review

is

and consent,
ates

the

(LOSC)

by the Senate

for advice

of customary international law and cre-

such provision of preexisting customary interna-

which

states that a vessel exercising the right

of innocent

passage through another nation's territorial sea cannot engage in activities "prejudicial to the peace,

good

order, or security of the coastal State." 54 Article 19

defines "prejudicial activities" to include:
•

Any

threat or use

political

of force against the sovereignty,

independence of the

coastal State, or in

violation of the principles of international law

the United Nations;
•

Any

act

aimed

.

.

territorial integrity

or

any other manner

in

embodied

in the Charter

of

.

at collecting

information to the prejudice of the defense or

security of the coastal State;
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Any

•

of propaganda aimed

act

coastal State;

Any

•

act

other

tial

.

aimed

at affecting

the defense or security of the

.

with any systems of communication or any

at interfering

or installations of the coastal State [.] 55

DoD/GC Paper observes that LOSC provisions "have the poten-

to affect only a

LOSC

ing of the

.

facilities

While the

H. Smith and Gordon N. Lederman

narrow category of information operations," 56
seems to point to information operations

purview. Ship-borne information weapons could be
the peace,

good order or security of the

ations are

"aimed

at interfering

falling

under

classified as "prejudicial to

with particular systems of communication or

The Convention establishes a

maximum territorial sea as twelve miles from the nation's coast,

cantly smaller than the

200 miles

that particular nations claim.

57

signifi-

Thus, an obvi-

ous remedy for any legal problems with ship-borne information operations
ships wielding information

weapons "against" or otherwise "aimed

nation to stay outside of the twelve-mile limit.

does not expressly address whether
national

Treaties

armed

on

its

when

A

should be noted that the

LOSC

obligations are enforced during an inter-

(ICAO),

"The contracting

States

un-

issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have

due

states,

of civil aircraft." 58

serves that, as a result, military aircraft

of civilian

at" a coastal

1944 Chicago Convention, which established the Interna-

regard for the safety of navigation

of civil

for

Civil Aviation

tional Civil Aviation Organization

safety

It

is

conflict.

Article 3(d) of the

dertake,

its

coastal State" because information oper-

other facilities or installations of the coastal State."
nation's

a literal read-

The

DoD/GC Paper ob-

have an obligation of "due regard" for the

meaning an obligation "not to interfere with the systems"
but does not elaborate on this obligation.

aircraft,

aircraft,

question thus arises concerning the use of information warfare against

particular navigational systems or other dual-use systems,

military

and

civilian aircraft.

For example,

a particular

might be used both by military and civilian
ian—military airport might use the same radar
flights.

An

aircraft,

for

i.e.,

used both by

navigational satellite

or a particular civil-

both military and

civilian

information operation against such computer equipment with the

aim of disrupting military operations could impact

civilian aircraft as well,

leading to a violation of civil aviation treaty obligations.

The

DoD/GC

Paper

notes that the Chicago Convention specifically provides that the treaty does

not "affect the freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected,
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whether

as belligerents

or

like to

as neutrals."

59

Lightning'

also notes that

It

many

provisions of

the convention are inconsistent with wartime circumstances and, therefore,

Convention would be unlikely

the Chicago

the event of an

armed

However,

conflict.

to survive as a

complete entity in

Article 89 does not provide ade-

quate guidance in ascertaining what provisions of the Chicago Convention
are applicable during an

armed

conflict

and thus what limitations

exist

on

in-

formation operations in wartime.

Treaties

on Diplomatic Relations

The 1961 Vienna Convention
violability

vention

of the premises and

also

requires

that

regulations of the State in

its

of in-

grants to diplomatic missions the right

documents and communications. The con-

diplomatic

which they

personnel

are stationed

respect

and

and

laws

the

that "premises of the

mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions of
the mission as laid
eral international

down

in the present

Convention or by other

rules

of gen-

law or by any special agreements in force between the send-

ing State and the receiving State." 60

As the

DoD/GC

Paper concludes,

"Planning for any information operations activity that involves diplomatic
premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications, either

strument or

as a target

as

an in-

of the operation, must take into account these interna-

tional legal obligations." 61

Treaties of Friendship,

These
tablish

bilateral

Commerce and Navigation (FCN)

agreements between the United States and other nations es-

arrangements for tourism, trade, transportation, and other routine and

practical issues.

According to the

DoD/GC Paper, such treaties probably would

be suspended in the event of armed

mation operations are

conflict.

However,

to the extent that infor-

utilized in peace-time, decisionmakers

count obligations incurred in

FCN

treaties to the extent

must take into acthey will impact

information operations. For example, one could imagine the scenario in which
the targeted nation will attribute the information operation to criminal elements

or to economic espionage and will request assistance from the United States un-

der the

FCN treaty (or under mutual legal assistance agreements and extradition

agreements)in response to such information operations.

prepared to respond to such a request even
military or intelligence operation.
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Law

Status of Forces Agreements and Foreign Domestic

Stationing agreements and defense cooperation agreements memorialize the

consent of the host nation to the presence of US troops,

set limits

on troop num-

and identify facilities. The United States also commonly enters into status
of forces agreements (SOFAs) to address legal jurisdiction over its forces. The

bers,

DoD/GC Paper notes that, by the end of 1998, the United States was a party to
103 SOFAs.

Many require

change regarding the

that the

US

notify the host nation of any significant

of the military forces stationed in the

capabilities or status

host country.

As the

DoD/GC

operations from

Paper

US bases

states, if authorities

intend to conduct information

abroad, a determination must be

made

as to

whether

the relevant agreements require notifying the host nation and perhaps even re-

questing

its

consent. 62

that

US

and

that such

The paper

equipment not

interfere

equipment cannot

also notes that

such agreements often require

with the host nation's communication system

and regulations.

violate the host nation's laws

Host nations may understandably be concerned about information weapons
criss-crossing their

tional infection

telecommunications equipment for fear of possible, uninten-

of the host nation's computers. They might

counter-measures or

acts

also

of self-defense by the target nation of a

be wary of the

US information

operation. Yet, even if a host nation opposed the use of US forces stationed in

its

country to conduct information operations, the difficulty of attributing an infor-

mation operation to

its

true source

might give

US forces sufficient cover regard-

ing the origin of the attack, and thus might assuage the host nation's concern
regarding
It

its

own

possible vulnerability to counter-measures or reprisals.

should be noted that foreign domestic laws impact the conduct of US de-

fensive information operations because foreign law enforcement officials

may

not be authorized to conduct criminal investigations of possible computer crime
or information warfare unless the conduct
to the laws

of that particular country. As a

at issue constitutes a

result, officials

may not receive the

pected levels of cooperation from foreign law enforcement
tigation

crime according

officials in

ex-

the inves-

of an apparently criminal information operation emanating from

a

government does outlaw activity that
constitutes information warfare, US military officials may decide to refrain from
offensively-oriented information operations conducted from their bases in that

particular country. Conversely, if a foreign

particular country in order not to subject

US

forces to liability or culpability for

violating that foreign country's laws. Furthermore,

be

liable or culpable legally,

even

commanders may wish

violating foreign domestic law.

63

As the
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military personnel that constitutes an offense

under the host nation's law and not

under US law could give the host nation exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute. This
situation could

occur if a host nation's computer law

is

more developed than US

law or prohibits particular forms of information warfare. 64

and interconnectedness of the Internet mean

bility

conduct the information operations from
tions, thus

a host

that the

Of course,
United

the flexi-

States

could

country that allows such opera-

avoiding the particular countries that criminalize such

activity. 65

Espionage

The DoD/GC Paper emphasizes the fact that, given the ambiguity surrounding the concept of information warfare, the division between espionage and the
use of force

is

ambiguous. Thus,

ation constitutes espionage or a
that the division

within

"it

—

of labor between the intelligence community and the military

concerning covert action
concludes,

may be unclear whether an information opermilitary attack
or both. The paper also notes

it

is

likely to

remains to be seen

this division

be blurred by information operations. As

how information

of labor," especially

when

operations activities will

fall

such information operations oc-

cur in the context of military operations other than war such

peace-enforcement, and counter-narcotics

it

as

peacekeeping,

missions. 66

An Information Warfare Treaty?
October 1998, Russia introduced a resolution in the United Nation's First
Committee calling for States to report their views concerning the "advisability of
elaborating international legal regimes to ban the development, production and
In

use of particularly dangerous information weapons."

ed that

it

was premature

information warfare.

The United

more advanced

respond-

to discuss negotiating an international treaty concerning

On the one hand, an international treaty serves the interest of

less-technologically developed nations because the treaty
strict

States

would most

likely re-

nations such as the United States from developing informa-

tion warfare techniques.

On

the other hand, an international treaty need not

below the level at which advanced nations currently operate. Such restrictions would be equivalent to arms-control agreements setting a
limit on number of weapons well-above the number of weapons actually posnecessarily set restrictions

sessed

by signatory

States.

Furthermore, a treaty limiting information operations

by nations does not address the problem of terrorists or hackers. 67
A treaty could potentially ban information operations but allow research on
information warfare or limit research to defensive capabilities. However, the
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distinction

between
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and defensive information warfare might blur be-

offensive

cause an understanding of offensive operations
fective defenses (and vice versa). 68

require certain identifying marks

is

required for construction of ef-

Alternatively, a treaty could conceivably

on

military information operations so that

countries can identify the source of operations, although the lack of such attribution characteristics might be a violation of the current law of war concerning

perfidy

—meaning

that a

should also be noted

new

that, as a

treaty

not required for

is

this specific

nation advances technologically,

it

purpose.

It

becomes more

vulnerable to technological attack; in other words, the United States could actually benefit

computer

from an international

treaty

infrastructure. This assumes,

due to

its

economy's heavy reliance on

however, that the treaty

is

both widely

adopted and enforceable. Also, the treaty should not leave the United States
powerless to defend

itself against attacks

from

terrorists

or hackers

as

opposed

to

information operations launched by another State.

The DoD/GC Paper concludes that "[tjhere seems to be no particularly good
reason for the United States to support negotiations for

and most of the

areas

tion operations."

69

It

new

treaty obligations

of international law that are directly relevant to informanevertheless observes that

agreements would be beneficial
efforts to raise the level

is

one area in which international

cooperation concerning criminal law, namely

of foreign countries' criminal laws concerning computer

crimes to that recognized by the United States. Although the
states that

it is

unclear

how

such a treaty could actually

work

speculates that a treaty concerning information terrorism

DoD/GC

in practice,

might be

Paper
it

also

useful.

Conclusion

The

DoD/GC Paper states that there are no "show-stoppers" in international

law prohibiting

US information operations. 70 However,

the use of outer space
qualifies as a

may present problems if a particular information

operation

"weapon of mass destruction." Furthermore, other obligations under

international law present complications

US

obligations concerning

—and

opportunities

—

information operations. Decisionmakers must be sure to

international law

for the

conduct of

assess the

impact of

on each proposed information operation.
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Brian T. O'Donnell and James C. Kraska

TIT*
his chapter offers a

framework

makers to begin constructing

network

attack

for military

rules

(CNA) during armed

of engagement (ROE) for computer

conflict, military operations other

war, and other overt and covert national security
erational

activities.

than

Focused on the op-

commander rather than the academic, it introduces the legal and policy

considerations surrounding the drafting of

unique

commanders and policy

legal issues that arise

from

ROE

for

CNA,

and discusses the

CNA within the law of armed conflict. Such

considerations are important for military commanders, their operators, planners,

and lawyers in designing and employing

CNA because they serve to

facilitate

and provide guidance that operationalizes the concept of computer network
attack

—removing

it

from the realm of speculation and placing it

hands of military commanders. Moreover, since

legal

and

ROE

as a tool in

the

decisions

im-

pact the development of tactics and doctrine, and the acquisition and force
structure processes, the discussion

well

as fleet

commanders.

is

relevant to force providers and trainers, as

Computer Network Attack: Developing

Engagement

the Rules of

Emerging Technologies and War

Over

the

last

decade, information technologies, including computer and

communications systems, have brought about

a sea

change in the global econ-

omy. Technology has grown from just 6% of the US economy at the beginning
of the 1990s, to over 20% today. What was once a narrow "technology" sector
within the whole economy has emerged as the "New Economy," comprised of
1

that third or fourth

of the economy that serves

as

the source of rapid innovation

2

and engine of economic growth. Entire subsectors of the

New Economy have

new industries have grown virtually overnight: photonics,
mechanical (MEMs) devices, wireless systems and specialty

emerged, and whole
micro-electrical

communications semiconductors, and, of course, the

Internet,

which

has be-

come omnipresent throughout the economy. The New Economy has transformed industry data management and storage, manufacturing, accounting, and
inventory management. Many of the same technologies have even more dramatically recast military communications,

and weapons.

gistics

3

command and

These technological changes

control, targeting, lo-

are transforming thinking

about military force structure and doctrine, and have opened up computer net-

work

attack as a viable instrument of military power.

Military technology displayed

by

coalition forces during the

Gulf War in

1991, particularly those technologies that were used by the United States military,

how

ignited broad interest

among

strategists

to best develop or channel the

(RMA).

4

and policymakers worldwide

emerging "revolution

in

in military affairs"

RMA,

which encompasses technologies that "gather, process and
fuse information on a large geographical area in real time, all the time," 5 has
driven the creation of new military capabilities and doctrine based on advanced concepts and emerging technologies. It grew from Cold War planning in the West that sought to apply technology as a force multiplier to
counter numerically superior Soviet forces in Europe. 6 After the Cold War,
began to be seen as a way to ensure Western superiority, or at least pre-

RMA

serve military advantage, in a broad variety of post-Cold

might be encountered within the context of

a

budget environment. Computer network attack

advanced manifestations of

RMA.

War

conflicts that

resource-constrained defense

one of the latest and most
With the growth of computer networks
is

and integrated systems, computers have assumed

a central role in

enabling

both offensive and defensive military operations. Despite widespread recognition that the technologies that enable
reality,

computer network

attack are already a

the specific legal and policy considerations that will control their

ployment have received scant

attention.
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This

is

em-

not surprising, since the

Brian T. O'Donnell and James C. Kraska

development of concrete

legal analysis tends to lag the

advancement

nology, particularly in the application of international law to
warfare.
in

7

equally important to recall that history

It is

which superior

new methods of

replete with examples

was squandered, and advantage was

military technology

surrendered, because the

is

in tech-

army employing the new weapon had an

inattentive

or feckless approach to developing corresponding doctrine and tactics for

employment.

CNA,

8

modern

In the

the development of appropriate

era,

along with operational doctrine,

mine whether

CNA

tactics,

and force

ROE

its

for

structure, will deter-

an effective weapon.

is

In the mid-1990s, the

initial

US

focus

on computers and

military conflict

resided almost exclusively in defending perceived weaknesses and vulnerabilities

in critical national information infrastructure

communications, and industrial energy

ing,

within the Department of Defense (DoD)

(IWD) was
cerned

replicated

as

—

grids.

especially electronic

bank-

This focus, which emerged

"Information Warfare

by other governmental agencies,

who

also

—Defense"

became con-

1995 about the vulnerability of their networks, coinciding with

after

the widespread use of the Internet. 9 All of these efforts migrated under the
brella term,

"Computer Network Defense" (CND), which

centrate interagency resources and attention

um-

has served to con-

toward protecting and defending

computer and information networks from sabotage by individual hack10
ers, terrorist groups, and unfriendly governments.
Planning for CND was accelerated with the advent of Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in
critical

May
and

1998, which ordered federal agencies, in concert with the private sector

state

and

local authorities, to create defenses against attacks

on

critical in-

from network assaults from all State and non-State actors that pothreaten American "national and economic security." 11 The DoD

frastructures
tentially

responded by standing up the Joint Task Force Computer Network Defense

(JTF-CND), which was renamed Joint Task Force Computer Network Operations (JTF-CNO). 12 The JTF is assigned to Commander-in-Chief, United
States Space Command, but has representatives from each military service and
many government agencies. 13 The CND movement has made great progress
in identifying information infrastructure vulnerabilities,

and organizing and

resourcing defensive interagency plans to address them.

Initial

ceived gaping holes in

way

to a

ment.

critical

more measured and

Now

that the

larly in the military,

panic

at

per-

information infrastructure has recently given

sober,

concern over

and more confident, vulnerability

CND

has stabilized,

US

assess-

planners, particu-

have begun to more seriously consider the potential

advantages to be gained in military operations by offensive attack against an adversary's information infrastructure.
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Computer Network Attack

Computer network attack has emerged as one of the more promising tools
available to a military commander for mission accomplishment and self-defense.
It

encompasses

activities

".

designed to

.

.

disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy in-

formation resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and

networks themselves." 14 While the

CNA in particular,

is

has received at least

very fact-dependent and open to considerable debate,

some

scholars maintain that a

maintain that
debate

CNA

is

of information warfare generally, or

legality

attention

among

it

Some

international law scholars.

CNA constitutes a use of force, whereas other scholars

much more akin to adverse nonforceable influence. 1d This

healthy and serves to shape the international law in the area.

is

Despite the importance of

CNA,

been unable

to adequately explain

CNA ROE.

Moreover, military

military

and

civilian

commanders have

or to achieve a consensus in designing

it,

staff judge advocates, civilian

lawyers within

the national security and intelligence establishment, and academics are grappling

with

how to best articulate the legal and policy underpinnings for computer net-

work

attack decisions.

While

theories

and approaches

that

emerge from academia

contending with these

tional decision-makers

group

levels.

For the operational commanders, the

at

may be of limited
Navy fleet and battle

they

issues,

value to operational commanders, including those

are useful to na-

the

legal

and policy research

sur-

CNA often raises more questions than answers. This results in leaving those commanders who might integrate CNA into real-world operations
rounding

it

confused and frustrated. Rather than offering a theoretical legal model for
this

a

chapter accepts the premise that

broad range of

stages

capabilities to attack

of development,

abroad. There

is

CNA

testing,

and

is

quickly becoming a

computer networks

training,

both

in the

reality.

CNA,

There is

that are in various

United

States

and

evidence that they are already being employed in actual opera-

by a growing number of nations. Furthermore, as these capabilities become
better understood and easier to use, it is likely that the approval authority to emtions

ploy them will gravitate

downward in

the chain of command to task force

CNA

manders. Eventually, proven methods of

com-

could be authorized to

individual units and platforms. This chapter presents a question of first impres-

by examining the development of operational CNA ROE for military operations, and it offers a practical approach to drafting CNA ROE. This pressing

sion

issue

of exactly

how a commander begins to

oping and applying

There

is

a

CNA in the real world

tremendous

legal

and policy gap
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on the cusp of wide discussions.
between rapidly advancing CNA

is

—

legal aspects
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technical capabilities emerging from the laboratories

which

ROE

The advancement of

to support them.

—and

the legal architecture

computer network

for

has not kept pace with these developments, should begin to

ROE

Determining the

CNA engagement,

attack,

this gap.

fill

process, considerations for creating the parameters of

and some guidelines for inclusion in operational orders are

commanders executing real world missions.
The commander should be able to understand which computer network and related military instruments may be used, under what conditions they may be employed, and to which missions they may be applied. This prevents a commander
from either employing means or methods that lie beyond the scope of his or her
especially important for operational

authority,

tion of

need

and ensures

that the

he or she does not unnecessarily limit the applica-

CNA because of confusion over the rules governing

to discipline

the process to ensure that the emerging

and domestic

tional military policy

For

this chapter,

legislation, as well as

and national diplomatic and

we

a central stake in

—

for an actual operation.

The

is

a

CNA.

overseeing

more

how

objective

remain in concert with na-

political goals.

assume that some level of

commanders, the greater question

is

CNA rules of engagement comply with

context of international law, but the

ment

There

use.

and govern the process of development of ROE for

The National Command Authorities (NCA) have
international law

its

CNA

lawful within the

is

practical question

—indeed

for

best to develop rules of engageis

to begin to

fill

in the

vacuum

CNA at the
warfighting level. 16 Does the existing process for developing ROE adequately
pertaining to the control,

accommodate
erational
this

CNA? What

can guide commanders, their warfighters, and op-

judge advocates in developing

an area best

crafting rules for

and employment of

application,

rules for

computer network

policymakers inside the beltway or

left to

is

attack?

Is

there a role for

CNA at the operational level—forward deployed, at sea, or in

the field? This chapter considers the historical basis for

ROE

development

ROE,

identifies the fac-

computer network attack, explores
the considerations that might limit or empower a commander, and suggests an
architecture for designing computer network attack ROE that may be em-

tors that fold into

for

ployed throughout the conflict spectrum.
to

many of these

issues,

the goal

manders and decisionmakers

is

ROE

providing a "navigational chart"

to begin to demystify the process for

com-

alike.

Historical

Modern

By

ROE Development

17

have their roots in the naval and maritime tradition. With

the advent of oar and

sail,

effective central control

399

of

a military asset

by the
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sending government was

cumbent upon

the

lost

once

commanding

a ship

the Rules of

Engagement

got underway from port.

officer to

It

was in-

conduct the mission pursuant to the

general guidance of the government. Virtually alone until the ship reached the

next friendly port, or until the ship encountered another friendly vessel that

could deliver news or orders, the commanding officer operated within broad
parameters or rules issued by the leadership.

The Continental Navy's

posure to rules governing operations occurred on January

Commodore Esek Hopkins
that included a

to

when

broad discretionary clause of authority:

execute, if bad

Winds

disaster disable

you

shall

distress the

1776,

ex-

received written orders to engage British raiders

Notwithstanding these particular Orders, which

Judgment

5,

first

hoped you

will

be able to

or Stormy Weather, or any other unforeseen accident or

so to

You

do

Suggest to you

Enemy by

'tis

all

means

are then to follow such Courses as

as

in

most useful

to the

your power.

18

your best

American Cause and

to

Although modern technology has tremendously improved communication
underway vessels, naval vessels now routinely travel far from port, and transit

much faster

—sometimes even underwater—without

time guidance from

War

a fleet

commander

access to detailed

and

or government leader. Prior to

real

World

on use of force aside from occasional
ships on diplomatic missions. 19 Following World War II regulations governing
the use of force, now known as rules of engagement, were promulgated in the
1948 United States Navy Regulations with Article 0614, "Use of Force Against
a Friendly State." 20 In 1962 the first in a series of ROE were issued that applied
Navy-wide. Written to address the unique challenges and special concerns arising from surface, undersea, and aviation operations throughout the maritime
environment, these ROE were subsequently updated in 1970 and 1981. 21 Even
II,

in the

there was

little

need

for a policy

updated version, however, they

still

only applied to

US

In 1986, the United States issued generalized JCS Peacetime
the

first

time, included guidance for air and land

lowing the experiences of the

naval forces.

ROE that, for

Two years later, foland USS VINCENNES

forces. 22

USS STARK (FFG-31)

1987 and July 1988 respectively, the Peacetime ROE were
again updated and revised. In 1994, a major revision was accomplished, and the
ROE that applied to all US forces were promulgated by the Chairman of the

(CG-49)

in

May

Engagement for US Forces
change that removed the "peacetime"

Joint Chiefs of Staff as the Standing Rules of

(SROE) 23 Aside from
reference, the

the obvious

title

1994 document not only streamlined the

ROE drafting and ap-

proval process, but also contained significant revisions, including a

400
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uniform

approach.

Separate

ROE

manders-in-Chief (CINCs) 24 augment the
ater-specific"

CINC

had

clarified a

ROE. 25

by

issued

SROE, and

Com-

combatant

the

are referenced as "the-

This marked a break from past practice, in which each

a theater- wide

top-to-bottom

of rules. Also, the 1994

set

SROE

commander's inherent right and obligation of self-defense, and

ulated a bright-line distinction

between

sponding to

a hostile act or

responding to

and the use of force for

self-defense

mission accomplishment. For self-defense, the
a

artic-

SROE are firmly grounded in re-

demonstration of hostile intent.

One

of the more significant changes was the declassification of the basic self-defense

SROE
forces

and enabled better coordination between

The most
This

enhanced training and application throughout

provisions. This

latest

editions.

SROE was released on January

recent iteration of the

version further refines and

It is

clarifies

comprised mainly of thirteen enclosures, including

little

substantive

mention of

partners.

26
15, 2000.

the concepts contained in earlier

closure for Information Operations. Unlike the

contained

and coalition

allies

US

CNA,

2000

a separate

revision, the

en-

1994 edition

sticking mostly to definitional

CNA may be authorized to a commander under the umbrella of the mission ROE provisions and
terms and basic concept statements.

Under the SROE,
(LOAC),

the international law of armed conflict

mental authorizations or

restrictions received

Even though commanders of forces
mission might be authorized

CNA as

a

subject to any additional supple-

from higher

ROE

means of warfare,

they were provided. Often,

within theater, or at the
dictated
tion. 28

tactical level.

authority. 27

tasked to accomplish an operation or

they will decide to use it. Historically, personnel in the
tion the

use of

ROE

fleet

mean

or field did not ques-

were not well-understood

Moreover, there was

from above could not be changed and were

that does not

to

a sense that the

ROE

be applied without ques-

This was demonstrated during the 1981 Gulf of Sidra freedom of naviga-

tion operation off the coast of Libya. Prior to the operation, orders issued to the

Navy F-14s restrained those
tent

even though the

sponse

ROE

to hostile intent. 29

from responding to indications of hostile

in effect at the time authorized self-defense in re-

Team (BLT)

Headquarters building in Beirut, Leba-

when a local commander's interpretation of the ROE led to orders

for "sentries to

keep their magazines in their ammunition pouches

tion against an accidental or over-eager discharge of a

wound one

in-

Another instance occurred during the bombing of the

Marine Battalion Landing
non, in 1983,

forces

of the thousands of Lebanese

daily." 30
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civilians

weapon

who

that

as a

precau-

might

kill

or

visited the airport
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Innovation, Military Doctrine, and

Limitations

due to

on

the use of

as

fall

ROE

victim to unnecessary restraint

complex and typically highly classified nature of
confidence in commanders. They may be hesitant to

several factors. First, the

CNA tools may not inspire
rely

CNA may also

Engagement

upon bare promises

taking

that certain

CNA tools can accomplish a mission, such

down an air defense site, when proven alternatives, such as air strikes or
Commanders likely will have had training and exmethods, but may not understand or appreciate CNA.

cruise missiles, are available.

perience with kinetic

During the 2000 Global War Game at the Naval War College, this dynamic was
repeated by commanders who tended to move away from more speculative instruments toward those which were more familiar. This tendency toward traditional and proven methods of warfare has been demonstrated in war games of
other services as well. Nevertheless, the war games also showed that US commanders were becoming more willing to adopt innovative methods to accomplish the mission, even when the methods lack historical record.

The military services are beginning to realize that to gain acceptance as a viable weapon system, the secretive nature of the tools must be reduced to a more
commanders and

accessible classified level so that

their staffs

and subordinate

commands can familiarize themselves with the systems. Consider the development of the machine gun more than one hundred years ago. An American,
Richard J. Gatling, patented and demonstrated

a reliable,

multi-barreled re-

gun in 1862, but the Belgian-invented and French-developed
mitrailleuse was the first combat-tested machine gun. 31 On the eve of the
Franco-Prussian war, the 1 1 mm mitrailleuse, recognized by the French army as
a technical breakthrough in firepower, was kept in such tight secrecy in peacetime that very few French officers could discuss or develop doctrine or tactics for
32
its use on the battlefield.
The weapon, which came as a complete surprise to

peating

the Germans, had the potential to swing victory to the French. Instead, advan-

was lost because the French were caught up in marveling at the technical aspects of development without devising correspondingly effective doctrine and
tactics for the weapon. 33 Similarly, although the Germans, British, and French
were developing and fielding battle tanks during 1915-1916, they were ineffectage

tively

and wastefully employed on the

doctrine for their
British strategist

weapon

was not

until a

coherent

—

employment was developed most notably by the innovative
Major J.F.C. Fuller that the tank was accepted as a viable

—

rather than a curiosity.

British tanks penetrated
strating that the

battlefield. It

On November

German

lines

20, 1917, a spearhead of

476

during the Battle of Cambrai, demon-

armored vehicles could achieve rapid and complete command
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of dug-in defenses. 34 Inertia prevents change, and
tary

commanders

in the

in the present day are

we

cannot assume that mili-

immune from this phenomenon. Just as

ROE for computer network attack from

examples cited above, bringing

commanders

the general and theoretical to the specific and concrete will help

migrate to computer "warfare.

The method by which

CNA will accomplish

its

end

result likewise

needs to

be explained to commanders, and commanders need to be able to engage in professional debate

tional

on the

subject.

The

ROE relate to the underpinning interna-

and domestic authority for using

CNA,

the scope of the commander's

authority within the context of the national and theater

and the conditions,

if any, in

which

pecially important consideration

view of the law of armed
neutral forces

is

CNA

is

commander's mission,

considered a lawful attack.

the potential for collateral effects of

conflict.

How might CNA

es-

CNA in

affect third countries

beyond the scope of the conflict? What might be the

societies, civilian populations, businesses,

One

or

on civil

effect

and related public and private

infra-

What impact might CNA have on protected persons or locations,
such as sick and wounded personnel near the battle area or sites representing religious or cultural heritage? What about the effect on prisoners of war (POWs)
structure?

and other protected

Any

of personnel, such

classes

as

medical or religious personnel?

anticipated or probable primary or secondary civilian injury or

damage

must be reviewed to determine whether it is excessive or disproportionate
military advantage to be gained.

Commanders

are

coming

to

view these

to the
issues

personally and with growing interest since they bear the ultimate responsibility
for the

consequences of an

attack.

The

trend toward creating universal multilat-

"war crimes" jurisdiction only serves to exacerbate many commanders' uneasiness toward command and personal liability.
eral

The

first

step

is

for a

commander

to

be able to understand the foreseeable

CNA attack, including damage or disruption to non-military
A review of the potential consequences within the ROE and LOAC

consequences of a
systems.

framework is essential to forming a decision on the use of CNA. In particular,
commanders must estimate the expected military benefit of CNA, and weigh
that calculation against the collateral costs

should be supported by an
cell

ROE

cell that

of

commander
menu of options. The

attack. Ideally, the

can present a

should include representatives from the operations, intelligence and

plans directorate,

as

well

as a

judge advocate. The

targeting and politico-military issues associated with

cell

should analyze

CNA,

ROE,

and deliver recom-

mendations to the commander.

Commanders

employ unproven systems as one critical
because if the CNA component fails, then

are rightly hesitant to

component of a coordinated

attack
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the entire effort
sions

imperiled. Inherent risk

is

is

the Rules of

Engagement

already attendant to real world mis-

without the injection of an unproven, and possibly speculative system.

Doubt as to legality and ROE would only serve to magnify these concerns.
Compounding this problem may be the short life span of the attack due to rapid
advance in technology and creative enemy adaptation. Even more so than conventional weapons systems, once the impact of a particular

CNA has been expe-

rienced, adversaries can be expected to devise a tailored defense, thereby

limiting future effectiveness. 35 Moreover, the comparatively low cost and global

of computer systems and trained programmers enables

availability

terrorist

groups or developing nations to enter the realm of information and computer
warfare. All of these factors serve to keep

CNA

tools underutilized, thereby

foregoing potential military benefit. Doing so deprives a
portunity to observe

plying

it

to a

major

we

mission-specific

effectiveness in training or

target.

do much to dissuade
breakthrough,

its

this

on

commander of the op-

lesser targets prior to ap-

A successful laboratory demonstration

is

not likely to

opinion. As legal analysis continues to lag technological

can expect that without great attention, the development of

ROE for ever newer computer network attack systems will be a

challenge.

Understanding
ning to
strate

this

realize that

CNA,

functions.

background, proponents of the

new

technology are begin-

not only must they be able to adequately explain and demon-

but they must

commander

also ensure that the

Computer network

how

understands

it

warfare and information operations are upsetting

the existing Westphalian paradigm of warfare

upon which

traditional

ROE

and

CNA rapidly changing. For instance,
some suggest that the architecture of CNA migrating from the traditional model

law of war are based. The very nature of

is

is

model based on a simultaneous "swarming" or overtaking of an opponent's system. "Swarming occurs when the dispersed nodes of a
network of small
forces converge on a target from multiple directions. The
overall aim is sustainable pulsing of a force or fire." 36 Once in motion, swarm networks must be able to coalesce rapidly and stealthily on a target, dissever and redisof "waves" of attack to

.

perse,

.

a

.

and then immediately recombine for

information-age attacks

may come

waves. 37 Such a paradigm

ments of ROE
act"

and

shift

are applied in

in

is

pulse.

In other words,

swarms rather than the more

could completely transform the

computer network

"hostile intent," for example, best

State action

new

a

fit

attack.

a linear

The

way many

"wave" model,

aggressive as time lapses. Crisis

War"

"Road

cal tensions that gradually escalate into

military confrontation.
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in

—

which

often be-

war games bear

out; often, military exercises begin with a

to

ele-

concepts of "hostile

directed toward another State in waves along a timeline

coming more permissive or

traditional

this

prelude of rising politi-

Then,

conflict
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slowly accelerates from peacekeeping to peace enforcement.

US-Thailand-Singaporean
cises

were

built

from

this

series

The

multilateral

COBRA GOLD 00 and 01 exersuitable ROE for those scenarios ex-

of unclassified

model. Crafting

posed the lack of flexibility inherent in

a linear focus.

Swarming attacks would pose, simultaneously, a confusing mixture of actions by a State or non-State actor against a State, with some actions perhaps
tantamount to a "hostile act" or demonstration of "hostile intent." At the same
time, other actions would fall below that threshold, confounding the development of ROE.
The blurring of offense and defense

reflects

another feature of net-war:

it

tends to

defy and cut across standard boundaries, jurisdictions, and distinctions between
state

and

society, public

military, police

and

and

private,

military,

and

war and peace, war and crime,

legal

and

assigning responsibility to a single agency

—

illegal.

A

civilian

government has

and

difficulty

military, police, or intelligence

—

to

respond. 38

Of course, this generates confusion over developing a common understanding of
rules

of engagement

as

the

DoD vies with international and multilateral organi-

zations, international coalition partners, a host

local

and

Lines of authority

and the "operational paradigms of politicians,

officials, soldiers,

to develop

police officers, and related actors get fuzzy and clash."

ROE, which

tary's

state

ROE.

law enforcement, and private business

will crisscross,

of other federal agencies,

are

39

In particular, the mili-

developed for military operations,

may

conflict

with

other agencies' approaches, which are often based on law enforcement. These

fundamental questions must be addressed before mission-specific legal analysis
can be thoroughly conducted.

The

ized military rules of engagement for

essential

law of armed conflict and general-

CNA, however, can be developed as a point

of departure for policy and planning. This will enable commanders to begin

a dia-

logue within the defense establishment and with their counterparts outside
the military, facilitating interagency cooperation and action.

The ROE Process

The

SROE has added granularity to what many commanders had realized all

—

along

that they are ultimately responsible for

developing and applying

ROE.

This responsibility cannot be abrogated to the StaffJudge Advocate or other di-

During crisis action planning, the Director of Operations (J3) is key to
generating options and ranking the choices available to the commander. When
rectorate.
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engaged in deliberate planning, the Director of Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) is
the central player. These directorates are closely assisted by the judge advocate,

who

serves as a facilitator to ensure that the principles of international

mestic law

are honored. 40

forming meaningful

Toward this

ROE.

end, subject matter experts are

Generally, the Director of Intelligence

Director of Command, Control, Communications and Computers
advisors regarding

and do-

critical to

and the

(J2)

key

(J6) are

CNA capabilities and limitations.
Toward a Results-Based Model

During the

ROE

drafting process, a "results-based" approach to

given preference over broad grants of authority to engage in

ROE

based
well

as

ample,

CNA into

tie

air

when

consequences.

sending an attacking code to an

trum, such

as

short out. This

damage or adverse

political

execute an attack,

in contrast to using the electromagnetic specrelies

upon

kinetic energy to obtain

41

Many commanders

ROE

is

not required, or

defense system computer, causing the

air

an electromagnetic pulse, that

a similar result.

site is

CNA, by contrast relies upon a data stream to

power supply to

are

concerned about the delay required to obtain supple-

approval, especially if the requested rules require

During joint and combined
cally

an ex-

as

the alternative of kinetic attack

physical destruction might cause excessive collateral

mental

defense unit

exercises in the

Western

ROE,

overtook requests for supplemental

as

NCA approval. 42

Pacific, scenario events typi-

superseding events

supplemental request irrelevant by unfolding scenario events.

made

can only decelerate the process.

been

One method

that

the

The same dynamic

occurs in the real world, and the introduction of computer network attack

has

as

period of time in order to accomplish one part of an overall mis-

This could prove extremely useful

as

Results-

CNA ROE might be written to authorize CNA to disable an air defense

might release dangerous forces, physical destruction of the

such

CNA.

mission type, along with the expected,

the desired, political or military effect. Using an

site for a specific

sion.

a specific

should be

might speed

this

ROE

process along

to request supplemental rules early in a scenario, delegating authorization

to

approve the

its

use.

ROE

For example,

commander

to a level closer to the
a

combatant regional

CINC

advance for actions that would normally require
supplemental

ROE

ultimately charged with

might be delegated authority in

NCA approval. Additionally, the

might be authorized pending occurrence of

a certain set

of

events or tripwires. This type of thinking was evident in discussions with Australian operators

and attorneys during Exercise

Australian Defence Forces, this concept

is
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called

"dormant

ROE,"

99. 43 In the

and

it

may
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CNA ROE. In "dormant ROE," a set of pre-authorized

prove to be adaptable to

supplemental or mission-specific rules becomes effective upon some triggering
event or receipt of a specialized code word. This

commanders being
given depending

able to see in advance the level

upon how

method has the advantage of
at which authorizations will be

a particular mission develops, rather than waiting for

change to occur during the mission. This avoids the commander having to address

ROE that are suddenly inadequate, and ameliorates the need for additional rules in
the midst of a

crisis. It

would also

let

the military personnel involved in the mission

ROE with the actual rules that would apply. Personnel familiar with US and Australian ROE will quickly point out that while the American
ROE are permissive in nature and US commanders feel comfortable with broad
train for a

grants

change in

of authority without the need to have

more

tralian rules are
ers

restrictive.

should expect more

CNA,

employ

However,

restrictions.

specific grants

of authority, the Aus-

in dealing with

CNA, US command-

When

a limited authorization will

a

most

the case until such time as decision makers

new method of warfare, and the ROE
out actual use in a conflict,
cises.

In the

last

two

is

commander

granted authority to

be the norm. This

will

become more comfortable with

mature.

One way to

to better integrate

years in particular,

likely

is

accomplish

this,

be

this

with-

CNA into war games and exer-

ROE addressing computer network attack

and defense have begun to enter the exercise lexicon. Unfortunately, war games
and exercises

still

rarely contain

rules are discussed

an

ROE development phase where supplemental

and developed. The concepts should be gravitating more

quickly from the national or theater levels to the operational and battle group levels. It is

even

for their

rarer for the

employment

CNA serves to

CNA procedures and effects to be explained, or the rules

to

be debated in the

ably.

the

last

Captain J.

derstanding of

The

highly classified nature of

exacerbate this problem.

Training and

Over

fleet.

Gaming ROE

two decades, the rules of engagement have matured considerAshley Roach, USN (ret.) recognized the need for greater un-

ROE and practice prior to conflict when he wrote nearly twenty

years ago:

There

is

a

very real need for greater knowledge of rules of engagement on the part

of strategy and policy personnel, tacticians and operators, and even by our
leaders.

At present these

rules are rarely, if ever, exercised

and commanders seek contingent approval
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civilian

and too few planners

for additional or relaxed rules. 44
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the Rules of

Since that time, judge advocates and commanders have
in integrating

ROE

Due

with operations.

and the explosion of computer networks

made

and military

throughout the globe, computer network attack has emerged

more immediate attention.
is included in a war game or exercise, a judge advocate
it is

the drafting of

is

as

given the task of craft-

The problem of lawyer-operator decoupling during

supporting.

ROE

is

certainly not

unique to computer network attack

Nonetheless, the process of an attorney crafting
staff representatives

—may

—

"notionally." That

CNA for an

game, and they

exercises,

CNA

will

events

"Blue" or "Red" team will

event, applying pre-authorized

ROE

often

Even when

NCA,

a

supplemental

state its

intention to

developed prior to the

ROE request

is

effort ei-

sent

up the

no discussion of the actual
be employed, making the event much more of a showcase assumpto the

there

is

usually

tion than an actual exercise. Moreover, neither the Blue or

Red force,

the control group, has an understanding of the mechanics of the
it

handled

are

be informed by the exercise control group that the

chain-of-command
to

In

to say the

ther succeeded or failed.

method

ROE without the input of other

do not serve the commander's complete package of po-

goals.

is

issues.

the intelligence and operations directorates in particu-

yield rules that

and military

litical

use

infrastructures

ROE for their use, usually without operator input or a full understanding of

the mission

lar

capabilities

one of the few
Typically, when any type of CNA

areas that require

ing

great progress

advance in

to the rapid
in civil

Engagement

will operate, particularly the potential collateral effects

or even

CNA and how

—expected or unex-

pected. Ideally, there will be a military attorney advising the exercise control

group

that can

work with

the control staff to determine legal effects of

CNA.

One part of this analysis that might benefit from more attention is whether CNA
affects

persons with protected or special status under international law.

"Train As

We Type"

No matter what shape the ROE begin to take, if we do not train like we actually anticipate utilizing a

use.

CNA tool, commanders may not have confidence in

Moreover, decision makers

crementally, progress

its

will lack confidence in their authorization. In-

on increased use of CNA in war games and experiments

is

much like early use of the concept of responding in self-defense based
demonstration of hostile intent. Many might assume this concept has

unfolding,

upon

a

been around forever
pressed

as

—but although

it

was adopted into

early

US ROE

an inherent right under individual and unit self-defense,

this

and exdid not

guarantee acceptance or use. 45 Discussing the August 19, 1981, shoot-down ot

two Libyan Su-22

fighters

by

US Navy

F-14s, Captain
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observed:
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It is a

common misperception that under the peacetime ROE a commander must

"take the

first

missiles away.

ROE.

hit"

and cannot

That

is

act in self-defense until the

not the law and

is

opposing force has

not required by our general peacetime

46

Interestingly, the tools

and technologies for

computer network

initiating

attack are expanding at a rapid pace, unsettling the associated
plicating the ability of attorneys

On

cepted principles.

CNA into

and commanders

ROE and com-

alike to fashion

widely ac-

the other hand, through the process of incorporating

war games and experiments, the familiarity of future decision makers and commanders is increasing. Once CNA is an option available
in time of crisis, deliberate planning during an armed conflict or other military
operation will expand the panoply of available tools for use by the comrealistic

mander. This

offers flexibility,

asymmetric action, and potentially reduced ca-

among both friendly forces and opponents
favorably mold the political outcome.

sualties

to

Disciplining

The

surest

way

to control the use

of

alike.

In turn,

it

promises

CNA

CNA

is

to

keep

its

authorization

at

the

NCA level. Doing so simplifies the decision making process for the commander
in the field, but
his or

it

does so

the expense of removing a flexible instrument from

her inventory. This approach tends to

American position on
with

at

all

move away from

the traditional

ROE construction that empowers military commanders

necessary authority to accomplish an assigned mission, so long as the

ROE are not limited by higher authority. 47 The goal should be to exercise and
prepare task force and group

commanders

to

engage opposing forces with com-

puter network attack, but to do so according to accepted criteria or

we need to

migrate from an ad hoc approach to

tine crisis action checklist appropriate for

its

rules.

Thus,

ROE for CNA to a more rou-

employment. Any such

checklist

would have to be frequently updated to reflect advances in computer technology. Only by standardizing rules for initiating ROE will commanders become
comfortable with exercising independent judgment on how, when, where, and
against whom to employ CNA. This requires judge advocates to convince commanders, and perhaps innovative technical developers, that computer network
attack

is

properly analyzed within the traditional

ROE

with which our leadership has grown accustomed.

main

—and

of force" (and

if so,

LOAC

Of course,

paradigm

questions re-

computer network attack
what kind of force) looms large

the dispositive issue of whether a

tutes a "use

and
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background. 48

Still, it

would be

Engagement

the Rules of

shortsighted to await the resolution of this and

other politico-legal debates before the military begins to think about

a legal

model for computer network attack. With that in mind, the existing approach of
rules of engagement, embedded within the law of armed conflict, has several ad-

The

vantages.

accepted
is

as a

is

familiar within the

United

States

and abroad, and it is

global standard for ameliorating the effects of military operations.

also flexible

thinking, so

construct

and adaptable, and

it is

a solid

reflects

It

hundreds of years of developmental

foundation on which to build. Most importantly, to the

extent that the law of armed conflict has been respected and observed in times of
conflict,

it

has alleviated suffering, limited destruction and spared civilian

casualties.

Law

The

basic

framework

for

Armed

Conflict

discussions of the laws of armed conflict center

from customary international law and
the Hague and Geneva Conventions. These principles

around the four principles
subsequently codified in

all

of

that evolved

They frame all
and thus must be understood by policy mak-

are: military necessity, distinction, proportionality,

military activities in
ers

and war fighters

action.

armed conflict,

alike. Military necessity

is

a

and

chivalry.

cornerstone principle of military

A commander may employ only that degree and kind of force, not other-

wise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the partial or complete

submission of the enemy.
sources

As

may be

A minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical re-

applied. 49

reflected in Article

49 of Additional Protocol

I

to the

1949 Geneva Con-

ventions, distinction ensures "respect for and protection of the civilian population

and

civilian objects

." 50
.

.

.

Article 51 protects civilian populations,

which are not dithose which employ a method or

51(4) defines unlawfully indiscriminate attacks

rected at a specific military objective;

(b)

and

as: (a)

those

means of combat which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; or (c)
those which employ a method or means of combat the effects of which cannot
be limited as required by Protocol I. Consequently, military strikes must distinguish between lawful combatants and civilians. 51 It would be a violation of

LOAC to use civilians or a protected place or property to shield combatants or a
The presence of civilians within or near a legitimate
military target does not make an attack unlawful.
In the fog of modern war, in which a State's entire society becomes vested

valid military objective.

in warfare,

it is

especially difficult to distinguish

targets:
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One

related issue

the extent that

is

commanders could order preemptive or

responsive attacks against non-state targets.
for example, put a lot of emphasis

individuals to use their

own

It's

not just the military.

on people's information warfare

The Chinese,

—encouraging

technology to annoy and attack others.

2

As we enter the computer warfare age, nations will attempt to further exploit this
difficulty.

Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attack must not be excessive
in relation to the concrete

and direct military advantage expected

to

be gained.

This concept of proportionality defines "concrete and direct" military advan-

from the specific military operation of which
the attack is a part taken as a whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the
operation." 53 Collateral damage and incidental injury have historically been the
product of three factors: (1) a lack of full knowledge as to what is being hit; (2)
tage as "the advantage anticipated

amount of force being applied to the target;
and (3) the inability to ensure that the weapon strikes precisely the right point. 54
On the digital battlefield, collateral damage could affect entire sectors of the
economy and society.
Finally, the main tenets of chivalry center around the principles of treachery
and perfidy. The 1977 Additional Protocol I bans "... acts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to
accord, protection under the rules of international law applicable in armed con-

the inability to surgically craft the

flict,

with intent to betray that confidence.

Perfidy includes:

." 55
.

.

feigning of intent to negotiate or surrender, 2) feigning

1)

incapacitation, 3) feigning civilian,

noncombatant

status,

and

4)

feigning pro-

UN

or neutral states. Ruses, howby use of signs or uniforms of the
ever, are not prohibited in an armed conflict. 56 Legitimate ruses include
camouflage, deceptive lighting, decoys, mock operations, simulated forces and

tected status

use of enemy codes and passwords. 57 These long-standing principles of international

law have direct bearing on possible future

e-mail delivery.

While

chivalry

analogy

[it]

One

Using

perfidy,

archaic today,

it

retains

strongly weighs against sending a logic

that

might

rely

upon

that:

some normative

value.

.

.

[by]

bomb disguised as e-mail from

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or even from "Microsoft

Software Support".
labels.

author has advanced the premise

may seem

the International

CNAs

.

ICRC

.

.

[S]uch a message might be permissible without perfidious

and Microsoft

much as would

an innocuous invitee.

tags

would

constitute an illegitimate act of

disguising any dangerous military intruder in the

58
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LOAC in mind, a commander must also possess addi-

the principles of

tional information prior to requesting permission for, or directing, a

or person?

cility

He

is it

or she must also understand the effect

—

cascading or collateral

the

target,

a

network,

—both

Whether

the target

is

and

the Target?

and evaluating

is

a

link, fa-

military

its

lawfulness, will continue to

cus of rules of engagement, and attacks against information systems are
tion.

As

CNA will cause.
What

Determining the

—

commander must know the target

practical matter, the

CNA.

purely military or

no excep-

or nominally civilian but

civilian,

intertwined with military purposes or uses (dual-use)

be a fo-

central to this analysis. In

is

the computer network attack realm, achieving "Supervisory Control and Data

(SCAD A)

Acquisition"

puter control of a

Over

the

last

power

twenty

often the objective.

As

US

is

quickly

states,

and

is

is

the

com-

becoming

a violation

targeting dual-use

becomes modernized and networked

this infrastructure

one proponent has argued
vilian bridges

SCAD A

more on

military has relied

most nations throughout the world, reaching system

crative targets

48

is

system, railroad or sewer system, or fresh water system.

years, the

infrastructure systems.

in

over a target

a milestone in

that the targeting

SCADA on a variety of lu-

any military operation. 59 At

least

of electric power distribution and

of Additional Protocol

60
I.

The

Basic

ci-

Rule of Article

"In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population

civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at

all

times distinguish between

the civilian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military
objectives

and accordingly

tives." Article
states:

"The

51

(4) states,

civilian

shall direct their

operations only against military objec-

"Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited." 61 Article 51

population

as

such

as

well

as individual civilians shall

(2)

not be

the object of attacks. Acts or threats of violence, the primary purpose of which
to spread terror

among

the civilian population, are prohibited."

Cascading

Effects

Other than the desired military impact, what other probable and
effects

— cascading

effects

—can

the

is

62

possible

CNA cause? Once such effects are assessed,
would require an
any damage excessive in

the principle of proportionality must be examined. This
analysis
light

of whether

civilian systems will

be affected.

of the definite military advantage anticipated?

Is

What

is

the threshold of al-

lowable civilian damage? Are there alternative means available to accomplish
the mission?
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Getting these answers

might be lacking,

the toughest part of the process.

is

collateral effects

frastructure being attacked

may

Intelligence

not be clearly understood, and the in-

may not be

comprehended. Uncertainty

fully

is

some ways, a CNA could be considered like a kinetic, indirect
weapon. Firing a weapon into an area, even during combat, without

the order. In
fire

proper intelligence, observation, and identification of valid targets
unlawful. 63

In

much

the same way, launching a

derstanding of the system being attacked
fact that the

weapon

target system

That

is

itself,

in this case a

and other linked

not to say that the

—

ing placed in inventory

is

generally

CNA without sufficient un-

would be improper. Add

to that the

CNA tool,

on

collateral systems

and

its

may be

effects

a

given

poorly understood.

CNA tool will not have been reviewed prior to befor the

United

States

and many other nations,

it is

a

weapons review be accomplished prior to it being authoHowever, unlike a hand grenade, CNA might have different
rized for use.
effects depending upon the system it is launched against. Additionally, as technology changes, CNA might not have the same effect originally anticipated.
Also of concern, due to the complex nature of computer programming and
principles, is how the commander in the field will ever hope to reach the
same level of understanding as computer and policy experts. Can he rely
upon another's judgment when he is the one "pulling the trigger" by pressing
the keyboard? Will this satisfy his requirements under international law?
What is the minimum level of knowledge the commander must possess?
Must the commander
prerequisite that a
64

•

understand what the targeted system does and

•

understand

•

be in

how and what

a position, either

CNA will do

how

it

operates?

to the targeted system?

through intelligence or direct observation, to judge

the effects of the attack?
•

determine what other systems share or are linked to the target system and

how
•

those other systems operate and

determine what impact the

CNA

what they control?

tool will have

on the non-targeted

shared or linked system?

Blurring Lines:

CNA ROE

for Self-Defense

Up to this point we have concentrated mainly on CNA ROE for mission accomplishment. However,

a brief discussion

worthy of examination.
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of the use of

CNA in self-defense

is
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The 2000
"These

do not

rules

the Rules of

Engagement

on actions for self-defense seems to be clear:
commander's inherent authority and obligation to

position

limit a

means available and to take all appropriate actions in self-defense of the commander's unit and other US forces in the vicinity." 65
It follows, then, that if CNA has been placed into the available inventory of
weapons, it would be available for actions in self-defense, subject only to auuse

all

necessary

by higher authority. Does the novelty of the weapon or the periodic comparison of CNA to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) 66 alter the
thorization

conditions precedent for the exercise of self-defense, namely necessity and
proportionality? 67 If the

use conforms to the four

CNA as a WMD

then characterizing
at least for

CNA

the present, a novelty,

new ROE. The

is

dubious analogy. Although

CNA,

the secrecy with

and, perhaps most importantly, the misperceptions
crease provocation

date

these

self-defense

and

escalation.

considerations. 68

may be

specifically tailored,

restricting

principles,

CNA

is,

does not require creation of an entirely

it

unfamiliarity with

a

LOAC

The

SROE

However,

it

which

may

it is

cause, could in-

accommo-

already stretches to

taking

CNA

treated,

off

the

table

for

an otherwise valid option for self-defense. If

CNA has the potential to remove or counter a hostile act

or hostile intent threat in a "human-friendly" fashion. Unlike a kinetic

weapon,

CNA can disable systems without injuring civilians.
Concluding

Comment

This chapter focuses on the process of developing rules of engagement for

CNA within the greater context of the international law of armed conflict.
does not address the general lawfulness of CNA in international law, except as
largely
bears on use of force, targeting, and the ROE process. That question
It
it

is

academic, often lying outside the immediate needs of the operational

mander and forward-deployed judge advocate. Moreover, much of the
to date, tends

toward the theoretical and thus

scholars than operational

By

offering

some

is

of greater interest and

analysis

utility to

commanders.

practical principles for

developing

ROE, we hope

gin closing the gulf between theoretical discussions of
tional application

com-

by theater and

task force

CNA

commanders. The

and

opera-

its

ROE

to be-

process

includes developing the rules within the context of the law, doctrine, and
force structure, as well as the boundaries of the mission.

mental process, and throughout the application of
spectrum, the

and have

commander should be

a dispositive effect

on the

During the develop-

CNA

personally involved.

political
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across the conflict

ROE

drive

and military landscape.

CNA

.
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Introduction

an exercise emphasizing
In 1997,Agency
exposed the United
in

curity

computer operations

at

State or an organization

infrastructure security, the National SeStates' vulnerability to the disruption

our major military commands

with hostile

intent.

1

at

the hands of a hostile

A year earlier, US

authorities

had

detected the introduction of a program, called a "sniffer," into computers

NASA's Goddard Space

of

Flight Center, that permitted the perpetrator to

at

down-

load a large volume of complex telemetry information transmitted from satellites.

The Deputy Attorney General

reported that the "sniffer" had remained in

place for a significant period of time. 2
detailed Chinese efforts to attack

ing the
into

3

Of equal concern,

an FBI report in 1999

US Government information systems,

White House network. These

actual

and projected

Government computer networks once thought

includ-

interstate intrusions

secure raise important

questions concerning what, if any, rights in self-defense are triggered by such attacks.

More

importantly, they pose the issue of how the right of self-defense,

if

Responding

an attack impacts
tive rules

to Attacks

on

Computer

Critical

a vital national security interest,

of engagement,

Infrastructure

would be

translated into effec-

specifically, legally defensible targeting decisions.

Understanding the Threat

The world of information

operations represents an environment created by

the confluence of cooperative networks of computers, information systems, and

telecommunication

threat posed to these systems

or degraded, or

puter networks

when
is

The concern

infrastructures.

when

addressed here relates to the

operations are unlawfully disrupted, denied,

secure information that

is

stored in computers or

com-

way that it has a
Computer espio-

destroyed, compromised, or altered in such a

on the national security interests of a nation.
nage and computer network attacks, as well as the subversion of political, economic, and/or non-military information bearing on a nation's capabilities and
destructive effect

may well

vulnerabilities,

under

tary response

constitute an unlawful use of force warranting a mili-

The threshold issues which emerge are:
ties
(2)

law

traditional international
(1)

principles.

which peacetime interstate activi-

within the telecommunications highway constitute

a threat

or use of force;

when does such a threat constitute an attack under the international law such

that a right to use force in self-defense exists;

sponse.

To respond to

and

(3)

what

is

an appropriate re-

we must understand the military applications

these issues,

of information technology. This requires an understanding of the Internet. The

network of computers linked by telecommunications
infrastructure and managed by the Department of Defense (DoD) in the 1970s.
The internal computer networks of universities and private research facilities
Internet was originally a

were merged through the development of hypertext, created in 1989 as the primary platform of the Internet. It (hypertext) translates diverse computer protocols into standard format.

This hypertext process, while extremely beneficial to both the military and
civilian sectors, has created vulnerabilities.

implementation of the Internet, which

form

Initiative

practices, can
late, evaluate,

information

is

at

The World Wide Web,

the

full

once the heart of the Defense Re-

and key to the reengineering and streamlining of our business

provide adversaries with

and

adversely affect

critical to

a

potent instrument to obtain, corre-

an unprecedented volume of aggregated

proper management of

DoD

and

US

infrastructure

capabilities.

This chapter responds to these attacks on

US infrastructure. Even though in-

ternational law could not have anticipated specific information warfare concerns

when

the

Hague Conventions of

1899, addressing means and methods ot

422

James P. Terry

were negotiated, the

warfare,

drafters thereof did anticipate technological

The "Martens Clause," included within both Hague Convention II
and Hague Convention IV 1907, provides that even in cases not explicitly

change.
1899,

covered by specific agreements,

civilians

and combatants remain under the pro-

tection and authority of principles of international law derived

from

established

custom, principles of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience, and therefore are not left to the arbitrary judgment of military

was

sion

considered

necessary

to

disproportionate destruction from

future

American
vations,

Civil

and/or

unnecessary

weapons systems not yet developed. The

had just witnessed unimaginable carnage in the Crimean

drafters

War

and the

War resulting from advanced rifling techniques and other inno-

and were cognizant that warfare was rapidly changing. As Greenberg,

al, so accurately state, as a result

largely

prevent

commanders. 4 This provi-

by

et

of the Martens Clause, "attacks will be judged

their effects, rather than

by

their

The Legal Parameters

methods." 5
for

Response

UN Charter System
The

existing legal regime available to deter destructive actions through

computer technology includes the United Nations Charter system and customary international law. The basic provision restricting the threat or use of
force in international relations

provision

"All

states:

Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter.

is

Members

shall refrain in their international relations

from the threat or use of force against the
pendence of any

state,

or in any

That

territorial integrity or political

manner inconsistent with

inde-

the Purposes of the

United Nations." 6

The underlying purpose of Article
tween

States,

is

not to "resort to

Covenant of the League of
12 of the Covenant stated that League members were obliged
war." 7 This terminology, however, left unmentioned actions

which, although clearly

The

drafters

of the

a conflict's status did

hostile,

could not be considered to constitute

of

not preclude cognizance by the international body. Thus,

term "war" was replaced by the phrase "threat or

The wording was

interpreted

hostile activities including not only
flicts,

acts

UN Charter wished to ensure that the legal niceties of

in drafting Article 2(4), the

use of force."

behavior be-

identical to that of its precursor, the

Nations. Article

war.

2(4), to regulate aggressive

as

prohibiting a broad range of

"war" and other equally destructive con-

but also applications of force of a lesser intensity or magnitude. 8
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UN General Assembly Resolution 2625
The United Nations General Assembly

has clarified the scope of Article 2 in

two important resolutions, both adopted unanimously. 9 Resolution 2625, the
Declaration on Friendly Relations, describes behavior which constitutes the
"unlawful threat or use of force" and enumerates standards of conduct by which
must abide. 10 Contravention of any of these standards of conduct
clared to be in violation of Article 2(4). n
States

is

de-

UN General Assembly Resolution 3314
Resolution 3314, The Definition of Aggression, provides

a detailed state-

ment on the meaning of "aggression" and defines it as "the use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political integrity or political

independence of another State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Char-

ter

of the United Nations." 12 This resolution contains

as acts

of aggression. Included in the

list is

against the territory of another State."

13

a

list

of acts which qualify

"the use of any

The

weapon by

a State

resolution provides that the State

which commits an act of aggression violates international law as embodied in the
Charter. 14

The

actions of States or their surrogates in supporting or taking part in acts

of aggression through information technology that threaten
terests

of

or States, whether through disruption of military infor-

a State

mation downlinks in

satellites,

sabotage of vital computer networks, or infiltration

of electronic commercial transmission systems, clearly
of Article

The

2(4).

vital national in-

fall

within the scope

15

Law and

Relationship Between Customary International

When the UN Charter was drafted in

the Charter

1945, the right of self-defense was the

only included exception to the prohibition of the use of force. Customary international law had previously accepted reprisal, retaliation, and retribution as le-

gitimate responses as well. Reprisal allows a State to

otherwise
fliction

on

illegal to

counter the

illegal act

of another

is

a

debate continues

it

as to

as a

is

is

the in-

has caused the victim.

criminal law concept, implying vengeance, that

used loosely in the international law context

act that

State. Retaliation

the delinquent State of the same injury that

Retribution

commit an

is

sometimes

synonym for retaliation. While

the present status of these responses, the

US

position has

always been that actions protective of US interests, rather than being punitive in
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nature, offer the greatest

national conflict.

hope of securing

a lasting, peaceful resolution

of inter-

16

The right of self-defense was codified in Article 51 of the Charter. That article
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
" 17
The use of the word "inherent" in the text of Article
the United Nations.
51 suggests that self-defense is broader than the immediate Charter parameters.
During the drafting of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, for example, the United
provides:

.

States expressed

There

is

its

views

way

sovereign state and
regardless
is

.

as follows:

nothing in the American

impairs in any

alone

.

draft

of an anti-war treaty which

the right of self-defense. That right

is

implicit in every treaty.

of treaty provisions to defend

its

Every nation

territory

is

is

restricts

or

inherent in every
free at

all

times and

from attack or invasion and it

competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in

self-defense. 18

Because self-defense

is

an inherent

right,

its

contours have been shaped by

custom and are subject to customary interpretation. Although the
ticle

51

drafters

of Ar-

may not have anticipated its use in protecting States from destructive ac-

tions perpetrated through technological means, international

law has long

recognized the need for flexible application. Former Secretary of State George
Shultz emphasized this point

when he stated that: "The UN Charter is not a sui-

The law is a weapon on our side and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent." 19 The final clause of Article 2(4) supports this interpretation and
forbids the threat or use of force "in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes
cide pact.

of the United Nations." 20

The late Professor Myres McDougal, of Yale Law School,
tionship

between

Articles 2(4)

Article 2(4) refers to
refrain

both

and 51 in clearer perspective:

the threat

and use of force and commits the Members to

from the "threat or use of force

independence of any

state,

against the territorial integrity or political

manner

or in any

United Nations;" the customary

has placed the rela-

right

inconsistent with the Purposes of the

of self-defense,

as

limited

of necessity and proportionality, can scarcely be regarded

by the requirements

as inconsistent

with the

purpose of the United Nations, and a decent respect for balance and effectiveness

would suggest that a conception of impermissible coercion, which includes
force, should

threats

of

be countered with an equally comprehensive and adequate conception

of permissible or defensive coercion

21
.

.

.

.
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from Professor McDougal's interpretation is our correlative recognition of the right to counter the imminent threat of techno-violence as well
Significant

as actual destructive acts

of information warfare. This comprehensive concep-

tion of permissible or defensive actions, honoring appropriate response to threats

of an imminent nature,
is

is

merely reflective of the customary international law.

precisely this anticipatory element that

ter destructive acts against critical

it

critical to

an effective policy to coun-

information systems. This does not suggest the

lack of international law restraints

emptive action. Rather,

is

upon

the determination of necessity for pre-

suggests that legitimate considerations for effective

response to evidence of imminent destructive acts against
tions infrastructure

One

must be appraised in the

total

communicawhich they occur.

critical

context in

aspect of this contextual appraisal of necessity, especially as

sponding

It

after the fact to destructive acts against

our

critical

it

relates to re-

information sys-

tems, concerns the issue of whether force can be considered necessary if peaceful

measures are available to lessen the

threat.

To

require a State to tolerate attacks

on infrastructure critical to its security and/or economic well-being without resistance, on the grounds that peaceful means have not been exhausted, is absurd.
Once an attack on critical infrastructure has occurred, the failure to consider a
military response would play into the hands of those governments or groups
who deny the relevance of law in their actions. The legal criteria for the proportionate use of force

on

tack

place.

is

established

once

a State or identifiable

group-supported

at-

technical infrastructure critical to the security of the nation has taken

No

State

is

obliged to ignore an attack

as irrelevant,

and the imminent

threat to the national security requires consideration of a response.

A related, but more difficult, issue concerns the elapsed time between the attack

on critical infrastructure and the

sible.

identification of the State or

group respon-

Admittedly, there must be some temporal relationship between

would be unpreclude the victim of techno-violence from redress, based upon a

destructive act and the lawful defensive response. Nevertheless,

reasonable to

a

it

doctrinaire determination that the threat of further destructive intrusions into a
critical

system

is

no longer imminent, when the

perpetrator's

own

actions have

precluded immediate identification.

The requirement of proportionality is
McDougal and Dr. Feliciano define the rule

linked

to

necessity.

Professor

as follows:

Proportionality in coercion constitutes a requirement that responding coercion

be limited in intensity and magnitude to what

is

reasonably necessary promptly to

secure the permissible objectives of self-defense. For present purposes, these
objectives

may be most comprehensively
426
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important values by compelling the opposing participant to terminate the
condition which necessitates responsive coercion. 22

This definition simply requires a rational relationship between the nature of
the attack and the nature of the response. Although the relationship need not ap-

proach precision,

a nation subjected to

important computer system

may

an isolated intrusion and disruption of an

not be entitled to launch

fender nation. Other canons of military practice, such

cation. 23

as reprisals

Where

there

sabotage will occur,

of a nation's
initial

of-

conservation of rehas

those defensive actions that greatly exceeded the provois

evidence that a continuation of destructive electronic

beyond the triggering event,

ability to

on the

The United Nations

sources, support the principle of restraint in defense.

condemned

as

a strike

that could threaten the very fiber

defend itself, however, a response beyond that related to the

intrusion would be legally appropriate to counter the continuing threat.

Because the real-time relationship between threat and threat recognition

is

often compressed in the techno-violence arena, strategy development is severely

limited with respect to the non-military initiatives that

may be considered in re-

sponse to cyber-attack, although they are always the options of choice where
available. Traditional

tomary

means of conflict

by law and cuson computer systems are,

resolution, authorized

practice, are often precluded because attacks

by nature, covert in execution, unacknowledged by the State or group sponsor,
and practiced with silent effectiveness.
It must be noted, however, that non-coercive efforts to avoid attacks on computer systems and telecommunication networks are also important. Diplomatic
action, alone or in concert

ceivable successful impact
tive,

with

upon

allies

or international organizations with con-

a State or

group considering such

a

cyber initia-

should be considered and employed whenever possible. In 1998, for

example, the

UN General Assembly passed Resolution 53/70, 24 an initiative of

the Russian Federation, that called
lateral levels

upon Member

States "to

promote

at

multi-

the consideration of existing and potential threats in the field of in-

formation security." 25

The United

States

supported

this resolution

with the

following pertinent comments:

The General Assembly's adoption of the resolution in plenary will launch the
international community on a complex enterprise encompassing many
interrelated factors

which

delegates ...

do not ordinarily

address.

For example,

the topic includes technical aspects that relate to global communications
as

non-technical issues

associated

intellectual property rights,

—

as

well

with economic cooperation and trade,

law enforcement,
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other issues that are considered in the Second and Sixth Committees. Further, the
actions and programs of governments are

by no means the only appropriate

for the initiative also involves important concerns
enterprises,

focus,

of individuals, associations,

and other organizations that are active in the private

sector.

26

Despite such international initiatives focusing upon multilateral cooperation,
the opportunity to look to outside assistance in protecting secure transmissions

and critical systems in circumstances where our national security is threatened,
likely illusory.

the National

That responsibility

will

most

remain exclusively within

Command Authorities.

Operational-Legal Considerations

Operational

certainly

is

Law Context Provided

in

Addressing Techno-Violence

in Rules of

Engagement

The rules of necessity and proportionality in the information warfare scenario
are given operational significance

through

of engagement (ROE).

rules

ROE

government may establish to define the circumstances and
limitations under which its forces will initiate and continue responsive actions to
eliminate the threat posed by an attack through technical or other means on
are directives that a

critical

communications/information infrastructure. In the

ensures that the National

US

context, this

Command Authorities' guidance for handling crisis re-

sponses to techno-violence and other threats

is

provided, through the Joint

Chiefs of Staff (JCS), to subordinate headquarters and deployed

US

forces

both

during armed conflict and in periods of crisis short of war.

ROE

reflect

domestic law requirements and

US commitments

to interna-

They are impacted by political, as well as operational considerations.
commander concerned with responding to a threat to his communica-

tional law.

For the

tions/command and control infrastructure, ROE represent limitations or upper
bounds on how to utilize defensive and/or responsive systems and forces, without diminishing the authority to effectively protect his
ture

from

own

critical infrastruc-

attack.

Evolution of JCS Rules of Engagement

Techno-violence against
tion,
tivity

a critical

US

computer system, whether informa-

communications, or command and control-related, represents

which may

peacetime

trigger the applicable

ROE.

US
ROE for US

Until June 1986, the only

ROE applicable worldwide were the JCS Peacetime
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ROE, which until 1986 served as the basis for all commands' peacetime ROE, were designed exclusively for the maritime environSeaborne Forces. These

ment. In June 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger promulgated more
comprehensive
for sea, air, and land operations worldwide. 27 The 1986

ROE
Peacetime ROE provided the on-scene commander with the flexibility to respond

to hostile intent, as well as hostile acts,

minimum
The

and unconventional

1986

ROE sought to terminate violence quickly

and decisively on terms favorable to the United
retary of Defense

States. In

October 1994, Sec-

Aspin approved the Standing Rules of Engagement for

Forces (SROE), which significantly broadened the scope of

ROE.

with

necessary force, and to limit the scope and intensity of the threat.

strategy underlying the

28

threats

As established

in the

SROE, US

US

policy, should deterrence

US

national
fail,

pro-

vides flexibility to respond to crises with options that are both proportional to

the provocation and designed to limit the scope and intensity of the conflict,

discourage escalation, and achieve political and military objectives.

The

herent right of self-defense establishes the policy framework for the

SROE.

These

in-

SROE are intended to provide general guidelines on self-defense and are

applicable

worldwide

to

all

echelons of command. Providing guidance govern-

ing the use of force consistent with mission accomplishment, they are to be used,
absent superseding guidance, in operations other than war, during transition

from peacetime to armed conflict or war, and during armed conflict.
The expanded national guidance represented in the 1994 SROE, as further
refined in the 2000 SROE, has greatly assisted in providing both clarity and flexibility of action for our theater commanders. The approval by the Secretary of

way

military

commanders, wherever

assigned, address unconventional threats such as those

posed to our advanced

Defense has ensured consistency in the

command and

all

control infrastructure systems

when

networks are destroyed, compromised, or altered so
fect

on the

these systems or
as to

have

computer

a destructive ef-

national security interests of the nation.

Targeting Considerations

The SROE,

as

they relate to information warfare, are implemented through

the law of targeting, a subset of the law of armed conflict.

based upon three fundamental principles. These
•

The right of States

•

The launching of

to adopt
attacks

The law of targeting is

are:

means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.
against

prohibited.
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Distinctions must be

on
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Critical

Infrastructure

made between combatants and noncombatants,

the effect that noncombatants are spared to the extent

Because the law of armed conflict

to

possible. 29

an eminently practical law which takes

is

into account military efficiency, these basic principles are also consistent with

non- violent but equally destructive forms of coersabotage of critical defense computer systems. Moreover,

the response authorized for
cive activity, such as
targeting theory

is

premised upon practical considerations that serve the purpose

of defining the objects of legitimate and proportional response to each variant of

whether it be an armed attack on US

aggression,

facilities

or an equally debilitat-

ing computer-assisted attack, and of providing functional targeting criterion to
the responsible

whether

official,

civilian or military.

Executive Order 13010

The key,

then, to an effective response to the threat posed

engaging in attacks against

by

States or

groups

US critical infrastructure must be the commitment to

address the attacks they sponsor within the scope of the law of armed conflict.

We must think of cyber aggression as a variant of terrorist activity.
cisely the

approach taken by the Clinton Administration.

This

When

is

pre-

President

Clinton signed Executive Order (EO) 13010 on July 15, 1996, thereby establishing

the

President's

Commission on

Infrastructure

Critical

Protection

(CCIP), he declared that certain designated "national infrastructures are so
that their incapacity or destruction

.

.

.

would have

a debilitating

defense or economic security of the United States."
critical infrastructure

designated in the

EO

as

The

impact on the

eight categories of

requiring the development of a

national strategy for protection include: continuity of government;
nications; transportation; electric

supply systems; gas and

oil storage

power

vital

telecommu-

systems; banking and finance; water

and transportation; and emergency

services

by Robert T. Marsh, a retired Air
Force General, the CCIP was tasked with developing a comprehensive national
strategy for protecting critical infrastructures from electronic and physical
(medical, police, fire and rescue). Chaired

threats.

On October 13,

1997, the

CCIP issued the unclassified version of its re-

port, entitled "Critical Foundations: Protecting America's Infrastructure." In

addition to determining the challenge of adapting to

a

changing culture, the re-

port found the existing legal framework inadequate to deal with threats to
cal infrastructure.

The

centerpiece of the CCIP's national strategy, then,

critiis

the

domestic and international legal regime required to protect against threats to
critical infrastructure.

May

22,

Although the report

itself

provides few specifics, on

1998, the Administration issued Presidential Decision Directives

(PDD) 62 and 63

in

implementation of its policy framework.
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Presidential Decision Directive 62

PDD 62,

Combatting Terrorism,

sion Directive

(NSDD)

which determined

is

the successor to National Security Deci-

by President Reagan on April 3, 1984,
of terrorism constitutes a form of aggression

138, signed

that the threat

andjustifies acts in self-defense. 30

PDD 62

is

more expansive in its coverage than

NSDD 138 and addresses a broad range of unconventional threats, to include aton critical infrastructure, terrorist acts, and the threat of the use of weapons
of mass destruction. The aim of the PDD is to establish a more pragmatic and

tacks

systems-based approach to protection of
ter-terrorism, with preparedness the

PDD

62 creates the

structure Protection

key to

critical

effective

new position of National

infrastructure

consequence management.

Coordinator for Security, Infra-

and Counter-Terrorism, which

management through

and coun-

"will

coordinate program

the Office of the National Security Advisor. 31

Presidential Decision Directive 63

PDD 63,

Critical Infrastructure Protection,

ordinator, established in

and private
tures.

The

mandates that the National Co-

PDD 62, initiate immediate action between the public

sectors to assure the continuity

goal established within

PDD

63

and
is

viability

of critical infrastruc-

to establish a reliable intercon-

nected and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003.

A

National Plan Coordination Staff is tasked with integrating the plans developed

by the various departments of government serving as lead agencies within their
respective areas of responsibility into a comprehensive National Infrastructure
Assurance Plan, overseen by the National Infrastructure Assurance Council.

The Council includes representation from both the public and private sectors.
Under the PDD, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Infrastructure
Protection Center, established in February 1998, will continue to provide a
control and

crisis

management point for gathering information on threats to

ical infrastructure

and

for coordinating the federal

Targeting in the Context of PDD 62 and

The issue remains, however, should the

crit-

government's response. 32

PDD 63

Critical Infrastructure Plan

fail,

what

remedy can be applied under the law of armed conflict. If a response is justified, what targets in a perpetrator country are proportional to the threat posed by
destruction or compromise of critical infrastructure. Again, our experience in
addressing terrorism must be reviewed. The reason this is necessary is that the
flexibility of the law of armed conflict in addressing unconventional threats provides far more salient options than domestic law or intelligence law in cases

legal
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where the very fiber of our national security is placed at risk. For example, as W.
Gary Sharp correctly points out, an unlawful entry into and/or compromise of a
critical national security system by an individual or individuals can be viewed as
criminal activity under the jurisdiction of the federal and state law enforcement
officials. The same intrusion by the same individual or individuals representing a
State or international entity could be viewed as lawful espionage or intelligence
gathering practiced by all States. If, however, that intrusion and the debilitating
effect it has on national security can appropriately be characterized as an attack
on vital US national interests, the range of options is greatly enhanced. 33
This is important because the State or group attempting to compromise US
national security through the calculated sabotage of critical infrastructure
tacking the nation,

not with bombs or

bullets,

grid or of a

US

at-

but with the intent of destroying

The

equally critical elements of national well-being and sovereignty.

power

is

loss

of a

telecommunications network through computer gener-

ated viruses for an extended period of time

would have

the capacity of placing

more Americans at risk than a significant military threat.
The United States was jolted into an awareness of the changing character of aggression when its embassy in Tehran was seized on November 4, 1979, by Iranian
militants

who

ment. 34 In

enjoyed the support of Ayatollah Khomeini's revolutionary govern-

US

August 1998,

Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam were the

of unconventional warfare

subjects

Nairobi. In the attacks, a

US

attacks, resulting in the significant loss

response was only possible because of the linkage es-

tablished

between Osama bin Laden's organization and the

interests.

The

thrust

claim the initiative

unconventional

of the

lost

of life in

new US

strategy, outlined in

while the United States pursued

threats, especially those to

its

assaults

PDD

62,

on American

must be to

a reactive policy

re-

toward

critical infrastructure.

An examination of authorized responses (and the selection of appropriate targets) to

techno-violence requires an understanding that cyberterrorism

is

egy that does not follow any of the traditional military patterns. In

fundamental characteristic of attacks on
the established

critical infrastructure

is its

a stratfact,

a

violation of

norm of information security. The only norm for cyberterrorism

While traditional international law requires discrimination
among those affected by an attack and proportion in its intensity, the nature of
information warfare and cyberterrorism is such that success is measured by the
extent and duration of destructiveness to the systems targeted, with no concern

is

effectiveness.

for those affected. In the

wage countervalue

Why
attacks

is

on

this

rather than counterforce warfare.

important?

critical

contemporary language of defense economics, they

It is

important because the only credible response to

infrastructure

is

deterrence. There must be an assured.
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imposes unacceptable costs on the perpetrators and those

effective reaction that

who make possible their activities.
suffice.

For domestic intruders, the criminal law

For those operating outside the United

States, the

US

may

reaction must

counter the cyber-terrorist's strategy within the parameters of international law

and

PDD

flexibility

62.

Those

who

suggest otherwise neither understand the inherent

of international law nor the cost of violating that law.

In this regard, a case for a response in self-defense

is

not persuasive either on

the political or legal level unless a reasonable basis of necessity

Those

to

whom

a justification

public) will consider

whether

addressed (that

is

it is

force as a purely discretionary act.

is

perceived.

other governments or the

is,

well founded; they will not regard the use of

An important dimension of this question con-

cerns the separate issue of when does action

become

the use of force necessary to enforce adherence to the

necessary; that

when

is,

is

norm of information secu-

As Professor Lauterpacht has pointed out, every State judges "for itself, in
the first instance, whether a case of necessity in self-defense has arisen," but that

rity.

"it is
is

obvious that the question of the legality of action taken in self-preservation

suitable for determination

." 35

thority or political

body

that each nation

free to

right

is

and must ultimately be determined by a judicial au-

.

.

.

defend

The United
itself and

of self-defense and the necessity

.

.

.

is

States has

long taken the position

the "judge of what constitutes the

of same." 36 Similarly, more than

century ago, Secretary of State Frank Kellogg noted that
sorted to the use of force, "if it has a

condemn
A

its

good

case, the

world

a State has re-

will applaud

and not

actions." 37

Pro-Active Response to Threats to Critical Infrastructure
International

The

when

a half-

is

Authorized under

Law

decision to respond with force against techno-violence must be

closely tied to a clear objective as in the case

where planning

is

conducted

the higher end of the coercion spectrum. Because the relationship

at

between

low intensity conflict arena, a stratcyberterrorism must always focus on the underlying political pur-

objective and threat

egy to fight

as

is

often unclear in the

pose of the State or group attempting to degrade or destroy an element of
critical

US

infrastructure,

whether

that

tions, intelligence, or defense-related.

element be commercial, communica-

That purpose

radation of our critical systems such that
militarily or protect ourselves

from

we

is

unquestionably the deg-

are unable to defend ourselves

serious political or financial overreaching

on the part of our adversaries. How do we counter this purpose, this objective?
Former Secretary of State Shultz was correct when he stated that US policy
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to

"must be unambiguous.
United
." 38

must be clearly and unequivocally the policy of the
back to resist challenges, to defend our interests

States to fight

It

—

Implementation of this pro-active policy requires that

use of all the
fensive

legal tools

we make

.

the fullest

These should include not only those de-

in our arsenal.

US

and protective measures which reduce

new

also

weapons

.

.

systems-vulnerability, but

and agreements on international sanctions,

as

well

as

the

While we should use our miliand where lesser means are not available, there

collaboration of other concerned governments.
tary

power only

will

be instances where the use of force

as a last resort

is

the only alternative available to elim-

inate the threat to critical civil or military infrastructure.

Closely related to the legal question

is

clear linkage to a supporting State exists,

respond with discrimination in

a

the political question of linkage.

we must publicize that relationship and

manner

calculated both to eliminate the cur-

rent threat while deterring the offending State

The

When

from further destabilizing actions.

"center of gravity" in the offending State must always be that target or capa-

bility

which most

destabilize

our

significantly

undermines

critical infrastructure.

ternational conflict

and

is

bound by

that State's will to continue to

Since cyberterrorism

its

rules, lawful

is

a lesser

response

form of in-

properly limited

is

which do not enjoy civilian immunity. Military targets may be
preferable for two other reasons. First, the selection of military targets, while our
to those targets

adversaries are attacking our civil infrastructure in violation of international law,

should not

concerns on the part of other

raise

military targets

would

techno-violence

The

thrust

on the fact
forms of armed conflict.

refocus attention

are, in fact,

of this

States. Additionally, selection

new

PDDs

strategy, outlined in

that cyberterrorism

address the threat posed

the

commitment

conflict. Full

by those willing

effective,

to target

our

to hold those accountable responsible

implementation of the two

PDDs

where deterrence

fails,

policy to in-

cyber-terrorists

nor

coordinated policy to

critical infrastructure

is

under the law of armed

should lead to increased plan-

ning for protective and defensive measures to address
tional security, and,

a reactive

which neither deterred

encouraged successful response. The key to an

and

62 and 63, must be to re-

claim the initiative lost while the United States pursued
cidents of information warfare

of

this

challenge to

respond in

to

a

US

na-

manner which

eliminates the threat, rather than treating each incident after the fact as a singular crisis

provoked by international

participants in international coercion
actor,

criminals.

where

By

treating cyber-terrorists as

clear linkage can

the right of self-defense against their sponsor

ing coercion

(political,

economic, or

military)

response to the threat.
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This pro-active strategy to the threat posed by attacks on our

critical infra-

structure embraces the use of protective, defensive, non-military,

measures.

It

attempts, for the

first

and military

time, to define acts designed to destabilize our

most important infrastructure systems in terms of "aggression," with the
concomitant right of self-defense available as a lawful and effective response.
eight

The

more

use of international law and,

specifically, the

law of armed

conflict,

complement the current criminal law approaches, but give pause to
those who would target vital US interests.

will not only
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Introduction

on computer network attack held at
Newport, Rhode Island, in June 1999 ad-

everal participants in the conference

the Naval

War

College in

dressed the issue of whether serious consideration should be given in the near future to negotiating international agreements to regulate information warfare.

The consensus appeared to be that it would be useful to expand current efforts to
improve international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer
crimes and "cyber-terrorism," but that

it

would be premature anytime

in the

near future to attempt any further prohibition or regulation of State action in the

broad area of information warfare.
will discuss a

I

number of possibilities

generally share those views. This chapter
for international agreements

on informa-

tion warfare, indicate the extent of declared support for negotiations intended to

produce such agreements, and venture an opinion on their potential

Some

observers have said that the few

information warfare
sire to

already heard for a treaty banning

come primarily from "have-not"

nations that fervently de-

keep the "haves" from reaping any advantage from the information war-

fare capabilities

that

calls

utility.

they have developed by their effort and investment. Others say

new agreements are necessary to enhance the international cooperation that

Time

Is It

is

for

a Treaty on Information Warfare?

of malicious interference with information

essential to effective suppression

systems that are essential to development, prosperity, international peace and security,

and human health and

safety. Still others say that

nologies raise novel international legal issues that

new information tech-

would be

by
negotiating a definitive international agreement than through the slow and uncertain process by which customary international law develops. Others reply
that we are not yet smart enough to sit down and create international law on
these new issues, and that the gradual accumulation of practice and precedent of-

fers

better resolved

the best process for applying existing international law to these

cyberspace.

I

and on some

boldly take the position that each of these views

is

new issues in

correct

—

in part

subjects.

For the purposes of this chapter,

I

intend to

of a number of

set aside discussion

war-

military missions that are often considered to be elements of information
fare.

These

are the physical destruction of information systems

by

traditional

"jamming" of radio and radar signals),
military deception, and operations security. These traditional military missions
have been conducted for a long time over a wide spectrum of military operations
from peace to war, and the application of international law to them is reasonably
well settled. I also intend to set aside discussion of directed energy weapons such
as high-energy radio, microwave, and electro-magnetic pulse devices. The
technology of these devices is relatively new, but their employment and effects
are likely to be so similar to those of traditional weapons that established principles of international law concerning the use of force and the law of armed conflict can be applied to them with great confidence.
Psychological operations have also been a traditional military mission, but
new technologies such as the broadcasting of radio and television signals from
aircraft and satellites, worldwide access to the Internet, and greatly improved camilitary means, electronic warfare (e.g.,

pabilities to create false

and power. As

we

images and messages give "psyops" unprecedented reach

shall see, there already

international controls over these

new

have been

a

few

isolated calls for

capabilities for spreading

The newest element of information

new

"propaganda."

one currently drawing
the most attention, is computer network attack, or CNA. CNA is conducted by
sending electronic messages from one computer to another through some connecting

medium

or network, such

as

warfare, and the

radio or the Internet, or

of the target computer system. The most

by

a user

(1)

overloading an adversary's

web

by

direct input

common forms of CNA are:

pages or e-mail systems with so

much

input

that they cannot function properly; (2) tricking an authorized user into inputting

malicious logic,

tached

file;

and

as

by sending an e-mail message with

(3)

a virus or a

worm in an at-

obtaining unauthorized access to an adversary's computer

.440

Phillip

system. Unauthorized access

may be
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obtained by exploiting a security weakness

by unauthorized use of a genuine user identification and password, or by other means. Even if an intruder does no apparent
harm, the mere fact that an intruder has gained unauthorized access renders the
system and its contents suspect, since an intruder could have altered stored data,
changed the operating system, or introduced malicious logic such as a virus,
worm, or logic bomb. An intruder may even damage the system to the point
where it becomes unusable. The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily
on the question of whether it would be desirable to negotiate international
in the target's operating system,

CNA.

agreements to prohibit or regulate

At

this

number of "revealed

point in history, there are a

CNA that make

it

different

truths" concerning

from prior methods and means ofconducting hostil-

them here as common points of departure; the reader can
discussion of them in the other contributions to this volume:

ities. I list

•

•

The more

a nation relies

vulnerable

it is

sophisticated information systems, the

to interference

more

with them;

Geography has ceased to be relevant
that are

•

on

find a fuller

to the security

of information systems

connected to the Internet or that are accessible by radio;

The worldwide

use of comparable equipment, operating systems, and

software greatly

facilitates

CNA;

•

Information technologies change rapidly;

•

Most advances

in information technology are developed

by

individuals or

companies for commercial purposes;
•

Developing

at

least

information systems

modern weapons

some
is

capability to interfere

relatively

systems,

with other nations'

cheap and easy, compared to other

and the necessary expertise and equipment

are

widely available;
•

CNA "offense" currently seems to be dominant over CNA "defense," but
the balance

•

between them might change quickly and

In most cases

it is

difficult to locate

dramatically;

and identify computer

intruders, to

discover their motive and intent, and to determine whether their acts are
attributable to State sponsors;
•

Because

many

and

"dual-use" information infrastructures

military operations

makes them legitimate

whose support

to

military targets are also used for

noncombatant purposes, interference with them may endanger the safety
of persons and property protected by the law of war from deliberate attack
and from disproportionate collateral damage.
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Calls For International

Agreements

by governments for new international agreements on information
warfare consist primarily of: (1) initiatives by the United States and by certain
European and other American nations to promote better international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes and terrorism; and (2) a
campaign by Russia in United Nations channels for multilateral arms control
Public

calls

negotiations to protect international "information security."
International cooperation in investigating and prosecuting

computer crimes

has sometimes proven to be quite effective even in the absence of new agree-

ments and working arrangements
fenses.

specifically tailored to this

new category of of-

For example, in 1987 West German authorities relied on the authority

provided by existing German law to trace the origin of over 200 intrusions into

US

government computers to four German nationals who turned out to be
working for the KGB. 1 In far too many cases, however, effective international
cooperation in investigating computer offenses has been frustrated by the unwillingness of the requested State to cooperate,
ity to investigate

and punish computer

its

lack of domestic legal author-

offenses, the absence

of established

procedures and points of contact, and problems arising from extradition

treaties.

In an effort to address such problems, in December 1997 the United States Attor-

ney General hosted

a

meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) Justice and Interior

Ministers to discuss international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution

of computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes. 2 Since

this

of international working groups have devoted considerable
the

G-8

nations' domestic criminal laws

and arrangements providing

for

mutual

meeting, a

effort to

number

modernizing

and to improving international agreements
legal assistance

and extradition in

cases in-

work has also generated a project in the Council of
Europe, which the United States has assisted, to draft an international convention on
"cyber-crime." The United States has also undertaken similar initiatives in the Orvolving computer offenses. This

ganization of American States and at the United Nations. Significant progress has

been made, but there

is still

an enormous amount of work to be done in

For example, while several European nations have made
domestic computer crime laws and the

state

this area.

significant reforms in their

of procedures for international

assis-

tance in investigating computer offenses has gready improved between various nations,

Russia has essentially stonewalled

several

thousand intrusions into

all

requests for cooperation in investigating

US military computer systems in early 1999 that ap-

parently originated in Russian territory. 3

In addition, these efforts have focused

on computer

offenses

individuals that can be characterized as crimes or terrorism.
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prominent

Somewhat

effort to address the use
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made

only nation that has

ironically, the

a

of computer network attack by States against

other States has been Russia. In October 1998, Russian Federation Ambassador
Vasily Sidorov

made a statement before the UN General Assembly's Committee

on Disarmament and
by the

International Security to the effect that Russia

serious threats to international peace

in information technology,

and

that

establishing international principles

it is

is

alarmed

and security raised by developments

urgent to take preventive measures by

on the use of information technology and

possibly an international monitoring and control regime. 4 Russia also tabled a

resolution that called for Member States to express their views

on the

creation of

"international legal regimes to prohibit the development, production or use of
particularly dangerous forms

of information weapons" and the establishment of

"an international system (centre) for monitoring threats pertaining to the security

of global information and telecommunications systems." 5

No

posal. Instead,

vote a greatly

mote

was expressed by other nations

significant support

for the Russian pro-

on December 4, 1998, the General Assembly adopted without a
watered-down resolution that called on Member States to "pro-

at multilateral levels

the consideration of existing and potential threats in

the field of information security," invited

all

Member States to inform the Secretary

General of their views on the subject, requested the Secretary-General to sub-

mit

a

report to the General Assembly in

provisional agenda for

its

its

1999

session,

and included in the

next session the topic, "Developments in the

field

of

information and telecommunications in the context of international security." 6

Undeterred, Russia has continued to pursue
legal

regime" on "information weapons." In

retary General as invited
that "information

its

its

proposal for an "international

submission of views to the Sec-

by the General Assembly

resolution, Russia declared

weapons" can have "devastating consequences comparable

to

the effect of weapons of mass destruction," called for the General Assembly to
pass "resolutions

on the question of information

security with a

view

to reduc-

ing the threat of the use of information for terrorist, criminal or military purposes,"

and proposed the development of

a

code of conduct for

States

concerning international information security that would ultimately be incorporated into a multilateral international legal instrument. 7

The United States also submitted its views, which generally were that the international community should give priority to developing measures to deal with
criminal or terrorist misuse of information technology, and that "it would be
premature to
security in

try to formulate

all its

overarching principles pertaining to information

aspects." 8
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eight other nations

—

Saudi Arabia, and the United
tary General.

Of these,

on Information Warfare?

for a Treaty

Australia, Belarus, Brunei,

Cuba, Oman, Qatar,

—submitted written views

Kingdom

only Belarus and

tions to restrict information warfare.

Cuba

to the Secre-

expressed support for negotia-

The Secretary General offered no opinion.

In August 1999, the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs and

Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) hosted a
conference in Geneva, Switzerland on the topic: "Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications and Their Impact on International Security." Russia used the forum to promote its proposals for international legal restrictions on information warfare, but it was unable to garner significant support
the United Nations Institute for

doing more than continuing to study the problem. 9

for

Nevertheless, the current paucity of enthusiasm for negotiating an international

agreement

twenty

restricting information warfare

years, the international

restricting

such weapons

as

community

may not last forever.

In the past

has negotiated multilateral treaties

chemical weapons, blinding

lasers, incendiaries,

weapons designed to wound with undetectable fragments, and antipersonnel
landmines. 10 It might take only a few spectacular incidents involving CNA to
provoke serious interest in placing international legal restrictions upon "information weapons."
Subjects For Possible Agreements

Treaties to suppress private misconduct.

1.

way

efforts are already

under

G-8, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American

States,

Suppression of "cyber-crime. "

in the

and the United Nations

to

As indicated above,

improve domestic criminal

legislation, international

cooperation in investigations and prosecutions, and extradition
to

more

US

effectively investigate

treaties in

and punish cross-border computer crimes. The

and British submissions of views mentioned above recommended

United Nations give

this area

order

top priority in

its

activities

that the

concerning information

security.

ASSESSMENT:

This topic

is

a logical

candidate for priority consideration,

problem of cross-border computer crime and the required remedial steps are reasonably well understood, and since national security
issues are not directly implicated. (It should be noted, however, that effective insince both the nature of the

ternational cooperation in tracing

would

computer network

also greatly expedite attribution

attacks to their origin

of State-sponsored CNA.) That

is

not to

say that the negotiation of the necessary international agreements will be easy,
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given the major differences that exist

croachment on
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legal systems

traditional sovereignty principles that will

ating legally binding obligations to

prosecutions, not to

assist

mention the proposals

and the en-

be inescapable in cre-

with criminal investigations and
that are

under consideration for re-

ciprocal authorization of cross-border electronic tracing and monitoring.
2. Suppression of "cyber- terrorism. "

adopt the

A "cyber-terrorism" agreement might well

common features of the existing multilateral treaties intended to com-

bat such terrorist acts as the hijacking and sabotage of aircraft, hostage taking, attacks

on diplomats,

These

common

terrorist

bombing, and the seizure of ships on the high seas. 11

features are a recognition

of universal or quasi-universal juris-

diction over individuals committing specified acts, an obligation

Party to put into place severe domestic criminal penalties for such

upon each
acts,

obligation to prosecute or extradite any person suspected of such acts

found in the

territory

and an

who

is

of a Party.

ASSESSMENT: It may prove to be difficult to generate much interest in negotiating

such an agreement until the international community experiences inci-

which "cyber-terrorism" causes death and destruction on the scale
experienced as the result of more traditional forms of terrorism. To date, the most
common form of cross-border CNA motivated by political reasons has consisted
of individuals defacing the target nation's websites, which is likely to strike most
people more as vandalism than as terrorism. Even the theft of large amounts of
dents in

money

or the crippling of expensive information systems

is

unlikely to provoke

more traditional terrorist acts that diIt would probably take an incident in which

the same kind of fear and loathing created by
rectly threaten

innocent

human lives.

planes crash, trains collide, floods cause death and devastation, or a nuclear acci-

dent spreads radiation over the countryside before
as

"cyber-terrorism." Another major problem

definitions
ties

of the

acts to

be suppressed.

here, but rapid progress

—

It is

or even

It

moving

the international

community

at

—seems

of a "cyber-terrorism" treaty

may turn out that the most effective legal mechanism

for suppression of "cyber- terrorists" will

cussed above, that

would be reaching agreement on

certainly worth exploring the possibili-

large to devote serious effort to negotiation

unlikely in the near future.

CNA would be taken seriously

would put into

tate cross-border investigations

effect

be "cyber-crime" agreements,

as dis-

domestic computer crime laws and

facili-

and prosecutions.

Treaties to restrict state action.

1

.

Declarations of general legal principles. Perhaps the simplest

approach to ad-

vancing the development of international law on information security would be
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broad relevant principles of inter-

to negotiate a multilateral treaty that declares

national law.

which

An example of such a document is the

declares, inter

alia,

that space

not subject to national appropriation or

is

territorial claims, that nations are obligated
ties

1967 Outer Space Treaty, 12

not to interfere with the space activi-

of other nations, that space objects remain under the jurisdiction and control

of their nation of registry, that nations bear international responsibility for their
space activities, and that established principles of international law, including the

UN Charter,

apply to space

declaration of principles

activities.

Some

candidate principles for a similar

on information activities might be that nations must not

damage/disrupt/interfere with the information systems of other nations; that

such

acts violate the

sovereignty of the victim nation and threaten international

peace and security; and perhaps even that interference with information systems
causing death, injury, widespread property damage, or serious damage to

munications, public

utilities,

tional security systems will

economic

institutions,

emergency

com-

services, or na-

be considered to be equivalent to an armed

attack,

thereby authorizing the victim nation to employ the remedies provided under
international law to the victims of traditional

armed attacks, including the use of

force in individual or collective self-defense.

ASSESSMENT:

It

will take

some time

for

most nations

to determine

what

international legal principles concerning information warfare are likely to best

serve their long-term national interests.
ticated information systems

have

little

Even nations that already possess sophis-

confidence

at this

ably forecast near-term technical developments that

point that they can

may

reli-

drastically affect the

balance of information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities. Those nations
that

have even

must make

a

a

minimum

judgment

of capabilities to engage in information operations

as to

whether

their interests

would be

best served

by

keeping open their options to interfere with other nation's information systems,
especially

when they are engaged in an international armed conflict,

their national interests

gime

or whether

would be best served by creating an international legal re-

that broadly prohibits such interference.

The

current domestic and international debate over "space control"

may

present a useful analogy. As indicated above, the Outer Space Treaty declares the
general principle that nations will not interfere with the space activities of other
nations.

However,

its

provisions recognizing that nations must conduct their

space activities in compliance with international law, including the

UN Charter,

bring to bear the international law principles that force can be used in

and to execute mandates of the Security Council. Accordingly,
these widely-recognized legal authorizations for the use of force apply to space
activities in the same manner as they do in the air, at sea, and on land.

self-defense
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Furthermore, since the Outer Space Treaty is
international

armed conflict, we

silent as to

are left to rely

its

application during an

on the general principles of inter-

which its obligations may apply in warIn these circumstances, there has been considerable activity in the UN
time.
General Assembly and in the Conference on Disarmament devoted to drafting a

national law to determine the extent to
13

multilateral

agreement to prevent an "arms race in space."

this activity has

produced

virtually

which might

however,

results.

14

to develop international legal measures

"arms race in space" might be seen

versus the "have-nots,"

date,

nothing in the way of concrete

The continuing impasse over attempts
to prevent an

To

as a

be seen

also

confrontation of the "haves"
the dynamic at

as

work

in the

On the

other hand,

the impasse might also be seen as reflecting the reluctance of at least

some of the

impasse over proposals for complete nuclear disarmament.

thirty or so space-capable nations to participate in formulating international legal

when they have yet to reach their own
own long-term national interests lie.

principles concerning space control

judgments concerning where

their

The analogy between space control and information warfare is less than exact,
for several reasons. One is the fact that it is many orders of magnitude easier for a
nation to develop a significant information warfare capability than

velop space control capabilities. This

network
flicts as

attacks that

demonstrated by the computer

have already been reported in connection with such con-

Kosovo and Chechnya, and in

and mainland China.
ploys at least

clearly

is

15

the continuing tensions

The converse

is

also true

some automated information

virtually every nation

systems,

many

seems unlikely that very

it

"non-players" in information warfare.

them

come

will

to firm conclusions

It

interests

formation warfare

activities.

making them vulnerable

2.

Arms

community

to

In these circum-

seems equally unlikely that

anytime soon about
restricting

how

many of

their

own

CNA or other in-

Accordingly, even a declaration of general legal

principles concerning information warfare

international

em-

nations will regard themselves as

might be affected by

long-term national

between Taiwan

—

CNA, while only about thirty nations conduct space activities.
stances,

to de-

it is

is

likely to

be beyond the grasp of the

for the foreseeable future.

Control Agreements.

Another approach would be

to negotiate agree-

would commit themselves not to develop, possess,
or transfer certain information warfare capabilities, or to use them in a manner that
is destabilizing to other arms control regimes or to crisis management systems.

ments under which the

ASSESSMENT:
which

is

that

not

parties

This approach

many

long-term national interest

from the great

difficulty

nations
lies

subject to the

is

—

if

any

—have

same caveat
figured out

in relation to information warfare.

of defining exactly what
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agree not to develop, possess, or transfer; from the apparent impossibility of

from the fact that governments have no monopoly over the development or use of CNA capabilities; and from the fact that CNA capabilities and vul-

verification;

nerabilities

change

The development of "hacking"

rapidly.

cottage industry, unlike nuclear weapons, tanks,
missiles,
all

is

a

worldwide

submarines,

ballistic

or warplanes. Powerful hacker tools are posted on the Internet for use by

comers. 16 Furthermore,

bilities

artillery,

tools

many highly capable computer network attack capa-

spring directly from techniques and programs developed for legitimate

purposes. 17 For these reasons,

it is

difficult to

envisage

how an arms control-style

agreement could be negotiated anytime in the near future. In addition, any proposal for a nonproliferation agreement might well raise suspicions

developing nations that the "have" nations are engaged in

a

among

the

conspiracy to deny

the developing nations the benefits of highly capable information systems.
Strategic arms control agreements often contain provisions to preserve or ex-

pand transparency, such as obligations not to interfere with other parties' national technical means of verification. It may not be necessary to negotiate
separate agreements in order to extend the reach of such agreements to

ban elec-

means of interference with national technical means of verification. At
most, an agreed interpretation by the parties should suffice. Another similar extension of arms control principles that might prove to be both useful and attainable would be an agreement that the parties will not employ information warfare
techniques in a manner that would interfere with each others' command and
control of strategic weapons or disrupt missile attack warning systems.
Another theme of arms control agreements has been to create new confidence-building procedures, as in the Open Skies Agreement. 18 However, it is
tronic

difficult to

imagine

computer network

how a

confidence-building agreement could be devised for

attack capabilities, since such an

agreement would

entail

widespread access by each party to the national computer systems of other parties
that

would be

exceptionally intrusive without holding out

much promise of

effectiveness.

In 1989, the United States and the Soviet

gerous military

activities in

Union agreed not

to

conduct dan-

peacetime in proximity to the military forces of the

One of the activities in which the parties agreed not to engage is
with command and control networks in a manner which could

other party. 19
interference

harm

damage

equipment of the other party. Since electronic interference was already the primary mechanism causing interference
with command and control networks, it would appear that this agreement can
cause

to personnel or

be applied to

to

CNA without change. Whether circumstances will make

priate to enter into similar

it

appro-

agreements with other nations remains to be seen.
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.
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Existing law of war treaties ban the use in interna-

of weapons such

conflicts

as

expanding

bullets,

barbed weapons,

on the basis that, used as intended, they are likely
to cause unnecessary suffering. 20 The methods and means of information warfare do not generally raise such considerations, since few information warfare
techniques cause any direct personal injury or impairment to health. An odd and
isolated exception is a report by Russian authorities that they have discovered a
computer virus called "666" that displays certain light patterns on a computer
screen that cause the operator to lapse into a coma. Fifty computer operators are
reported to have died as a result of exposure to the "666" virus. 21 With this bizarre exception, information warfare "weapons" are not generally understood
to cause unnecessary suffering in the same way as do weapons that have been
banned for this reason.
The law of war also bans the use in international armed conflict of weapons
and projectiles

filled

with

that are indiscriminate,

glass

i.e.,

they cannot be controlled and directed only against

authorized military targets. Poison gas and non-self-destructing/non-self-disabling

antipersonnel landmines are examples of weapons that have been banned for this
reason. 22

We

"worms"

that clearly

have already seen self-propagating computer "viruses" and

through military and

foreshadow the

issue

of malicious logic that runs

amok

computer systems. Again, however, malicious
computer logic is unlikely to directly cause injury and death. Furthermore, any
attempt at drafting an international agreement that would ban indiscriminate information warfare "weapons" is likely to founder on the difficulty of defining
them.
tional

It

civilian

seems unlikely that any resulting agreement would advance interna-

law beyond the principle that "information weapons,"

like

all

weapons,

must be discriminate.

Law of war
attacks

on

agreements have

taken the tack of banning or restricting

certain targets, such as medical facilities, prisoner of war camps,

cultural property. 23

from

also

attack

These existing agreements already protect these

by any means, including information warfare techniques.

and

facilities
It

might

be argued that infrastructures that are heavily relied upon for the health and
safety

of the civilian populations and that are particularly vulnerable to

CNA

should be specifically protected from such attack by international agreement.

Examples might be public

utilities,

transportation, communications, financial

networks, emergency services, and universities.

The problem

is

that such sys-

may in certain circumstances be legitimate targets of attack. This may be
the case when the system is being used to provide direct support to military
operations, as when a single electric power net is used both for military and
civilian purposes. It may also be the case, in a long and protracted conflict,
tems
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that a belligerent's transportation, utilities, financial system,

development systems become valid military

would

undermine

significantly

because disrupting them

military strength. Accordingly,

would agree

it

seems un-

bestow blanket immunity on such sysan international agreement could be negotiated that would

likely that the nations

tems, or that

its

targets

and research and

to

advance law of war principles on the targeting of dual-use infrastructures be-

yond

would be highly counterproductive
to ban CNA against such infrastructures while leaving them open to attack by
traditional military weapons, which would in most cases create a much greater
their current state. Furthermore,

it

danger of collateral damage.

one theme of the Russian initiative for a ban on "especially dangerous
information weapons" has been a push for limitations on psychological warfare.
Finally,

The Russian statement submitted to the
to the threat
cal

Secretary General in June 1999 referred

of "(u)se of information with

a

view to undermining a State's politi-

and social system; psychological manipulation of a population for the purpose

of destabilizing society." 24 The Cuban submission

also addressed this issue:

"The misuse of information and telecommunications
resources, especially

systems and information

when such systems and resources are used by some States to

carry out their policies of interference in the affairs of other States,

is

an infringe-

ment of the sovereignty and independence of the affected States and creates cen-

may pose

a serious threat to international security." 25

From
past experience, it seems highly unlikely that the international community will
be eager to create broad restrictions on propaganda, even as it has been empowered by new and more powerful information technologies. Russia, Cuba, and
tres

of tension that

other States stung in the past by the Voice of America, Radio Marti, and other

no doubt continue to beat this drum. It seems particularly unlikely that any of the Western democracies will support such calls to impose international legal restraints on the criticism of other societies or
governments. As the authors of a recent article in Foreign Affairs concluded,
"voices of freedom" will

"Their societies are familiar with the free exchange of information, and their institutions

of governance are not threatened by

it."

26

Forms Of Possible Agreements

A. Multilateral Conventions. Multilateral conventions,
which substantially all nations become parties, carry the
authority in establishing

however,

new

that a multilateral

international law.

convention

It

especially those to
greatest

weight of

seems extremely unlikely,

restricting State action relating to

information warfare will be adopted anytime soon. As stated above, few nations
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have expressed any interest in negotiating such an agreement, chiefly because

few nations understand information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities well
enough to determine what principles of international law would best serve their
long-term national

interests.

In addition, the fundamental unhappiness

felt

recent experiences in diplomatic conferences

procedural controversies that
multilateral conventions.

would have

There

to

is

be

are essentially

by many nations

in such fora as the

The

first is a

the result of

likely to generate significant

new

settled before negotiating

two procedural approaches to the

negotiation of a multilateral convention, whether through
special diplomatic conference.

as

UN channels or in a

consensus procedure, which

is

used

Conference on Disarmament. This procedure requires

achieving general acceptance of a negotiating text, usually by a process of tough
bargaining and compromise.

A

recent alternative approach to negotiating multilateral conventions has

been the use of majority-rule procedures, which were in essence the procedures used in the negotiations in Oslo that produced the Ottawa Convention
banning antipersonnel landmines and in the

Rome

Conference

produced

that

the draft Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The

vantage and also the worst defect of such procedures

that they allow the

jority of participating nations to

approve

the negotiations and the
it

produces

almost meaningless because
countries
affairs,

whose

it

this

gratification,

process generated a treaty

military forces

of

but

States.

which

is

number of

apparently will not be ratified by a

and operations are most important to world

including the United States, Russia, and China.

somewhat

which minority

probably not be accepted by the dissenting

Ottawa Convention,

ma-

a result affords the organizers

members of the majority immediate

a treaty that will

In the case of the

a treaty text to

Such

nations have fundamental objections.

is

great practical ad-

lesser extent for the draft Statute

The same

is

true to a

of the International Criminal

Court. Ironically, there were opportunities in the negotiations that produced

both of these conventions to arrive

them more widely

compromises

at

that

would have made

acceptable. In both cases, however, the "like-minded"

groups were not required to agree to these compromises to produce an agree-

ment, and in both they chose ideological purity over wider acceptance. With
these recent debacles in mind,

it

seems unlikely that there will be

thusiasm in the near future for convening any major

making diplomatic conferences on any
B. Bilateral Agreements.

number of nations,

are

new

much

en-

international law-

subject.

Bilateral agreements, or

most useful when only
451
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agreements

among

few governments

a small

are directly
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involved in the issues to be addressed. This
to

one geographic

area,

may be because

the issues are limited

or because only a few nations are capable of engaging in

the activities in question.

Good examples of the latter group are strategic nuclear

arms control agreements and agreements to limit

anti-ballistic

and theater missile

defense systems. Agreements to promote better suppression of cybercrime and

cyberterrorism could be negotiated either multilaterally or bilaterally.
results

of the current

efforts

The

described above in the G-8, the Council of Europe,

and the Organization of American

States are likely to

with regional agreements arrived

at

on some

be

issues,

combination of both,

a

and

bilateral

approaches

taken to others. Negotiation of a global multilateral convention on these issues
unlikely until the problems of cybercrime and cyberterrorism are

is

more broadly

experienced and more broadly understood.

C. General Assembly Resolutions. The United Nations General Assembly
has displayed great enthusiasm for passing resolutions

on Member

jects calling

States to

a

broad range of sub-

adhere to certain principles.

lutions enjoy broad support they

member governments and

on

may

When such reso-

persuasively influence the policies of

international institutions, but such resolutions

not generally have the force of international law.

On

do

the other hand, there are

occasional General Assembly resolutions that are expressly intended to declare
certain principles of customary international law.

supported by

all

or substantially

all

as

tion

An

example of such

among

States in

is

a resolution rec-

the 1970 Declaration

Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 27

Judging from the lack of interest generated by the Russian

mation security"

great weight as

on
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Coopera-

"law-declarative" by the United States

Principles of International

such resolutions are

Members, they may be given

evidence of customary international law.

ognized

When

in the

General Assembly,

it

initiatives

on

"infor-

seems unlikely that there will be

on Member States to observe any set of principles concerning information warfare. Given the novelty
of the international legal issues involved, it seems even more unlikely that the
General Assembly will pass a "law-declarative" resolution on information warenough support

fare in the

to pass

any kind of resolution

calling

next several decades.

D. "Codification" of Existing Customary International Law. Several
participants in the Newport conference recalled the work of the round-tables of
governmental and academic experts

that

met

periodically

from 1988

to 1994,

hosted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which ultimately

produced the San Remo Manual on

International
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The San Remo Manual is widely recognized as an authoritative restatement
of the consensus understanding among the world's leading governmental and
Sea.

academic experts in

branch of international law, and

this

accorded great weight

as

it

will

no doubt be

evidence of the interpretation of applicable

treaties

and

However, there would appear to be
for successfully employing an "experts

the state of customary international law.
little

potential in the foreseeable future

conference" to authoritatively record the customary international law governing
information warfare. At present there

from

no such law, which can only accumulate

is

State practice in reaction to events as they unfold over time. Accordingly,

there are

no "experts"

either, since there

is

no accumulation of State practice that

learned commentators could analyze and restate.

Conclusions

The next few

years are likely to produce a

agreements

designed

cybercrime

and

improve

to

international

cyberterrorism.

of computer network

pression of cyberterrorism
treaties

may find it useful to

their provisions apply to
fication,

command and

may

dramatic

If

cyberterrorism, or if the international
thing in the area

number of regional and
events

community feels

The

in

occur

battling

involving

the necessity to do some-

attacks, a multilateral

result.

state their

cooperation

bilateral

convention on sup-

parties to strategic

arms control

common understanding concerning how

CNA directed against national technical means of vericontrol systems, and attack warning systems.

However, there seems to be little or no prospect of negotiating international
agreements that would broadly prohibit or regulate state action involving information warfare techniques because:
derstood;

(2) traditional

—do not

the issues involved are not yet well un-

arms control and law of war mechanisms are not well

suited for application to
States

(1)

CNA;

and

(3)

the nations

—including

the United

yet have a clear understanding of what kind of international legal

regime relating to information warfare would best serve their long-term national interests.

For the foreseeable future, the development of international law

concerning information warfare

is

most

likely to consist

of the incremental ac-

cumulation of customary international law resulting from the actions and

ments of nations in response to events
circumstances, that

is

as

state-

they unfold. Considering the

probably the best available process. During

this

formative

period, statesmen and their advisers will have a heavy responsibility to bear in

mind

that their acts

and statements

will play a

major role in the development of

international law concerning information warfare.
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PREFACE
This assessment of international legal issues in information operations
the

combined

efforts

reflects

of a superb team of Department of Defense lawyers.

It

could not have been produced without the contributions of representatives of
the General Counsels of the

Agency and

Army, Navy, Air Force,

the Defense Information Systems Agency,

the National Security

as

well

as

the Judge

vocates General of the military services and the Legal Counsel to the

Ad-

Chairman

wisdom and persistence have not only
been of great value but have reflected exceeding well on themselves and their offices. The principal draftsman, Phillip A.Johnson (Colonel USAF, Retired), is
owed a note of special appreciation; his scholarship and dedication were truly
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Their

insight,

extraordinary.

This second edition contains a

number of editorial

events that have occurred since publication of the
discussion in Section

bombing campaign

II

of

EUTELSAT's

edition, including a brief

actions during the 1999

—adds Section XI, Notes

for Further Research.
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NATO

VI concerning
Agreement, and by popular

in Yugoslavia, adds a paragraph in Section

the U.S. -Soviet Dangerous Military Activities

demand

first

changes, refers to several
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INTRODUCTION

A. Sources and Application of International Law.
International law consists of binding legal obligations

Two

of the basic principles of the international

states are legally

legal

among sovereign states.

system are that sovereign

equal and independent actors in the world community, and that

they generally assume legal obligations only by affirmatively agreeing to do

The most

effective instruments in creating international

agreements, which

ments, such

as

may be

either bilateral or multilateral.

that

is

a

law are international

Some of these

agree-

the United Nations Charter, establish international institutions

that the parties agree to invest
that there

so.

with certain authority.

body of customary

international law,

It is

also generally

which

consists

accepted

of practices

have been so widely followed by the community of nations, with the under-

standing that compliance

mandatory, that they are considered to be legally

is

obligatory.

International institutions have legislative authority to create legal obligations
for nations only
thority.

when

their

member

nations have agreed to give

The most prominent example is the power of the UN

to pass resolutions requiring individual nations to

of a particular

situation.

The

that au-

Security Council

perform or refrain from certain

actions in order to protect or restore international peace
text

them

and security in the con-

decisions of the International

Court ofJustice

are binding upon nations that

have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and are

parties to litigation before

Other international

the

power

to

it.

as

be given

impose binding obligations upon nations that agree to submit to

their authority. In addition, certain actions

such

institutions can also

of some international

the International Court of Justice and the

institutions,

UN General Assembly,

are

considered to be persuasive evidence of the existence of principles of customary
international law.

As with domestic law, the primary mechanism
effective

tions

is

tional

is

voluntary compliance. Also

often required as well.

The

as

that

makes international law

with domestic law, the threat of sanc-

international legal system provides institu-

enforcement mechanisms such

as

international litigation before the

Court ofjustice and other judicial and arbitral tribunals, as well as
petition the United Nations Security Council to authorize coercive

International

the right to

measures to protect or restore international peace and security.
tional legal system also provides self-help

right to use force in individual

The

interna-

enforcement mechanisms such

and collective self-defense and the right

in

as

the

some

circumstances to repudiate treaty obligations which have been violated by
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another party.

An

aggrieved nation

may

always withdraw from voluntary rela-

most kinds of commerce.

tionships involving diplomatic representation and

Even

the right to publicly complain about another nation's illegal behavior

provide an effective enforcement mechanism

if such

may

complaints generate diplo-

matic costs for the offending nation.

Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once wrote, "The life of the law has
not been logic; it has been experience." It seldom happens that a legislature fore-

problem before

sees a

it

arises

and puts into place

a legislative solution before

it is

More typically, legislators react to a problem that has already manifested
The international legal system operates in the same manner. The interna-

needed.
itself.

tional

community

until their

ordinarily does not negotiate treaties to deal with problems

consequences have begun to be

felt.

This

is

not all bad, since the solu-

tion can be tailored to the actual problems that have occurred, rather than to a

range of hypothetical
sulting law,

possibilities.

One

consequence, however,

is

that the re-

whether domestic or international, may be sharply influenced by the

nature of the events that precipitate legal developments, together with

their

all

attendant policy and political considerations.

The development of international law concerning

advanced technology to launch
tories

of the

rest

earth satellites

down with perfect foresight and
"Should we permit those nations among us that have access to

provides a good example. If the nations had

asked themselves,

artificial

sat

satellites into orbits that will pass

over the

terri-

of us and take high-resolution imagery, eavesdrop on our

tele-

communications, record weather information, and broadcast information
directly to telephones

and computers within our borders?",

a

very restrictive

regime of space law might have resulted. Instead, what happened was that the
first satellites

entirely

benign devices engaged in

clear that
its

launched by the Soviet Union and the United States were seen

no nation had the

scientific research,

capability to interfere with

territory. In these circumstances,

it

national law, soon enshrined in the

were beyond the
for exploitation

The
early

territorial claims

by

and

it

them

was

as

as

also perfectly

they passed over

quickly became accepted customary inter-

Outer Space Treaty,

that objects in orbit

of any nation, and that outer space

is

available

all.

history of space law contrasts sharply with that of air law.

Much

development of heavier-than-air aviation coincided with the

First

of the

World

War, during which the military power of aircraft for collecting intelligence, attacking ground forces, and bombing enemy cities was clearly demonstrated. The
result was a highly restricted regime of air law in which any entry into a nation's
airspace without its permission was to be regarded as a violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
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Similarly,

we can make some educated guesses as to how the international le-

system will respond to information operations, but the direction that re-

gal

sponse actually ends up taking
events that

draw the

techniques are seen

as a

a great deal

on

the nature of the

nations' attention to the issue. If information operations

as just

the nations' interests,

may depend

another new technology that does not greatly threaten

no dramatic legal developments may occur.

If they are seen

revolutionary threat to the security of nations and the welfare of their

zens,

it

will

be

much more likely that efforts will be made

citi-

to restrict or prohibit

information operations by legal means. These are considerations that national
leaders should understand in

making

decisions

on using information operations

techniques in the current formative period, but
the course of future events

The

often

is

it

should also be understood that

beyond the control of statesmen.

actors in the international legal system are sovereign states. International

and international enforcement mechanisms generally do not

legal obligations

apply to individual persons except where a nation enforces certain principles of
international law through

domestic criminal law, or in

its

a

very limited

serious offenses (war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity,
against peace) that the nations

class

of

and crimes

have agreed may be tried and punished by interna-

tional criminal tribunals.

B. Essentials of Treaty Law,

In domestic U.S. law there are important distinctions between treaties and

executive agreements. This distinction primarily involves issues of Constitutional authority within the U.S.

nationally. Treaties

United

States

will use the

government, but

and executive agreements

and the other party or

term "treaty" in

this

a

of little importance inter-

are equally binding

between the

an international agreement.

parties to

paper as

it is

shorthand way of referring to

all

We

forms

of legally binding state-to-state international agreements.
Treaty obligations are binding on their
nizes certain circumstances in

which

a nation

being suspended, modified, or terminated.

minate
their

a treaty

own

but international law recog-

can regard a treaty obligation

as

The parties can always modify or ter-

by mutual consent. Some international agreements expire by

terms after a fixed period of time. Generally, unless the terms of the

agreement
ally

parties,

establish a right

of unilateral withdrawal,

repudiate or withdraw from a treaty unless

it

a

nation

may not

unilater-

has a basis for doing so that

is

recognized under international law. Treaty obligations are reciprocal in nature.
If one

of the parties commits

the other

may be

a material

entitled to suspend

breach of its obligations under the

its

own
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the agreement entirely. Also, a fundamental change in circumstances

by one of the

a decision

parties to regard

suspended or

treaty obligations as

its

may justify

terminated.

One

of these fundamental changes of circumstance

hostilities

between the

parties.

Some

is

the initiation of armed

international agreements specifically pro-

vide that they will remain in effect during armed conflict between the parties,

such

as

law of war

ever, are silent

and the United Nations Charter. Most

treaties

on whether or not they

how-

treaties,

will continue to apply during hostilities

between the parties. Many peacetime agreements facilitate tourism, transportation, commerce, and other relationships the continuation of which would be
fundamentally inconsistent with a state of armed conflict between the parties.
Agreements on other subjects, such as boundary settlements and reciprocal
rights

of inheritance of private property,

hostilities

may be

and may ultimately be determined

to

unrelated to the existence of

remain in

full force.

The

issues

involved may be particularly complicated when the treaty concerned is multilateral,

rather than bilateral.

When two parties to

engaged

a multilateral treaty are

armed conflict, the result may well be that the effect of the treaty is suspended
between the belligerents, but remains in effect among each belligerent and the
other parties. We will see later in this paper that the United States is a party to a
in

variety of bilateral
affect

and multilateral agreements containing obligations

information operations.

One

of our

tasks will

be to determine

can which of these agreements are likely to remain in effect during

The tests we will apply are
dressing

its

effect

(1)

whether there

is

parties,

and

language, whether the object and purpose of the treaty

with

C.

a state

of armed

hostilities

New Legal Challenges

between the

may

as best

we

hostilities.

language in the treaty ad-

specific

during hostilities between the

that

is

(2) if there is

or

is

no such

not compatible

parties.

Presented by Information Operations.

Many traditional military activities are included in current concepts of "information operations" and "information warfare," including physical

attacks

on in-

formation systems by traditional military means, psychological operations,
military deception,

and radio

signals.

of operations

is

and "electronic warfare" operations such

The

as

jamming

radar

application of international law to these traditional kinds

reasonably well settled. Similarly, electro-magnetic pulse

weapons and directed-energy weapons such
high energy radio frequency

(HERF) guns

as lasers,

micro-wave

(EMP)

devices,

will probably operate in a

and

manner

enough to that of traditional weapons that one could apply existing legal
principles to them without much difficulty. It will not be as easy to apply existing
similar
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international law principles to information attack, a

term used to describe the use

of electronic means to gain access to or change information in

mation system without necessarily damaging
the principal forms of information attack
tack, or in today's vernacular, the

its

physical components.

likely to

is

a targeted infor-

One

be computer network

of
at-

"hacking" of another nation's computer

systems.

The

proliferation of global electronic

communications systems and the in-

creased interoperability of computer equipment and operating systems have
greatly

improved the utility of all kinds of information systems. At the same time,

these developments have

made information

kind of network, whether

it

systems that are connected to any

be the Internet or some other radio or hard- wired

communications system, vulnerable to computer network

attacks.

Moreover,

global communications are almost seamlessly interconnected and virtually in-

stantaneous, as a result of which distance and geographical boundaries have be-

come
result

conduct of computer network

essentially irrelevant to the
is

that

many

attacks.

The

information systems are subject to computer network attack

anywhere and anytime. The attacker may be a foreign state, an agent of a foreign
state, an agent of a non-governmental entity or group, or an individual acting
for purely private purposes. The equipment necessary to launch a computer network attack is readily available and inexpensive, and access to many computer
systems can be obtained through the Internet or through another network to

which

access

is

obtained.

One major implication is

that

it

may be very difficult to

attribute a particular

computer network attack to a foreign state, and to characterize its intent and
motive. For the purposes of analysis we will initially assume away issues of attribution and characterization, returning to them near the end of the analysis. An-

may not be physically present at the
place where the effects of the attack are felt. The means of attack may not be tanother major implication

is

that an attacker

gibly present either, except in the

form of anonymous and

invisible radio

waves

or electrons. This will complicate the application of traditional rules of international

law that developed in response to

troops, aircraft, vehicles, vessels,

territorial invasions

and kinetic weapons

attacks

by

that the victim could see

and touch, and whose sponsor was usually readily apparent.
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II.

Legal Issues

THE LAW OF WAR

A. Essentials of the Law of War.

The
latter

terms "law of war" and "law of armed conflict" are synonymous.

term has the virtue that

conflicts,

it

whether or not they

more
are

The

armed
formally declared wars. "Law of war" is
clearly applies to

all

international

more familiar, and we will use it in this paper. The application of the
law of war does not generally depend on which of the parties was at fault in starting the conflict. The law of war applies whenever there is a state of international
armed conflict, and it applies in the same manner to all the parties to the conflict.
There is a small subset of the law of war that applies to noninternational armed
shorter and

conflicts

vant to

such

this

as civil

wars, but those sorts of conflict are not immediately rele-

paper and will not be discussed. As with other branches of interna-

composed of treaties and customary international
law. The United States is a party to eighteen law of war treaties, along with their
various annexes and protocols, and several more law of war agreements are
tional law, the

law of war

is

pending before the Senate. The United

States also recognizes the existence

of a

body of customary law of war.
The general principles of the law of war have been expressed in various ways,

considerable

but their essence can be said to be

•

as follows:

Distinction of combatants from noncombatants:

tions,

With very

limited excep-

only members of a nation's regular armed forces are entitled to use force

enemy. They must distinguish themselves from noncombatants, and
they must not use noncombatants or civilian property to shield themselves from
attack. If lawful combatants are captured by the enemy they may not be punagainst the

ished for their combatant acts, so long

They

are required to be treated

humanely

for the treatment of prisoners of war,

cessation of hostilities. Persons

they complied with the law of war.

as

in accordance

with agreed standards

and they must be released promptly

at

the

who commit combatant acts without authoriza-

tion are subject to criminal prosecution.

•

Military necessity:

Enemy military

forces are declared hostile.

They may be

attacked at will, along with their equipment and stores. Civilians and civilian

property that

make

a direct

contribution to the war effort

may also be

along with objects whose damage or destruction would produce
vantage because of their nature, location, purpose, or use.
principle

is

that

noncombatants and
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civilian

objects

A

attacked,

a military

ad-

corollary of this

making no

direct
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war effort, and whose destruction would provide no signifiadvantage to the attacker, are immune from deliberate attack.

contribution to the
cant military

•

Proportionality:

lateral injury

When an attack is made against a lawful military target,

and damage to noncombatants and

avoidable. Attacks

is

property

may be un-

may be carried out against lawful military targets even if some

amount of collateral damage is foreseeable,
age

civilian

unless the foreseeable collateral

dam-

The

mili-

disproportionate to the military advantage likely to be attained.

tary advantage to

whole

col-

be gained from an attack

from

rather than only

"military advantage"

an attack considered

isolated or particular parts

not restricted to

is

refers to

tactical gains,

as a

of an

attack. Generally,

but

linked to the

is

full

The commander ordering the attack is responsible for
making the proportionality judgment. The calculus may be affected somewhat if
the enemy has failed to carry out his duty to separate his troops and equipment
context of war strategy.

from noncombatants and

such circumstances the de-

civilian property, since in

fender must shoulder much of the blame for any collateral damage that
corollary of the principle of proportionality

•

may

a

contemplated at-

The

nations have agreed to ban certain

weapons because

they cause superfluous injury.

with

weapons

damage

cause.

Superfluous injury:

filled

A

that the attacker has a responsibil-

reasonable steps to find out what collateral

ity to take

tack

is

results.

Among these are "dum-dum" bullets, projectiles

or other nondetectable fragments, poisoned weapons, and laser

glass

specifically

designed to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced

vision.

•

Indiscriminate weapons:

The

nations have agreed to ban certain other

weap-

ons because they cannot be directed with any precision against combatants.

Among
•

these are bacteriological

Perfidy:

The law of war

identify persons

weapons and poison

provides certain visual and electronic symbols to

and property

that are protected

prisoners of war and prisoner of war camps, the

personnel, vehicles, aircraft, and vessels.
to

immunize

a lawful military target

perfidy. Suppression

symbols, since

of such

known

similar reasons,

it is

gas.

acts

misuse

is

from

attack.

wounded and

Any misuse of these

from attack

Among
sick,

these are

and medical

protected symbols

constitutes the

war crime of

necessary to preserve the effectiveness of such

may

lead the combatants to disregard them. For

unlawful to feign surrender,
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or death to gain an
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well

as

as to

broadcast a

Issues

report of a cease-fire or

false

armistice.

•

Neutrality:

neutral.

Nations not engaged in

A neutral nation

is

entitled to

so long as the neutral nation satisfies

neutral nation

is

belligerents in a

may have

manner

that gives

a right to attack

a conflict in

tions authorized

declare themselves to be

immunity from attack by the belligerents,
its

obligation not to

assist

either side. If a

unable or unwilling to halt the use of its territory by one of the

its

it

the neutral's territory. There

that the concept

which one of the

by the

a military advantage, the other belligerent

enemy in

argument

able support for the

during

may

a conflict

is

consider-

of neutrality has no application

belligerents

is

a

nation or coalition of na-

UN Security Council to use armed force to protect or

restore international peace

and

security. This conclusion

is

based upon Article

49 of the Charter, which provides, "The Members of the United Nations
join in affording mutual assistance in carrying out the measures decided
the Security Council."

In other situations, however,

as

when

a

shall

upon by

nation uses

armed

force in individual or collective self-defense without the benefit of a Se-

curity

Council mandate,

flict

retain the option

it

would appear

that nations not involved in the

con-

of declaring themselves to be neutral.

B. Application to Information Operations.

what information operations techniques will end up
being considered to be "weapons," or what kinds of information operations will
be considered to constitute armed conflict. On the other hand, those issues may
not end up being particularly important to the analysis of law of war issues. If the
deliberate actions of one belligerent cause injury, death, damage, and destrucIt is

by no means

clear

tion to the military forces, citizens, and property of the other belligerent, those
actions are likely to be

•

judged by applying

traditional

Distinction of combatants from noncombatants:

combatants could see each other and make

law of war

principles.

This rule grew up

when

judgment of whether or not to
open fire based in part on whether or not the individual in the sights wore an en-

emy uniform. When

the unit of combat

a

came

to

be

a vessel, tank, truck,

or air-

became more important that such vehicles be properly marked than that
their occupants wear a distinctive uniform. If a computer network attack is
launched from a location far from its target, it may be of no practical significance
whether the "combatant" is wearing a uniform. Nevertheless, the law of war recraft, it

quires that lawful combatants be trained in the law of war, that they serve under
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effective discipline,

and

be under the

that they

command of officers responsible

for their conduct. This consideration argues for retaining the

requirement that

combatant information operations during international armed

conflicts

ducted only by members of the armed forces.
unauthorized persons, their government

If combatant acts are

may be

conducted by

in violation of the law of war,

depending on the circumstances, and the individuals concerned are
retically subject to criminal

war crimes
computer network

tional

is

theo-

enemy or by an internaand anonymous nature of

The long-distance
may make detection and prosecution unlikely, but it

the firmly established policy of the United States that U.S. forces will fight in

full

•

at least

prosecution either by the

tribunal.

attacks

be con-

compliance with the law of war.

Military necessity: In developed nations both military and civilian infrastruc-

tures are vulnerable to
tually

all

computer network attacks. During an armed

conflict vir-

military infrastructures will be lawful targets, but purely civilian

infrastructures

must not be attacked unless the attacking force can demonstrate

that a definite military advantage

banking systems,

universities,

expected from the attack. Stock exchanges,

is

and

similar civilian infrastructures

tacked simply because a belligerent has the ability to do
tracted conflict,
capabilities

so.

may not be

at-

In a long and pro-

damaging the enemy's economy and research and development

may well inhibit its war

target such capabilities. In a short

effort,

providing a lawful basis on which to

and limited

conflict,

however,

it

would be

hard to articulate any expected military advantage from attacking purely eco-

nomic

targets.

tacks just as

it

Targeting analysis must be conducted for computer network
traditionally has

been conducted

at-

for attacks using traditional

weapons.

•

Proportionality:

coalition

During Desert Storm, one of the

bombing campaign was

the electrical

earliest targets

of the

power system in Baghdad. Con-

made of electricity from that system, it
was clearly a lawful military target. The Iraqi government then made a public
pronouncement that the coalition's attack on the city's electrical power system
constituted an act of attempted genocide. The logic of this position was that the
city's sewage system depended on electric pumping stations, so when the electricity went out the sewage system backed up and created a threat of epidemic
sidering the important military uses being

disease.

No

one took

when an

this

claim very seriously, but

this

incident highlights the

made on an infrastructure that is being used for both
military and civilian purposes the commander will not be in a proper position to

fact that

attack

is

weigh the proportionality of the expected
471

military advantage against the
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foreseeable collateral
to discover
tial

damage unless the commander has made a reasonable effort

whether the system is being used for

to public health

and
is

computer network

attack.

civilian

carried out using traditional

stated above, the

purposes that are essen-

This principle operates in exactly the same

safety.

whether the attack

As

Issues

law of war places

weapons or

in the

way

form of a

much of the responsibility for collateral

damage on a defending force that has failed to properly separate military targets
from noncombatants and civilian property. When military officials decide to use
civilian infrastructure for military

purposes (or vice-versa), they ought to con-

may make that infrastructure a lawful military target. There may be no choice, as when military traffic has to move on civilian
highways and railroads. There may be little alternative to military use of civilian
sider the fact that such action

communications systems, since
tary

communications systems

communications.

Where

it is

have sufficient capacity to carry

that

there

is

impractical to put into place dedicated mili-

a choice,

all

military

however, military systems should be

kept separate from infrastructures used for essential civilian purposes.
Military

command and

military targets. Civilian

as

lawful

media generally are not considered to be lawful military

but circumstances

targets,

control systems have long been recognized

may make them so.

In both

Rwanda and Somalia,

example, civilian radio broadcasts urged the civilian population to commit

of violence against members of other

tribes, in the case

for
acts

of Rwanda, or against

UN-authorized forces providing humanitarian assistance,

in the case of Somalia.

When it is determined that civilian media broadcasts are directly interfering with
no law of war objecshut them down. The extent to

the accomplishment of a military force's mission, there
tion to using the

which

necessary force to

force can be used for purely psychological operations purposes, such as

shutting

down

morale of the
tatively

•

minimum

is

a civilian radio station for the sole

civilian population,

is

purpose of undermining the

an issue that has yet to be addressed authori-

by the international community.

Superfluous injury:

We

are not

aware that any weapon or device yet con-

ceived specifically for use in information operations has any potential for causing
superfluous injury, but

new

systems should always be reviewed with an eye to

their potential for causing catastrophic

to an extent not required

•

by military

Indiscriminate weapons:

The

injuries to

human beings

indiscriminate

weapons may

and untreatable
necessity.

prohibition

on

apply to information operations techniques such
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when
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malicious logic launched against a military information system spreads to other

information systems being used to provide essential services to noncombatants.
It

might

also apply if malicious logic spreads to

neutral or friendly nations. Finally,

quence of

it

might be applied indirectly

computer network attack

a

information systems belonging to
if

the conse-

to release dangerous forces, such as

is

opening the floodgates of a dam, causing an oil refinery in a populated area to explode in flames, or causing the release of radioactivity.

Perfidy:

•

It

may seem attractive for a combatant vessel or aircraft to

avoid be-

ing attacked by broadcasting the agreed identification signals for a medical vessel
or

aircraft,

to use

but such actions would be a war crime. Similarly,

computer "morphing" techniques

of state informing

his troops that

signed. If false, this

•

would

might be possible

image of the enemy's chief

an armistice or cease-fire agreement had been

be

also

to create an

it

a

war crime.

Neutrality: If a neutral nation permits

its

information systems to be used by

the military forces of one of the belligerents, the other belligerent generally has a
right to
is

demand that it stop doing so.

If the neutral refuses, or if for

some reason it

unable to prevent such use by a belligerent, the other belligerent

limited right of self-defense to prevent such use by
able, for

vide

example, that

satellite

a belligerent

might demand

imagery of the belligerent's forces to

its

enemy.

It is

may have

a

quite foresee-

that a neutral nation not proits

enemy, or

that the neutral

cease providing real-time weather information or precision navigation services.

There appears, however,
munications relay systems.
neutrality, the

to

be

a limited

The primary

exception to

in

the Rights

and Duties of Neutral

Case of War on Land, to which the United States

provides in Articles 8 and 9 that

com-

international agreement concerning

1907 Hague Convention Respecting

Powers and Persons

this principle for

is

a party,

"A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or

wireless

on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of
telegraph apparatus belonging to it or to Companies or private individ-

uals," so

long

restrict the

use

as

such

plain language of this

well

lites as

There
plies to

tions.

is

as to

facilities are

provided impartially to both belligerents. The

agreement would appear to apply to communication

ground-based

nothing in

this

facilities.

agreement, however, that would suggest that

systems that generate information, rather than merely relay

These would include the

systems mentioned above,

tems such

as

satel-

well

as signals intelligence

satellite
as

it

ap-

communica-

imagery, weather, and navigation

other kinds of intelligence-producing sys-

and hydrophonic systems. For example,
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belligerent nation
services to

belligerent

demanded

enemy, and

its

may have

self-defense, such as

if

that the U.S.

Issues

government deny GPS navigation

the U.S. were unable or unwilling to comply, the

the right to take necessary and proportional acts in

jamming

the

GPS

signal in the

combat

area.

International consortia present special problems. Information systems built

around space-based components require such huge investments and access to
such advanced technology that even developed nations prefer to share the costs

Where

with other nations.

an international communications system

oped by a military alliance such as NATO, few neutrality issues
Other international

consortia,

however, provide

weather data that are used for both
a

civilian

satellite

allies

in future

devel-

are likely to arise.

communications and

and military purposes, and they have

breadth of membership that virtually guarantees that not

consortium will be

is

conflicts.

Some

all

members of the

current examples are

INTELSAT, INMARSAT, ARABSAT, EUTELSAT, and EUMETSAT.

NATO operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1999
which EUTELSAT, the majority of whose membercomprised of NATO members, after two months of the bombing cam-

present a striking case in
ship

is

paign, agreed to stop broadcasting Serbian television programs hostile to the

NATO

The broadcasting at issue materially contributed to the campaign of Serbian human rights violations and thus was deemed inconsistent with
mission.

EUTELSAT
Some

principles.

readers

INMARSAT

may

recall that there

was an

issue

among

INMARSAT

provision of the

tions service provided

the

members of the

consortium providing mobile communications services

what use could be made of the system by the members'

poses."

the

agreement

military forces

stating that the

as

to

under

a

mobile communica-

by the system could be used "exclusively for peaceful pur-

This issue has largely disappeared because of the recent privatization of

INMARSAT

tem continue

The agreements establishing the new privatized sysprovide that the management and board of the new

system.

to

INMARSAT must "have regard to" certain principles, including "acting exclusively for peaceful purposes, taking into

account the past practices of the Organi-

Company," and that "[t]he Company shall act
exclusively for peaceful purposes." However, this language establishes no enforceable obligation, and no legal remedy is provided for any third party. A recent opinion by the Office of General Counsel of COMSAT, which continues
zation and the practice of the

to represent the

United

States in the

new INMARSAT,

notes that neither

INMARSAT or INTELSAT have ever denied service to the military forces of a
member nation, and concludes, "COMSAT envisions no circumstances in
it
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which the

'peaceful purposes' principle

service to the U.S.

would be invoked

Department of Defense or

as a

reason to deny

units thereof."

C. Assessment.

There

are novel features

of information operations that will require expan-

sion and interpretation of the established principles of the law of war. Nevertheless,

the

outcome of

predictable.

this

process of extrapolation appears to be reasonably

The law of war

which current

is

legal obligations

probably the single area of international law in

can be applied with the greatest confidence to

information operations.
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INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF
FORCE IN "PEACETIME"

III.

A. International Law Concerning the Use of Force among Nations.
As discussed above, the law of war authorizes
tional

armed

conflict to

employ armed force

a nation

engaged in an interna-

to attack lawful military targets be-

longing to the enemy. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) may also authorize the use of armed force as provided in the UN Charter. The focus of this section, however, is on the application of international law
principles in circumstances

UNSC

mandate

—

i.e.,

where there

neither a state of armed conflict nor a

is

conduct of military opera-

in peacetime, including the

tions other than war.

An exploration of the manner in which international law on the use of force
among

nations

is

likely to apply to

three distinct purposes:

duct

itself in

(1) it will

enable

a

government

that

is

resolved to con-

scrupulous compliance with international law to avoid activities

that are likely to

be regarded by the target nation and the world community

violations of international law; (2)
activities that

peacetime computer intrusions will serve

might be considered

of such actions; and

(3) it will

it

will enable a

government contemplating
law to weigh the

to violate international

enable a government that

mation attack to identify the remedies afforded to

it

as

is

risks

the victim of an infor-

by international law, includ-

ing appeals to the Security Council, the use of force in self-defense, and other
self-help remedies not involving the use

The

frequently-heard question, "Is

of force.

a

computer network

war?" invokes an obsolete concept not mentioned in the

dom

heard in modern diplomatic discourse.

An

other nation's rights under international law that

act
is

attack an act of

UN Charter and sel-

of war

is

a violation

of an-

so egregious that the victim

would be justified in declaring war. Declarations of war have fallen into disuse,
and the act of war concept plays no role in the modern international legal system.
In any event, significant sanctions

of another nation's

rights that

may follow from much less

would not be regarded

The members of the United Nations have agreed

as acts

serious violations

of war.

in Article 2 (4)

of the

UN

Charter to "refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political

other

manner

independence of any

state,

or in any

inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

This obligation

is

elaborated in the Declaration on Principles of International

Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States
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Charter of the United Nations, General

Assembly Resolution 2625 (1970), which

provides in part:

•

"A war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace for which there is
under international law."

responsibility

•

"States have a duty to refrain

from

acts

of

reprisal

involving the use of

force."

•

"Every State has the duty

from organizing,

to refrain

or participating in acts of civil

strife

or terrorist acts in another State or ac-

quiescing in organized activities within

commission of such acts, when the

instigating, assisting

territory directed towards the

its

acts referred to in the present

paragraph

involve a threat or use of force."

•

"Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs

shall

be construed as enlarging or di-

minishing in any way the scope of the provisions of the Charter concerning

which the use of force

cases in

NOTE: The

United

Assembly resolutions
particular General

lawful."

States has often expressed the

are only

few General Assembly resolutions

its

cases

of customary international law

of the United States have on several oc-

casions publicly endorsed the Declaration

In

most General

that are

are persuasive evidence

a particular subject. Representatives

states fails to

that

meant to be declaratory of inadopted with the support of all members, and are observed

by the practice of states,

tive restatement

view

recommendations, but that in exceptional

Assembly resolutions

ternational law, are

on

is

that the

on Friendly Relations
United

of customary international law,

States regards as
at least until

as

one of the

an authorita-

the practice of

demonstrate that they consider its principles to be legally binding.

1974 "Definition of Aggression" Resolution, the General Assembly

further provided:

•

set

•

the use of armed force

by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as

Article

1

Aggression

.

out in

Article 2.

Charter

is

this Definition.

The

shall

first

use of armed force by a State in contravention of the

constitute prima facie evidence of an act of aggression
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although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has been committed

would not be justified in

the light of other relevant circumstances, includ-

ing the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.

•

Article 3.

Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war,

shall,

subject to and in accordance with the provisions of Article 2, qualify as an
act

of aggression:

(a)

The

invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory

of another
sulting

any military occupation, however temporary, re-

State, or

from such invasion or

attack, or

any annexation by the use of

force of the territory of another State or part thereof;

Bombardment by the armed forces of a

(b)

State against the territory of

another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the territory of
another State;

The blockade of the

(c)

ports or coasts of a State

by the armed

forces of

another State;

An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land,

(d)

or marine and

air fleets

of another

sea or air forces,

State;

The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of

(e)

another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of
their

presence in such territory beyond the

termination of the

agreement;
(f)

The

action of a State in allowing

its

territory,

which

it

has placed at

the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrat-

ing an act of aggression against a third State;
(g)

The sending by or on behalf of a

State

of armed bands, groups, irreg-

which carry out acts of armed force against another
of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its substan-

ulars or mercenaries,

State
tial

involvement therein.

NOTE: The

United

States delegation

among the 35

noted that the text of this resolution

were members of the Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. After the resolution was
adopted by the General Assembly without a vote, the U.S. delegation stated the
view that the resolution did not establish rights and obligations of states, but that
reflected hard bargaining

it

was

states that

"likely to provide useful guidance" to the Security Council. Translated,
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this

statement appears to indicate that the United States does not regard the lan-

guage of this resolution

as a

international law, but that

completely authoritative restatement of customary

its

essential concepts are correct. In

question of what constitutes an "act of aggression"

is

any event, the

unlikely to be as useful for

what kinds of information attacks are likely to be
considered by the world community to be "armed attacks" and "uses of force."
Turning to the question of when force may lawfully be used by nations, the
United Nations Charter provides that in some circumstances the Security
our purposes

as

is

the question,

Council may authorize the use of coercive measures, including military force:
•

The

Article 39.

Security Council shall determine the existence of any

threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression

recommendations, or decide what measures

shall

and

shall

make

be taken in accordance

with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and
security.

•

Article 41

.

The

Security Council

may decide what measures not involving

the use of armed force are to be

employed to give effect to its decisions, and
it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of
communication, and the severance of diplomatic
•

Article 42.

relations.

Should the Security Council consider that measures provided

would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it
may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include
demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.

for in Article 41

Perhaps most significantly, the Charter also provides in Article 51, "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right

self-defense if an

armed

until the Security

tional peace

Read

attack occurs against a

Member of the United Nations,

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-

and security."

together, these provisions of the Charter and the related General As-

sembly resolutions provide
ited uses

of individual or collective

of force

among

a

myriad of terms and concepts concerning prohib-

nations, including the threat or use

aggression, wars of aggression, the use of
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force, acts

of force,

acts

of

of armed force,
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invasion, attack,

bombardment, and blockade. These
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acts

may be directed at the

victim nation's territorial integrity or political independence, or against

marine or

tary forces or

air fleets.

They

all

have in

troops and the use of traditional military weapons.

common

mili-

its

the presence of

The question before us is how

they are likely to apply to computer network attacks.
Further,

when one looks for provisions describing a sanction or remedy,

only

two provisions present themselves: the authority of the Security Council to authorize various sanctions, including the use of the members' armed forces, when
it

finds there

is

a "threat to the peace,

breach of the peace, or act of aggression;"

and Article 51's recognition of the inherent right of self defense

"if an

armed

at-

tack occurs."

There

is

no requirement

armed attack,

a use

that a "threat to the peace" take the

form of an

of force, or any other condition specified in the charter. The

Security Council has the plenary authority to conclude that virtually any kind of

conduct or situation constitutes

a "threat to the

peace" in response to which

it

can authorize remedial action of a coercive nature. Nothing would prevent the
Security Council from finding that a computer network attack was a "threat to
the peace" if it determined that the situation warranted such action.
likely that the Security

It

seems un-

Council would take action based on an isolated case of

state-sponsored computer intrusion producing

little

or no damage, but a

com-

puter network attack that caused widespread damage, economic disruption, and
loss

of life could well precipitate action by the Security Council. The debate in

would more

on the offender's intent and the consequences of the offending action than on the mechanism by which the damage
was done.
The language of Article 51, on the other hand, requires an "armed attack." A
close parsing of the language would tend to limit its effect to attacks and invasions using traditional weapons and forces. On the other hand, there is a
well-established view that Article 51 did not create the right of self-defense, but
that it only recognized a pre-existing and inherent right that is in some respects
such

a case

likely center

broader than the language of Article 51.
History has also seen the emergence of such derivative doctrines

as

"anticipa-

tory self-defense" and "self-defense in neutral territory," both of which have

been

relied

upon by

the United States in certain circumstances. "Anticipatory

blow if it has good reason to conThe JCS Standing Rules of Engagement im-

self-defense" permits a nation to strike the

clude that

plement

it is

this

about to be attacked.

first

doctrine in their authorization of the use of force in response to a

demonstration of "hostile intent" by an adversary. "Self-defense in neutral
tory"

is

terri-

the right to use force to neutralize a continuing threat located in the
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of a neutral

territory

state,

unable or unwilling to

but not acting on

behalf,

when

the neutral state

is

of its territory

as

responsibility to prevent the use

fulfill its

on another

a base or sanctuary for attacks

roots in U.S. foreign

its

nation. This doctrine has venerable

and defense policy, dating

at least to

the Caroline incident.

December 1837, Canada, which was still a British colony, was fighting an insurrection. More than 1,000 insurgents were encamped on both the Canadian
In

A small steamer, the Caroline, was used by
the insurgents to travel across and along the river. On the night of December 19,
and U.S.

sides

of the Niagara River.

1837, a party of British troops crossed the Niagara and attacked the Caroline in

New York,

on fire and casting it adrift
over the Niagara Falls. One U.S. citizen was killed on the dock, another was
missing, and several others were wounded. The United States demanded reparations. The British Government responded that it had acted in self-defense. Secretary of State Daniel Webster agreed that the doctrine of self-defense in neutral
the port of Schlosser,

territory

setting the vessel

was a valid principle of international law, but asserted that it did not ap-

ply in the circumstances of this case. Britain continued to maintain that

its

was legal, but nonetheless apologized for the invasion of U.S.

No repa-

were paid.
In 1986 the United

territory.

action

rations

States

bombed Libya

as a

response to Libya's continuing

support for terrorism against U.S. military forces and other U.S. interests. In

June 1993 U.S. forces attacked the Iraqi military intelligence headquarters because the government of Iraq had conspired to assassinate former President

camp in Afwhich chemical weapons had been

Bush. In August 1998 U.S. cruise missiles struck a
ghanistan and a chemical plant in Sudan in

manufactured.

The

self-defense. Acts

rationale

articulated

of self-defense must

satisfy

for

the

terrorist training

each
tests

of these

actions

was

of necessity and propor-

no requirement that an act of self-defense use the same
means, or target the same type of object, or otherwise be symmetrical to the
provocation, or that the action taken be contemporaneous with the provocationality,

but there

is

tion, particularly if the attacker

B. Acts not

Amounting

is

responding to a continuing course of conduct.

to the

Use of Force.

1949 decision in the Corfu Channel Case, the ICJ ruled that the intrusion
of British warships into Albanian territorial waters, which it found to have been
In

its

without justification under any principle of international law, constituted
lation

of Albania's

vio-

The result seems to be recognition of a
although the remedy may be limited to a

territorial sovereignty.

general international law of trespass,

a

declaratory judgment that the victim's rights have been violated.
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Permanent Court of International Justice, in its
1928 Chorzow Factory Decision, declared that reparations were due to any nation
whose rights under international law were violated by another nation. This concept

is

ICJ's predecessor, the

often referred to

There

is

the doctrine of state responsibility.

also a general recognition

international law have

ing

as

state, in

of the right of a nation whose rights under

been violated to take countermeasures

against the offend-

circumstances where neither the provocation nor the response in-

volves the use of armed force. For example, an arbitral tribunal in 1978 ruled that
the United States was entitled to suspend French commercial air flights into Los

Angeles

after the

French had suspended U.S. commercial

air flights into Paris.

Discussions of the doctrine of countermeasures generally distinguish between

countermeasures that would otherwise be violations of treaty obligations or of
general principles of international law (in effect, reprisals not involving the use of

—

armed force) and retorsions actions that may be unfriendly or even damaging,
but which do not violate any international legal obligation. The use of countermeasures is subject to the same requirements of necessity and proportionality as
apply to self-defense. Some examples of countermeasures that have been generally

accepted

as

lawful are the suspension of diplomatic relations, trade and

munications embargoes, cutting off foreign

aid,

blocking

assets

com-

belonging to the

other nation, and prohibiting travel to or from the other nation.

The international law doctrines of self-defense,
all

require that a nation invoking

against further harm, either

or by persuading

its

—

its

and countermeasures

so with the intent of protecting itself

directly blocking further hostile acts against itself

tormentor to cease and

tion of the nation or

harm

by

them do

reprisal,

citizens

desist.

The motive must be

protec-

or other national interests from further

by itself, is not acceptable. These
do only what is necessary and proportional in

the satisfaction of extracting revenge,

doctrines also

demand

that a state

the circumstances.
In

summary,

it

appears that one trend in international law

is

to provide

some

kind of remedy for every violation of a nation's rights under international law.

Some of these remedies are in the nature of self-help,

the interruption of commercial or diplomatic relations,

remedies

armed self-defense,
or public protest. Other

such

may be sought from international institutions,

as

such

as

an imposition of

coercive measures by the Security Council, or a declaratory judgment or an or-

make reparations from an international tribunal. The issue for the victim is
to choose the most effective available sanction. The issue for a nation contemplating an action that may be considered to violate the rights of another nation
under international law is to accurately predict what sanctions such action may
der to

provoke.
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C. Application to Computer Network Attacks.

There is no way to be certain how these principles of international law will be
applied by the international community to computer network attacks. As with
other developments in international law,

much will depend on how the nations

and international institutions react to the particular circumstances in which these
issues are raised for the first time. If

Article 51, the obvious question

we were to limit ourselves to the language of

would

be, "Is a

computer network

attack an

'armed attack' that justifies the use of force in self-defense?" If we focused on the

means used, we might conclude that electronic signals imperceptible to human
senses don't closely resemble bombs, bullets, or troops. On the other hand, it
seems likely that the international community will be more interested in the

consequences of a computer network attack than in
hard to

sell

its

mechanism.

It

might be

the notion that an unauthorized intrusion into an unclassified infor-

mation system, without more, constitutes an armed attack.

On the other hand, if

computer network attack shuts down a nation's air traffic control
system along with its banking and financial systems and public utilities, and
a coordinated

opens the floodgates of several dams resulting in general flooding that causes
widespread

civilian deaths

and property damage,

it

may

well be that no one

would challenge the victim nation if it concluded that it was a victim of an armed
attack, or of an act equivalent to an armed attack. Even if the systems attacked
were unclassified military logistics systems, an attack on such systems might seriously threaten a nation's security. For example, corrupting the data in a nation's

computerized systems for managing

its

military fuel, spare parts, transportation,

troop mobilization, or medical supplies

may seriously interfere with its ability to

conduct military operations. In

short, the

consequences are likely to be more

important than the means used.
If the international

community were persuaded

network attack or a pattern of such

attacks should

that a particular

computer

be considered to be an "armed

would seem to follow that the victim
nation would be entitled to respond in self-defense either by computer network
attack or by traditional military means in order to disable the equipment and personnel that were used to mount the offending attack. In some circumstances it
may be impossible or inappropriate to attack the specific means used in an attack
attack," or equivalent to an

(e.g.,

armed attack,

it

because the specific equipment and personnel used cannot be reliably

means used would not be effective, or an effective attack on the specific means used might result in disproportionate collateral damage). Where the specific means cannot be effectively

identified or located, or an attack

on the

specific

attacked, any legitimate military target could be attacked, including intelligence
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and military leadership
the

enemy from

targets, as

long

as

Issues

the purpose of the attack

is

to dissuade

further attacks or to degrade the enemy's ability to undertake

them.

There has been some support for the proposition
right to use force in self-defense against acts that

do not constitute

a classic

armed

This view is supported by the inclusion in the General Assembly's defini-

attack.

tion of aggression of acts that
forces,

that a nation has an inherent

such

as

do not

entail

armed

attacks

by

a nation's

armed

the unlawful extension of the presence of visiting forces, or allow-

ing a nation's territory to be used by another state "for perpetrating an act of ag-

A-8—A-ll above). U.S. practice also
as demonstrated in the 1986 bombing ofLibyan command

gression against a third State." (See pages

support

this position,

and leadership

targets to

against U.S. interests,

persuade Libya to stop sponsoring terrorist attacks

and in the 1993 attack on the

Iraqi military intelligence

headquarters to persuade Iraq to desist from assassination plots against former
President Bush.

1986 ruling in Nicaragua

tice's

the
so

leftist

it

A contrary view was expressed in the International Court ofjusv.

U.S. that the provision of arms by Nicaragua to

armed attack on El Salvador,
self-defense argument that would

rebels in El Salvador did not constitute an

could not form the

basis

of a collective

armed attacks in response, such as laying of mines in Nicaraguan waters or
certain attacks on Nicaraguan ports, oil installations and a naval base
acts that
were "imputable" to the United States. The Court also said it had insufficient
evidence to determine whether certain cross-border incursions by Nicaraguan
military forces into the territory of Honduras and Costa Rica constituted armed
attacks. The extent to which Nicaragua's conduct would justify El Salvador and
its ally the United States in responding in ways that did not themselves constitute
an armed attack was not before the Court. The opinion of the court nevertheless
provides some support for the proposition that the provocation must constitute
an armed attack before it will justify an armed attack in self-defense. It seems safe
to say that the issue of whether traditional armed force may be used in self-defense in response to provocations that are not technically regarded as armed at-

justify

—

tacks

is

far

from

settled,

and

that the positions taken

by

states

may be

influenced by the nature of the events concerned, together with

all

sharply

attendant

policy and political considerations.

By

logical implication, to the extent that a nation chooses to

respond to

a

computer network attack by mounting a similar computer network attack of its
own, the issue of whether the initial provocation constituted an armed attack
may become a tautology. If the provocation is considered to be an armed attack,
the victim

may be justified

the provocation

is

in

launching

its

own armed

attack in self-detense.

not considered to be an armed attack,
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presumably not be considered to be an armed attack. Accordingly, the ques-

also

com-

tion of the availability of the inherent right of self-defense in response to

puter network attacks comes into sharpest focus

network attack considers acting

The

issue

may

(e.g., if a state

when the victim of a computer

in self-defense using traditional military means.

also arise if the response causes disproportionately serious effects

computer network attack that caused only minor
own computer network attack that caused multiple

responded to

inconvenience with

its

a

As in all cases when a nation considers acting in self-defense,
the nation considering such action will have to make its best judgment on how
world opinion, or perhaps a body such as the International Court ofJustice (ICJ)
deaths and injuries)

.

UNSC, is likely to apply the doctrine of self-defense to electronic attacks.
As with many novel legal issues, we are likely to discover the answer only from
or the

experience.
It

seems beyond doubt that any unauthorized intrusion into a nation's com-

puter systems

would justify that nation at least in taking self-help

the intruder and to secure the system against reentry.

as

a violation

unauthorized elec-

computer systems may very well end up

tronic intrusion into another nation's

being regarded as

An

actions to expel

of the victim's sovereignty.

It

may even be regarded

equivalent to a physical trespass into a nation's territory, but such issues have

yet to be addressed in the international

community. Furthermore, the

taining unauthorized access to a nation's
since the intruder will have

ity,

he

may have been able to

ingly, the discovery that
liability

computer system

had access to the information in the system and

corrupt data or degrade the operating system. Accord-

an intrusion has occurred may

call

into question the re-

of the data and the operating system and thus reduce

its utility.

as

If

an

intentional

can be attributed to the agents of another nation, the victim nation will

at

have the right to protest, probably with some confidence of obtaining

a

it

least

of ob-

creates a vulnerabil-

unauthorized computer intrusion can be reliably characterized

and

act

sympathetic hearing in the world community.

D.

An "Active Defense"
A

against

persistent foreign intruder

Computer Network Attacks.

who

gains repeated unauthorized entry into a

computer systems by defeating a variety of security measures or who
gains entry into a number of computer systems may demand a different response.
Such behavior may indicate both that there is a continuing danger and that coernation's

cive measures are necessary to stop the intruder's pattern of conduct. Similarly,

there

may be a right to

use force in self-defense against a single foreign electronic

attack in circumstances

where

significant
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is

being done to the attacked
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system or the data stored in

it,

when

the system

to essential national infrastructures, or

when

is

Issues

critical to

national security or

the intruder's conduct or the con-

text of the activity clearly manifests a malicious intent.
If it

is

tified in

capable of doing so, in such circumstances the victim nation

launching

a

computer network

attack in response, intended to disable

the equipment being used by the intruder. Disabling one computer

not defeat

may be jus-

a state-sponsored operation. It

may, however, serve

as a

may or may
"shot across

bow" warning of more serious consequences if the offending behavior continues. It is also an action unlikely to come to public attention unless one of the
the

two governments announces it, making it a potentially useful measure for conflict avoidance. Conducting a responsive computer network attack as a measure
of self-defense against foreign computer network attacks would have the major
advantage that it would minimize issues of proportionality, which would be
more likely to arise if traditional military force were used, such as firing a cruise
missile at the building from which a computer network attack is being conducted. Either response would likely be analyzed on the basis of the traditional
criteria

If it

tion,

of necessity and proportionality.
impractical to focus an attack

is

any legitimate military target

able to demonstrate a nexus

on the equipment used

may be

attacked.

in the

provoca-

The primary value of being

between the provocation and the response

is

to

able to argue the likely therapeutic effect of the force used in self-defense.
practical matter, the next

most

attractive target after the

equipment used

be

As

a

in the

may be the offending nation's communications systems, or its milior intelligence chain of command. The consequences of a large-scale cam-

provocation
tary

paign of computer network attacks might well justify a large-scale traditional
military response.

As

stated above, the discussion

intruder
is

is,

and that we

seldom the

sions.

truder

to this point has

assumed we

legal analysis

may change

uncertain, or if his intent

is

of responding to computer intru-

if the identity

when

when he

has

and location of an in-

unclear.

Identification of the originator of an attack has often
especially

know who an

are confident in characterizing his intent. In practice, this

case, at least in the early stages

The above
is

up

been

a difficult

problem,

number of intermediate relay points,
used an "anonymous bulletin board" whose function is to strip
the intruder has used a

away all information about the
device that generates

false

origin of messages

it

relays,

or when he has used

origin information. Progress has

a

been made, how-

problem of identifying the originator of computer
messages, and reliable identification of the computer that originated a message
may soon be routinely available. Attribution may also be provided by
ever, in solving the technical
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from the

rela-

Locating the computer used by the intruder does not entirely solve the

attri-

intelligence

from other

sources, or

might be

it

reliably inferred

tionship of the attack to other events.

bution problem, however, since

it

may have been used by an unauthorized peran unauthorized purpose. A parent may not

by an authorized user for
know that the family computer is being used for unlawful attacks on government computer systems. Universities, businesses, and other government agencies may be similarly unaware that their computer systems are being misused.
son, or

The owner of a computer system may have some responsibility to make sure it is
not being used for malicious purposes, but the extent of such responsibility, and

meet it, have apparently not been addressed in any
U.S. or foreign statute or court decision. These considerations should make us
cautious in implementing any "active defense" system for government computer systems. Nevertheless, circumstances may arise in which the urgency of
protecting critical information systems from serious damage may warrant adopthe consequences of failing to

tion of a properly designed "active defense."
Similarly, characterization
theless,

such factors

of an intruder's intentions may be

as persistence,

especially sensitive systems,

difficult.

Never-

sophistication of methods used, targeting of

and actual damage done may persuasively indicate

both the intruder's intentions and the dangers to the system in

a

manner

that

would justify use of an "active defense." As with attribution, there may be useful
intelligence on this issue from other sources, or it may be possible to reliably infer the intent of the intruder from the relationship of the attack to other events.
A determination that an intrusion originates in a foreign country would be
only a partial solution to the attribution problem, since the attack

not be state-sponsored. State-sponsored attacks
self-defense. State sponsorship
as signals

or

may

may

may

well generate the right of

might be persuasively established by such

human intelligence,

or

factors

the location of the offending computer within a

by officials. In other circumstances,
state sponsorship may be convincingly inferred from such factors as the state of
relationships between the two countries, the prior involvement of the suspect
state-controlled facility, or public statements

state in

computer network

attacks, the nature

of the systems attacked, the nature

and sophistication of the methods and equipment used, the

and the damage which seems
Attacks that cannot be
acts

from future

likely

shown

to

of past attacks,

attacks.

be state-sponsored generally do not justify

of self-defense in another nation's

ereign prerogatives,

effects

territory. States jealously

guard their sov-

and they are intolerant of the exercise of

law-enforcement, and other "core sovereign powers" by other
their territory

without their consent.

military,

states

within

When individuals carry out malicious acts
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of one

for private purposes against the interests
a

state

from within the

territory

of

second state, the aggrieved state does not generally have the right to use force in

self-defense against either the second state itself or the offending individual.

Even

were possible to conduct a precise computer network attack on the
equipment used by such individual actors, the state in which the effects of such
an attack were felt, if it became aware of it, could well take the position that its
sovereignty and territorial integrity had been violated. The general expectation
is that a nation whose interests are damaged by the private conduct of an individual

if it

who acts within the territory of another nation will notify the government of

that nation

and request

its

cooperation in putting a stop to such conduct.

Only if the requested nation is unwilling or unable to prevent recurrence does
the doctrine of self-defense permit the injured nation to act in self-defense inside

the territory of another nation.

camps

in Afghanistan

United

The U.S.

cruise missile strikes against terrorists

on 20 August 1998 provide

States attacked

camps belonging

a close

to a terrorist

analogy in which the

group located in the

terri-

which had clearly stated its intention to continue to provide a refuge for the terrorists. At some point, providing safe refuge for those who
conduct attacks against another nation becomes complicity in those attacks. At a
minimum, the offended nation is authorized to attack its tormenters, the terrorists. As complicity shades into the kinds of active support and direction that are
tory of a state

commonly called "state sponsorship," military and leadership targets of the
state may themselves become lawful targets for acts of self-defense.
Attacks

on

insurgents or

tion's territory as a refuge
satisfy its obligations.

on

terrorists

and other criminals using

host

a neutral

na-

may also be justified when the neutral state is unable to

During the Vietnam war, the United States attacked North

Vietnamese military supply

lines

and base camps in Cambodia

dian government took the position that

it

was unable

after the

to prevent

Cambo-

North Vietnam

from making such use of its territory. This principle might justify using active
defense measures against a computer intruder located in a neutral nation if the

government of the neutral nation declared it had no way to locate the intruder
and make him stop, or if its behavior made it clear that it could not or would not
act, or even if the circumstances did not allow time for diplomatic representations to be effective. As an analogy, it seems unlikely that a nation would complain very loudly if

its

neighbor nation returned

fire against a terrorist

sniper

from its territory.
In summary, the international law of self-defense would not generally justify

firing

acts

of "active defense" across international boundaries unless the provocation

could be attributed to an agent of the nation concerned, or until the sanctuary
nation has been put

on notice and given
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private conduct in

its

territory

onstrate that such a request

the National

so,

or the circumstances

would be futile. Nevertheless,

Command Authority (NCA)

in

dem-

some circumstances

might decide to defend U.S. infor-

computer system overseas, and take the risk of
make an apology or pay compensation to the offended government.

mation systems by attacking
having to

and has failed to do

a

Among the factors the NCA would probably consider would be the danger presented to U.S. national security from continuing attacks, whether immediate action

necessary,

is

how

how much the sanctuary nation would be likely to

the rest of the world

There need be

less

community would be

object,

and

likely to respond.

concern for the reaction of nations through whose

tory or communications systems a destructive message

may be

terri-

routed. If only

the nation's public communications systems are involved, the transited nation
will

normally not be aware of the routing such

message has taken. Even if it be-

a

comes aware of the transit of such a message and attributes it to the United States,
there would be no established principle of international law that it could point to
as being violated. As discussed above, even during an international armed conflict

international law does not require a neutral nation to restrict the use of its

public communications networks by belligerents. Nations generally consent to
the free use of their communications networks

a

commercial or reciprocal

Accordingly, use of a nation's communications networks

basis.

an electronic attack would not be
that

on

would be

a flight

through

airspace

conduit for

of its sovereignty in the same way

a violation

its

as a

by

a military aircraft.

A transited state would have somewhat more right to complain if the attacking state obtained unauthorized entry into

computer systems

its

as part

of the

would be even more offended if
malicious logic directed against a target computer had some harmful effect
against the transited state's own equipment, operating systems, or data. The possibility of such collateral damage would have to be carefully considered by the
communications path to the

state

target

computer.

It

launching any such attack. If there were a high potential for such collateral

damage

to transited systems, the

discriminate"

weapon

weapon might even be considered to be an "in-

incapable of being reliably directed against a legitimate

target.

There

are at least

two ways

in

which the

may affect the active-defense equation.
ment
will

availability

First, it

of improved technology

might be argued that as a govern-

acquires the ability to build better firewalls and other security systems

be harder to argue that an active defense

might be raised even
technological security

manding approach

is

it

"necessary." This argument

government has failed to install all possible
measures on the system that is under attack. This de-

if

the target

to "necessity" finds

little
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The

focus of self-defense analysis

is

on events

as

they unfold, and not

as

they

might have been

if different

budgeting and acquisition decisions had been made

sometime in the

past. If such

systems are in place, however, their apparent effec-

tiveness should

be taken into account in deciding whether active defense mea-

mean that a nation has no right of self-defense
where a first attempted intrusion fails, or even when a series of intrusions fail. If
an attacker is permitted to continue mounting a campaign of such attacks it may
learn by trial and error, it may employ other capabilities, or it may stumble onto a
sures are necessary. This does not

point of vulnerability Just
.

may pursue

a force that

as

an infantry unit exercising the right of self-defense

breaks off an attack and attempts to retreat until the at-

on taking measures of self-defense against
must take into account the extent to which an at-

tacker ceases to be a threat, decisions

computer network

attacks

tacker continues to present a threat of continuing attacks.

Another possible implication of a defender's technological prowess may

arise

when a nation has the capacity for graduated self-defense measures. Some
may argue that a nation having such capabilities must select a response that will
do minimal damage. This

is

a variant

of the argument that

them whenever there

precision-guided munitions must always use
for collateral

damage. That position has garnered

and has been strongly rejected by the United
that the risk

of collateral damage

must be balanced by military
sideration

is

nation possessing

a

little

States.

support

There

is

a potential

among

nations

broad recognition

only one of many military considerations that

authorities planning an attack.

One

obvious con-

that a military force that goes into a protracted conflict

is

is

of always using precision-guided munitions whenever there

is

with

a policy

any potential for

damage will soon exhaust its supply of such munitions. Similarly, military authorities must be able to weigh all relevant military considerations in
choosing a response in self-defense against computer network attacks. These
considerations will include the probable effectiveness of the means at their disposal, the ability to assess their effects, and the "fragility" of electronic means of
collateral

attack

(i.e.,

will render

to the

once they

are used, an adversary

them ineffective in the future)

.

may be

able to devise defenses that

In the process of reasoning by analogy

law applicable to traditional weapons,

it

must always be kept

in

mind that

computer network attacks are likely to present implications that are quite different from the implications presented by attacks with traditional weapons. These
different implications
It

may be

may

well yield different conclusions.

possible to specify certain information systems that are vital to na-

tional security

—both government systems and key

civilian infrastructure sys-

tems. This process should serve both to give such systems high priority for
security measures

and

also to identify a class
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would immediately

raise the issue

of whether an active defense should be em-

ployed. This should not, of course, eliminate consideration of using an active
defense against attacks

on systems not on such

"vital systems"

a

list

where the

circumstances justify such action. For example, a vigorous attack that threatens
to

overwhelm an information system not on the

"vital systems"

forms an important national security function could be
use active defense measures than would be a

designated "vital system."
alert

mechanism

that

trivial

a

more

list

but that per-

valid occasion to

and easily defeated attack on a

A list of "vital systems" would serve primarily as an

would bring about

a

prompt high-level evaluation of all

the circumstances.

In addition,

it

would be

useful to create a process for determining

response to a computer intrusion should

shift

when

the

from the customary law enforce-

ment and counter-intelligence modes to a national defense mode. Such a process
should include

(1) a

statement of general criteria to be applied;

(2) identification

of officials or agencies that will be involved in making the decision; and

(3)

pro-

cedures to be followed.

There

of course

are

a variety

of treaty obligations that will have to be consid-

ered before adopting an "active defense" against foreign computer network at-

and these will be discussed below. There are

tacks,

also a variety

of domestic legal

concerns that will have to be addressed, and these will be discussed in the

panion assessment of domestic law

issues in

com-

information operations.

E. Assessment.

It is far

from clear the extent to which the world community will regard com-

puter network attacks

as

"armed

attacks" or "uses of force,"

and

how

the doc-

of self-defense and countermeasures will be applied to computer network

trines

attacks.

The outcome

attacks than

on

their

will probably

depend more on the consequences of such

mechanisms. The most

likely result

is

an acceptance that

a

nation subjected to a state-sponsored computer network attack can lawfully re-

spond

in kind,

tional military

and that in some circumstances

means

treaty addressing

it

may be justified in

using tradi-

in self-defense. Unless the nations decide to negotiate a

computer network

attacks,

which seems unlikely anytime

in

the near future, international law in this area will develop through the actions of
nations and through the positions the nations adopt publicly as events unfold.

U.S.

officials

ments in

this

must be aware of the implications of their
formative period.
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SPACE LAW

A. Introduction,
International law regulating activities in outer space

mation operator because space segments are

is

important to the infor-

critical to so

many important infor-

mation systems. These systems perform such functions as communications relay,
imagery collection, missile warning, navigation, weather forecasting, and signals
intelligence. In fact,

it

can be said that

at

the current stage of space activity, the

exclusive functions of both military and civilian satellites are to gather and relay

information. In the conduct of information operations, there will be strong imperatives to interfere with the space-based information systems belonging to an

adversary,

and

to defend one's

own.

One approach to attacking space systems is by targeting their ground stations.
Another approach is
are subject to the
activity.

to jam or

"spoof

their

communications links. Such actions

normal international law principles governing other

Sometimes, however,

it

may be more

terrestrial

effective to attack the satellite or

form the space segment of the system. As we will see, activities in
subject both to general principles of international law and to a number

satellites that

space are

of treaty obligations that apply
B. Space

There

Law
is

specifically to space activities.

Treaties.

probably no other

field

of human endeavor that produced so

much

Within twenty years after the first Sputnik launch in 1957, international diplomatic conferences produced four major
widely-accepted multilateral space law treaties. Taken together, these treaties
international law in such a short period.

provide the foundations of existing space law.

•

The Treaty on
Use

Principles

Of Outer Space,

Governing the Activities of States

including the

Moon and Other

in the

Exploration and

Celestial Bodies (the

Outer

Space Treaty, 1967)

•

The Agreement on

the

Rescue ofAstronauts, Return ofAstronauts, and the Return

of Objects Launched into Outer Space (the

Rescue and Return Agreement,

1968)

•

The Convention on
(the Liability

International Liability for

Convention, 1972)
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Damages Caused by Space

Objects
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•

The Convention on

the Registration of Objects

Launched

into

Outer Space (the

Registration Convention, 1975)

Note: There

United

is

another treaty called the

Moon Agreement of 1979 which the

never signed and which has attracted only 9

States has

whom only France

is

parties,

active in space operations. In addition, several provisions

of the 1980 Environmental Modification Convention apply to space

These agreements

are not directly relevant to information operations,

and they

be discussed further here.

The

will not

among

activity.

however,

four major space treaties together establish the following principles that

are directly relevant to information operations.

These principles have been so

widely accepted that they are generally regarded as constituting binding customary international law, even for non-parties to these agreements.

•

Space

is

free for exploration

tional appropriation

and use by

all

nations.

by claim of sovereignty,

It is

not subject to na-

use, occupation, or

any other

means.

•

Activities in space shall

other

•

be conducted with due regard for the

interests

of

may do

in

states.

States that

launch space objects are

liable for

any damage they

on the surface of the Earth. Different standards of liability are established for damage done to other items in space, for which a
"fault" standard applies, and damage done on the surface of the Earth and
to aircraft in flight, for which absolute liability applies.
space, in the

•

Space

air,

or

activities are subject to general principles

cluding the

of international law, in-

UN Charter.

Several conclusions are apparent from these general principles.
that the rules

on

the use of force discussed in Section

to activities in outer space.

Among these

III

The

first is

of this paper apply

fully

are that nations are obliged not to use

force in their relations with each other unless they are acting in self-defense or

when authorized to do so by the UN Security Council. Once again, however,

as

with other forms of information operations, one has to consider what actions by
or against objects in space will be considered to be uses of force.

munity would probably not
a satellite

by

hesitate to regard as a use

a missile or a laser.

It

would probably
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of force the destruction of

react similarly if it could be
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one nation took over control of another nation's satellite by electronic means and caused it to fire its retro rockets and fall out of orbit. In such a

proven

that

case, the

The

consequences will probably matter more than the mechanism used.

reaction of the world

predict.

For example,

community

if one

of interference

is

hard to

nation were able by electronic means to suspend the

which it returned
service undamaged, it seems likely that the world community would consider

operations of another nation's
to

to lesser kinds

such action

satellite for a

brief period, after

breach of the launching nation's sovereign

as a

rights,

but not

as a

use

of armed force.

One

could argue, however, that

argument

this

is

unimportant because the

space treaties create a specific obligation not to interfere with the space activities

of other nations, and to pay reparations for any damages resulting from such interference. This

argument appears to have considerable

force, at least in peace-

During an international armed conflict between the two nations
concerned, however, the law of armed conflict would apply unless it was
trumped by the principle of noninterference with space systems. Resolution of
this issue depends largely on whether the four space treaties will be considered to
apply during an armed conflict. None of them has any specific provision that indicates whether the parties intended that the agreement apply in wartime.
There appears to be a strong argument that the principle of noninterference
time.

by these agreements is inconsistent with a state of hostilities, at least
where the systems concerned are of such high military value that there is a strong
military imperative for the adversary to be free to interfere with them, even to
established

the extent of destroying the

satellites in

of treaty law in the introduction to

the system. As indicated in the discussion

this

paper, the

outcome of this debate may

depend on the circumstances in which it first arises in practice. Nevertheless, it
seems most likely that these agreements will be considered to be suspended between the belligerents for the duration of any armed conflict, as least to the extent necessary for the
If the principle

the conflict,

it

conduct of the

of noninterference

also

conflict.
is

seems likely that the

regarded
liability

as

suspended for the period of

provisions in these agreements

would also be suspended, at least between the parties. This would not, however,
excuse the belligerents from liability to neutral nations if their actions caused
damage to their citizens or property
C. Specific Prohibitions of Military Activities in Space.

There
space

is

is

a

popular notion that military

a place a little closer to

activities in space are

prohibited

—

that

heaven into which the nations have agreed not
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introduce weapons and

supported by high
restrictions

flights

conflict.

There

is

germ of truth

a

of rhetoric in international

on military operations in space

tions are included in
trol

human

both the space

fora,

in this notion,

but the existing treaty

are in fact very limited.

treaties listed

These

restric-

above and in various arms con-

agreements.

The Outer Space Treaty

provides that the parties will not "place in orbit

around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of

weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies [i.e., the
moon, planets, and asteroids], or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner." The treaty permits placing in orbit weapons other than nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Also, the treaty contains no
prohibition against nuclear weapons transiting outer space, as long as they do not
enter into an earth orbit and they do not explode in outer space.
The Outer Space Treaty also prohibits the establishment of military bases, the
testing of weapons, and the conduct of military maneuvers on the moon or other
celestial bodies. It permits these activities in orbit around the Earth, and in other
places in outer space. Similarly, there is no prohibition against establishing military space stations or operating other satellites

with offensive or defensive

capabilities.

The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons

Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space

Under Water (the Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963) prohibits
in outer space. Accordingly, a party to this
a nuclear device in

agreement

effects.

belonging to

a

its

its

own

satellites

satellites

nuclear explosion, or by

would be

is

by
its

unlikely to take such

subject to the

same

ef-

adversary.

ABM Treaty,
972) provides that no party may "develop, test or deploy space-based ABM sysThe Treaty on

1

may not lawfully explode

A nation operating its own satellite systems

an action in any event, since
fects as those

nuclear explosions

outer space in order to disable an adversary's

means of the electro-magnetic pulse generated by
other

all

and

the Limitation of Anti- Ballistic Missile Systems (the

tems or components."

Under

a

1997 theater missile defense

(TMD) agreement

not yet

ratified

by

the Senate, the United States and Russia have agreed not to place in space theater
missile defense interceptor missiles "or space-based

physical principles,

whether or not part of a system,

components based on other
that are capable

of substitut-

ing for such interceptor missiles."

A

number of arms

control agreements provide that

no party

with the others' "national technical means of verification."

means no interference with the orbiting imaging systems used
strategic

arms of another party.
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together, these agreements permit the development, testing, and de-

ployment of anti-satellite and satellite-defense systems unless they involve either
the stationing or testing of nuclear devices in outer space or the orbiting of sys-

tems that

also

ABM or ATM capabilities. Their use

have

is

subject only to (1) the

general principles of international law relating to the use of force;
ple

(2)

the princi-

of non-interference with the space systems of other nations in peacetime,

subject to the right to use force in self-defense and

Security Council;

(3)

when authorized by

the law of war during international

the

UN

armed conflicts; and

(4)

obligations under relevant arms-control agreements not to interfere with other
parties' national technical

means of verification. This leaves a very broad range of

permissible "space-control" systems and operations.
In a non-nuclear conflict, the parties might very well determine that the
treaty prohibitions against placing nuclear

weapons

nuclear devices in outer space, and against placing

in orbit, against exploding

ABM components and ATM

interceptors in orbit remain consistent with a state of limited

Those obligations may well serve
clear level.

The

parties'

to avoid escalation

conclusions

as to

armed

conflict.

of the conflict to the nu-

the obligation not to interfere with

other parties' national technical means of verification will probably depend to a
great extent

on the circumstances of the

conflict.

D. Domestic Law and Policy.

A

USC

federal statute, 18

ciously interfere with a

hinder any
rity

satellite

1367, makes

it

a felony to intentionally

communications or weather

transmission.

information operations

is

The

satellite,

or mali-

or to obstruct or

application of this statute to national secu-

discussed in the

companion assessment of domes-

tic legal issues.

U.S. domestic policy on developing space control capabilities has been inconsistent at best.

By

anti-satellite missile

fighter

the early 1980s the U.S. Air Force had developed an

by an F-15
A test of this system was conducted in 1 985

with an explosive warhead that was carried

and launched at high

against a U.S. satellite

altitude.

whose

useful

life

aloft

had expired. Congress soon thereafter

decreed that no appropriated funds were to be used to

test

any weapon against an

USAF

program was terminated. At the time, it appeared that members of Congress voting for the ban had done so for a variety of
reasons, among which were: (1) support for the broad principle that space should
be free from human conflict; (2) dismay that the first test had generated 285
object in orbit. In 1987 the

pieces

of trackable space debris;

anti-satellite capability

might

concern that further testing of an

(3)

interfere

with continuing
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negotiations;

and

(4)

concern that the United

testing an anti-satellite system

long-term

interests

lie.

when

Concerning

States should

the nation had yet to decide
this last point, it

military interest in being able to defend

your

ation that the long-term interests of the

own space

pends most heavily on space systems

United

—may be

development of a regime of international law

States

do

so.

own

its

that there

is

a

systems and having the

also a contrary consider-

—

as

the nation that de-

by promoting the
prohibits any interference by

better served

that

one nation with the space systems of another, and
capability to

where

was obvious

with your adversary's, but there was

ability to interfere

not press ahead with

inhibits the acquisition

That fundamental debate has yet to be pursued to

of the

a definitive

conclusion.
Later,

when

anti-satellite

public attention was

October 1997 the U.S.
at

satellite

White

to the possible use of lasers as

weapons, Congress prohibited the use of appropriated funds to

minate any object in orbit with
Force

drawn

a laser.

This restriction was removed in 1995. In

Army conducted

nearing the end of its useful

Sands,

a test in
life

which

with the

it

illuminated an Air

MIRACL laser, located

New Mexico. Despite public announcements that the purpose

of the experiment was purely defensive in nature
laser

illu-

on the satellite's

—

to observe the effects

of the

optical sensors in order to better protect U.S. satellites

deliberate or accidental laser illumination

—

a public furor

from

ensued. Shortly there-

item veto authority to delete

after President

Clinton exercised

funds from the

FY 98 DoD Authorization Act for development of an Army Ki-

netic

Energy

his short-lived

Anti-Satellite Missile

and two other projects

that

he considered to

be related to space control. Congress approved additional funds for space control
projects in the

FY

1999

DoD Authorization Act and urged expenditure

of the

FY 98 funds that were restored after the Supreme Court ruled that the item veto
was unconstitutional.

At this point,

it

seems fair to say that the United States has not arrived at a con-

on the fundamental policy issues concerning space control. It seems likely
for the near future that the development of such systems will continue, with renewed controversy to be expected as soon as a decision is imminent on the desensus

ployment, or even advanced

testing,

E. International Efforts to Control

of an operational system.

"Weaponization of Space".

Over the last decade there has been strong support in the UN General Assembly for negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of a draft treaty
banning weapons in space. The most recent action by the General Assembly was
its adoption on 4 December 1998 by a vote of 165-0-4 of a resolution entitled
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"Prevention of an arms race in outer space." This resolution

calls

for reestablish-

ment by the CD of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space that existed in prior years. Canada and Egypt are actively promoting consideration of a "no weapons

in space" treaty in the

they have garnered

among

little

active support

the other

CD

CD,

but so

far

members. Both

Russia and China have also announced their support for negotiations to ban

"weaponization of space," but neither has advanced

much vigor.

In

summary, there appears

to

a specific

proposal with

be widespread lukewarm support for

the general idea of a treaty banning an "arms race in space," but the subject en-

moment and no draft treaty has garnered significant
This may all change if and when a nation or nations are known to have

low

joys a

support.

priority at the

deployed operational space control systems, or are on the verge of doing

Chinese and Russian support for

some

quarters as ironic, since

anti-satellite laser

an operational
the Soviet

where

it

a

anti-satellite missile.

Union developed a
close

seen in

is

China is reported to be developing a ground-based

system and Russia

maneuvered

ban on "weaponization of space"

so.

is

There have been

"co-orbital

enough

known

the only nation

ASAT"

a

that

to

have once had

number of reports

was launched into

that

orbit,

to a target satellite to destroy the target

by

exploding. Reportedly, the Soviet system was tested against objects in space 20
times and

became operational

in 1978. Russia consistently denied that

tested or deployed such a system until

it

September 1997, when press reports indi-

cate that President Yeltsin said in a letter to President Clinton that Russia at

time possessed an

F.

had

anti-satellite capability,

but that it had since "renounced"

one

it.

Assessment.

There

is

no

legal prohibition against

developing and using space control

weapons, whether they would be employed

in orbit,

from an aircraft in flight, or

The primary prohibition is against weapons that entail
the placing of nuclear weapons in orbit or that would employ a nuclear explosion in outer space. The use of space control systems in peacetime would be subfrom the Earth's

surface.

ject to both the general principles of international law

and to

treaty obligations

not to interfere with other nations' space systems and national technical means of
verification.

tional

These obligations would probably be suspended during an interna-

armed conflict, during which the parties' conduct would be governed pri-

marily by the law of war. U.S. domestic policy on space control, however,
best unsettled.
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V.

COMMUNICATIONS LAW

A. International Communications Law.
International

communications law

consists primarily

of a number of bilateral

and multilateral communications treaties. The most significant of these

treaties

is

1982 (ITC), which has over
140 parties and which became effective for the United States in 1986. This
agreement, often referred to as the Nairobi Convention, is the latest in a series of
the International Telecommunications Convention of

widely adhered to multilateral telecommunications conventions signed in
century,

which were preceded by multilateral agreements

viding protection for submarine cables.
lishes the International

The

in the late 1800s pro-

current series of agreements estab-

Telecommunication Union (ITU), which has the

of a specialized agency of the United Nations, and they invest the
authority to formulate telegraph and telephone regulations

ing legal obligations

among

status

ITU with the

which become bind-

upon formal acceptance by ITU member

agreements also establish mutual legal obligations

which

this

nations.

These

the parties, several of

are directly relevant to information operations.

Perhaps the most significant of these obligations
vides that

all

is

radio "stations, whatever their purpose,

erated in such a

in Article 35,

must be established and op-

manner as not to cause harmful interference

or communications of other

Members

which pro-

to the radio services

or of recognized private operating agen-

on radio service, and which operate in accordance with the
provisions of the Radio Regulations." "Harmful interference" is defined in Annex 2 to the Convention as "interference which endangers the functioning of a
cies,

which

carry

radio navigation service or of other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs or repeatedly interrupts a radio

communication

One

cordance with the Radio Regulations."
provision

would be

the

Without speculating on

jamming
all

of the

service operating in ac-

clearest violations

or "spoofing" of a radio navigation service.

the possible permutations of the application of this

provision to the broad range of information operations, suffice

provision

on

its

face

of this

would appear

to restrict

many such

it

to say that this

operations that involve

the use of radio broadcasting.

On

the other hand, Article 38 of the

military transmissions:

"Members

ITC

provides a specific exemption for

retain their entire

military radio installations of their army, naval

when

and

freedom with regard

air forces."

to

In July 1994,

the United States was considering broadcasting messages to the Haitian

people from U.S. military
out to sea in hazardous

aircraft in international airspace

vessels, the Office

urging them not to

set

of Legal Counsel in the Department of
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Justice relied

on the

military

ITC

determining that the

exemption

in Article

does not prohibit such

say, "Nevertheless, these installations

Legal Issues

must, so

38

one of several bases

as

38 goes on to

activity. Article

observe

far as possible,

for

.

.

.

the

measures to be taken to prevent harmful interference, and the provisions of the
Administrative Regulations concerning the types of emission and the frequencies to

tions."

be used, according to the nature of the service performed by such

While this provision indicates that military installations do not have carte

blanche to interfere with civilian communications, the phrase "so
ble," read together with the specific

provides considerable

by

installa-

exemption

far as possi-

for military radio installations,

room to maneuver for information operations conducted

military forces.

The ITC

also provides specific authority for

its

member

nations to interfere

with international telecommunications in certain circumstances:

•

members

Article 19 allows

to "stop the transmission

gram which may appear dangerous

of any private

to the security of the State or contrary

to their laws, to public order or to decency, provided that they
ately notify the office

thereof, except
rity

•

immedi-

of origin of the stoppage of any such telegram or part
such notification

may appear dangerous

to the secu-

of the State."

Article 19 also permits

nications
trary to

•

when

tele-

Article

members

to "cut off any other private

which may appear dangerous

its

to the security

telecommu-

of the State or con-

laws, to public order or to decency."

20 reserves the right of members "to suspend the international

tele-

communication

service for an indefinite time, either generally or only for

certain relations

and/or certain kinds of correspondence, outgoing, in-

coming or

in transit, provided that

each of the other

it

immediately

Members through

the

notifies

medium of

such action to
the Secretary-

General."

Finally,

The

it

seems clear that the ITC's provisions apply primarily in peacetime.

how

treaty does not specifically state

armed

conflict. Nevertheless, there

is

—

if at all

—

it

will apply during an

ample precedent in which nations have

demonstrated conclusively that they regard the provisions of international com-

munications conventions
in

armed

as

being suspended between belligerents engaged

conflicts. Prior to the First

ropean nations were

parties to the

World War,

for example,

1884 Convention for

500
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the major

Eu-
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Cables.

The first day of the war,

the British

Navy pulled up and cut the five major

submarine cables serving Germany. Throughout

communications
gets.

Since

facilities

some of the

of all

sorts

have been regarded

ITC and

parties to the

tions conventions are likely to

the wars of this century,

all

as priority military tar-

communicabetween other

other multilateral

be neutrals in armed

conflicts

may become somewhat complicated. Most ITC obligations
will be considered to be suspended among the belligerents, but they will remain
nations, the result

in effect

between each

and the neutral

belligerent

agreement,

parties to the

as

among the neutral parties.
Note: The issue of the extent to which a neutral nation or an international
communications consortium may continue to provide communications services

well

as

to a belligerent

The United

is

discussed in the law of war section of this paper.

States has negotiated bilateral

primarily because the

communications only

selectively,

ITC and the ITU provide a framework for handling most

As one might expect, the need for bilateral
communications agreements has arisen for the United States primarily with

international

communications

issues.

Canada and Mexico, because of the potential for interference
munications across our
tions agreements

nations
lateral

where U.S.

also

borders.

A

number of bilateral

been negotiated between the United

military forces are stationed.

agreements to either

military forces.

sue

have

common

comcommunica-

in broadcast

restrict

There

is

States

a potential for

and

such bi-

or facilitate information operations by U.S.

The agreements concerned should be consulted when such an is-

arises.

B. Domestic Communications Law,

The ITC and its predecessors obligate each Member nation to suppress acts by
individuals or groups within

of other members. In
acted 47
violates

its

territory that interfere

partial satisfaction

USC 502, which provides,
any

with the communications

of this obligation, in 1934 Congress en-

"Any person who

rule, regulation, restriction, or

condition

.

willfully

and knowingly

made

or imposed by

.

.

any international radio or wire communications treaty or convention, or regulations

annexed thereto,

to

which the United

party, shall, in addition to

States

is

or

may hereafter become

a

any other penalties provided by law, be punished,

upon conviction thereof, by a fine of not more than $500 for each and every day
during which such offense occurs." In October 1993, when the United States
was considering broadcasting radio messages

to the people

of Haiti supporting

the return of democracy in that nation, the Office of Legal Counsel of the

partment ofJustice concluded in

a

written opinion that 47
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USC

De-

502 would not
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members acting on behalf of the President
pursuant to the President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-Chief authority.
apply to the actions of U.S. military

C. Assessment.
International

communications law contains no

tion against the conduct of information operations

peacetime.

The

direct

by

and

specific prohibi-

military forces, even in

established practice of nations provides persuasive evidence that

telecommunications

treaties are

regarded

as

suspended

among belligerents

dur-

ing international armed conflicts. Domestic communications laws do not prohibit properly authorized military information operations. Accordingly, neither

international nor domestic

communications law appears

barrier to information operations

by U.S.

502

to present a significant

military forces.

Appendix

VI.

The

IMPLICATIONS OF OTHER TREATIES

State Department's

most recent published

ments to which the United States is
1998,

is

tilateral

a party,

list

of international agree-

TREATIES IN FORCE, January 1,

495 pages long. The United States is a party to literally thousands of muland bilateral international agreements. From their sheer numbers, one

would think it inescapable

that lurking

somewhere in those agreements

are pro-

visions that will affect particular information operations activities. This section

attempts only to highlight certain kinds of "typical" agreements that are likely to

contain obligations relevant to the conduct of information operations.

A. Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements.

Mutual

legal assistance

agreements (sometimes called judicial assistance

agreements) obligate each party to gather and provide evidence located in its territory

concerning litigation or criminal prosecutions that occur within the juris-

The United States is a party
agreements. Some of these agreements

diction of another party requesting such assistance.
to several

dozen mutual

apply only to the

legal assistance

management of particular

fenses such as drug trafficking
assistance

litigation or to certain types

and money laundering. Only

agreements apply broadly to

all

a

few mutual

legal authority

for the assisting party to investigate offenses that did not occur within
tion,

and

it

also establishes

legal

law enforcement investigations and

Such an agreement may supply the only domestic

prosecutions.

of of-

its jurisdic-

procedures that expedite the requested assistance.

To

be effective in helping to suppress computer crimes and other high-tech offenses,

mutual

fenses or they

legal assistance

agreements must either expressly cover such of-

must apply broadly

to

all

crimes.

B. Extradition Agreements.

Extradition agreements obligate the parties in certain circumstances to deliver

persons accused of crime to the other party for criminal prosecution.

United
well

more than a hundred bilateral extradition treaties, as
1933 Convention on Extradition to which thirteen nations in the

States

as to a

The

Americas are

is

a party to

parties. If no extradition treaty

is

in effect, a national

government

often will have neither an international obligation nor the domestic authority to
deliver custody of an individual to another nation for the purpose of prosecution.

It is

important that the

list

of offenses covered by such agreements include

computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes. In addition, the
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of extradition

treaties

is

often frustrated

quested nation will not extradite
sons

who commit

its

by provisions providing

that the re-

own citizens, or that it will not extradite per-

crimes for political reasons.

NOTE: The

Department of Justice has undertaken a major initiative with
the "G8" countries (the other seven being the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia) to modernize the domestic criminal law
of each nation to adequately provide for the investigation and prosecution of

computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes, and to put into place any
needed improvements to international agreements providing for mutual legal
assistance and extradition. In December 1997 the Attorney General hosted a
meeting of the

G8 Justice and

Interior Ministers to discuss these issues,

and

a

number of follow-up working group meetings have been held since that time.
The United States has also participated in a project undertaken by the Council of
Europe to draft an international convention on "cyber-crime." Recently the
United States undertook similar efforts in the Organization of American States
and at the United Nations.
C.

The United Nations Convention on

the

Law

of the Sea

(UNCLOS)

.

Many provisions of this treaty, which is before the Senate for advice and consent, are

considered to express customary international law.

sions discussed here are

on

all

tute

Some of the

provi-

among them, and are therefore considered to be binding

nations whether or not they are parties to the Convention. Others consti-

new

obligations.

ternational law

is

One

principle widely accepted as existing customary in-

the obligation in Article 19 for a vessel exercising the right of

innocent passage through
"prejudicial to the peace,

a nation's territorial sea

not to engage in

good order, or security of the

coastal State."

activities

The prej-

udicial activities listed in Article 19 include:

•

"any threat or use of force against the sovereignty,
political

independence of the

coastal State, or in

tion of the principles of international law

territorial integrity

or

any other manner in viola-

embodied

in the Charter

of the

United Nations
•

any act aimed

at collecting

information to the prejudice of the defence or

security of the coastal State

•

any act of propaganda aimed

at affecting

coastal State
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•

with any systems of communication or any

any act aimed

at interfering

other

or installations of the coastal State"

Once

facilities

UNCLOS

on activities aboard
vessels in a coastal state's territorial sea will be of relatively minor importance be-

UNCLOS

cause

is

in general effect, these restrictions

limits the

width of the

territorial sea a

nation can claim to

number of nations claim territorial seas as
The twelve-mile limitation on the width of the territorial sea,

twelve nautical miles. At present, a

wide

as

200 miles.

UNCLOS establishes for the free operation of military aircraft and vessels, have led DoD to strongly support ratifica-

together with other important guarantees

tion of

UNCLOS.

Article 109 of

UNCLOS

provides that

all

"States shall co-operate in the

suppression of unauthorized broadcasting from the high seas" and defines

unauthorized broadcasting, for the purposes of the Convention,

as

"the trans-

mission of sound radio or television broadcasts from a ship or installation on the

high seas intended for reception by the general public contrary to international
regulations."

The

international regulations referred to consist primarily of the

provisions of the Nairobi Convention and the ITU's

Radio Regulations discussed in section V of this paper. This provision, which is generally regarded as
establishing new law, was designed to deal with "pirate radio" broadcasting from
vessels and platforms on the high seas, which became a significant problem for a
number of countries in the 1960s. These broadcasts were primarily commercial
in nature; by operating from the high seas they escaped the coastal state's regulation and taxation. Article 109 confers jurisdiction to prosecute persons en-

gaged in pirate radio broadcasts upon the

where

a broadcasting installation

ing person
state

109

is

a citizen,

whose

flag the ship flies, the state

registered, the state

of which the broadcast-

any state where the transmissions can be received, and any

where authorized
also provides that

is

state

radio

any

communication

state

is

suffering interference. Article

having jurisdiction to prosecute

may "arrest any

person or ship engaged in unauthorized broadcasting and seize the broadcasting
apparatus."
Article 113 requires parties to adopt domestic criminal legislation punishing
willful or culpably negligent

damage

to

submarine cables belonging to other

by ships or persons under their jurisdiction.
These UNCLOS provisions have the potential to

parties

affect

only

a

narrow cate-

gory of information operations, but they will have to be considered
sions are

made concerning

those operations to

which they do

peacetime.

UNCLOS does not expressly address how

ternational

armed

conflict. In

it

when

deci-

apply, at least in

will apply during an in-

accordance with the general principles discussed
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in the introduction to this paper, provisions
a state

The

of armed conflict will be regarded

established practice of nations leaves

erning innocent passage through the
belligerents.

The same can be

said

determined to be incompatible with
suspended

as

no doubt that Article

territorial sea will

with

a

among

the belligerents.
19's

regime gov-

be suspended between

high degree of confidence concerning

Article 113's protections for submarine cables. Article 109's provisions for the

suppression of unauthorized radio broadcasting from the high seas are relatively

new, with

little

established practice. Analytically, there

reason to suspend
conflict,

but

it

conducted by

would seem

to

be

application to commercial broadcasters during an

its

would almost

certainly not apply to broadcasts

a belligerent for military

little

armed

from the high

seas

or diplomatic purposes.

D. Treaties on Civil Aviation.

The United

States

is

a party to a

the most significant of which
tion.

is

number of treaties concerning civil

the 1944 Convention on International Civil Avia-

This treaty, which has more than 180

cago Convention.

It

aviation,

parties,

is

often referred to

as

the Chi-

establishes the International Civil Aviation Organization

(ICAO) and provides the basic legal framework for international civil aviation.
The Convention does not directly apply to state aircraft, except for the obligation stated in Article 3(d): "The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state aircraft, that they will have

due regard for the

navigation of civil aircraft." This concern for safe navigation by
also reflected in Article 28,

which provides

safety

civil aircraft

of
is

that each party will provide naviga-

upon through ICAO procedures,
and in Article 37, which provides that the parties will comply with "international standards and recommended practices and procedures" on a variety of
subjects including communications systems and air navigation aids. Over the
tion and

communications

years the

ICAO Council has developed and adopted 18 technical Annexes to the

services as agreed

Chicago Convention. Annex

10, Aeronautical

Telecommunications, contains

agreed provisions on aeronautical communications, navigation and surveillance.

While

military aircraft are not directly

bound by

these provisions, their obliga-

tion of "due regard" for the safety of civil aircraft generally includes an obligation not to interfere with these systems.

The United

States

is

currently engaged in negotiations in

ICAO

concerning

the role to be played by the Global Positioning System in future navigation sys-

tems for international

civil aviation.

In particular, an

accommodation must be

reached between ICAO's interest in ensuring that navigation services
to the safety

of international

civil

essential

aviation are not interrupted during an
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and the military imperative for the United

conflict,

States to

be able to deny the

use of GPS to a military adversary. Similar issues are certain to arise in the future
in

which information operations

of international

activities

may create implications for the safety

civil aviation.

The Chicago Convention

among

rare

is

multilateral treaties in that

it

has a

armed conflict. Article 89
provides, "In case of war, the provisions of this Convention shall not affect the
freedom of action of any of the contracting States affected, whether as
belligerents or as neutrals. The same principle shall apply in the case of any contracting State which declares a state of national emergency and notifies the fact to
concerning

specific provision

the Council."

broadly

as its

its

application during

Upon reflection, however, this provision is unlikely be applied as

language indicates.

vention are inconsistent with a

It

many provisions of the Conof armed conflict. The most obvious is the

seems clear that

state

principle that aircraft not engaged in scheduled airline service have the right to
free passage into or

through the airspace of other

not appear to be incompatible with a
parties.

parties

state

For example, the existence of a
should not be regarded

out their combatant

activities

as

Other provisions do

among some of the
of armed conflict among certain

of armed conflict

state

suspending the belligerents' obligation to carry

with due regard for the safety of civil aviation. Ac-

cordingly, Article 89 does not provide

much help in deciding what provisions of

the Convention will remain applicable during an
still

parties.

armed

conflict,

and

resort will

be required to the general principle that only those obligations that are in-

compatible with a

state

of armed conflict will be suspended, and only

among the

belligerents.

E. Treaties

on Diplomatic Relations.

The United States is a party to
tions, a

the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rela-

widely adhered to treaty establishing obligations

among

its

cerning the treatment of diplomatic personnel and premises.

parties

con-

Among

the

protections afforded a party's diplomatic mission in the territory of another state
are the right to inviolability

chives and

dence,

documents"

of the premises of the mission (Article

(Article 24); the private residences, papers, correspon-

and property of diplomatic agents

communications

2); its "ar-

(Article 27).

The

(Article

30);

and diplomatic

treaty further provides that the mission

may

communicate with its government and other missions and consulates of its government by "all appropriate means, including diplomatic couriers and messages
in code or cipher. However, the mission may install and use a wireless transmitter

only with the consent of the receiving State." Conversely, the treaty imposes
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certain duties

on diplomatic

missions. Article 41 provides that personnel of the

mission must respect the laws and regulations of the receiving

must not

and

interfere in the receiving state's internal affairs,

they

state, that

that the "premises

of the mission must not be used in any manner incompatible with the functions
of the mission

as laid

eral international

down in the present Convention or by other rules

law or by any

special

agreements in force between the sending

and the receiving State." Article 45 provides

that the duties

of the receiving state

continue in force even in the case of armed conflict between the

parties,

diplomatic relations are broken off between them, even though the

mission

is

recalled.

of gen-

staff

or

if

of the

Planning for any information operations activity that in-

volves diplomatic premises, persons, archives, documents, or communications,
either as an instrument or as a target of the operation,

must take into account

these international legal obligations.

F. Treaties of Friendship,

The United

States

Commerce, and Navigation.

a party to a large

is

number of bilateral agreements with

other nations providing reciprocal arrangements for expedited tourism, trade,

and transportation between the
and their provisions
cific

provisions

differ

parties.

These agreements have various

somewhat. Most such agreements do not contain spe-

on telecommunications, and they

type of agreements that are likely to be regarded

constitute perhaps the arche-

as

suspended during an armed

conflict because their provisions expediting free travel
parties are incompatible

with

hostilities

and trade between the

between them. Nevertheless, planning

for information operations, especially in peacetime, should include a
all

significant international

nation that

may be

titles,

review of

agreements between the United States and any other

affected.

G. Status of Forces and Stationing Agreements.

When the military forces of one nation are present in the territory of another
nation with

its

consent,

it is

customary for the nations involved to execute writ-

ten agreements establishing the rights and obligations of the parties concerning
the visiting forces. "Stationing agreements" establish the consent of the host nation to the presence of foreign troops; set agreed limits

on

their

numbers, equip-

These topics may also be
dealt with in a "defense cooperation agreement" or some other agreement providing for the overall defense relationship between the parties. It is also common
ment, and

activities;

and identify facilities for

for the parties to execute a "status

their use.

of forces" agreement (SOFA) that addresses
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the allocation of various kinds of legal jurisdiction over the visiting forces.
best

known of these

agreements

the 1951 Agreement Between the Parties

is

North Atlantic Treaty Regarding

the Status of Their Forces

end of 1998 the United

was

States

the general pattern of the

a party to

NATO

The
to the

(NATO SOFA). As of the

103 SOFAs, most of which follow

SOFA. SOFAs

of an

are necessary because

overlap of legal jurisdiction exercised by the sending and receiving

receiving state has jurisdiction over persons and activities in

states.

territory,

its

The

while

the sending state has both the right and the duty to exercise control over

armed

forces,

Since the

which

clearly a core sovereign function.

concurrent exercise of the normal jurisdiction of the sending

full

and receiving

is

its

states

is

impractical, status of forces agreements allocate criminal

and civil court jurisdiction between the sending and receiving states, and also ex-

empt the visiting force and its members from certain taxes, customs fees and procedures, immigration formalities, and most host nation licensing and inspection
requirements. Typically, an administrative claims procedure
personal injuries and property

damage caused by the

is

established for

visiting force.

Another

common provision requires that the visiting force and its members "respect" the
host nation's laws. (This requirement will be discussed in detail in the next section of this paper).

by

separate,

more

The NATO SOFA is implemented in most NATO
detailed, bilateral

countries

supplementary agreements, and by numer-

ous other bilateral agreements on specific subjects including communications.

These agreements contain provisions

that

must be taken into account

if U.S.

military forces intend to engage in information operations activities while pres-

ent in the territory of the receiving

•

For example,

state.

many such agreements require

that the

United

States notify the

host nation of any significant change in the capabilities or uses of installations

made

available for the use

of U.S. military

conduct information operations

must be made

activities

forces. If U.S. authorities intend to

from such

determina-

installations, a

whether the relevant agreements require notifying the
host nation, and perhaps even requesting its consent.
tion

•

as to

Stationing agreements often provide that the visiting U.S. forces

and use various communications equipment, but they often provide

may
as

install

well that

such equipment must not interfere with host nation communications systems

must be used

and

that

this

equipment

it

is

to

in accordance with host nation laws

be used for information operations

termined whether the contemplated

activities

obligations.
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and regulations.

activities,
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consistent

If

must be dewith these
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•

Many

Issues

stationing agreements authorize or even obligate the visiting force to

use the receiving

state's military

and

civilian

communications systems.

Com-

monly, there are obligations that any U.S. use of host nation communications
systems must not cause interference and that such use must be in accordance

with host nation laws and regulations. The potential for information operations
to cause interference with the host nation's
sible application

communications system and the pos-

of host nation laws and regulations must be carefully consid-

ered, along with the fact that the

conduct of offensive information operations

countermeasures and

acts

of self-defense in

gitimate military targets during an

armed

Finally, if a host nation discovers that

without

its

knowledge

as a

its

may

them to possible
peacetime, and may make them le-

through host nation communications systems

subject

conflict.

territory

and facilities have been used

base for U.S. information operations of a nature that

may tend to involve it against its will in a conflict or dispute, U.S. diplomatic and
military relationships with the host nation are likely to suffer. The host nation
between using
an ally's territory to launch air strikes and using it to launch computer network
attacks or other information operations activities. As a practical matter, computer network attacks are much more difficult to identify, trace, and attribute.
However, it will not always be impossible to do so, particularly when information on such attacks is available from intelligence sources. Accordingly, decisions concerning whether to conduct information operations from the territory
of an ally, and especially whether to do so without the host nation's knowledge
could well take the view that in principle there

and consent, must be made

at

is little

difference

senior policy levels.

H. U.S. ^Soviet Dangerous Military
During the Cold War there were

Activities

Agreement.

number of incidents

which U.S. and
Soviet forces followed each other closely in international waters and airspace, especially during military exercises, and sometimes physically interfered with each
other's operations. Lest these incidents inadvertently escalate into an armed confrontation, on June 11, 1988 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Soviet Chief of General Staff issued a joint statement in which they declared
their intent to avoid

and on July
ment on

11,

a

dangerous military

1988 the United

States

activities in the vicinity

of each other,

and the Soviet Union signed the Agree-

the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities. In

of that agreement, the parties agreed

in

that,

when

Section 1(d) of Article

II

operating in proximity to per-

sonnel and equipment of the armed forces of the other party during peacetime,
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they will not interfere "with

command and control networks in a manner which

could cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the armed forces of
the other Party."

with

Article

command and

limit the operation

I,

Section 9 of the agreement defines "interference

control networks"

of the

signals

as

"actions that hamper, interrupt or

and information transmission means and

sys-

tems providing for the control of personnel and equipment of the armed forces

of a Party." The United States has recognized the Russian Federation
cessor state to the Soviet

has not

stances in

suc-

Union for purposes of this agreement. The question of

succession under this agreement

Union

as a

by other nations

that

were

part of the Soviet

been authoritatively addressed. In the rather narrow circum-

which

this

agreement

applies,

it

obligation.
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remains a binding international legal
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LAWS

A. Introduction.

Laws enacted by other nations may have important implications for information operations activities conducted by U.S. military forces. U.S. criminal statutes addressing computer-related offenses, space activities, communications,

and the protection of classified information all raise important issues for information operations. Similarly, foreign laws affecting U.S. information operations
activities will

The

most

likely also consist

of criminal

sophistication of foreign domestic law

enormously, and

it

will continue to

do

statutes.

on high-tech

activities varies

so for the foreseeable future.

technologically advanced countries tend to be

The more

more aware of the dangers

cre-

ated by computer hackers and other high-tech criminals, so they typically take
the lead in putting legislation into place to criminalize such behavior.

It is

no

ac-

cident that the Justice Department's international program to promote appro-

mutual

priate changes to

legal assistance treaties

and other nations' domestic

VI of this paper, concentrated first on the
G8 countries and the Council of Europe. There are other important variables at
which was discussed

laws,

work

in Section

besides technological advancement, however, including each nation's

public opinion and policy positions concerning high-tech offenses, especially

computer hacking. There
States,

who

regard hackers

well-established minority

connected to

are persons in every country, including the

it

as

view

essentially

harmless pranksters. There

that the Internet

and

all

even advanced

imposing regulations on personal conduct on

The argument

that hackers provide valuable assistance to the operators

computer systems they

attack,

by revealing

have been exploited by

sinister

persons with malicious motives.

tional scene, there

is

tions, especially the

vulnerabilities that otherwise

the additional factor that

their fellow citizens succeed in pulling the

ies

a

the computer systems

the Internet are repressive violations of the hackers' civil liberties.

As

is

should be free game, and that defeating attempts to gain unre-

stricted access to these resources or

is

United

United

a result, the state

of the

might

On the interna-

many individuals love to see one of

tail

of richer and more powerful na-

States.

of domestic laws dealing with high-tech misconduct var-

enormously from country

to country. This has important implications for

U.S. information operations for two basic reasons:

(1)

The state of a nation's do-

mestic criminal law directly impacts the assistance that the nation's public officials

can provide in suppressing certain behavior by persons operating in

territory;

and

(2)

The

state

of

a nation's
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domestic criminal law

may have

its

a
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on U.S. information operations conducted in the nation's territory or involving communications routed through the nation's communications
significant effect

systems.

B. Cooperation in Investigations and Prosecutions.

It

should be readily apparent that law enforcement

an individual for conduct that
law.

may be

It

less

not defined

is

as a

officials

cannot prosecute

crime in the applicable criminal

obvious, but equally important, that in most constitutional

governments law enforcement

officials

may

not use their authority to conduct

criminal investigations unless the alleged conduct constitutes a crime. If a hacker
in

Country X

uses the Internet to gain access to a

DoD computer in the Penta-

gon, copies sensitive data, deletes or corrupts data, and
the law enforcement officials of Country
that

malicious logic,

installs

X may be able to assist in investigating

conduct and may be able to extradite the offender to the United

States only

more of the hacker's actions constitute a crime under that nation's law.
Even where such legislation exists, the legal system may still not be able to proif one

or

vide either extradition or meaningful criminal punishment,
case

of a young Israeli hacker given

he participated in

a series

a

as

suspended sentence by an

of unlawful intrusions into

occurred in the

Israeli

court after

DoD computer systems in

early 1998.

The domestic laws of some nations may also permit the use of devices specifically

designed to frustrate attempts to trace Internet communications to their

source. Since geography

is

essentially irrelevant to

communications on the

anonymous remailers, which strip off all information
about the originator of a message, make it possible for a hacker located anywhere
even in the United States or other country to avoid identification by routing his or her message through the anonymous remailer. In this way, weaknesses
Internet, devices such as

—

—

in the domestic

The weakest

law of one

state

may provide impunity

link therefore threatens

to hackers everywhere.

law enforcement even in countries with

robust and sophisticated laws. Accordingly, the imperative to bring domestic

laws in every nation up to a reasonable standard should be readily apparent.

C. Effect of Foreign Domestic

Law on Actions

of U.S. Information

Operators.

If a

CINC or a JTF commander decides to order execution of a certain infor-

mation operations
ployed

activity

by

forces

in a foreign country, the

under

his

or her

commander may have
513

command who
to consider

are de-

whether or
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not such activity

two

is

prohibited under local law.

different levels

of analysis:

(1)

The answer may be important at

The individuals who issue or execute such an

order might be subject to prosecution in a host nation criminal court; and

The commander might

on

feel obligated

a policy basis to refrain

from

(2)

issuing

such an order.
U.S. military

If a

her

his or

member
court.

member issued an order or performed an act in the course of

official duties

overseas that was a crime under host nation law, the

could very well be subject to prosecution in

Under many SOFAs, an act done in the course of a military member's ofwithin the primary right to exercise jurisdiction of the sending

ficial

duties

state,

but that rule applies only

falls

when

the conduct constitutes an offense under

the law of both nations, or only under U.S. law.
stitutes

Where the conduct alleged con-

an offense only under the law of the host nation, the host nation has ex-

clusive jurisdiction to prosecute.

position that

it

would be

The United

States has consistently taken the

intolerable for a U.S. military

prosecuted for performing an act that
the

a host nation criminal

is

legal

member to be criminally

under applicable U.S. law, such

Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and which he or she was

structed to perform in the execution of an official duty.

cently in connection with the adoption

domestic laws making

There

is

no

it

a

similar crime

by

several

as

in-

A similar issue arose re-

NATO member nations of

crime to possess anti-personnel land mines (APLs).

under the

UCMJ.

In several cases, the nations con-

cerned have agreed to permit the U.S. forces to retain their APL stockpiles in the
host nation's territory for at least
cific

some period of time.

In these cases, either spe-

exemptions from the host nation law or agreed screening procedures for

prosecutions have had to be devised to prevent prosecutions of U.S. military

members

for

performing their

official duties.

In practice, such prosecutions are most unlikely because if U.S. military authorities

become aware

within the territory of
within

its

that

performance of certain information operations

a specific host nation, or that

territory, will subject military

produce harmful

effects

personnel to possible host nation crimi-

nal prosecution, those U.S. military authorities are

most unlikely

to order that

The result will be that U.S. forces are unable to
conduct certain activities they would otherwise conduct, or perhaps they will
have to use forces elsewhere to conduct the operation. The issue thus becomes
such operations be conducted.

not so

much one

members but

of the prospect of criminal prosecution of individual service

rather of a limitation

on the conduct of U.S. information

operations.

This consideration

—

may be not only a policy issue

it

may involve binding legal

obligations under a status of forces or similar agreement. For example, Article
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of
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the

NATO SOFA provides, "It

is

and the members thereof as well
ceiving State

United

.

States

.

.

is

."

the duty of a force and

as their

its

component

dependents to respect the law of the re-

Similar language appears in most other

a party.

civilian

SOFAs to which the

Considerable practice has accumulated concerning the

application of this obligation to "respect" the law of the receiving state.

It

has of-

"comterm "respect." The

ten been argued that the drafters could have said the visiting force must
ply" with host nation law but instead chose the

product of almost

wide appears

to

fifty

less definite

years of U.S. practice in

be that U.S.

implementing SOFAs world-

visiting forces will generally observe the content

of

exempt from the law's procedural requirements such as
and reporting. If U.S. visiting forces seek to avoid the ap-

host nation law, but are
licensing, inspection,

plication of the substance of a foreign law, they generally request the host nation
to grant

them

a specific

particular host nation
If a

exemption or

at least to

reach an understanding that a

law will not be enforced against the

visiting forces.

contemplated information operation activity appears to conflict with host

nation law, the
officials in

an

commander concerned might choose to consult with host nation

effort to resolve the issue. If time or

permit such consultations, the

commander should

other circumstances do not
carefully consider

whether

the activities in question should be conducted by forces outside the territory of
the host nation concerned, and in a
that nation's

manner that would not make use of or affect

communications systems. U.S. military and diplomatic authorities

should be able to manage host nation legal issues
carefully consider the available courses

if

of action.
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we identify them early on and
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VIII.

IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW

A brief review of the treatment of espionage under international law may be
instructive in predicting

how

mation operations, especially
capabilities

community will react to informission areas in which the same technical

the international

in those

may be used for both espionage and information operations, and also

in other areas

where reasonably persuasive

analogies present themselves.

A. Espionage under International Law.
For our present purposes, espionage

may be

of intelligence about other nations. Espionage

defined
a

is

as

the covert collection

much narrower

topic than

much of which is collected via open source information, voluntary exchanges of information among nations, and technical means such as satel"intelligence,"

lite

imagery and

signals intelligence that are generally

accepted

as legal

by the

community. Roughly stated, covert methods of collecting intelligence are in most cases designed to go undetected by their target, and if detected
international

they are designed to be unattributable to the sponsoring

state.

Nevertheless, dis-

covery, attribution, and public disclosure occur fairly often.

B. Espionage during

Armed

Conflict.

The treatment of spies during armed

A

war.

"spy"

destinely or

is

defined in the law of war

under

the area controlled
hostile party.

ship

is

lines.

false pretenses,

by

Only

status or

as

well established in the law of

is

any person who,

when

acting clan-

obtains or endeavors to obtain information in

a belligerent,

with the intention of communicating

any

spies,
a

even

if

they engage in collecting intelligence behind

while wearing an

issue

enemy

person gathering intelligence while relying on protected civilian

enemy uniform is considered to be a spy under the law
not

will

of spying under the law of war unless they involve the presence of

individuals inside enemy-controlled territory

who

information with the intent of communicating

wearing

to a

wearing their own uniforms are not consid-

of war. Accordingly, information operations during an armed conflict
raise

it

A spy may be a military member or a civilian, and his or her citizen-

irrelevant. Military personnel

ered to be

conflict

civilian clothing or

enemy

uniforms.

it

It

(1) are

engaged

in collecting

to a hostile party,

and

(2) are

seems highly unlikely that the

notions of "electronic presence" or "virtual presence" will ever find their
into the law of war concept of spying, for
physically behind

enemy

lines

he or she
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two
is

reasons: (1) If an individual

way

is

not

not subject to capture during the

.
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mission; and

(2)

There

will

be no

issue

of acting under false pretenses by abusing

protected civilian status or by wearing the enemy's uniform. This will exclude

most information operations

activities

from being considered espionage

in

war-

time. Nevertheless, behind-the-lines missions to collect information, or to install

devices that enable the collection of information,

spying

may

well raise wartime

issues.

If caught in

enemy territory,

a spy

can be punished,

after

an appropriate

trial,

under the domestic law of the captor. The punishment can include the death
penalty.

The

nation on

whose behalf the spy was

acting,

however,

will not

considered to have violated any international legal obligation. In addition,
dividuals

who may

missions (that

is,

be

if in-

have engaged in espionage but successfully complete their

they have returned to friendly

lines)

tured while not engaged in acts of spying, they

and subsequently

may not be punished

are cap-

for their

previous acts of espionage.

C. Espionage in Peacetime.
Unlike the relatively well developed treatment of espionage under the law of
war, there
tional
als

is

very

little

authority

on

the treatment of espionage under interna-

law in peacetime. There have of course been many domestic criminal

of peacetime

spies in

contrast, there has

many

countries, including the

been almost no

activity

United

States.

tri-

By

concerning peacetime espionage

within the international legal system except for public complaints and the expulsion of implicated diplomats. This

may be because the primary harm done to the

victim nation consists of the fact that certain secret information has been

promised, which

jured

citizens,

is

a

more

abstract

and indirect type of injury than dead or in-

property damage, or invasions of territory.

international legal sanctions for peacetime espionage
plicit application

com-

The

may also

lack of strong

constitute an

im-

of the international law doctrine called "tu quoque" (roughly,

nation has no standing to complain about a practice in which

it

itself

a

engages)

Whatever the reasons, the international legal system generally imposes no sanctions upon nations for acts of espionage except for the political costs of public
denunciation, which don't seem very onerous.

The consequences
ous.
tute

for individuals caught spying,

however, can be very

seri-

Such individuals can be tried for whatever crimes their conduct may constiunder the victim nation's domestic law, whether charged as espionage, as

unlawful entry into
theft, bribery,

computer

its

territory, or as a

common crime such as burglary, murder,

obtaining unauthorized access to state secrets, or unauthorized

intrusions. This fact accounts to
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some extent

for the widespread

An Assessment of International

Legal Issues

practice of assigning intelligence operatives to embassy staff positions in

which

The only remedy for an offended host nation is to declare such persons to be persona non grata, which obligates the sending nation to remove them from the country.
The treatment of espionage under international law may help us make an
educated guess as to how the international community will react to information
they enjoy diplomatic immunity from prosecution.

operations activities. As discussed in Section

III

of this paper on the use of force,

depend on the

international reaction

is

activity. If lives are lost

and property is destroyed as

tivity

may

very well be treated

breach of the perceived
that the

likely to

as a

reliability

practical
a direct

consequences of the
consequence, the ac-

use of force. If the activity results only in a

of an information system,

seems unlikely

much exercised. In short, information operaare likely to be regarded much as is espionage
not a major issue

world community will be

tions activities

it

—

unless significant practical consequences can be demonstrated.

That leaves the
tor

issue

of the possible criminal liability of an information opera-

who may later come

into the custody of a nation that has

an operation in which he or she has engaged. As with
theoretical reason

been the victim of

a spy, there

a practical matter,

however, the prob-

lems of detection and attribution of information operations

activities at the

individual engaged in a certain information operations activity

Finally,

it

na-

of being able to prove in court that an

tional level are daunting; the likelihood

—seems

no evident

why such an individual could not be prosecuted for violation

of the victim nation's criminal laws. As

possible

is

—while not im-

small.

deserves mention that there

is

an established division of labor

within the U.S. government between the intelligence community and the uni-

formed

military forces concerning "covert action." Generally speaking, the in-

telligence

community conducts covert

action operations in peacetime that do

not consist of traditional military

activities. It

tion operations activities will

within

fall

remains to be seen

this division

how informa-

of labor, especially

when

they are associated with military operations other than war.

D. Assessment.
Information operations

activities are unlikely to fall

spying in wartime, although
tion operations
to

fall

may

a

within the definition of

limited category of activities related to informa-

so qualify. Information operations activities are

more

likely

within the category of peacetime espionage. Perhaps more importantly,

the reaction of the world

community

to information operations that
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do not
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generate widespread dramatic consequences
action to espionage,

which

has traditionally

519

is

likely to

been

be very similar to

tepid.

its re-
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IX.

As soon

as

Legal Issues

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT
"INFORMATION WARFARE"

the concept of "information warfare" began to receive broad press

would prohibit or restrict
in 1995 said simply, "The

coverage, discussion began of negotiating a treaty that
it.

A draft treaty text that circulated on the

Parties to this

Convention agree not

Internet

to engage in information warfare against

The first public governmental initiative was a resolution tabled by
Russia in the UN's First Committee in October 1998 that apparently reflected a
serious effort to get the UN to focus on the subject. The Russian resolution ineach other."

cluded

a call for states to report their

views regarding the "advisability of elabo-

rating international legal regimes to

ban the development, production and use of

particularly dangerous information

weapons." The United

position that

it is

premature

States has taken the

point to discuss negotiating an international

at this

agreement on information warfare, and that the energies of the international

community would be better spent on topics of immediate concern such as helping each other to secure information systems against criminals and
far there has

been

little

support expressed for the Russian

So

terrorists.

initiative.

There are both similarities and differences between the concept of a treaty to
ban or restrict information warfare and similar efforts to prohibit "weaponization of space."
nificant

new

One similarity is the political reality that nations lacking a sig-

military capability that they perceive will be

wealthy and powerful
that capability.

states

have

a strong incentive to agree to

There may be an even greater incentive

with information systems, which

dominated by

all

nations possess to

ban or

a

few

restrict

to prevent interference

some

degree, than with

which only 30 nations are currently active and which are dominated by the United States, Russia, and the European Space Agency. On the
space systems, in

other hand, the

veloping their
fingers

number of nations

own

that

have any reasonable expectation of de-

space control systems anytime soon can be counted

of one hand, while anyone with

a

on

the

desk-top computer and an Internet

wide variety of important information targets worldwide. Accordingly, as nations appraise where
their long-term national interests lie, the calculus is quite different as between
connection thereby has access both to hacker tools and to

a

international legal restriction of the "weaponization of space"
trol

of information warfare. With space systems, most

either an attacker or a defender in the near future.
states

states

and

similar

do not expect

With information

conto

be

systems,

all

can reasonably expect to be both.

As with space control, the United
policy decisions about

where

its

States has

long-term
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interests lie in

connection with the
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possible international legal restriction of information operations.

hand, there

is

On

the one

an obvious military interest in being able to interfere with an ad-

versary's information systems,

and in being able

to protect one's

own. Used as an

instrument of military power, information operations capabilities have the sig-

damage and friendly losses
of personnel and equipment. Their use may avoid unwanted escalation of a disnificant advantage that they

pute or conflict.

They

minimize both

are relatively cheap

forward basing, deployment, and

and

logistical

collateral

and require

much

less

in the

way of

support than do traditional weapons

their delivery platforms.

On the

other hand,

as

the nation that relies most heavily

mation systems, the United

on advanced

infor-

States has the greatest vulnerability to attack. This

concern would seem to drive U.S. policymakers to consider the merits of inter-

on information operations. If we could negotiate an effecban on certain types of information operations activities,

national restrictions
tive international

might signing such

The

our long-term national

a treaty best serve

subject of information operations

is

of course

interests?

much more complex than

many more information systems subject
to attack, so many more ways of attacking them, so many more potential players,
plus constant rapid changes in the relevant systems and technologies. As we have
that

of space control, since there are so

learned in our internal U.S. policy deliberations, there are great difficulties in

even agreeing on definitions of what ought to be included in discussions of "information warfare" and "information operations."

seems unlikely that there will be
an international

agreement

In these circumstances,

it

much enthusiasm anytime soon for negotiating

that

would

operations.
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significantly

restrict

information
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OBSERVATIONS

X.

There seems to be little likelihood that the international legal system will soon

body of "information operations" law. The most useful approach to the international legal issues raised by information operations activities
generate a coherent

will continue to
ticular

planned

be to break out the separate elements and circumstances of par-

activities

and then

to

make an informed judgment as

isting international legal principles are likely to apply to

such

as

to

how ex-

them. In some

areas,

the law of war, existing legal principles can be applied with considerable

confidence. In other areas, such the application of use of force principles to

much less

where the international community will come out, and the result will probably depend more on the perceived equities of the situations in which the issues first arise in practice than on
legal analysis. The growth of international law in these areas will be greatly influenced by what decision-makers say and do at those critical moments.
There seems to be no particularly good reason for the United States to support negotiations for new treaty obligations in most of the areas of international
adopting an "active defense,"

law
is

it is

clear

that are directly relevant to information operations.

international criminal cooperation,

mutual

legal assistance

The principal exception

where current U.S.

efforts to

and extradition agreements should continue

strong emphasis. Another idea that might prove fruitful

is

suppress "information terrorism," but there seems to be

improve

to receive

to negotiate a treaty to

little

concept

at

present

how such an agreement would operate or how it would reliably contribute value
to information assurance

and

critical infrastructure protection.

no "show-stoppers" in international law for information operations as now contemplated in the Department of Defense. There are, however,
many areas where legal uncertainties create significant risks, most of which can
be considerably reduced by prudent planning. Since so many of these potential
issues are relatively novel, and since the actions taken and public positions announced by nations will strongly influence the development of international law
There

are

in this area, the

involvement of high-level policy

cuting information operations

with more traditional military

is

officials in

planning and exe-

much more important at present than is the case

activities.

522

Appendix

XL NOTES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
I.

INTRODUCTION

There are many textbooks and casebooks that provide general surveys of international law. Some of the more recent of these are:
Ian Brownlie,

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW

Barry E. Carter

& Phillip R.

Trimble,

Stephen Dycus, Arthur L. Berney

Security Law (2nd
Louis

Henkin,

INTERNATIONAL LAW

&

William C. Banks,

1 990)

(1991)

NATIONAL

ed. 1997)

Richard

C.

Pugh,

Oscar

Schachter

International Law: Cases and Materials
John Norton Moore, Frederick

Security Law

(4th ed.

S.

Tipson

&

Hans

Smit,

(3rd ed. 1993)

& Robert F.

Turner,

NATIONAL

(1990)

Malcolm N. Shaw, INTERNATIONAL

LAW

(4th ed. 1997)

Useful collections of materials on U.S. practice concerning international legal issues include:

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States (1986)
Hackworth, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 Volumes (1940-1943)

Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 15 Volumes (1963-1973)
Contemporary
feature in

Practice of the

United States Relating

to

International

Law,

a regular

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW;

and

International Legal Materials; both of which are publications of the
American Society of International Law. (Web site at vvrww.asil.org)
The United Nations Charter has been widely reprinted.
Stat. 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153.
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It

can also be found

at
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The

THE

COMMON LAW

treaty obligations can

be found in the

Holmes

quotation from Chief Justice

Legal Issues

appears in

(1881).

Discussions of the effect of

war on

following:

Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, Vol. I 218-222 (1986)
Whiteman, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Vol. 14 490-510 (1970)
B.

Lester

Orfield

&

Edward D. Re, CASES AND MATERIALS

INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-78
Ian Brownlie,

ON

(1955)

PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL

LAW

616-617

(1990)

There have been

relatively

few books and

articles

published to date addressing

international legal issues in information operations.

M.E. Bowman*

FORDHAM

Is

International

Law Ready

Among

these are:

for the Information

Age? 19

INT'L. L.J. 1935 (1996)

Goodman & Kevin J. Soo Hoo, OLD
Law for a New World? The Applicability of International Law
TO INFORMATION WARFARE (1997). Published as a monograph by the InLawrence T. Greenberg, Seymour

stitute for International Studies,

1998 by the
versity,

the

Institute for
latter

E.

Stanford University, and in revised form in

National Strategic Studies, National Defense Uni-

under

the

title

INFORMATION WARFARE AND

International Law
Sean P. Kanuck, Information Wafare:
Law,

HARV.

New

Challenges for Public International

INT'L. L.J. 272 (Winter 1996)

Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and
tional

Law: Thoughts on

a

Normative Framework, 37

the

Use of Force

COLUM. J.

in Interna-

INT'L. L. 885

(1999)

Roger D.

Scott, Legal Aspects of Information Wafare: Military Disruption of Tele-

communications, 45

Naval

L.

Rev. 57
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W Gary

Sharp,

CYBERSPACE AND THE USE OF FORCE

Sr.,

(1999)

THE LAW OF WAR

IL

The views of the U.S.

on law of war matters are summarized in
military publications such as the U.S. Army's Field Manual 27-10, LAW OF
LAND WARFARE (1956); Air Force Pamphlet 110-31, INTERNATIONAL
military services

—

Law The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air Operations
(1976);

and

Naval

Warfare

Publication

1-14M,

THE COMMANDER'S

Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations

(1995). In addition,

Burrus Carnahan has compiled a comprehensive research report on U.S. practice
relating to

tee

of the

customary law of war principles for use by the International Commit-

Red

Cross in

its

ongoing study of worldwide practice

relating to the

customary law of war. Unfortunately, neither Mr. Carnahan's study nor the

DoD Law of War
Working Group chartered by DoD Directive 5100.77, "The DoD Law of War
Program," December 1998, has for several years been composing a DoD LAW
ICRC

study

is

yet available in published form. Finally, the

OF WAR MANUAL. When it is published it will

constitute the

most current and

comprehensive statement of the Department's views on law of war matters.

There
sues,

are also a large

which

number of books and articles commenting on law of war is-

are far too

numerous

to

list

here.

Information on law of war issues that arose during the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict

can be found in Appendix O, "The Role of the
to the

Law of War," in the DoD report

Congress on the conduct of the Persian Gulf War, which

International Legal Materials

is

reprinted in 31

(1992).

The 1907 Hague Convention Respecting

the Rights and Duties of Neutral

Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land is published at 36

Stat.

2310, T.S.

540.

EUTELSAT's

actions during

NATO's

are described in Steven Pearlstein, Serb

INGTON POST, May
The

significance

INMARSAT

is

1999 bombing campaign

TV Gets Notice It's

in

Kosovo

Canceled,

WASH-

23, 1999.

of the

"peaceful

purpose"

discussed in a April 15, 1999 letter

poration's Office of Legal Counsel to
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principle

from the

to

the

new

COMSAT Cor-

Mobile Datacom Corporation.
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III.

Issues

USE OF FORCE

Indicators that the

United States considers the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Re-

lations to constitute

an authoritative statement of international law include

"Statement by Richard H. Ginger, U.S. Alternate Representative to the U.N.
General Assembly,"

DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN 623 (November

1970) and

CommitPRACTICE IN

"Statement by Robert Rosenstock, U.S. Representative to the Sixth
(Legal)"

tee

International Law
The

OF UNITED STATES

DIGEST

Boyd,

in

1977.

statement by the U.S. delegation to the effect that the 1974 "Definition of

Aggression" Resolution does not constitute an authoritative statement of international law

is

reported

at

DEPT OF STATE BULLETIN

The 1994 JCS Standing Rules of Engagement

155 (February 1975).

for U.S. Forces are published as

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01. Some portions of this
publication are classified, but
against "hostile intent"

vised version of the

discussion of the use of force in self-defense

its

unclassified.

is

SROE

At

this

writing in

was nearing publication.

No

November 1999
change

is

a re-

expected in

the principle cited here.

The

Caroline incident

which

is

2 Moore,

A

many texts, one of the most detailed of
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 409-414 (1906).
is

reported in

For an authoritative U.S. statement of the

legal basis for the

1986 bombing of

Libya, see "President's Address to the Nation," April 14, 1986, reprinted in

"U.S. Exercises Right of Self-Defense against Libyan Terrorism,"

State Bulletin

A

1

DEPT OF

(June 1986).

collection of authoritative U.S. statements of the legal basis for the August

1998 cruise missile attacks on

terrorist

camps

in Afghanistan

in Sudan, as well as other relevant materials, can

LAW

161-170 (1999).

The

Corfu Channel case

The Chorzow

is

published

Factory decision

is

at

1949

published
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at

be found

at

and a chemical plant
93

AM. J. OF

INT'L

I.C.J. 4.

1928

P. C.I.J, (ser.

A) No.

17.

9
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The U.S. French
Services

ber

9,

air traffic tribunal

Agreement Between France and

1978,

UNRIAA 417,

decision

is

published

as

the United States, Arbitral

published

at

1986

Award of Decem-

443-446.

The International Court ofjustice decision in Nicaragua v.
is

Case Concerning Air

United States ofAmerica

I.C.J. 14.

A statement by the State Department's Legal Advisor concerning the legal basis
on North Vietnamese forces
Dept of State Bulletin 765 (1970).
for U.S. attacks

Timothy Guiden

in

Cambodia

is

published

at

62

on U.S. operations in CamARIZ. J. INTL & COMP L. 217

has published an extensive article

bodia: Defending America''s Cambodian Incursion,
(1994).

IV:

SPACE LAW

The

treaties cited in this section are

Outer Space Treaty, 18

UST

published

2410;

as follows:

TIAS 6347; 610

UNTS

205

Rescue and Return Agreement, 1 9 UST 7570; TIAS 6599; 672 UNTS
Liability

Convention, 24

UST

Registration Convention, 28

Moon Agreement, U.N.

2389;

UST

TIAS 7762; 961

695;

TIAS 8480; 1023

187

UNTS

15

Doc. A/RES/34, 68 (1979)

Environmental Modification Convention, 31

UNTS

UNTS

1 1

UST

333;

TIAS

9614; 1108

151

Limited Test Ban Treaty, 14

ABM Treaty,

23

UST; TIAS

UST

7503; 944

V.

COMMUNICATIONS LAW

At

this

writing in

1313;

November 1999

TIAS

5433; 480

UNTS

UNTS

13

13

the International Telecommunications

vention of 1982 has not yet been published in the
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UST series, which

is

Con-

the State
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Department's

United
S.

States

official
is

a

compilation of international agreements to which the

party.

This agreement

is

TREATY DOC. No. 99-6. The United States

tion

Issues

probably most accessible in
is

also a party to the Constitu-

and Convention of the International Telecommunications Union of 1992,

which replaces the 1982 agreement as between parties to the 1992 agreement.

The two memorandum opinions of the

Justice Department's Office of Legal

Counsel concerning broadcasting into Haiti

USC

are entitled "Applicability

of 47

Section 502 to Certain Broadcast Activities" (October 15, 1993) and

"Memorandum

for the

Deputy Attorney General"

(July 8, 1994).

The 1884 Convention for Protection of Submarine Cables and associated documents are published at 24 Stat.989, 25 Stat. 1424, TS 380, 1 Bevans 89, 112,114.
The major
United

bilateral

States

is

and regional communications agreements to which the

a party are listed in

TREATIES IN FORCE. Many

others are

unpublished.

VL OTHER TREATIES
Citations to the agreements described in this section can generally be found in

the current
tional

TREATIES IN FORCE. Pursuant to

Agreements," June

11, 1987, a

DoD Directive 5530.3, "Interna-

DoD repository and index of unpublished

international agreements relating to military operations and installations

tained in the Office of the

VII.

Deputy General Counsel

is

main-

(International Affairs).

FOREIGN DOMESTIC LAWS

None.

VIIL

IMPLICATIONS OF ESPIONAGE LAW

None.

INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT "INFORMATION
WARFARE"
IX.

The

effort

stand

by Russia

in the

fall

of 1998 to get the United Nations to take

a

firm

on restricting information warfare produced only a resolution passed by the
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General Assembly on 4 January 1999 entitled "Developments in the

field

of in-

formation and telecommunications in the context of international security,"

which

"calls

upon Member

States to

promote

at multilateral levels

the consider-

ation of existing and potential threats in the field of information security," "invites

all

Member

assessments"

submit

States to

on information

a report to the

inform the Secretary-General of their views and
security issues, "requests the Secretary-General to

General Assembly"

at its

next session, and "decides to in-

clude information security in the provisional agenda for

its

next session." U.N.

Doc. A/RES/53/70 (1999). In August 1999 the Secretary General submitted his
report to the General Assembly. It contained the statements submitted by ten

Member

States (Australia, Belarus, Brunei,

Cuba, Oman, Qatar, Russia, Saudi

Kingdom, and the United States). The Russian statement referred to "information weapons
the use of which
can have devastating
consequences, comparable to the effect of weapons of mass destruction." It proposed that the General Assembly "adopt resolutions on the question of information security with a view to reducing the threat of the use of information for
terrorist, criminal or military purposes," which would help generate "international principles (e.g., a regime, a code of conduct for States) with a view to
Arabia, the United

.

.

.

.

.

.

strengthening international information security," and ultimately to a "multilateral international legal

instrument." Aside from Russia, only Belarus and

Cuba

expressed support for the development of international legal principles in the
field

of information security other than cooperation in suppressing computer

crime and terrorism.

The United

was premature to attempt
formation security, and

States

and the United Kingdom

it

to formulate overarching principles pertaining to in-

that, for the present, international efforts

measures to combat computer crime and terrorism.
tured no opinion on the subject.

X.

stated that

U.N.

DOC.

OBSERVATIONS

None
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